KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - Jewish Philosophy #06
KMTT - Topics in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Shiur #06, by Rav Ezra Bick
KMTT Kimi Tsionte Tsai Tora, Uddvara Shamigushalayim. And this is Ezra Beck, and today is Tuesday – Tech Bishpat. Today's share will be given by myself, the weekly share, the sixth chapter, the sixth share in the series on problems in medieval philosophy. We spoke last week about Hashkaha prate, about divine providence. We were basically going over the 17th chapter in the third section, the third book of the merryne vorim. But the problem defines five different opinions, five different schools of thought concerning Hashkaha. The first one was that there was no Hashkaha, the second one was basically that there is Hashkaha Khaled, General Hashkaha, which he assigned to Aristotle, which means that everything in the world follows certain rules, certain laws, which are themselves expressions of the divine intelligence. But because they're rules, individuals are not included in any particular kind of patterns. The third opinion, now it begins to get interesting, was the opinion that the Dvamam was assigned to the Asharia, to Orthodox Islam, which says that everything that takes place in the world is a direct result of God's will. God's will itself is subject to no other rule other than the autonomy of God's will. The Vamamam ejected this opinion, and then we got to the fourth and the fifth opinion. The fourth opinion is the opinion that the Vamamam assigns to the Mukta de Lea, which is a Radidik's, an Islamic sect, or philosophers, and the fact is that it more or less corresponds to the opinion of Sajigon. And the fifth opinion, the Vamamam calls that Tongatino Akatosha. It's not immediately apparent in the Vamamam what the difference between the fourth and the fifth opinion is. The Vamamam sums up the all five opinions, he has the following statement. He says, "I've given you now five opinions, and this is what you can say." Everything that happens in the world. So he skips the first one, he says, "I've started with, say, it's an accident." The Asharia will say, "It's because of will." The Mukta de Lea will say, "It's because of wisdom," and we will say that it's a result of that which is worthy, that which is appropriate for man, according to his actions, and that's my answer. In other words, he's saying that the fourth opinion says everything is based on God's wisdom, and the fifth opinion says that everything is based on God's justice. And then he gives the difference in terms of what is indeed the most important problem for medieval religious philosophy in general, the palm of evil, and he sums up his father's. He says because of this, the Asharia, it's the third opinion, finds it possible that God will torture the perfectly righteous man in this world and place him eternally, even in the next world, in fire. And the reason will be because they will say that is God's will, Mukta de Lea will say that that is injustice. And therefore, if there is pain in this world, even to an ant, it will be recompensed in the next world. And we say that all these human actions are because of justice, and God will not do any injustice, and he will not punish or cause pain to anyone unless it is appropriate and deserved. What's the difference between the fourth and the fifth opinion? What's the difference between wisdom and justice? Since wisdom includes justice, wisdom for the rambam, as for all medieval philosophers, meaning morality, morality is included in wisdom. Now, the difference is that the rambam mentions is that the fourth opinion thought that there needs to be recompensed for the suffering of animals, and apparently the rambam thinks that's not true, but it's not clear how that follows from the opinions that he's expressed. There is another difference, and that is what the rambam said that according to the fourth opinion, it's possible that God will cause pain undeserved in this world in order to give more reward, more pleasure in the next world. And apparently he thinks it's also impossible, according to the Torah and according to the fifth opinion. So I suspect that the rambam is doing here is that the word hachma, wisdom, includes more than morality. Whatever the justification for this particular maneuver that he mentions, that God would cause pain in this world in order to pay you back with more pleasure in the next, I find it harder to swallow the logic behind that, but in any event, it's not justified by justice. It might be wise, it might be a good idea if it really works, but it's not justified by justice. The rambam should be rejected out of hand because the rambam is opinion that everything is justice leads obviously to the pamma of evil, to why is it that it appears to us that there isn't justice in the world, whereas most, or many of the answers to the pamma of evil, as we will see when we will discuss it, try to cast a wider net, a wider range of options which are justifiable for God to pursue, even though they are not expressing strict justice. One of which might be that opinion which he ascribes to Muktazaria of cause and pain in this world in order to pay back more pleasure in the next. I'm not saying that's the only option, it's not an option which is pursued by the later Jewish philosophers, it just really seems to be very strange, but nonetheless, that's an example, but the rambam really limits all possibilities. The only thing which explains God's actions in the world, which explains what happens to people, is that God is paying reward to the righteous and dispensing punishment to the unjust. I would like to at this point immediately, before we get to the rambam's own addition to the fifth opinion, the rambam says the fifth opinion is the opinion of all adherents of Torah, but I have a certain addition that I'd like to make. To get to that, I'd like to immediately compare the rambam's insistence on justice as the hallmark of divine parvings, with the opinion of Rastai Kresskas, who is the main other opinion in later Jewish philosophy, discussing the problem of parvings. Whoever the rambam says justice, or even chochmah, as we said, it's not like a very different word between them, but Rastai Kresskas says love, ahava. God's providence in the world is indeed individual, and it covers every single human being, and the guiding light, the motivation, for what happens to a person by the hands of God, is God's love of man. Now, what does God's love of man direct it to, but Rastai Kresskas says, yes, it's designed to give to man good things, with the ultimate good thing that God can give to man is to allow him to be close to God, to give him basically of himself, to give a person they could, cleaving on to, on to God. It includes other good things, includes food, and happiness, et cetera, but the ultimate good thing which motivates God's actions in the world is to bring man closer to God. Now, the difference between Rastai and the Ramam is immediately apparent in one very, very important point. There will be other differences, specifically, again, what we discussed in the panel of evil, which as the Ramam mighty points out, is the immediate ramification of theories of Hashekapatit, but there is a more basic distinction here. The Ramam's picture of the God as being judge makes God basically into being reactive. God will not interfere in the world unless justice demands it. So, if a person has done nothing, nothing wrong, nothing good, I don't know how common that could be, but if a person has done nothing, then nothing will happen to him either. Whereas, Rastai's picture of God, not as a judge of the world, but as one who is giving to the world, and I will add immediately, we'll discuss this again another time, that according to Rastai, the very existence of the world is a continual giving of God to the world because of God's love to the world. So, God is one, infinitely active, and two, relative to man, he's proactive. If you're sitting and doing nothing, for some reason or another, then God is thinking how to bring you closer to him, how to cause you to react or to do something, or to change, or to grow in such a way that you will become closer to God. Now, I think this is a basic difference in Medieval philosophy in terms of the relationship between man and God. It might have been apparent from the thought of my voice that indeed, I am more sympathetic to the opinion of Rastai Kraskas, but if I did let that out, I'm sorry, because there is a tremendous advantage, possible advantage to Ramam's opinion as well. It comes down to a very, very basic question, which is not usually expressed explicitly in the Medieval philosophers. There's a basic problem in religious philosophy, to the extent that God is more active than man is less active. A totally religious view, I say religious view in the sense that one is fixated on God's power, God's might, God's wisdom, and God's will will tend to diminish the role and the value of man. That's why in general, the history of philosophy and history of human thought, there's a tendency to oppose humanism to theism. Does man create endo or does God create endo? And I think the Ramam may very well have been sensitive to that point. The Ramam does create a system where man's faith is in his own hands. Of course, there is a price to pay. If you choose to do evil, you'll be punished. If you choose to do the right and to be wise, then you will achieve a great good, the goal of man, you will achieve knowing God. But what happens at any given point is really your choice to make, and it does indeed place a tremendous responsibility on man. A position like of Christ Christ Christ, and we'll just see this more when we discuss it more, would on first glance have the tendency of robbing man of his autonomy. I don't think that conclusion is necessary, but nonetheless, at first glance, everything that happens to me is God pulling strings. God is making me a better person. If you take a simple example, say of a classroom, if you have a teacher who sits back, he gives out perhaps assignments, or he tells you where the books can be found, sends you to the library, tells you to come back in a few months, and they'll give you a grade on the basis of what you've done. Or you can have a teacher, an educator, or we call a machanek rather than a moré in Hebrew, who's constantly viewing each student, and giving some punishments, and giving some encouragement, and giving each one an individual assignment, and if you don't do it, so he checks up when you're going to cause your mother, and he's plotting you, or pushing you in multiple directions, because he's trying to get the max amount of each student. Now, like myself, our sympathies might well be with the second kind of teacher, but we all know that there is a certain value that will be achieved by the first teacher, which might be missed by the second teacher, because the second teacher didn't let the students actually develop themselves. He was pushing and pulling them all the time. So obviously, on a philosophic level, one can add that point to a Christi's picture, part of God's. Providence is letting you do things on your own, because it's better for you. But I'm not actually coming to say, what does each person hold? I'm saying that there is a motivation here, which I think is present in the Bible, although he does not say so explicitly, to really have God only react, but we create our world. And for a Christi, it's quite clear that he's insistent on saying that God creates our world, and God is responsible, to some extent at least, for what we are and what we will become. He is indeed constantly concerned, and constantly acting in a manner to have us turn out the way he wants, to have us come closer to him, and to be better people, and to ultimately achieve our love of God, and our cleaving, I would very good with God. These two, I'm speaking now more of a picture rather than a philosophy. God is being infinitely active, or God as being a referee, for a world where we are active is a very, very basic cleavage in Jewish philosophy, I think in the evil philosophy, and I think in any religious philosophy. And of course, it will relate to the palm of evil, do we expect God to constantly make sure that nothing bad happens, including not letting people do things, or are we eventually responsible for our fate, and therefore have to both suffer and benefit from that which we have done. This will become even more apparent when we speak about the goal of human existence. But I'll mention it right now, because the Ramen will immediately connect Ashkhar Patit to his view of the goal of human existence, which is knowledge of God. Knowledge of God for the Ramen is achieved by an action of man. If you make the effort, and you think, you will know God. What is God's role in that? He's available. He's the object of our knowledge. So I can know something about a tree by looking at the tree. The tree has evolved it. The tree, in fact, is the cause of my knowledge of the tree, but it's not doing anything. And you can know God by contemplating God. In rifhasa crescas, the goal of human existence is the love of God, and the love of God is intimately woven and interwoven with the love of God, God's love of man. We love God, and God loves us. It's the same thing. And, in fact, our love of God is instigated, not because God exists and is worthy of our love, but because God showers us with his own love. Obviously, there are going to be differences, and immediately, I think, think of differences, relationship to the palm of evil. The Ramam's answer to the palm of evil will have to be either that evil does not exist, or that it's unavoidable, or that we misinterpreted it. Whereas rifhasa crescas will, as we see, again, we have to wait a few weeks, but rifhasa crescas will advance a theory to explain why God's love could lead him to actually do evil. It is evil, but it's justified because in the end, it brings us even closer to him. As I pointed out, when I explained the Ramam's strictures against the fourth opinion, if you're dealing only injustice, you're extremely limited. Anything wrong is unjust, but if you're dealing in this case, with something wider, before it was wisdom, and now it's even wider, you're dealing with love, then we all know parents' love for a child could involve sometimes inflicting pain, and God's love for humanity could, we have to think how, to try to explain this theory, could indeed include things which wouldn't necessarily only answer to the ball of justice, and most importantly, they wouldn't only be reactive to what you have done, according to some rule of what is just or what is unjust, but in fact, God initiates things in order to bring the best out of man, because that is God's ultimate purpose in the world. Now, to go back to the Ramam, the Ramam adds to the picture he claims is the attatora taino hakato shah, the opinion of the Torah, he says I have a few things I'd like to add to that, which are my own opinion. He admits there is our own opinion. The first is that the supplies hash kaha pate applies only to human beings, it doesn't apply to animals. There, there is hash kaha klalit, general rules, the fact is that each species has the c, the means of survival, but a given ant, a given bird, or a given tree, doesn't make it the fifth one way or another. There's no need to ask why this ant was stepped on, if it isn't hash kaha pate tainas. That's his first point. The second point, based on his first point, is much more subtle and much more difficult. The Ramam says the reason for this is, is that hash kaha pate tainas, divine providence is in direct relationship to the intelligence of the individual who is being watched over, who is being divinely watched, and in fact is directly relative to his knowing god. The Ramam hints at, and there have been 800 years of, of controversy as to what he means exactly. The Ramam says is that somehow our knowing god is the pipeline, is the basis, is the, is the substratum on which the bhikhi vah, on which the hash kaha pate tate operates. One of the Ramam exactly means, some people thought, that he basically meant is what, I think we would call no hash kaha pate t, what he meant was that if you know god and are intelligent, then you will be protected because wisdom protects you. That is very close to the opinion of the Ralbagh, Ralbagh was a more extreme, was itelian than the Ramam, living somewhat after the Ramam, and the Ramam Bagh really says that hash kaha pate tate basically consists of, that the whys are protected by their wisdom. We add to that there could be prophecy, so nivuah, which is also a form of wisdom, it's a higher form of wisdom, it will protect you even more, but more or less the Ralbagh leaves out divine action, god literally pulling me out of the pit into which I'm placed. The Ramam speaks in terms of god being active, and in fact he says you cannot have any R value, you cannot have any injustice, and that god does these actions to man, but then he continues and speaks of intelligence and knowledge of god as being the basis for the hash kaha, and so some people again have said that maybe the Ramam was just merely speaking in terms of actions, but didn't really mean it. I don't think that's correct in the Ramam, but there is some sort of an unknown quantity here in the Ramam, but what is the connection between my knowledge of god and god taking care of me? He doesn't mean that god takes care of me as a reward for my knowledge of him. He means, he says that the knowledge is the basis, the word pipeline, it's the divine providence flows within the connection, the link that was created by my knowledge. The Ramam draws absolute conclusions from that, he says that therefore the more an individual knows god, the more he will enjoy divine providence. Divine providence is not equal on all levels, which means that divine providence doesn't only mean that god is responsible for what happens, it also means that god takes care of you, and god indeed takes care of more of those who know him than those who don't, and therefore the Ramam justifies a greater degree of divine providence for Jews than for non-Jews, even among Jews, for those who, well basically are philosophers, for those who know him in one way or another, as opposed to those who don't, and he says it could very well be that there are people who are so ignorant, so lacking in the knowledge of god, that they are equivalent to animals, who he has already said, do not have individual divine providence at all. I should mention we are now in the 17th parrot of the 3rd book of the Man of Wacham, in the 51st parrot, which is a very famous parrot because Ramam there contradicts many of the things he said previously in the book, the Ramam raises his distinct possibility that there is in fact, miraculous, miraculous divine providence, no evil, nothing bad can happen to a person who has total divine providence, but that's the people who are totally connected to God, who know God and know God actively in their minds are focused on God at all time. Doesn't necessarily contradict the opinion we've discussed, still now it applies only to a small fraction of the human race, and they indeed benefit from the most miraculous divine providence taking care of every one of their needs. In the chapters that we're dealing with, he does not mention this, he says it's a relative thing, the greater your knowledge of God, the greater divine providence applies to you, and without saying, as the Robach says, that divine providence consists only of allowing you to benefit from your own wisdom, he nonetheless creates a certain parallelism between what the Ramam believes is the goal of human life, knowledge of God, and the conditions of human life, providence, benefit, how well taken care of we are, two of them are somehow going hand in hand. This, our framework, these half hour shuyuim, once a week, do not really allow me to go into more depth, and frankly, I don't have a final answer in my own mind as to how to explain the Ramam, anyone should know you, with the literature on the Ramam knows that at least 20 or 30 or 40 different shades of opinion how to make sense of the Ramam in this point, but it is crucial to understand, once again, as we'll see it in many other occasions, the Ramam, how much weight the Ramam places are an intellectual knowledge of God, so here, the verse that says that God takes care of the righteous, means for the Ramam, God takes special care of those who know him, of course Ramam thinks that if you're righteous and you've done it so, the goal of it was that you should then use the different things you've developed in order to know God, if you don't do so, that itself means that you're throwing away both the purpose and the benefit of Torah, and the leading of ritual's life, and in effect, giving away the benefits of divine, of divine, of divine providence. Again, in the picture that I mentioned of a fraste kraskas, this, this point, we never even arise, since God loves mankind, it's true, where the fraste says that God loves those who love him more than others, so just like the Ramam, the fraste is very insistent on saying that there are levels, multiple levels, the closer you are to God because of you loving him the more he is close to you, but nonetheless, it doesn't need a, a basis of, of knowledge, nor his love of God, the basis, the way it appears to be in the Ramam, it's simply, it's simply an explanation, if we love God and God loves us, and on a personal level, he takes a greater interest in our lives and will make greater efforts to, to work with us, and bring us closer, and bring us closer to him, but the way that Ashkaha is expressed is indeed through basically a miraculous, there was a direct action of God in the world, God arranges and does things for people who he's interested in, in order to bring them closer, closer to God, in order to make them have a better life, in order to give them more good God literally gives good things to man in direct manner, which going to the Ramam would not normally be true, because nature, as created by God, provides good things for those who act in the proper manner without the necessity for God's direct, direct action, so the Ramam's own opinion is a bit of a mystery here, but we should remember that the Ramam says that his opinion fits into the framework of the fifth opinion, the fifth opinion is the opinion of all, he says, all those who go in the way of the Torah, I have certain additions, and it would appear to be incorrect, I think, for the Ramam's additions to contradict his original definition, his original definition is that the world is run by justice, and justice means the good are rewarded, and the sinful transgressors, the evildoers are, are, are punished. In the years after the Ramam, there undoubtedly was a school of Jewish thought, a controversial school of Jewish thought, that more or less limited Hashkachapate, although claiming that they believe in Hashkachapate, but in attributing Hashkachapate to the basic way the world is run, to wisdom, to knowledge of the world, to the fact that the world itself rewards the virtuous, the intelligence provides its own reward, or that virtue provides its own reward in the common sale, in the common saying, crime never pays, and somehow this would be a philosophic, and I think viewed by most religious people as being not really, really just a opinion, it was the development of the Ramam's approach, the development of one-half of the Ramam's approach, and it was severely criticized and caused a great deal of controversy in specifically in Spanish Jewry, in the years, in the 13th and 14th centuries, in Spain where there was a great deal of division between those who were called the philosophers, the acculturated philosophers, and the pious Jews as represented by most of the running we know. Here the World Bank has a very special position because he comes very close to defending the more extreme of Sertilian none, none Hashkachapate, none interventionist view of God's place in the world. And again, I want to stress, before we reject it out of hand, this opinion, that there is a certain benefit involved in, it's an really dis-benefit, which I don't think is a criticism. It gives man room to work, and that itself is in fact the religious value. By limiting God, man can work, and the Ramam himself, when he defines his opinion, when he finds the opinion of Torotenor Pocha, the entire fifth opinion, he starts with first by saying that the Torah has always believed that man has ability. Madam, yes, you call it. To do anything which he is capable of doing, he doesn't have infinite ability in nature, but he is capable, basically what we call brirakh of shit, he has free will, he is capable of doing things. And then he says everything that happens to man happens because of din, because of justice. There was part of what the Ramam defined as the Torah's view of divine providence is the point that man has ability. Why does he put that into this context, maybe an important point, say it's up ourselves. If you have a discussion of free will, the Ramam cannot talk about divine providence without talking about free will, because again, I think the Ramam is sensitive not to allow divine providence to crush free will, and he suspects very strongly that the third opinion that of the Asherir, God's will is everything, then your will is nothing, whatever happens because God wanted it. And it could be that the Ramam was suspicious of the fourth opinion as well. Wisdom is such a wide, such a wide power. Everything that takes place should reflect wisdom, everything that takes place should be the best of all possible situations, which would not leave us very much room, if any, in which to act. The Ramam knows that it's a principle of Judaism, which he claims that no one ever disagreed with. When man has free will, Ramam means it's not something merely psychological about man. Man has free will that means that the world is designed, is created, is influenced by our actions. And God therefore has to step back to allow those actions to have significance. And I think that is what leads the Ramam, among other things, to say that, okay, God will in the end give a verdict, so to speak, if you're playing on a playing field, there are players, and there are referees, the players basically create a game, but the referee steps in and says, that's illegal, that's legal. And the opinion of Hraste Kraskas and others is based on the Ramban, it's based on a major trend in Jewish philosophy that says that God is responsible for almost everything will require a much more subtle development, so as not to lead to the crushing of man, which Ramam is correct, would be an impossible conclusion for Judaism, which is based on Torah, which is based on a command to man, to act in a certain way, to take responsibility for his life. You have been listening to the sixth shear on issues in medieval philosophy, and now we will turn to the Al-Akhai Yomit. We've begun Kriyachma and it's Bukhat, first Bukhat of Kriyachma in the morning is Bukhat Yotseh Or, Bukhat Yotseh Or includes within it a kadusha, we say kadosh, kadosh, kadosh and baruch shampu on nuchotam, there is a well-known disagreement among the Richard name, is it really a kadusha, the difference would be could a individual, a private individual say it because the verse of Bukhat Yotseh can only be said by ten people, with a minion, that's why Tusha and Shwinesh, so you do not say on your own. But there are two other kadoshot in Fila, one in Yotseh, another one, which we'll talk about when we get to it in Uralitzian. So, Samushanim, principally the Ramban in the Yada Khazakha, say that Yahid and Omra, an individual who's not able with a minion, should not say the kadosha because you now will say kadosha if you don't have a minion. Tushanim, Beno Yona, and many other Tushanim say that this is not really a krusha, krusha is when you sanctify God's name. Here we're simply telling the story that the angels sanctify God's name, it's very hard to tell the difference because when we say krusha and Shwinesh, we also say that we will sanctify God the way the angels sanctify God. You always mention the angels first because that's where it comes from, it comes from the description, eni shayao, eni shaskal, what the angels said before God in the prophecy which Yishayao, eni shaskal, but here it doesn't say we will say what the angels say. Here it says this is what the angels do and therefore many we've shown him say that it's not an active tusha, it's a description of someone else's tusha and therefore it can be said in private. That's halakhal amisa what's accepted by all Jewish communities. But Polske, for instance, debate is safe, thought that you should really be worried about the other opinion, especially since in the case of debate is safe, the zoa has the opinion of the vambam that a individual should not say krusha, debate is safe and as a general rule feels that where there is no explicit mara, one should follow the zoa. So what debate is safe suggested was that an individual can say it but if he is by himself and now with the minion, so he should say it binigun ubita amim, this is a kind of a trick that if you're saying something which perhaps should be spent in a minion, so you have to make sure you say it differently, that you're not saying it in real but you're merely quoting. How do you know you're merely quoting sukim? You say them bita amim as though you were reading the Torah, in this case reading from the from the nivim. The truth is that even according to this suggestion, there's no real halakhal that you have to quote a passok with tameim. So I think the real point is that you should say it keilu kareba tara, you should have the intention according to debate is safe in order to avoid the problem of whether you can say this krusha, krusha do you would say by yourself, you should have the intention that you're quoting a passok, the way to show that would be to read it bita amim, the main thing is really more your intention of how you say it, debate is safe amidst that people don't do this. Very in his time the minag was in all places that he knew of, that all people said it whether they were a minion or they were not a minion and halakhal amisa, that's what's done. Later generations the gwa returned to this opinion, he thought you should be harsh and therefore the mishnabura returns to the debate yourselves, krusha, that if you by yourself will be better if you said it vinigun ubita amim, you said it keilu kareba tara, but again he knows that that's not the minag and halakhal amisa, everyone says that halakhal amisa individual should say the krusha, because we at least also follow the opinion that it's not an active krusha but merely a quotation of the krusha of the maldachim. There also is a defense enough karmina in the opposite direction, if you were in some other place say in bhikr krusha, for some reason you were very in the middle of krusha, and you heard the khasen get up to the point of the krusha of your seim. So if it's a required answer like krusha itself, then one can answer krusha even in the middle of krusha, but if it's not, if it's merely something which each person is saying to himself, then you could not interrupt your other bhikr or your krusha to answer for that. So therefore some personal point out that if we are basically concerned about both opinions surely if you're every day relying on the opinion that says it's not an active krusha but merely a one long bhikr which includes a quotation of how the maldachim, how the angels sanctify God, then you would not be justified interrupting another bhikr or krusha in order to say this krusha together with the kibur if you were saying it in a minag. Haddachalam isa, I think what should be done is that if one is saying it in a minag then what should say it in the manner that a minag would say it which means which is what the khasen does. The khasen gets up to the point of the line before hand, onim bhikr or nim bhikr or nim bhikr or nim bhikr and then the entire congregation says together kadosh kadosh kadosh. Then the khasen says kadosh and often im and they all say together bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr shamim khamma. In order that if you very have a minion then you should say it properly. You might say that that's sure that one should also stand, we'll talk about standing at a later time, but ashkhanazim the bhikr bhikr bhma is that one should stand for all the women should be krusha, like kadosh, like tusha, like bhikr, svadim don't necessarily stand but according to the bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr and if you thought this was also krusha then you should stand for this as well but no one stands for it and the reason is because bhikr kriyashmah specifically said sitting, bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr just like kriyashmah said sitting. So this is a bit of a contradiction involved here, should I stand because of the bhikr bhikr or should I sit because it's part of, because it's part of kriyashmah. So the meaning is that everyone sits but one tries to say it together with the sibhu in the manner that it's sibhu says krusha, but if you by yourself then you say it simply has part of the bhikr and you rely on those opinions that say there is no krusha here at all. That's it for today. Tomorrow on Wednesday we will have the weekly share of a bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr bhikr. Until then this is Ezra Beck wishing you kultov, veyomtov, ferm, ishivat harition, you've been listening to the daily podcast of KMTP, khi mitzian te tseitor a udvarashmihu shalayim. [BLANK_AUDIO]