The Moscow Murders and More

The Docket: The Government Responds To Maxwell's Attempt At Appeal (Parts 4-6) (1/1/25)

In response to Ghislaine Maxwell's appeal, the United States government submitted a brief urging the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold her conviction and sentence. The government contended that Maxwell's arguments lacked merit, emphasizing that her prosecution was not barred by Jeffrey Epstein's 2007 non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with the Southern District of Florida. They argued that the NPA did not extend immunity to Maxwell for crimes prosecuted in the Southern District of New York, asserting that her conviction was based on substantial evidence demonstrating her pivotal role in facilitating Epstein's sexual abuse of minors.

Additionally, the government's brief addressed Maxwell's claims of juror misconduct and alleged procedural errors during the trial. They maintained that the district court had appropriately handled these issues, ensuring Maxwell's right to a fair trial was preserved. The government further argued that the sentence imposed was reasonable and proportionate to the severity of her offenses. Ultimately, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Maxwell's conviction and sentence, rejecting her appeal and supporting the government's position.

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Duration:: 39m
Broadcast on:: 01 Jan 2025
Audio Format:: other

What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode we're going to pick up where we left off, with the United States brief in response to Elaine Maxwell in her attempt at an appeal. Number 3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a hearing. Finally, Maxwell argues that the District Court, erred by denying remotions to dismiss, without an evidentiary hearing. That is Judge Nathan explained the cases cited by Maxwell in support of a request for a hearing, mostly involved oral arguments, where there was no written record of the full set of terms reached by the parties, and all of which involved defendants with first-hand knowledge of the negotiations. This is no such case. The NPA's terms are clear. Furthermore, Maxwell had an unusually large amount of information about the NPA's negotiation history in the form of the OPR report yet identifies no evidence that the Department of Justice made any promises not contained in the NPA. Here as below, Maxwell's further request for a hearing rests on mere conjecture, Judge Nathan did not abuse her discretion. Point number 2. The District Court correctly concluded that the charges were timely. In 2003, Congress extended the Statue of Limitations for offenses involving the sexual or false physical abuse of a minor to allow prosecution so long as the victim remains alive. US Code 18, Section 3283, attempting to undermine the clear legislative intent, Maxwell, argues that the amendment did not apply to her case because her crimes both predated the amendment and did not involve sexual abuse. These arguments fly in the face of the statutory text, legislative history, this Court's own decisions and the persuasive authority of other circuits. The charges fell squarely within the amended Statue of Limitations, and this Court should affirm Judge Nathan's well-reasoned decisions denying Maxwell's motions to dismiss the charges as untimely. A. Applicable Law One standard of review. This Court reviews Dinovo both the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment and the application of a statute of limitations (United States v. Samson, 898, F.3D, 270, 276, 278, 2nd Circuit, 2018), 2 statutes of limitations for offenses against children, US Code 18, Section 3283, and Child Abduction and Sex Offences, US Code 18, Section 3299. First federal, non-capital offenses carry a five-year statute of limitations, C.U.S. Code 18, Section 3282A. In 1990, Congress enacted a provision titled "Extension of Child Statute of Limitations," which provided that no statute of limitation, that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse of a child under the age of 18, shall preclude such a prosecution before the child reaches the age of 25. The Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub.L #101-647, Title II, Section 225A, 104, S.T.A.T. 4789, 4798, codified at US Code 18, Section 3509K, 1990. This provision extended the federal criminal limitation period for child sex abuse offenses, making it easier to prosecute offenders who commit sex crimes that may be difficult to detect quickly. Winegarten vs. United States, 865F.3D 4854, 2nd Circuit, 2017. In 1994, Congress recotified this provision, moving it to US Code 18, Section 3283 with identical language. Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L #103-322, Title 33, Section 330018A. Statute 108, 1796, 2149, codified at US Code 18, Section 3283, 1994. Within a decade, Congress began to view even the extended statute of limitations period in 1994 version of the 3283 as inadequate in many cases because it released from criminal liability sex abusers whose crimes were not brought to the attention of federal authorities until after their victims turned 25. Winegarten, 865, F.3D at 54. Accordingly, in 2003, Congress enacted a provision titled "No Statute of Limitations for Child Abduction and Sex Crimes," which amended Section 3283 to read, "No Statute of Limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child under the age of 18 shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child," prosecutorial remedies and tools against the exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, the Protect Act, Pub.L #10821, Title 2, Section 202, 117, Statute 650, 660, codified at US Code 18, Section 3283, 2003. In 2006, Congress enacted a provision titled "Longer Statute of Limitations for Human Trafficking Related Offences," and subtitled "Modification of Statute applicable to offense against children," which further amended Section 3283 to its current form to permit the prosecution of such offenses during the lifetime of the victim or ten years after the offense, whichever is longer. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub.L #109-162, Title 11, Section 1182C, 119, Statute, 2960-3126, codified at US Code 18, Section 3283-2006. Later in 2006, Congress enacted US Code 18, Section 3299, in a provision titled "No Limitation for Prosecution of Felony Sex Offences," which provides that notwithstanding any other law, an indictment may be found or any information instituted at any time without limitation for any offense under Section 1201, involving a minor victim, and for any felony under Chapter 109A and 10, except for Section 2257 and 2257A, or 117, or Section 1591. The Adam Walsh, Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub.L #109-248, Title 2, Section 211-120, Statute 587-616, codified at US Code 18, Section 3299-2006. 3, Retroactivity Under Land Graph. In Land Graph v. USI Film Products, 511, US244-1994, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part framework for determining whether a statute may be applied retroactively. At the first step, if Congress expressly prescribed that a statute applies retroactively to the antecedent conduct, the inquiry ends in the court enforces a statute as it is written, saved for constitutional concerns. The statute is ambiguous, or contains no express command regarding retroactivity, then the court must turn to the second step, where a reviewing court must determine whether applying the statute to the antecedent conduct would create presumptively impermissible retroactive effects. If it would, then the court shall not apply the statute retroactively absent clear congressional intent to the contrary. If it would not, then the court shall apply the statute to antecedent conduct. b. The discussion. 1. There was no impermissible retroactivity in applying Section 3283 to Maxwell. Maxwell's claims at the district court erred by applying Section 3283's 2003 amendment to her six counts of conviction (i.e., count 3, 4, and 6 because they involve conduct that predated the amendment). As an initial matter, this argument ignores the fact that Count 3 and 6 both charge continuing offenses that continued into 2004, thus post-dating Section 3283's amendment. Moreover, under the land graph framework, in the 2003 amendment properly applies to preenactment criminal conduct that still could have been timely prosecuted at the time of the enactment as was the case here (a). There was no retroactivity as to Count 3 and 6. As an initial matter, Count 3 and 6 both charge conduct that continued through 2004 (i.e., after the 2003 amendment to Section 3283), and thus present no retroactivity concerns. For conspiracy charges requiring proof of an overt act, including US Code 18, Section 371, the conspiracy statute at issue here, the statute of limitations, runs from the date of the last overt act, in furtherance of the conspiracy, United States v. Monaco 194, F.3D 381, 387, and .2, Second Circuit, 1999. According to the United States v. Ben Zivi 242, F.3D 8997, Second Circuit, 2001. Similarly for a continuing, substantive offense, the statute of limitations only begins to run out when the crime is complete, meaning when the conduct has run its course, United States v. Apolito 543, F.3D 2546, Second Circuit, 2008. Here the indictment alleged the conspiracy charged in Count 3, and the sex trafficking offense charged in Count 6 continued through 2004 (a. 127-132, c. 123-124, 131-32, describing conduct through 2004, involving victim 4), thus the statute of limitations for these two counts, did not begin to run until 2004, well after Congress enacted the 2003 amendment to Section 3283. Maxwell's arguments about retroactivity are therefore "inapplicable" to Count 3 and 6, b. Applying Section 3283 to Maxwell complies with Landgraph. Furthermore, under the Landgraph framework, the 2003 amendment to Section 3283 properly applies to pre-enactment conduct for which the statute of limitations had not expired at the time the amendment was passed. Because the statute of limitations had not expired when Congress amended Section 3283 in 2003, that amendment extended the limitations period for prosecuting Maxwell rendering the charges timely. Aye, Landgraph, step 1. At step 1 of the Landgraph analysis, the question is whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. Landgraph 511 U.S. at 280. When evaluating Congress' intent, at step 1, this court has considered both statutory text and legislative history. In re-enter, Mort Acceptance Company, Secretary Litigation Enterprise, 391 F.3D 401, 406 and 408, Second Circuit 2004. Here the text in history of Section 3283 established that Congress intended to extend the time to bring charges of child sexual abuse in cases where the limitation periods had not yet expired. Prior to 2003, any child sex abuse offense could be prosecuted until the victim reached the age of 25 years, at which point the statute of limitations then in effect would bar prosecution. In 2003's amendment, which was titled "No Statute of Limitations for Child Abductions and Sex Crimes," pub L #108-21, Section 202-117, Statute 660, Congress explicitly provided that "no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for such an offense shall preclude such prosecution during the life of a child," U.S. Code 18, Section 3283, 2003. The amendment draws no distinction between pre-enactment and post-enactment conduct. Instead, as Judge Nathan explained by stating that "no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply." The amendment's plain language, unambiguously, requires that it apply to prosecutions for offenses committed before the date of enactment. Thus, the breadth of the text shows that Congress intended to extend the statute of limitations even for pre-enactment conduct. Reaching same conclusions as Section 3283's predecessor based on similar title and wording of statute, CF Enterprise 391 F.3D at 407, describing provision that "no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed," as example of statute reflecting clear, congressional intent to "apply" to pre-enactment conduct. Legislative history confirms this conclusion. In initially enacting a special statute of limitations for child sex abuse offenses, Congress sought to make it easier to prosecute offenders who commit sex crimes that may be difficult to detect quickly. Weingarten, 865, F.3D at 54, but that limitation period proved to be inadequate in many cases. HR Conference Number 108-66 at 54 Tellingly, the conference report offered the example of a child rapist who cannot be prosecuted because he was identified as the perpetrator one day after the victim turned 25. Given that Congress bemoaned those offenders who escaped prosecution because the limitation period had expired, there is every reason to believe that it intended to preserve the ability to prosecute pre-enactment offenders whose limitation period had not yet expired. See the United States v. Sure Chief, 438 F.3D, 920, 924, 9 circuit 2006. Concluding that in enacting the 2003 amendment, Congress "events to clear intent to extend the limitations period." Maxwell notes that Congress considered and rejected a retroactivity clause before enacting the 2003 amendment. But, as Judge Nathan recognized, the legislative history makes clear that Congress abandoned the retroactivity provision because it would have produced unconstitutional results. A. 152, discussing co-sponsor remarks expressing concern that the proposed retroactivity provision was a doubtful constitutionality because it would have revived the government's authority to prosecute crimes that were previously time barred. Thus, the rejection of the retroactivity clause shows only that Congress intended to limit the protect act to its constitutional applications, including past conduct, like Maxwell's, on which the statute of limitations had not yet expired. The reach of the 2003 amendment to Section 3283 is clear, because Congress has expressly extended the statute of limitations to pre-enactment conduct, Judge Nathan correctly resolved this analysis at Landgraph Step 1. In the alternative, however, the statute is, at worst, ambiguous. If the court takes that view, it should proceed to Landgraph Step 2, which examines the retroactive effects of the statute. 2. Landgraph Step 2. As the Supreme Court explained in Landgraph, even absent specific legislative authorization, applying a statute to pre-enactment conduct is unquestionably proper in many situations. 511 U.S. at 273. A statute does not operate retrospectively merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct and to dating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based on prior law. I.D. at 269. Instead, the question is whether the statute would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increased a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. I.D. at 280. Importantly, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make the application of the rule at trial retroactive. Because parties have diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure, and because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct. I.D. at 275. In Vernon v. Casadaga Valley Central School District 49. F.3D. 886. Second Circuit 1995. This court considered a new statute of limitations that shortened the time to file certain discrimination claims and held that applying the new statute in a case filed after its enactment but arising out of events that predate its enactment is not impermissibly retroactive under land-graph. I.D. at 889 and 90. As the court explained, the conduct to which the statute of limitations applies is not the primary conduct of the defendants, the alleged discrimination, but is instead the secondary conduct of the plaintiffs, the filing of their suit. I.D. at 890, the 2003 amendment to Section 3283 likewise applies, only to the secondary conduct of filing a criminal case. It does not apply to the primary conduct of Maxwell's child sexual abuse by, for example, modifying the elements of an offense to criminalize conduct that previously had not constituted a crime, C.I.D. at 891. Land-graph and other cases, continents treating statutes of limitations differently from statutory provisions that affect substantive rights. Thus, like the new statute in Vernon, the 2003 amendment impaired no rights possessed by either party, increased neither party's liability, nor opposed any new duties with respect to past transactions. I.D. at 890. Enterprise does not alter this conclusion. Therefore, this court considered whether an amended statute of limitations operated to revive already expired securities fraud claims. Enterprise, 391, F.3D at 405. While acknowledging that under Vernon, retroactive application of a revised statute of limitations generally does not have an impermissible retroactive effect, the court concluded that the resurrection of previously time-barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect. I.D. at 409 and 410, emphasis removed. Enterprise has no application here as a limitations period for the charges against Maxwell did not expire before the statute of limitations was extended. Thus, unlike Enterprise, where a resurrection of expired claims would have stripped defendants of a complete affirmative defense they previously possessed. I.D. at 410. Here, Maxwell never possessed that complete defense. Judge Nathan correctly concluded that the 2003 amendment accordingly did not deprive Maxwell of any vested rights. To be sure, this court has observed that there may be "colorable arguments that the logic of Enterprise extends to criminal cases where the defendant's statute of limitations defense had not vested when the limitations period was extended because the extension increases the period of time during which a defendant can be sued, thereby increasing a defendant's liability for past conduct." Winegarten, 865, F.3D, at 57. See also, United States v. Miller, 911, F.3D, 638, 644, 646, for a circuit, 2018. Discussing potential defense arguments. But such a claim runs headlong into the vast weight of retroactivity decisions, which recognize that revoking a vested statute of limitations defense is different from retroactively extending the filing period for his still viable claim. Winegarten, 865, F.3D, at 57. For example, in the criminal context, there is a consensus that extending a limitations period before prosecution is time barred does not run a foul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, Cruz v. Mipa, 773, F.3D, 138, 145, 4th Circuit, 2014. See also, Stogner, 539, U.S. and 632, holding that ex post facto clause, does not prevent the state from extending time limits for prosecutions, not yet time barred. As this court explained long ago, while it is unfair and dishonest for the government to assure a man that he has become safe from the pursuit, but then withdraw its assurance, it is permissible to extend a statute of limitations while the chase is on. Valtter v. United States, 23F.2D, 420, 426, 2nd Circuit, 1928, El Hange. These ex post facto cases are particularly instructive here because land graph and the ex post facto clause are informed by the same retroactivity concerns. Cruz, 773, F.3D at 145, see also land graph 511, U.S. at 266, citing the ex post facto clause as an expression as the entire retroactivity principle it was applying. Thus, applying section 3283's 2003 amendment to Maxwell's unexpired charges is permissible under land graph. As the 10th Circuit recently explained with respect to the very same statute of limitations at issue here, by extending the unexpired statute of limitations, Congress did not increase defendant's exposure to prosecution retroactively. It did not raise the penalty for the charge defense, it did not redefine the offense to make it easier to establish, it did not expose defendant to criminal prosecution anew, it merely altered the ongoing charging period for the conduct that had already exposed him to criminal prosecution. Defendant was subject to indictment in 2002 before the statutes of limitations were extended and he remained the subject to indictment in 2007 once the changes were made. A dead charge was not resurrected and the underlying nature of defendant's potential criminal liability remained the same. United States versus Piatt, 45F for a circuit 1142, 1161 and 62, 10 circuit 2022. The decisions of other courts of appeals are in accord. Sure Chief, 438, F.3D at 922 through 25, Jeffries 405, F.3D at 685. Maxwell cites United States vs. Richardson 512, 2D 105, 3rd circuit 1975 and 2 district court decisions that are bound to follow it, BR 58 and 59. But Richardson, which was decided before land graph, is inconsistent with land graph. United States vs. Nader 425, F.SUPP 3D 619, 630, Eastern District, Virginia 2019. Specifically Richardson, focused on whether Congress expressed a clear intention to overcome the presumption against retroactivity. 512, F.2D at 106, without engaging in land graph second step, i.e., considering whether the statute would have retroactive effect, land graph 511 US at 280. Moreover, unlike the 2003 amendment, the statute at issue and Richardson did not expressly provide that no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of the relevant offense shall preclude prosecution under terms of the amended statute. In sum, the statute of limitations for the charges in the indictment had not yet expired when the 2003 amendment to Section 3283 extended the limitations period, and Judge Nathan correctly determined that applying the 2003 amendment in this case does not create impermissible retroactive effects. Therefore, step 2 of land graph is satisfied, and Section 3283 applies retroactively. See, Winegarden 865, F.3D at 55. If a statute would not create impermissible retroactive effects, then the court should apply the statute to antecedent conduct. Accordingly, the charges were timely. 2, Section 3283 reaches counts 3 and 4. Maxwell separately argues that Section 3283 does not apply to count 3 and 4 because neither is an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse of a child. Maxwell contends that these counts, which charged her with transporting a minor with intent that the minor engage in illegal sexual activity and conspiracy to do the same, are not offenses involving the sexual abuse of a child because a completed sex acts is not an essential element of either charge. But Maxwell does not dispute that the evidence at trial established that her commission of counts 3 and 4 involve completed sex acts abusing one or more minor victims. Nor could she, as Jane testified, that she was in fact sexually abused when transported across state lines, including to New York as a minor. Instead, Maxwell insists that counts 3 and 4 do not involve sexual abuse of a child because a completed sex act is not an element of those crimes. This argument misreads the relevant statutes and legislative history and runs contrary to the decision of this court and other courts of appeals. A, counts 3 and 4 are offenses involving the sexual abuse of a child. Maxwell's entire argument is based on a mistaken premise, that the phrase offense involving the sexual abuse of a child, US Code 18, Section 3283 only encompasses crime in which unlawful sexual activity actually took place. This flawed proposition ignores relevant statutory definitions, which make clear that Section 3283 reaches more broadly to include offenses in which there were no completed illegal sex act. As described above, Section 3283 was originally codified at US Code 18, Section 3509K. The definition of the term sexual abuse is located within the same section. For purposes of this section, the term sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children or incest with children. US Code 18, Section 3509A8, the term sexually explicit conduct is in turn defined to mean, among other things, sexual intercourse, including sexual conduct, and the term sexual contact means the intentional touching either directly or through clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks of any person with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse a gratifying sexual desire of any person. ID, Section 3509A9A. Courts have looked into the definition of sexual abuse at 4th and Section 3509A to determine whether the statute of limitations of Section 3283 applies to an offense. United States v. Carpenter 680, F.3D 1101, 1103 and 4 9 circuit 2012. We join our sister circuits in looking at subsection 3509A for a definition of sexual abuse under federal law and find it the appropriate definition to use in applying Section 3283's extended statute of limitations. The definition of sexual abuse includes not only actual sexual contact, but also the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in sexual contact. U.S. Code 18, Section 3509A. The breadth of the definition is underscored by Congress's use of the word includes In Section 3509A's text, which is significant because it makes clear that the examples enumerated in the text are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Christopher v. Smith Klein Beacham Corp. 567US1421622012, citing Burgess v. United States 552US124131 and .32008, and the text of Section 3283 goes even further beyond the definition provided in Section 3509 by covering any crime involving the sexual abuse of a child. Congress, therefore, did not require that a particular statute have actual sexual contact with a minor as an element of its offense, but rather sweat broadly to cover any crime that in any way involves sexual abuse as broadly defined. Given this expansive language, sexual abuse as defined here encompasses a wider set of behavior than just rape or other unwanted sexual touching. United States v. Schneider 801F.3D186197, 3rd Circuit 2015. Thus courts throughout the country have concluded that Section 3283 applies to a variety of offenses that do not require a sexual act between a defendant and a specific child. United States v. Vicar's #13CR128RJA 2014WL1838255 at 11, WDNY May 8, 2014, or physical contact with the victim, Carpenter 680F.3D at 1103, according to the United States v. Deal 775, 714, 720 5th Circuit 2015. Section 3283's definition thus captures crimes of intent where a perpetrator seeks to have a minor engage in sexual contact even if such sexual contact does not occur. Transportation of a minor with intent to engage in a legal sex act as charged in count 4 and conspiracy to commit the same as charged in count 3 fall comfortably within that definition. Even though a completed sex act is not required to commit those two crimes, count 4 has sexual abuse as an element because it requires the defendant to induce a child to engage in illegal sexual activity by transporting the minor across state lines with an intent that the child engage in an illegal sex act. US Code 18, Section 3509A8 and count 3 as a conspiracy to commit count 4 is an offense involving such sexual abuse, ID at 3283, C United States v. Sensi, #08CR253, WWE, 2010, WL, 2351484@2, and 3, Connecticut, June 7, 2010. Collecting cases, interpreting the term sexual abuse to encompass all crimes that would logically relate to the common understanding of sexual abuse, even when found in chapters 110, sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, and 117, transportation of illegal sexual activity and related crimes of Title 18. Schneider 801F.3D at 196 and 97. Holding that Section 3283, applied to defendant convicted of traveling with the purpose of engaging in sex with a minor victim in violation of US Code 18, Section 2423B. Accordingly, even considering only the elements of the offenses, counts 3 and 4, falls squarely within Section 3283's definition of an offense involving sexual abuse of a child. B. Maxwell's argument for use of a categorical approach lacks merit. Because counts 3 and 4 qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of a child, US Code 18, Section 3283, even without resort to the facts of the case, the court need not to address Maxwell's claim that the categorical approach applies in this context, but the arguments Maxwell advances in support of her claims are meritless in any event. Maxwell first relies on Section 3283's use of the phrase "offense involving the sexual abuse of a child," which she contends dictates looking only to the elements of the offense. But as this court has already recognized, Section 3283's text reaches beyond the offense and its legal elements to the conduct involved in the offense. A linguistic expansion that shows Congress' intent for courts to look beyond the bare legal charges in deciding whether Section 3283 applied. Weingarten, 865, F.3D at 59 and 60, see also, Nizhwin vs Holder, 557, US 29, 32, 38, 2009. Seeing that a statute that includes an offense involves phrase is consistent with the circumstance specific approach. Indeed, the Third Circuit has expressly rejected an essential ingredient test comparable to the categorical approach and instead applied case-specific analysis to determine that Section 3283 applied to travel with intent to commit an illegal sex act with a minor in violation of US Code, Section 2423B, Schneider 801F.3D at 196 and 197. Maxwell also argues that the clear weight of authority holds that statutes employing similar language should be read through a categorical rather than case-specific lens. But the decision she cites involves statutes with other features favoring the categorical approach which are notably absent here. Some cases involve statutes that define the crime of violence as an offense that either has an element, the use of physical force or by its nature involves a substantial risk of force, language that invokes an element-based approach. United States vs Davis, 139, Supreme Court, 2319, 2328, and 29, 2019. Lea Cal v. Ashcroft, 543, US, 1 in 7, 2004. Some cases concerned the definition of an aggravated felony under federal immigration law, Kawashima v. Holder, 565, US, 478, Lea Cal, 543, US, 7, a context in which the categorical approach traditionally applies because the inquiry is whether the aliens prior conviction meets the definition. Winegarten, 865F.3D at 59, and United States vs Morgan, 393F.3D 192, DC Circuit 2004 is likewise distinguishable as it involved a venue statute presenting significantly different concerns than those presented here. Maxwell also relies on a trio of cases, chief among them bridges vs United States, 346, US, 209, 1953. In bridges, the Supreme Court applied an essential ingredient test to determine whether an offense qualified for a provision that extended the criminal limitations period for certain fraud offenses. Winegarten, 865F.3D at 59, and 10. But as this court has explained, bridges is distinguishable because the Supreme Court, there believed, applying the restrictive essential ingredient test to determine if an offense involved the defrauding of the United States, effectuated Congress's specific intent to limit the extended limitations period to only a few offenses. While Congress had the opposite intention for Section 3283, ID, the other two cases, United States vs. Chardon, 285 US, 518, 1932, and United States vs. Novak 271, US 201, 1926 are distinguishable on similar grounds. In any event, the essential ingredient test does not help Maxwell. As discussed above, an offense involving the sexual abuse of a child, US Code 18, Section 3283, must be read in light of the definition of sexual abuse, set forth in Section 3509A, which encompasses a wide range of conduct that is not limited to actual sexual contact with the child. Counts 3 and 4 each have an essential ingredient that fits with a broad definition. See SuperPoint 2B2A. Finally, neither deal nor United States vs. Contentos 651 F.3D 809 8 Circuit 2011 supports the use of a categorical approach. In each decision, the court concluded that Section 3283 applied to the subject offenses without considering the specific facts of the crime, but in neither case did the court consider whether a categorical approach was required, let alone hold that it was. As noted above, it is undisputed that the evidence that trial established that Maxwell's commission of counts 3 and 4 involved completed sex acts abusing one or more minor victims. Jane testified that she was in fact sexually abused when transported across state lines, including to New York as a minor. Accordingly, counts 3 and 4 qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of a child, both by their statutory terms and based on the specific facts of this case. Alright folks, we're going to wrap up right here and in the next episode we're going to pick up with 0.3. The district court did not abuse its discretion, including that juror 50 could be fair and impartial, notwithstanding his inadvertent mistakes on his juror questionnaire. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box.