In the coming week, an anxious NATO tries to build on the post-summit momentum. Japan hosts Pacific Island leaders amid rising competition with China, and France considers the cost of political deadline. It's July 11th, 2024, in time for the world next week. I'm Bob McMahon. And I'm Karl-Ann Robbins. Karl, let's start right here in Washington, where as we were taping this podcast, leaders of the Transatlantic Alliance were wrapping things up. Not only is this major anniversary of the Alliance 75 years, it's also the first time Sweden was attending as a member. There have been a great deal of comments and support of Ukraine. Very strong communique, which I'll let you address how you'd like as well. Which I actually read it. Which I know you read it. That's why I'm leaving it to you. But there are concerns that the circumstances facing some of the key NATO members, such as the US, Germany and France, to name a few, could be affecting their ability or their resolve in the year and years ahead. So how is NATO looking for the future 75 years, Carla? Well, by pretty much everything at this NATO summit, and I suspect this is going to continue in the weeks and months ahead, has been overshadowed by one thing. And that's US politics and this perceived implosion of Joe Biden's presidential campaign after his disastrous debate performance. And national security is all about planning. You can't plan for everything, but planning as NATO has planning staff. And trying to what officials are calling Trump-proof the Alliance. That is sound planning. But I'm not sure how much can be guaranteed for all they're trying to do. One of the big deliverables of the summit was NATO's statement that Ukraine is now on a "irreversible path to membership", although there are still no dates attached or actual process. But even before the NATO communique with its carefully negotiated wording was released, Elbridge Colby, who's a senior official in the Trump Pentagon, and who will likely be back if Trump wins in November, told Politico that the commitment to NATO membership for Ukraine was of course "reversible". And while the 32 NATO leaders were meeting in DC, former President Trump was out on the campaign trail attacking the Alliance, complaining to his supporters about how the US was footing all the bills and retelling that story, about how his president he told the leader of an unknown NATO member that he would not defend his country. That there would be no Article 5 all for one one for all commitment. Wouldn't defend the country from Russia if the country wasn't meeting its military spending targets. So you got the split screen and as much as people were celebrating this incredibly successful military alliance and focusing very much on what it could do to continue to support Ukraine no matter what happens in Washington. What happens in Washington was the major focus of what was happening. Yeah, absolutely. And, you know, I would also add in terms of a future Trump administration, it would be interesting to see how it might differ from the first Trump administration in terms of there was quite a bit of pushback on his efforts to walk away from NATO commitments or even symbolically do so. And there are definitely ongoing members of the Republican Party who openly support Trump, who also are strong backers of NATO. That's still sort of unresolved tension that would play out. It doesn't help the Alliance. It certainly doesn't help the spirit of unity that they're trying to convey at this upcoming summit. There is that Trump-proof aspect, absolutely, with the commitment to spending 2% of GDP. We heard at a CFR event this week from the Danish Prime Minister, Metta Fredrickson, who basically said, regardless of who's present, Europeans have to do a lot more and they have to do it now. They have to do it yesterday. She was emphatic that these countries need to step up more on their own defense commitments on supporting Ukraine. She was really strong on supporting Ukraine's air defenses. And we heard within the day of her speaking at CFR some new commitments to providing air defense systems for Ukraine. So we'll see whether Europe steps up and whether any of this sort of Trump-proofing can happen. There's going to be a new NATO Secretary-General coming in, former Dutch leader Ruta, who was very much seized of this issue as well. So lots of interesting sort of things percolating. And, you know, as you say, it all comes back to the Biden question, and that's going to certainly play out even as this podcast is dropping. Yes, because Biden is having his post-summit press conference, and she's supposed, of course, to be about NATO and is going to be one more litmus test about whether he's up to the job. And you really have to feel at this point, this is absurd because none of us can be perfect. I mean, I'm going to stumble over my words in this podcast. And I'm not taking a position here at this point about whether Biden should go or stay, but this is, you know, this constant watching. And it is diverting attention from these questions here about the future of NATO and certainly the future of the commitment to Ukraine. There were major commitments made here. Many of them focused on Trump-proofing. They're going to shift to Europe, the planning apparatus for supporting Ukraine. They're going to set up this military. We talked about this before, this military structure. In some of it in Ukraine, there's going to be NATO-civilian in Kiev, and then also planning a structure that's going to be in Germany. These long-promised F-16s are supposed to arrive this summer. They're going to give them more patriots, finally not as many as Zelensky himself wants, which are absolutely essential with all these glide bombs arriving. They're still this unresolved question about how far into Russian territory they're allowed to shoot with the equipment that we've already given them. But there's a lot that they, you know, gave Ukraine, and Zelensky seemed reasonably satisfied with it, including with this irreversible commitment. But let's face it, nothing is irreversible, and everybody's holding their breath to see what happens with American politics. One other thing that did happen, which was really quite interesting, and we'll have to see how it plays out. For the first time, NATO bluntly said to the Chinese, "Stop enabling the Russians," and they put it into the communique. Now, they didn't say you're giving them weapons directly, but you're giving them everything to build the weapons. They're very concerned about it. We've talked about this a lot. They put it down in the communique. They didn't say what they were going to do to punish the Chinese for it, and the Europeans have a lot of choices to make on sanctions, sanctioning individual companies and individuals, how much they're going to push back. But the Americans have persuaded Europeans that this is a really serious problem, and that the Russians, part of the Russian success, is the fact that they've been able to continue here is because of Chinese enabling, so that was one of the big things, and it was in the communique right there. No, you're absolutely right to point that out, and it raises questions of, you know, NATO's, Asia future, and so forth. You know, we don't have to get ahead of ourselves there, but it is worth noting the European attitudes changing, and I mean a critical mass of European countries have been much more critical of the Chinese relationship, and it's not just because of its support of Ukraine, it's also its trade measures, it's dumping of, let's say, renewable energy products and things like that. There's a lot of fresh and challenging scrutiny of China that's going on, and it looks like it will intensify, so watch this issue in particular. Which is a good segue to our next topic, which we need to move to, but there's so much else we could talk about the NATO, so I'm going to have defense commitments, and we're going to be talking about that a lot in the weeks to come. So, Bob, let's move to Japan, next Tuesday Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will host the 10th Pacific Islands leaders meeting, and China has been courting Pacific island countries like Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. What are they able to offer to counter balance that push by Beijing, and are these countries ready to buy whatever the Japanese are offering? You know, when you look at the Pacific Islands sphere these days, Carla, it's sort of overtones of what used to be called the Great Game, which was this, I think, 19th century competition from great powers and, I think, mostly Central Asia competing for hearts and minds and resources of that part of the world. Definitely overtones of that, though. These are 18 countries that are overall part of this Pacific Islands leadership meeting now. They have a regular meeting that takes place every year. This particular meeting, though, is one that occurs every few years, and it's significant that's being hosted by Tokyo. Not just Japan that is part of this big competitive move, though. I would say Australia, which is part of this meeting, is playing a really stepped-up role, and it's really even much closer physically to a lot of these islands and has considered them part of a sphere of influence anyway. And, by the way, we should note an affiliated think tank. The Lowy Institute does a great job of sort of tracking aid, the wrapping up of aid to Pacific island nations. And so, China is a player here. China is moving in, interestingly, in one area in particular, helping their police forces. So, you mentioned, you know, Solomon Islands. In the past years, China signed a police cooperation deal. They were also offered security support to Tonga. And, you know, Kiribat is looking like it's going to get involved in some sort of Chinese support of its police. Papua New Guinea, and on and on. And so, there's a security overtone. And I think one set of speculation involved in the meeting in Japan is, you know, will there be some sort of announcement on security agreement or security and even defense cooperation agreement? That might be too sweeping. I think these Pacific island nations, while happy to be invited to this forum and happy to have the aid that's forthcoming, you know, they're playing their cards pretty carefully, too. Like they have, among other interests, they have existential interests. And so, while the competition with China is out there, they're also going to be keenly looking for help in terms of, you know, the climate change issue, which is an existential one for them front and center. I mean, these are countries that are watching eerily as the water levels rise. And these are, in some cases, these countries are constituted of hundreds, not thousands of islands and so forth. So, they're going to be looking at the climate change issue. They're going to be looking at this issue, particularly involving Japan of whether they come to some sort of agreement on Japan releasing more than a million tons of treated water from its Fukushima nuclear plant over a number of years. So, some of these islands have memories of nuclear testing that took place over many years in the post-war period, post-war, war two period. They are not going to blithely look at tainted water being, you know, distributed their way. So, I think that's an issue of potentially some impasse. But in general, it's going to be Japan saying, look, we have ways of helping you. We have development aid. We have ways of being a partner and not just a sort of a overbearing big brother like they were portraying China. And China has had in its Belt and Road Initiative this reputation of sort of this debt diplomacy reputation and building infrastructure and then sort of weighing heavily on these countries that can't pay up and having leverage and so forth. So, it's all to say, Carla, there is a big competition playing out. And Japan is going to be showing what it can offer these countries while also trying to retain a sense of free and open navigation as well as the open exchange of resources which Japan keenly relies on some of these countries. So, can we go back to China and this police forces training them? Of course, Japan has its history of occupation. But given China's, the Chinese known for their great respect for civil liberties and personal privacy, why would a country invite the Chinese into train a police force? That is a very good question. I think there are other issues at play here, but China is coming in and basically saying many respectful things about the sovereignty and the integrity of these countries and that it has a role to play in offering assistance. It offering, let's say, could be some infrastructure assistance for policing programs. Keep in mind, again, these are countries that are, some of them are extremely poor, extremely under equipped, and they are, you know, glad to have whatever aid they can get in terms of basic governance. Isn't it something that the United States or the Japanese or the Australians could easily, easily compete on? All you have to do is go out there and look at the Freedom House ratings or any other rating system and say, who would you rather not that we have a perfect, you know, okay, we won't have the American police forces do it, but certainly the Japanese out there with their gloves and they're, you know, why would you want the Chinese to come in and do this? Isn't this something we could easily compete on? Well, I think that's certainly the message that's coming from countries like Australia. Again, Australia can come in and offer help. The United States is also, especially when it saw the agreement taking place in the Solomon Islands, it stepped up and it started to, you know, propose its own offers, I think, to Papal New Guinea, among other places. So, yes, you're absolutely right. They should, the fact that it's still a competition rather than a walkover for the, you know, countries that support democracy and rule of law, you know, should give you pause about what other baggage might be involved with these other countries. So, I think it's a question of providing the right package of agreements not to be sort of overwhelming in their support, but come with the right sort of bundle of things, Carla. And I think to your point, China has been, you know, handling its diplomacy fairly deftly, but there is a counterpoint. And I think what's going to come up at this meeting in Tokyo is going to be Japan's offer. Japan has had its own kind of tough history. Obviously, World War II era being one episode, but also in resource extraction, in overfishing. It wasn't just Chinese fishing fleets, but Japanese fishing fleets that would roam into these waters and heavily fish areas. I think some of these countries have done a great deal to wall off and create exclusion zones for their, their fisheries, which are really important as you look at the pace of overfishing going on the world. I just cite that as one sphere in which countries are competing and countries have, you know, legacy to deal with as they try to present a more positive face and to try to bring these specific island nations into their orbit. Again, this meeting in Japan is an important forum for these countries to come together. You know, let's say Japan, Australia, and New Zealand can provide particular resources to the small Tuvalous and Vanuatu and so forth. And we'll see what happens. As I say, it is a great race type of image that's emerging from this area. And China is in it for keeps. And I think you're starting to see Australia certainly and Japan really step up. Okay, Carla, let's take it all back to Paris. Shall we? We'll always have Paris after all. And previously, when we were in Paris on this podcast, we deliberated if the French snap parliamentary elections could actually alter the France's political landscape in a rightward direction in particular. So changes occurred in the runoff, but not in the way most expected. During the second round of voting, the national popular front, which is a coalition of leftists and environmentalists parties, took the lead. Macron's together movement came in second, and Marine Le Pen's national rally came in third in terms of the number of seats. National rally actually had the highest percentage of votes at 37%. But because of a electoral maneuver, this coalition of leftists was able to come ahead. So can you talk a little bit about this process, what's going on in France, and whether this coalition is going to be able to govern and pull together some sort of a coalition? You know, Macron, this was the snap elections. He didn't consult with anybody. But this was, we talked about this was this big gamble after the EU parliamentary elections in which the right did so well in France and in Germany and other places. Macron said, "Okay, you guys, you got it out of your system. Let's pull it together here, and I'm going to give you a real choice." And all the polls suggested that this was really a big mistake on his part. And when the first round came around, it showed it was a really big mistake because lots of people turned out to vote for the right, and then people woke up in France. And it did not turn out as disastrously as the polls predicted in the second round. And that is because of the rare willingness of politicians in France to set aside their egos. And in the second round vote, in three-way races, the weaker candidates, either from the left or central parties, dropped out to avoid splitting the anti-right vote. And they ended up blocking the right-wing candidates in lots of these different races. And you don't really see self-abnegating politicians very often in any country. And we've seen this strategy before in France. It's called the Republican front, but it worked. That's good right now. There will not be a far-right government in France this time around. But let's not forget that Le Pen's far-right party still increased its number of seats in the lower house from 89 and 2022 to 143. So it is not time to let down our guard. That's a quarter of all seats, so it's significant, yes. The left-wing coalition came in first, and Macron's ensemble, as you said, came in second. What those numbers mean also is that no party has the 289 seat majority. And the big question now is whether Macron, and under the Constitution, it's the president who is supposed to do this, can put together and keep together a government that can actually run the country. You know, coalition governments are common in parliamentary systems in Europe and lots of other places, and they're not necessarily the most stable ways to govern. And Politico noted it took Germany more than 10 weeks and 166-page document to negotiate its current government, and it took the Belgians almost two years to put together coalition government with seven parties. But the French don't have a history of governing by coalitions, and in fact Macron's government, up until this election, was a minority government, no coalition there. But it looks like now the coalition is what Macron wants, and he sent a letter to the French people that was published today, Thursday in regional papers, and he said it would take a little time to build what he called a broad gathering of "republican forces" to form a coalition government. He also said that no one won the snap elections. Now, the left-wing coalition is incensed about this, and they say they have the largest number of seats, which means that they should have the right to choose the next prime minister. And they say they'll name one soon. But, you know, so far there's really no sign that this coalition can even agree on a candidate. And keep in mind, this isn't a party, this is a coalition of parties, and they didn't even exist before these snap elections. They pulled together solely for this vote. They go all the way from socialists and Greens, and this far-left party itself that's, you know, France Unbowed, led by a guy. You don't see a single story that describes this, it doesn't describe as a fire breath. This guy Jean-Luc Melanchon. You know, I can't imagine how this coalition is going to hold together. I can't imagine how they're going to come up with a candidate that they can agree on. They do share some policy positions, but there's no leader. And so we will see Macron seems to want to strip away the more moderate members of the left coalition and begin a dialogue. But for him to put together a government that could actually work, a coalition actually work, he's going to have to give up a lot of policies that are near and dear to him. I mean, one thing that this left coalition all agrees on is they want to do away with his pension reform. They want to lower the retirement age again. They want to increase the minimum wage. They want to freeze the prices of essential goods, food, energy, and gas. And this really, really goes against everything Macron believes in. And it also goes against what the EU wants. France is already in big trouble for deficit spending. So we'll see. And final point is that one thing that everybody pretty much in France seems to agree on. Nobody likes Macron. And he's going to Iran at least another three years, barring any other dramatic events in France. But I am struck Carla by this sense of, hooray, we held off the right surge. But oh my God, we can't govern. Because the images are showing people out in the streets waving French flags, the sense of relief and unity and so forth. And yet behind it all is a governance problem. And we've seen our share during the Macron years and before that of French protest, really, really stirring ones. It wasn't too long ago, for example. And a lot of these were in response to some of these policies, you mentioned, Carla. So for him to go back into that and dive into that, it just seems very difficult. Even though he does, as president, possess a lot of powers, right? I mean, he still has the ability to conduct foreign and defense policy with a good amount of authority. And he has some constitutional powers to override parliament. Is that right? He does. And that's how he did the pension reform. He jammed it down their throat. He did it without a vote in the lower house. But then people were out in the street. Some people are already saying that the far left of this coalition, which has the largest number of seats in the coalition, that, you know, won, saying that, you know, they're going to go back into the street if they don't get their candidate and as prime minister. So we'll see, we could see people back in the street over that. I think Macron's strategy is he wants to strip away the socialists. He wants to strip away the Greens, what he calls you, republican forces, and try to get some sort of coalition government, which will build on what you're saying, this relief that they don't have the extreme right. And what he considers the extreme and anti-Semitic left in the coalition as well, and Macron has certainly made anti-Semitic comments. And so we'll see whether he can pull it off. If people liked him more, it might be easier. And he's not a guy who's known for compromising, and he is going to have to compromise on some really fundamental domestic issues. And he's caught also between his ego and his, you know, fundamental fiscal beliefs. And he's also got a lot of pressure from the EU, as I said, deficit spending. The EU says that they're supposed to keep their deficit below 3%, they're at 5%. And all the things at the parties he wants to strip away from the NPF want would require a lot more deficit spending. We'll see. Is France ungovernable? Let's hope not, because we certainly need France as an ally for Ukraine and for a stable Europe, so... Second biggest EU economy, yep. We will see. Bob, it's time to discuss our audience figure of the week. This is the figure listeners vote on every Tuesday and Wednesday at CFR_org's Instagram story. This week, Bob, our audience selected "Reformance, Possession", is Iran's president-elect? A rare bit of good news? The results of Iran's elections were a true surprise. Why did the religious elite let him win? And is there any hope he can make any change in Iran? A short answer, probably not. No. But hope springs eternal, and it's interesting how often it springs up when Iran elects a, you know, take your pick, reformist, moderate pragmatist. That was a term we heard under the Rouhani administration not too long ago. These are people who can, you know, nudge around the edges, but the power structures, such as they are in Iran, and again, most power emanates from the supreme leader, are hard-line. And those power structures did permit possession into Iran, and it was an intentional move. They weeded out a lot of other people, and people who were so-called moderates, who were a lot more conservative than possession. But I think this is a concern. This is something our colleague, Raitake, has written about and talked about a lot, which is the regime values the legitimacy that these elections bring. And the turnout was getting really jarringly low. The first round of these elections was, like, 40 percent. Pasekian emerged as one of the three candidates remaining, and it shot up to about close to 50 percent turnout for the runoff. And Pasekian is saying many of the right things. He's not out there calling for radical changes, but he is saying that, you know, the hijab law is too restrictive. Now, let's see what kind of leeway he has in really loosening up the enforcement of that, but he has been saying that that was a campaign issue. He's talking about, in positive ways, largely Iran nuclear deal, which, when it was in effect for the brief period, eased up sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran allowing controls on its nuclear enrichment program, which it continues to profess is for civilian purposes only. So will he bring back the former foreign ministers, Yvonne Zarif, who was the foreign minister who negotiated that deal? Will he come back as foreign minister? Possibly. He was certainly out there campaigning very strongly, and they're not basically saying, by the way, that Iran's going to yield all sorts of concessions to get back into the nuclear deal. They're still going to expect what the Reisi government expect, the Ibrahim Reisi government, which was that the U.S. would come back into compliance with the deal. That's going to be really hard to do without some sort of gestures from Iran. So it's a difficult road. He certainly cuts a different figure from Ibrahim Reisi. Reisi, again, as a reminder, was killed in a helicopter crash. He was more front and center of the regime. He was even rumored to be someone in the running for succeeding the Supreme Leader, who, by the way, is about 85 years old. And possession is not that. He is not part of the hard line judiciary, for example, that Reisi was. He's a heart surgeon. He was a health minister previously. Again, he's someone who is a somewhat even bland figure. He's an ethnic Azare and Kurt, who got a lot of support from those constituencies, of which there are many, by the way, in Iran. So he comes from a different part of society. Again, seen as non-threatening, and he was allowed, and it was a very tough gatekeeping process that allowed him to run. So I think he's seen as controllable. We might see some changes by degree. It's not like Iran's going to rein in its axis of resistance or suddenly turn over a new leave. So the things I've read suggest that he will have next to no control over international issues, other than suggesting that he wants to resume discussions over the reviving the Iran nuclear deal, which actually is supposed to run out right now. But I don't know how you start the clock, since it's been in advance for such a long period of time. And let's face it. I mean, this deal was supposed to put off Iran's breakout ability, its ability to have enough field to produce a bomb within a year. And now betting as it's got enough field to produce three or four weapons within days or weeks. So how you roll that back, I mean, the goal obviously would be to get Iran to ferry stuff out. That's a big step. There's a lot there. And then, of course, what hangs over this is the possibility of Trump's reelection. So there's a lot of wishing and hoping, and we will see about that. But he's not going to have, as you said, a lot of control over the axis of resistance. But he also has been quoted as talking about how Iran is, you know, in too tight with the Russians, and that it's lost a lot of its autonomy with the Russians. I mean, the Russians, Iran has been supplying drones to the Russians, played a pretty fundamental role in Russia's ability to deploy drones in Ukraine itself. I mean, he says a lot of the right things, and it's remarkable that they let him even run, saying a lot of the right things. And his position on the hijab, from my understanding, has been that women should have a choice on the hijab. That's a pretty radical position to take. So I keep coming back to why do they let him run? Maybe it just comes down to who they thought they could control him. Yeah, I really think that seems to be the case, Karla. They feel like he's not someone who has a commands a strong constituency on his own, not hugely charismatic, per se. And has said all the right things, even while saying these other things, has said all the right things about supporting the Supreme Leader and, you know, sort of doubling down on Iran's sort of form of governance and so forth. You know, I think one of the other things that Iran watchers are going to be checking out soon in the weeks ahead as he's inaugurated is who he picks for his cabinet. Will he pick a woman? Will there be a woman who's outspoken on issues like the hijab, for example? Will there be other sort of non-traditional people who are part of this cabinet in terms of coming from ethnic minorities, or even it's been mentioned, possibly a Sunni Muslim could be part of the cabinet? That would be a very interesting sign, because again, those types of things usually, you know, one expects they would have the blessing of the Supreme Leader, but I think this election was about getting more people out to vote. And people are angry about the state of the economy, this sort of Iran-in-a-box syndrome, and the deep, deep corruption that pervades some of the senior figures. And I think they see possession as somebody who's at least worth a try and just comes from a different background and, you know, might hold some keys to some path out of this. Because Jelili, Said Jelili, an arch-hardliner who was his main opponent, was about doubling down on making common calls with Russia and China stood up to the West, and very much against, you know, any sort of reopening the nuclear deal and so forth. So, you know, I do think it's a situation where the regime feels like it can inch ahead. What's also going to be fascinating, though, is this issue of a succession to the Supreme Leader. He's very old, he has been said to be ailing for a while, and what is that process going to be like, and how much is that going to affect the countries moving forward? Because Supreme Leader, as the name says, could be someone who comes in and issues a fatwa about the nuclear program, for example, and that could change the whole situation. So, much to watch on the Iran front this summer, Carla. Well, I still, being hopeful about Iran is probably a losing game, but the fact that they let him run, the fact that they let him win, is either cynically because they thought they could control him. But also, perhaps because they're a little bit afraid of their own people, and the potential for protests in the street, you know, stealing this election overtly from him would potentially have had a pretty bad backlash. So, if he were a savvy political player, maybe he could build a constituency. But that's probably naive, but I want to believe that, so let's hope. Well, we'll come back to this many times, I'm sure, Carla. And that's our look at the world next week. Here's some other stories to keep an eye on. Rwanda holds general elections. The KOPA America Soccer Tournament final takes place in Miami. Who do you want to win, Carla? Not my area, although I am a Miami. Just say Lionel Messi, and you'll be fine. Although my daughter who's Chilean is already mourning about this, yes. For the record, it's Argentina and Colombia, so I'm saying Argentina is likely to win this. And finally, new UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, will host the European political community, made up of 50 leaders from across Europe. Please subscribe to The World Next Week on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcast, and leave us a review while you're at it. We appreciate the feedback. If you'd like to reach out, please email us at T W N W at CFR.org. The publications mentioned this episode, as well as the transcript of our conversation are listed on the podcast page for The World Next Week on CFR.org. Please note that opinions expressed on The World Next Week are silly, those of the hosts not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's program was produced by Esther Fang with director of podcasting Gabriel Sierra, and special thanks to Helena Copans Johnson, Welcome Helena, Emily Al Smith, and Kennedy Mangus for their research assistance. Our theme music is provided by Marcus Zacharya, and this is Carla Robbins saying so long. And this is Bob McMahon saying goodbye, and be careful out there. [MUSIC] [ Silence ]
