KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - Jewish Philosophy Shiur #05
Issues in Medieval Jewish Philosphy, by Rav Ezra Bick, Shiur #05
This is Esribek, today is "Bech Fat", today's shoe will be the fifth installment in the series on major issues in medieval Jewish philosophy. The shoe is 31 minutes long and will be followed by a la chayomit. Today's topic, I wish to talk about, is the topic of "Hashkaha", which is normally translated as providence, divine providence. Before we even begin, I'd like to point out there's a certain ambiguity in the use of the term in the Middle Ages and in Jewish philosophy in general, one which is rarely, rarely defined. The word la chayomit, in Hebrew, would mean to watch over. When he has a certain implication, if somebody is watching over me, it seems to imply that he's watching over me in order to protect me from my benefit. He's taking care of me and very often when we speak of "Hashkaha", that's in fact what we mean. We mean that God is taking care, at least of people, even beings, perhaps of Jews, but "Hashkaha" "fatit" means like a babysitter, like someone who's a caretaker, is someone who's "mashkir". On the other hand, the word philosophically very often means simply responsibility. In most of the chapter, chapter 17, and the third tralek of the mornin of Uchim, which we will be discussing today, that's what the mamma means by "Hashkaha". Sometimes it's very, very explicitly, for instance, throughout the chapter, we have the example of what happens to evil people, evil people are punished by God. That's "Hashkaha". It's not "Hashkaha" for the tzedek, it's "Hashkaha" for the Vashah, because God is punishing them through his direct involvement in their lives. So "Hashkaha" doesn't mean that he's watching over them, or this not in the benevolent sense. It means that everything that happens happens because God wills it to happen. There's not only an ambiguity, there's a certain contradiction between the two terms. Is it merely a metaphysical statement about the relationship of nature to God? Or is it a statement that has something to do with the religious virtue called "Bittachom", one should have one's trust in God, because God basically cares about us, and wants our well-being, and has the power and the desire to, in fact, take care of us? We're going to see a certain amount of attention in the mamma's discussion and in other discussions, but as I pointed out, it's rarely made explicit in the Middle Ages, and one has to be careful since to list our own minds, there's quite a clear distinction between the two senses of the word. You have to be careful what we mean in any given discussion. Our discussion today will center on the Parak Yudzai, the 17th chapter of the third tralek of the Rem, which is the chapter that the rambam discusses as "Hashkaha". He begins by saying there are five theories of "Hashkaha". The first theory, which we want to elaborate on, is that it is "Nahashkaha", not a normal theory of "Hashkaha". The first one is that there's "Nahashkaha", the rambam mentions the name of "Epicurus". He whose name became synonymous with "Epicosa", too. What was the "Epicosa" of "Epicurus", at least according to the rambam, "Epicurus" thought there was "Nahashkaha". In terms of the history of brief philosophy, from which the rambam divides his knowledge, which is Aristotle's book on metaphysics, "Epicurus" had the theory that the world consisted of atoms, which are moving through space, and then on then an atom simply swerves to the right or to the left. No reason. For Aristotle, and for modern science, and for the rambam, that's really epicosit. Everything that happens has to have a cause, because I said no, sometimes things just happen. There is a phenomenon called "pure chance", "pure accident", "no cause", "no explanation can be given". The rambam says that "Epicurus" didn't believe in "Hashkaha". That's what he means. He means that some things happen, and nothing is responsible for it. Nothing ultimate, nothing which you might call God or by any other name. Of course, that's the first thing we can place it on the side. Surprisingly, the second theory is, one that there is "Hashkaha". And that theory of "Hashkaha" is Aristotle. Anyone who knows anything about Aristotle and Judaism would normally assume that Aristotle did not believe in "Hashkaha" at all. God doesn't know what's going on in the world. He's not concerned about the world, and he doesn't do any actions within the world. What does the rambam mean when he says that Aristotle believes in "Hashkaha"? The answer is a typical rambam answer. According to Aristotle, everything that takes place in the world takes place because of the laws of nature. The laws of nature are a reflection, are an environment of ultimate wisdom, which in the rambam's language means the wisdom of God. Every time we read the rambam about nature, we have to remember not to read it in our own mindset, in our own language. For us, laws of nature, for all modern science, laws of nature are simply things which work. There's nothing logical about them. Gravity says that two objects attract each other. If there would be a universal phenomenon, that two objects repel each other, that would also be a law of nature. No scientist attempts to explain the rationality involved in the fact that gravity works or that electoral magnetism follows certain laws. But for Aristotle and for the rambam, the laws of nature were laws of wisdom. They were basically logically true. And for Aristotle, they were logically true, and that said all there needs to be said about them. For the rambam, they were wisdom which God, because God is committed to wisdom, imposed upon the world. So therefore, when Aristotle said that everything takes place according to the laws of nature, to the rambam, that's a kind of hashkaha, meaning that things don't take place in abandonment. They don't take place haphazardly. They take place because something is watching over them. What's watching over them is the laws of nature. And the rambam has a religious nature, a religious character to the laws of nature. The laws of nature are the wisdom of God. The rambam immediately admits that this kind of hashkaha is hashkaha-kill-alit, not hashkaha-pratit. This general hashkaha makes no difference which particular ant you are. All ants follow the laws of ants, trees follow the laws of trees, wind will knock down leaves. There is no hashkaha-pratit for the individual within the species, but for the species as a whole, all things which exist, all categories, all universals to use the first traffic, degree for sappacal term, follows certain rules, those rules are among other things, and here we do have a environment of the higher, more benevolent sense of hashkaha. All the rules of nature are designed to maintain nature, to maintain the existence of nature. There is a rule of nature that says this food for animals, animals have teeth that they can eat. That's hashkaha-kill-alit, hashkaha-kill-alit for the lions gives them the digestive system which can digest the meat which they are going to eat. Any individual lion might starve to death, but lions as a species have been granted, so to speak, we who are theists would say, granted by an evident god, Aristotle, or even the Ramam's version of Aristotle, would say the wisdom of God has been expressed in the world in such a way that every species has the means of its existence and basically the world works, the rules, the laws of nature, don't destroy the world, they don't take the world apart, they maintain the world as we know it. So that's hashkaha-kill-alit, okay, what really interests us is the final three opinions in the Ramam, all of which are religious opinions, opinions held by mano-theists, and frankly their opinions which were held by Jews, although the Ramam does not ascribe them necessarily to Jews. The third opinion is very, very interesting, the Ramam says this is the opinion of the hashkharia, the hashkharia is basically what orthodox, the orthodox philosophy of Islam. And the hashkharia answers the question why do things happen, and it says yes there is a vision, there is hashkaha, and the hashkhar is the will of God, no further answer can or should be given. Now here we basically moved on to a question not whether there is hashkhar, but what is the principle which under lies hashkharia, and that's really the important question for the Ramam in order to first understand. Anything that takes place, the hashkharia says, it took place because the will of God. On the one hand there is a certain extremism involved here, everything that takes place, the leaf that falls in the desert and the ant that was stepped by the elephant in the jungle, and the ice that cracks in the arctic is because God said it should happen at the time. No universal laws of nature involved here, but God wills that that should take place. On the other hand, if you ask what wide is God will, that that should take place, the answer is because that is his will. In Islam in general, there was an extreme emphasis on the unity and sovereignty of God, and in one of the most famous passages in platonic dialogues, Plato has Sakurai's asking whether the things which God or the Greek language, the gods, which they will, is it because those things are good, or are they good because the gods will them. And for a monotheist, for an extreme monotheist, like an adherent of Islam, you cannot answer that God makes certain rules or will certain things because they are good, because then you are saying that there is something outside of God called the good, which first of all exists in a supreme, so they are basically two, two supreme, two transcendental existing things, and two, you are basically saying that God is subject and subservient to the second one. And therefore, in Islam, the answer to why God says A, B, or C, or why God does A, B, or C is because that is his will. We cannot apply any rules to God's will. As the Raman points out, immediately in the chapter, in Orthodox Islam, in the Asheriah, there is no answer, but no need to answer the most basic question of religious theology, namely the problem of evil. Why is there evil in the world if God is good? The answer of the Asheriah is, there is evil in the world because God wills that there should be evil in the world. In other words, you can't say, "Well, God is good, and this is bad, and that's a contradiction." Whatever God wants is good. Luckily for us, or when any better of us, luckily for us, God said you shall not kill, but if we said you should kill, we would kill because God's will is law, and there are no questions and no standards to God's will. The Raman considers this to be absurd. I am emphasizing that because I suspect that there are many Jews who basically, basically, at least when they want to be philosophic, accept that. I think it's impossible for a Jew to accept it. The Torah is replete with the understanding that we don't merely do God's will, but that God's will is good. Starting a very in-beshit, whenever Havino says to God, "Haschofit kolha agat sloye asse michpat," he holds God up to a standard, which both he and God are presumed to share. As well as many other halakhalt, God is not good because we've defined the word good to be what God's will is. God really is, really is good, including the ability of God to give you a command then to be good with I am telling you what to do. You should do that which is good and correct and righteous. And how do you know that? The Ramban points out God is not going to tell us. It's too complicated. It's too detailed. There's a limit to what he can tell you. But he can tell you just to be good because you know what it means. It's the value, it's the ultimate value, which God represents. As part of a defense sometimes, I don't think we have the Islamic problems here, but as part of a defense against this question or that question, Jews sometimes we treat the same. It's God's will. For instance, if somebody asks, "How do you justify the morality of mitzvat mchiatamalek?" God commanded us to kill every amalek, height, man, woman, and child. We feel a certain amount of moral uncomfortableness with this mitzvah. So I think the classic Jewish answers to try to explain it, but the answer to Islam is you don't have to explain it. If God said it, then it's okay. Not just okay. It's a mitzvah. It's right. And I think I've heard Jews sort of retreat to this, you know, not that we don't have the right to question God. There's nothing to question. There's a slight, but in very important philosophic difference between saying, "If God said it, then I in my modesty, in my lack of knowledge, in my ignorance, accept that God's will is correct," to saying there is nothing to be ignorant about and not being modest when I say that if God says it, it's correct. It's defined as being correct. There is no problem whatsoever. And I think Jewish history and Jewish philosophy is always grappled with a problem, or you haven't been necessarily very good at finding answers to the problem of theodicy of justifying God's way in the world, the problem of evil. But we know there's a problem. EO is about a problem, safer EO. It's not about a mistake. It's not about an illusion of a problem because you're being overly, overly proud of your own intellectual powers. EO said to God, "Lama der ech le shame sa leich, why do the evil doers prosper?" And it was a problem. So that simply rejects, he rejects out of hand this opinion. He treats it relatively at length. This is the thing you ask them a question. They'll say, "It's God's will. Why does this child die? This child not die? Because it's God's will." The influence of Islam on Islamic cultures is very, very deep in precisely this point. This has been noted by many writers. There's certain fatalism, something that's called fatalism of the East, but it basically means fatalism of the Islamic East, but it says that what's going to be is what's going to be. You know, I think it's called kulam in Allah. Everything is from God, and if you've achieved true sublimating of your own desires before God, then you're not troubled by anything because everything comes from God. And once it's happened, we call that cidu kadin. Cidu kadin is not the same, as someone once pointed out. Allah says, "Qashaym shim bachim ala tov, kakm bachim ala tov." Just like when we make sabbah un good, when we make sabbah un bad, but as we was pointed out, you don't make the same bach. You say, a tov amitiv aun qun, you say, den anha imet, un bad. There is a certain feeling which I've heard from Arabs, not necessarily theologians, kulam in Allah. In the end, in the end, it's all, it's all the same. There's a, a, a, a, there are moral repercussions of such a theory, if everything is all the same, whatever God wills is what is, whatever God wants is the good that frees us on the one hand from the necessity of moral struggle with the world about us, some God's hands, or understanding God's commands, because he commanded, we accept it. On the other hand, it also frees us from moral responsibility. You don't actually have to change the world, unless you think God commanded you at this particular moment to do something, but the fact that the world is miserable, the fact that there's misery in the world, we have a fairly good explanation for that, kulaminala. And there isn't really, there isn't much you can do about it, there isn't any reason why you should do anything about it, because if it's God's will, then it's what should and must and must be. So the Baba mentions this as a theory of ashkahra pratid, it's very pratid, it's very particular and individual. The metaphysics behind it might claim that nothing could happen, unless it was God's will, but it is so inclusive, so dominated and so centered on God's will, that doesn't leave room for anything else, specifically for any moral, moral value. And the next two opinions that the Baba brings down, the fourth and the fifth opinion, theory of ashkahra, both proclaim, both propose that there is ashkahra pratid, but the principle of ashkahra pratid is one of two things, either mishpat or hochma. The difference is not obvious and we're not going to go into it today, I wish today to merely emphasize the difference between both four and five, the latter two day out and the previous and the third opinion, the fourth opinion he calls calam, you remember this word from last week, and once again he is referring, among others, to of sajagon. And the fifth opinion he says is the atatar attaino octoshah, with his own particular version of it, his thing between the general version is on particular version, but it's also assumed under the fifth, under the fifth theory of ashkahra, ashkahra which is based on mishpat says, this is what we are basically familiar with, everything that takes place, it released to people and perhaps to others as well, is because of God's will, but God's will is an expression of justice. This of course is a problem, this means that you must have sadikvitovlo rashavarado, the righteous should prosper and be rewarded and the evil should be punished, because if the righteous suffer and the evil prosper then that's not justice, if everything is God's will there's no problem, but if everything is God's justice then the world apparently does not reflect that, and that's a problem, and in fact it is a problem, that is the problem called the pamma of evil, and we will eventually discuss different Jewish approaches to it, but perhaps in one might strike one as an illogical approach, the fact that this theory creates the ground for the pamma of evil is in fact its major benefit, because it's clear to the pamma that we don't wash away the pamma of evil, as I pointed out, say for Iov, Iov, Iov, discussions in Nikumara, discussions throughout the ages, the pamma of evil is in fact a real problem, and to be a true believer in God's ways in the world means that you have to grapple with the pamma and not wash it away. So justice, or in a randomness version, wisdom, but wisdom includes justice, wisdom means to do that which is right, and all times, justice demands that God in fact, meet out to everyone, to everything, that which it deserves, and you therefore must answer the question of the pamma of evil, and everything can be explained in that way. Obviously, what results from this is a certain demand for Emma Vittachan, even if we have a theory which will explain the pamma of evil, but clearly the world doesn't support this kind of view. If you have enough faith, a tremendous amount of faith, you can believe in God's justice in the world despite the apparent evidence to the country, despite the fact that that little children die unnecessarily, and there are earthquakes and various terrible things happen, even though the people are apparently at least righteous in any event, not terribly evil. On the other hand, there are terrible evil people who prosper and go to their graves happy. So you might have an answer, and we will discuss the answers eventually, but in order to believe in that, you have to say, "Well, I believe in it," despite the fact the world doesn't appear, doesn't appear to support it, and the well-known line of Voltaire in his story of Candide, where Voltaire is making fun of this kind of belief. So the philosopher in that story, Panglass says all the time, no matter what happens, always for the best and the best of all possible worlds. I'm not saying that's the Jewish attitude, it's not the Jewish attitude, but the point is, Candide is based on Voltaire trying to show how a person can be in the middle of the earthquake, the great earthquake of Lisbon, who can be struck down by disease, people are dying left and right, but he has his joke in his head, he has his belief in his head, that says all is for the best and best of all possible worlds. So it can be taken to extremes, but surely the opposite cannot be true, it's not really possible to look at the world and say "Ah, I see all the time without exception God's justice." And the whole theory is based on that there is no exception, it's based on the fact that this is the way Hashkaha works, not that sometimes God does justice, the theory says that Hashkaha is justice or is wisdom, and therefore any exception is a question, and not merely a little bit of a variation on an original theme. I'm going to believe the problem's own attitude towards Hashkaha next week, which I'd like to conclude with a point that the member makes concerning Vasajigone's opinion, the fourth theory in Hashkaha, which indeed will strike one as being strange. In the Kalam and in Vasajigone, no distinction is made between humans and the best of the world. If the world is run on the basis of justice, then justice has to apply to everything. And some people were bothered by the injustice in the non-human world, and the answer crushed by the millions. So one answer for the injustice in the human world was based on Olamaba on the future world. The moral calculus is not simple, again we'll talk about this when we talk about the Pomevivo, but the calculus says that you might suffer more than is your due in this world, but the next world will make it up to you. So that in a larger picture, you do not suffer unnecessary, you do not suffer more than was your due, more than justice demanded. But if that's going to be true for animals, there has to be a world to come for animals. The member thought this was funny. He doesn't even criticize. He just says, you know, look at this absurd conclusion that they had to reach, in conclusion he thinks that his theory will be absorbed from having to reach. Unless so much interested in the, basically the curiosity of a world to come for cats. But what is important is the calculus involved because what the fourth opinion claimed was that God could in advance, God could look at Rila, he could afflict the person and then pay him back in the next world. Pay him back double perhaps in the next world, so that everything is okay. And the reason why they had to say this is again because of the centrality, the monopoly that justice has on God's ways. It doesn't leave room for shadings, it doesn't leave room for complexity. So that any single case, if anything happens, if it rings and the wrong person, it has to be just. It can't be unjust but to some other explanation. It has to be just. And therefore, they came up with a theory which I think, morally I find it very, very difficult, I don't understand how it could even be suggested. It says that justice not only allows, but justice could require God to afflict the basically a righteous person, the undeserving, the undeserving of affliction. And then, ten, twenty years later, give him a greater share in Olamabad. And therefore, the whole thing is just. If we would say this about people, I think it would be scandalous. I can hit you as long as I pay you back double tomorrow. In fact, there's a sudya writer to do such a thing. The Ram Ram, it's the Ram Ram, of course, but the Ram Ram quotes in Okhod Ghanayvad, someone who steals with the condition, the assumed condition is headed, he'll pay back, he'll pay back double, a Qantas al-Akhai if you, if you burgle, if you steal in secret, then you pay double. So it might even be a method of helping people out, the Ram Ram says it's a sudya writer because you're not going to steal. There's no justification for stealing, that you're going to pay later, doesn't really make a difference. So Sadhguru basically said this about God, God hits you and then gives you two kisses. So it's a very interesting point, I think we should understand where it comes from. It comes from a certain metaphysical basis, so it's basically our question. The metaphysical basis is how does the world run? And the answer is by justice. God is justice. It doesn't leave you wrong, maybe much room to maneuver. What it all comes down to in the end is that the theories of Ashkaha are in the end theories of what is God or what is the, it's not a totally metaphysical question, but what is the metaphor of that for us is the dominant one about God. And what this fourth opinion Ram Ram says is that God is the judge. We act and above this world, above this stage, above this court, this playing field that's called the world, there's a referee and when you break the rules he blows the whistle. And if you play by the right rules, you get a point. That's God's job in the world and everything that we do, our religious lives is centered on that figure, on that character, what we call God, which is a synonym for what Avamavino called Hasshofatkolaarats, the judge of all the land. Now, for the Ram Ram, when the Ram Ramam switches, which we'll see next week, the idea of Ashkaha from Mishpat, judgement, justice to Khochma, he's not merely switching a theory of why does it rain on Tuesdays, but he's basically changing the image of God in your lives. And if he doesn't judge the world, God is the rationality of the world, who Khocham is the wise one. Obviously, it can't be a good judge if you're not wise, and wisdom demands you to do justice. But the basic picture, who do I relate to when I get in the morning and I dive in, I'm not worried about sadic verado of Hasshofatkola, I'm not coming to complain about my lat or demand, I want more rewards or to try to avoid punishment, I'm just going to go in the morning to dive in. I'm searching for God, what are you searching for? And the Ramam consistently thought about Abraham, and this would be no exception, where a person is searching for is pure intellect, is God's who Khocham, he's the Khochma, he's not merely the wise one, he's wisdom itself. And the opinion that the Ramam here is passing over, and I'm rejecting, is one that says that basically we look for God in the world of action, he's not an ideal wisdom, but he's he, who when we do actions, referees between us, between ourselves and ourselves, and ourselves and other people, and ourselves and morality. So God is an actor among the actors, but a very different role. We play the game, and God, and God judges the game. We're going to see next week, the Ramam's own particular opinion, in its two shades, what he calls that to Latina Rachshah, the opinion of the Jews as opposed to the fourth opinion, which he doesn't describe to us, he scribes it to the Mutakalam, and he says in my particular opinion within that group, as well as an opinion not quoted by the Ramam, it's later than the Ramam, but I think a very, very important one, the opinion of Christa Kraskass in Safer, or Hashem. So we're in the middle of Hashkaha'ana'u, the full import I think of what we've seen today will be understood better when we reach the conclusions next week, and until that time, call through this as Rebecca. You have been listening to the fifth installment in the weekly series on major issues in medieval Jewish philosophy. Now for today's Al-Aqayomit, we've said Yishtabakh, we've said Kaddish, we've said it now comes to Kriyachma Ubil Khotar, Kriyachma and the Bakhot that surround it in Shaqawit, a two Bakhot before the one Bakhah afterwards. Start with Kriyachma itself, there's a Makhloket Indigmara if Kriyachma is the writer or the Rebanan. If it's the writer, then the Prasok in the first part of Kriyachma, Vishakah Ubukumara is a Mitzvah twice a day Vishakmara when you're getting up or when you're going to sleep, Ubukumara when you're getting up, to say this Pasha, to say Haddavarimha Ailum, these things, these words, the Pasha of Kriyachma. However, there's also an opinion in the Kriyachma that's the Babanan, and Vaiyuha Dvarimha Ailah, Vishinam Tamam, Shifthava Vittaka, is referring not to this Pasha but to Torah in general, one should learn Torah in the morning and the night. And there's a Makhloket among you showing him how one should, how one should Pasha. There are, in fact, quite a number of you showing him who Pasha and Haddavarimha Aisah that Kriyachma is the Babanan. It's found in the Chubhavaat Vash in several of the Gonim, in Tausvah, apparently in one place. That's how it would appear, that they hold that Kriyachma is the Babanan. The obvious Nafkamina, when we find a question where the Sun is the right order of the Babanan, the obvious Nafkamina is Mysafik, what one should do? If one is not sure whether one read Kriyachma, yes or no, so if it's the right order, you should read it again, or you should read it even if it's again, and if it's the Babanan, then you don't have to do it again. The Gomara says, and Dafkamina is the right order of the Babanan. So that's why many of you are saying that the Gomara is the Kriyachma is the right order, if you have to read it again, if you aren't sure whether you read it the first time, then implies the Kriyachma is the right order. If that's the Saka of the Baban, it's the Saka of the Shuchunar, that's the Saka of the most people know because it's called that way in Shuchunar. In the explanation, how it's possible to say that Lakhal and Mysa, Saffikkava, Saffiklokkava, has the Kriyachma, if you have to read it again, if you're not sure if you read. However, it's the other Babanan, it's because there is another Gilsa in the Gomara. The Shilto, the Shilto, the Baba are a Haigon, the Gonic source has a different Gils in the Gomara, what the reason is. Why is if one is unsure whether one read does one have to read again? So in Agamur it says, because Kriyachma is the right order, but in the Shilto it says, Mysumkava, Nakhal-Chaman, even though it's the Babanan, but it's very important. It's talking about the kingdom and the kingship of God, of heaven. And so, I guess you could either say, why not do it again? Or, it's just spiritually so important. It may not be a riv, it may not be an obligation from the Torah, but it's still very, very essential and basic to Jewish life. And therefore, it may be to Abana, but it's inconceivable that you take a chance on that saying it. There's a sama-la-la-chah, Quran-shokhanah, that says that, the Gomara says, the women are exempt from Kriyachma, because it's Mysumkava, say, Shazmangvamah, and at certain times, and therefore, it's one of those myths for two women and an abligated. But the Shoshan-ar, Pazkhanah, qalam-la-chah, the women say Kriyachma, because Yeshbok-kava-la-la-chah-ma-am. I mean, a Jew should accept the york of heaven. So, this was the gisa of the Shilto-tot, Enigama. Even though it's the Babanan, it's an exception to the wrong. It's the Babanan, but it's so important that you shouldn't take a chance on missing it, and therefore, you should say it again. So, according to that, there is no nafkamina. This is not an afkamina. There are other or less always nafkamina. We definitely pass can saffe kava, saffe glo kava, you eat again. That doesn't only mean if you're some of a god with your red knife, which is a little bit, you know, hard to imagine how it can happen. Could happen. But there could be others, say, Kriyachma, and later on, you realize it might not have been this man. Too early in the morning, or too early in the evening. You, for one reason or another. So, that's also saffe kava, Kriyachma, saffe glo kava. If you're not sure whether the time was appropriate, because there are certain times, we'll see this in another ala hai yomit, that there are certain times when one has to say Kriyachma. Now, you realize that you may have made a mistake. So, ala hai is that you read it again. There are still two possibilities. The obvious possibility is that it's because it's the writer. It's in the stomach you write it to read Kriyachma twice a day. However, the last time you've shown him, who thinks Kriyachma is the la banan. But nonetheless, misa fake, you have to read it again. Anyhow, that's the opinion of the shilto. And apparently, of all those other, we've shown who say it's la banan. The rush, the toss-fought, and several, and several others. That's it for today. Tomorrow's shiyur will be the weekly mitzvah, with a wrap in your mint of worry. And until then, this is Ezra Beck saying, kultov, kwaiitimla torah, wishing you well in your Torah learning. I repeat again, please spread this to your friends. We really want to have a lot of subscribers. That's why we're doing this. Kultov speaking from Ishivat habetsion, English et cion. Until tomorrow, this is KMTT. K. Mitzion, tece torah, udvar hashemirushadai.