The Moscow Murders and More

Charles Kenyatta Has His Certificate Of Default Against Diddy Vacated By The Judge (1/2/25)

In the case of Kenyatta v. Combs et al., No. 1:2024cv06923, the plaintiff, Charles Kenyatta Jr., filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against defendants Sean Combs and Bad Boy Entertainment (BBE). Kenyatta alleged that BBE was served on October 4, 2024, and subsequently obtained a Certificate of Default when BBE did not respond. BBE moved to vacate this default, contending that service was deficient and that the court lacked personal jurisdiction

Upon review, the court found that the summons served lacked the Clerk's signature and seal, rendering the service improper and depriving the court of personal jurisdiction over BBE. Additionally, the court determined that BBE's default was not willful, that vacating the default would not prejudice the plaintiff, and that BBE had presented potentially meritorious defenses. Consequently, the court granted BBE's motion to vacate the Certificate of Default.

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source:

gov.uscourts.nysd.628369.42.0.pdf

Duration:: 10m
Broadcast on:: 02 Jan 2025
Audio Format:: other

What's up, everyone, and welcome to another episode of the Diddy Diaries. In this episode, we're going to take a look at the memorandum and opinion and order of Judge Total in regards to Charles Kenyatta and his lawsuit filed against Diddy. Case number 24-CV-6923. Charles Kenyatta Jr., plaintiff, against Sean Combs, etc., the defendants. John G. Coddle, district judge. The plaintiff, Charles Kenyatta Jr., brought this action against the defendant, Sean Combs and Bad Boy Entertainment, alleging trademark infringement. The clerk of the court issued a summons for BBE, and the plaintiff filed an affidavit of service asserting that BBE has been served. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a proposed certificate of default, and the clerk issued the certificate of default. BBE now moves to vacate the certificate of default, alleging that the service was deficient, and the court lacked personal jurisdiction over BBE. One, on September 6, 2024, the plaintiff filed a complaint in this action, ECF number one. Because the court approved the plaintiff's motion to proceed and form a "pauperous," the court issued an order authorizing the plaintiff to rely on the court and the U.S. martial service to affect service on defendants. ECF numbers 10 and 11. On October 8, 2024, the clerk of the court issued a summons for BBE, ECF number 13. On October 26, 2024, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of service asserting that service on BBE was affected on October 4, 2024, four days before the clerk of the court issued the assigned summons. On October 29, 2024, when BBE had not yet responded to the complaint, the plaintiff filed a proposed certificate of default followed by a declaration requesting the entry of the certificate of default. ECF numbers 17 and 18. In the declaration, the plaintiff stated that he served defendant, Bad Boy Entertainment LLC, on 10/4/2024, ECF number 18. On October 30, 2024, the clerk of the court issued certificate of default, ECF number 19. BBE now moves to vacate the certificate of default alleging that service was deficient, and the court therefore lacked personal jurisdiction over BBE and cannot issue a certificate of default. ECF number 24. Alternatively, BBE alleges that the certificate of default should be set aside for good cause. Unless otherwise noted, this memorandum opinion and order, amidst all alterations, emissions, emphasis, quotations, marks, and citations, quoted in the text. 2. The disposition of motions for entries of defaults and default judgments and relief from the same, under Rule 55(c) are left to the sound discretion of the district court. Enron Oil Corporation vs. Diacora, 10F.3D9095 Second Circuit 1993. BBE moves to vacate the certificate of default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c). A district court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, Fedarsiv P55. To evaluate whether good cause exists, courts consider three factors. One, whether the default was willful, two, whether setting aside the default would prejudice the adversary, and three, whether a meritist defense is presented. Enron Oil Corporation, 10F.3D, at 96. Moreover, because defaults are generally disfavored and are reserved for rare occasions, when doubt exists as to whether a default should be granted or vacated, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party, IDN96. See also New York v. Green 420, F.3D99, 104 Second Circuit 2005. Expressing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits. 3. In this case, the plaintiff concedes in his opposition, brief, that the summons lack the clerk of the court's signature in seal. See opposition memorandum at 7, ECF No. 30. The summons, therefore, did not comply with the requirements of federal rule of procedure for C, which provides that a summons must be served with a copy of the complaint, or Rule 4A1F through G, which requires that a summons must be signed by the clerk and bear the court's seal. The court, therefore, lack the personal jurisdiction over the defendant necessary to issue the certificate of default. Planktiff's argument that the court has personal jurisdiction over BBE because of BBE's contacts with the foreign state is unavailing, because proper service of process is an independent prerequisite to the court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See omni-cap International Limited, Burs Rudolph Wolfen Company, 484 U.S. 97, 104, 1987. Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied. Moreover, good cause justifies setting aside the certificate of default. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed a preference for resolving disputes on the merits, C Green, 420F.3D at 104, and defendant BBE appears ready to defend the case. The Planktiff also contends that he served BBE's attorney via certified mail on October 18, 2024. Memorandum at 6, however, BBE never authorized Defense Council to accept service for BBE. Nor can actual notice of suit cure a failure to comply with the statutory requirements for serving process, Sarter v. Toussaint, 70F.Appendix 11/13 Second Circuit, 2002. The Planktiff has also felt to show that any prejudice has resulted from the brief period of delay in the case. See David v. Musler, 713F.2D907, 9/16 Second Circuit, 1983. Delay alone is not a sufficient basis for establishing prejudice, rather it must be shown that delay will result in the loss of evidence, create increased difficulties of discovery, or provide greater opportunity for fraud and collusion. The Planktiff filed this action in September of 2024, ECF #1. The clerk of the court issued the certificate of default only five days after the Planktiff contends a response to the complaint was due. See ECF #19. BBE moved to vacate the certificate of default only one day after it was issued, see ECF #22. Any delay was exceedingly brief and the Planktiff is not shown that he suffered any prejudice. The other two good cause factors also favor BBE. First, the Planktiff offers no support for his assertion that BBE's alleged default was willful. Meanwhile, BBE contends that it was unaware that the Planktiff had purportedly affected service. Under the standard for emotion to vacate a default, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party. See Enron Oil 10F.3D at 96 and pursuant to that standard, this court concludes that BBE's delay was not willful. Second, BBE has proffered several defenses on the merits and the standard for asserting. A meritist defense is not demanding. See American All Insurance Company versus Eagle Insurance Company 92F.3D5761 Second Circuit 1996. To satisfy the criterion of a meritist defense, the defense need not to ultimately persuasive a defense's meritist if it is a good law so as to give the fact finders some determination to make. Accordingly, there is good cause to set aside the Certificate of Default. Conclusion. The court is considered all of the arguments raised. To the extent not specifically addressed above, the arguments are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to vacate is granted. The Clerk is directed to vacate the Certificate of Default. See ECF #17. The Clerk is also directed to close ECF #22. The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion in order to the prosay, plaintiff and note such mailing on the docket. So ordered November 20th, 2024 and it was signed by Judge Kotal. And as far as Mr. Kenyatta's lawsuit goes, that's pretty much all we have our hands on as far as court documents as of now. But obviously, once we have some more, if we have some more, those bad boys will be added to the catalog right along with the rest of them. But I would expect that there is going to be a lot more of these lawsuits coming down the pike. And when we're talking about Mr. Pines, for example, I haven't even gotten my hands on that one yet. So obviously, when we get that lawsuit and the documents to take a look at, we'll get them added as well. Because that foundation that we've talked about from the very beginning, well, it's starting to take shape. And when you have a strong foundation to build your case upon like these investigators seem to have, it usually ends up in a conviction. But obviously, there's a lot that can go down between now and then, and considering what we've seen so far, I would say that it's a good bet that whatever can go down will go down as this story continues to move forward. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box.