KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - The Weekly Mitzva Parshat Pinchas
KMTT - The Weekly Mitzva Parshat Pinchas, by Rav Binyamin Tabory
KMTT Kimitsion Tessetora Uddvarashami Rushalayim and this is Esuevek, I'm back, I was away for a few days in South Africa and therefore we didn't have the Midrashio Mi for a week and I think even my introductions were missing correctly for a day or two but I'm back and this is a new week, today is Yud Dalid Tamuz Monday, Yud Dalid Tamuz today's year by Arav Benjamin Tavari in the weekly Mitzvah for Pashat Pinchas. It's an opportunity at the end of the week maybe for Shabbat, I'll talk a little bit about my trip, what did I learn from going overseas, what I learned from going to South Africa, and probably won't be a heritage for South Africans, they've seen lions before but I'll share it with the rest of the world. But today we'll stick to the regular schedule after the show but after I'll be back with the Midrashio Mi, the daily Midrash for Pashat Pinchas, the Jewish world has been reunified, we're in the same Pashat Shabbat this week finally, everybody's reading Pashat Pinchas, I'll be back after this year, now here Arav Tavari. After Benaz Tlafrad came to Moshe and asked him for a share in their nachalah, Moshe asked Akhosh Baruchu, who then revealed to him the various laws of nachalah and Tari says, "Ishki amut uvein engau, v'aratemat nachalato libhito. If a person dies without a son, then his daughter will inherit him." The Torah then goes on to say the list of people who inherit, if there's no son, there's a daughter, then there's a father, a brother, a nachal, all kinds of relatives who inherit when the previous inheritor is not alive. The Torah does not say specifically the laws of a husband and a wife. The Torah at the end of the Pashat of nachalos, v'aratemat nachalato libhito li she elohakalovelaf. You transfer the property, the estate, to she el row, haqalovelaf, to his closest relative, whoever remains alive, that's the closest relative inherits. The word she el row could mean a relative. The word she el rataal could mean also flesh. The question whether she el row is a generic term referring to any relative and therefore the relatives who inherit are those that are enumerated in the Torah or whether she el row means his own flesh, which could mean in this case a spouse. This question is discussed in the Gomara in Ksubis. We will deal with the sakhalocha with the halocha as relating to a husband inheriting his wife's estate. As I said before, there's a controversy in the Gomara in Ksubis but we'll look at the Rishonim to see what the halocha is according to Mos Rishonim. The ramban anelchas nachalos in the laws of inheritance says explicitly the people who inherit. He gives a list of all the people who inherit. And the ramban says in Perik alef halocha alef. He says said in nachalos kahu. He gives the order of inheritance and he begins with sons. The Torah, interestingly enough, never really said that a son does inherit. The Torah just said if a man dies without a son then his daughter inherits. So it seems by your inference and everyone in the world agrees to this inference that when there is a son, the son inherits. But it's just an interesting point that the Torah never said specifically that a son inherits. But obviously we pass from the son inherits when there is a son. And if there's no other son, the ramban goes on to say all the other lists. But the ramban says in Perik alef halocha alef. Haishah nachalos kahu. He said this is not the topic of the shear, but provisions for widows, financial situation are well taken care of by the halocha. But she does not receive the inheritance. The ramban then says habal, yorish, kolnik saishto, midivrisofim. The phrase midivrisofim we well know is a problematic phrase in the ramban. Very often it means the rambanan. And sometimes we're really not 100% sure what he means. Even in this issue there is a controversy as to the opinion of the ramban. There are those that think the ramban thinks that yorishah's habal is midaraysah, but he calls it midivrisofim. But it seems that most of the commentators in the ramban assume that he meant that a husband inherits his wife midivrisofim, midriblana. And the ramban says, who called him the kobiyurushasa? And he is the first inheritor. Although usually the son would be the first inheritor, in this case the husband precedes everyone else. Derives it on the spot, says, and then he modebas it. He does not agree. It seems that he disagrees and says that a husband inherits his wife according to biblical law. The ritva, the rush, the ramach all agree that yorishah's habal is derivesah against the ramban. So we have, in rishonim, the ramam's opinion that yorishah suppiles the ramban. But we have a number of opinions. The ramach and the ritva specifically that yorishah's habal is midaraysah. If we would assume that a husband does inherit his wife, minatora, according to the rishonim who interprets a row to mean the wife, would that mean that, holically, we see a wife as related to her husband? Normally, when we talk of relatives, we assume that relatives are blood relatives. Father, son, brothers, uncles. But the legal relationship, which obviously is much more than a legal relationship, but it's engendered by legality, engendered by kiddushin, that relationship might not constitute a law of crow-vim, of real relatives, according to jewish law. Are they really relatives? Perhaps that's what the Torah is telling us. Lishay-ro, the ramban, the halacha of shay-ro, for those people that learn it's minatora. They learn that the Torah means your closest relative and your closest relative might mean your wife. The ritva seems to say like this. In moi-katan on dafkhaf, the gmare there has a list of the people who inherit. There are different texts in the exact wording of the gmare, and some people have the word "ishto" in it, and some manuscripts do not have the word "ishto" in that list. Those people that do not have the list have the word "ishto" in the list would probably learn that midrabana, according to biblical husband, does not inherit his life. This list excludes women, the wife of the husband, and the husband does not inherit his wife at all, and therefore it's not listed at all. But those that do have it in the text, so it does not prove whether it's the ritva and it just says it is one of the cases where a husband inherits. I should have been more specific. The case in moi-katan is not referring to inheritance. It's referring to the case of avelus, which we'll get to later. We'll connect the two laws, but I'll just want to prove one example from this ritva. The ritva says the list of people that to whom you can be matame does not include a wife, why not? So the ritva says the list that's mentioned in moi-katan, to whom a husband, a kowain, obviously. A kowain is generally not allowed to become tame, to become richly impure to a dead person, but to his relatives, the Torah and Pasha, says you can become tame. According to some, you must become tame. There it doesn't say ish-to in the list. I said we'll get back to the den of avelus soon, but the ritva uses the word, the lo-i-ri-el-a-be-krow-ve-mah-mas-kor-va-valam-mas-kadushin. The Torah was only referring to the case, or the Braisa, the gamara, was only referring to the case of cro-ve-mah-mas-kor-va, of cro-ve-m relatives who are relative who are related because of relationship, and not because of kadushin. Does that mean that there is a relative that's created by kadushin, but it's not the same as the relative who's created by blood? Or does he mean now? This is a different halacha. It seems to me the simple words of ritva mean that a husband and his wife are related. Although there are two types of relationships, there's a halacha relationship through halacha. A husband and wife are married, and therefore the relationship is that of relatives. Or we could learn that in that related at all, relationships are only blood relatives, and husband and wife are halachically connected, but not considered as family. I mentioned this issue in Hilchossavelus to draw an inference from that as to why a husband does inherit his wife. If it's a biblical law, we could learn, like I inferred from the ritva, that they are related. They're related through marriage, which is a halachically relationship. On the other hand, Tossus seems to say that a husband and wife are not related, even if you would hold that it's a biblical law. The rambi... Tossus says in Baba Basra, daf kufjid kimmuk, kevansha bal eno yoresh mahmat kurva, ella mahmat she el rut, sheen huk hoshu vin ke basaraha. A husband does not inherit because of relationship, because of being a relative. ella mahmat she el rut, he's called a sheeir, which means sheen hoshu vin ke basaraha. The idea of a husband and a wife forming one union as if they become one person, that perhaps is true, but it seems to be that according to Tossus, they are not really related. And Tossus, in daf kufjid dahl al amud vase, in Baba Basra, seems to say a very similar thing. bal dul lohya yarit mahmat kurva. A husband does not inherit because of relationship. Apparently, he is not, according to Tossus, he's not really related to his wife. He does inherit her. So, I said, if a husband does inherit his wife, is this a biblical law? So, we saw it that Sami shown him, the riva, the ramach, who think that it's a biblical law. And there I asked a question, assuming it is a biblical law, what's the nature of the law? Are they really related? Is it a relative, which is what I inferred from the witzvah? Or perhaps we could say, they're not really related. It's a Frus. Her husband and a wife are considered to be the same person, shiro, basarahad. And therefore, he takes over his wife's estate, but he's not really related. The same question would be asked if we passkin that yuushas habals drabana. If yuushas habal is the rabana, which is the opinion of the rabana. A husband inherits his wife only because of rabbinic law, according to the Torah, he does not inherit. If we assume that that's the position of the rabana, so the question would be, again, midrabana, or perhaps even daraysa. Are they related at all? Or no, they're not related, neither midraysa nor midrabana, but the fact that the husband inherits his wife is not predicated upon the law of being relatives. It's based at a different halacha, and namely that a husband has certain rights, which he gets when he's married. At the same time, the wife gets rights when she gets married. The rabana min hilkhos ishos, parakute base, explains that there are 10 things that a husband owes his wife when they get married. She has 10 rights, he has 10 obligations to her when they get married, and he at the same time receives 4 rights. And the ramam says, "Our bush, zachobam, kula medivir selfim." All the laws, the 4 things that a husband receives, the privileges that he receives medivir selfim, there it seems medivir selfim is clearly darabana. It's a rabbinic law that a husband receives 4 things, valang, one leos massi yada shalot. Her income goes to him. Of course, I didn't talk about his obligations to her, which involved total support. He's got to support his wife totally. And therefore, seems to be almost quid pro quo, she has to give her income to him. The ramam continues, for our purposes, im maysa beshayya virashana. If she should die while he is alive, he inherits, he inherits. vuhu kodem laholadam biushat, and he is the primary inheritor. Vir, the raved, also disagrees and says, "Yiwushas about Vartara." The raved seems to think clearly that a husband inherits his wife according to biblical law. The ramam thinks it's only darabana, and therefore, the argument is mentioned in two places. But, what we have seen from the ramam is that the rights of a husband to it, Virusha, are a zhuz that he has when he gets married. It doesn't seem to be that they're actually related. It seems to be that it's a zhuz that he has, he has rights to her estate, both when she is alive, after her death, he inherits the estate, and this seems to be a zhuzmaman, simply a monetary law, but it does not seem to be based on kurva. I've said before that the summary would be we have a makhlokas if Yiwushas about, if a husband inherits, is it minatura umudrabana? But, if he does inherit, we raise the issue, does he inherit because of the relative, or does he inherit because of a, he's either shero, or he'd say, or it's a financial agreement, financial arrangement that was instituted by the Torah, by Khamim, and I said this question could be asked whether we pass in Yiwushas habales daraysa, or Yiwushas habales darabana. Mentioned before in the name of the writvah, the issue applies as well to the laws of avelus. The relationship of a husband and a wife would find another ramification in the laws of mourning. As I said before, a kowain is not allowed to become ritually impure, to a mace. A kowain is forbidden to come and to contact with a dead body. Pasta, an amor, lenefesh leitamabamaf, a kowain cannot be kamtame. The ramam, the Torah then goes on to say, only to shero. And again, we have that same enigmatic word, shero. A kowain is allowed and perhaps required to become tame to shero. And then the Torah goes on to say, who are the relatives? Le imo la aviv, le livno, le vito, la ajiv la hostra, sula. The ramam explains that there are six relatives here. There is father, brother, father, mother, son, sister, brother and daughter. I didn't give the proper order in English, but the six relatives again are father and mother, son and daughter, brother and sister. What about a wife? So, we could learn the pastaq in two ways. It's very interesting to see how we could read the pastaq. Kim le shera karaf el av could mean to your relative, kowain. And who are those relatives? One, two, three, four, five, six. We could learn the pastaq differently. Kim le shera karaf el av is the first one to whom you become tame. And that is shero karaf el av, your closest shear, which would mean your wife. And then the Torah goes on with two, three, four, five, six, seven. The basic question is the Torah said a kowain can become tame to his relatives. Does it mean seven relatives? Or does it mean six relatives? Six relatives and not your wife. The rambha paskins, everybody paskins, that a kowain is tame to his wife. But the question is, is this a biblical law or a rabbinic law? The rambha explains in hilchas aviel, peric beis halochalef. These are the people that, to whom a person must mourn, emo aviv binovitova hivahoto, meeviv. His mother, his father, his son, his daughter, his brother, his sister, umidivre hem. Now here, this is clearly medrabana, meevre hem, sha eta bella haish alishto, hanisua. That a person should mourn for his wife. But the rambha says clearly, it's drabana. The rambha also says that a kowain can become tame. The laws of becoming tame and the laws of avielus seem to be connected intrinsically. And the rambha paskins there in hilchas aviel, peric beis halochalef. Each does show a kowain, mestami, mestami lau karha. Even if he doesn't want to, a kowain has to become tame to his wife. The anon, metami, la meevre eselfim. This halochal is only medrabana, meevre eselfim. Again, the issue is used meevre eselfim. But since the rambha said nalochalef, meevre hem, sha eta bella haishto, sha eta bella haish alishto, it seems that this is clearly drabana. And the rambha had then, obviously, has a question. How could it be that the kowain told the person to become tame? I understand that there might not be a biblical law of avielus. Perhaps the Torah, the laws of avielus, which are predicated upon the laws of tuma, of tuma smays, of those people to whom a kowain can become tame, those laws medrabana. You could say that a man should be in aviel for his wife, even if it's not required by the Torah, even if it's not within the Torah parameters. But there's nothing wrong with saying a person should become an aviel. But how could it be medrabana that a kowain is allowed to become tame? The Torah said you're not allowed to become tame. And if we learn that a wife is not included in the laws of the Torah, then a kowain would not be allowed to be medrabana to his wife. How could it be that the kowain could get up and say do something against the Torah. We have a general principle that the kowain can tell you not to fulfill all of the Torah. The kowain can tell you, for example, not to blow shawl for enchabes, or even if it's on the shawl, or not to take a lull of enchabes of sukkis. Because that's shayvata, I said. Those are things that we refrain from doing hazalah of the power to tell the person not to do a mitzvah. But to go to tell a person doing a vera, how does haqam have such a power? How can they tell the kowain who is not allowed to be mutami lee shawl? According to Bibliklah. How can they tell him that you must do it? So the ramam has the phrase, as so kame kame smitzvah. They made him, they considered him, as the case of a mace mitzvah. What is that? Sha'ang loyo ra'shayl lohu. Tim. Lotim samishita segba. Because since he inherits her, now we said that inheriting her is a rabbinic law according to the ramam. But nevertheless he inherits her. Since he is the inheritor, the assumption is nobody else will bother making the arrangements. They feel he has the estate, he is the husband. He should take care. Now the law of a mace mitzvah is anybody to whom nobody will is taking care. Then a kowain is required according to law to take care of this person. When someone else is related and will take care of a dead person, then a kowain is now allowed to become tame. But in the case of a mace mitzvah, where the kowain is the one who is the responsibility to take care of this person, even though according to biblical law he should not have become tame, but there is a biblical law that for a mace mitzvah is a mace mitzvah. He is allowed to become tame to a mace mitzvah. The khamim didn't uproot a law of the Torah according to the way the ramam explained it. What they did is they defined a wife as a mace mitzvah. Since the husband is the primary caretaker, we would assume that nobody else would be would get involved in a case where there is a husband. Therefore midrabana we look at her as a mace mitzvah and therefore the the husband, even though he is a kowain, has a responsibility to take care and even to become tame, if necessary, even if not necessary, mistami laukara, he has to take care. He has to become tame tara. So the interesting thing is that this law is midrabana. Again I said the ritzvah before said that kowain is metami to his wife minatora and the ramam says no a kowain is metami to his wife midrabana as a mace mitzvah. All the questions that we asked earlier can be as repeated here. If a kowain is metami to his wife, midrabana is because they are related or because the Torah said calls her shee rho, its responsibility. The question is stronger according to the ramam, according to the ritzvah that kowain is metami to his wife, it seems to be that it is a kowra of makmas kedushin. It is considered relative and it makes sense that in order to become tame you have to be a relative and shee rho is considered a relative. According to the ramam we said midrabana, a husband and a wife, a husband does inherit his wife but I said in the ramam they are not really related even with drabana. The halacha is that he has a source to be your aesher to inherit her. It would therefore seem that for the laws of yushah we would say the same thing. The same question I asked before would be asked here but according to the ramam I would therefore say that a kowain is allowed to be metami to his wife midrabana but it is not because she is a relative, because she is a makmas mitzvah. This is one of the things that is created by kedushin. The same way kedushin creates certain obligations and certain rights at the inception of kedushin, at the death of the spouse, the husband still is the primary caretaker and therefore it is more of a financial type of thing that a kowain is metami. Interestingly enough the rivet in hilhas avel is quiet. In hilhas ishos the rivet mentioned and in hilhas nakhlos that he disagreed with the ramam. He apparently thought that a husband inherits his wife midracer he is a biblical law that he inherits his wife. If that would mean that they are related then it would seem logical that the ramam, the rivet interpreted the word shee rho as being a relative. If he interpreted the word shee rho as being a relative then in the laws of avelus when he says you can come tummy to a mace he should have used the, he should have thought the same thing that a kowain is metami to his wife midracer and he should have disagreed with the ramam in hilhas avel too. So the question that I am asking is why did the rivet argue with the ramam and hilhas ishos and say that I think that a husband is called shee rho in the Torah and therefore inherits his wife mina Torah. However in the laws of avelus the ramam says a husband according to the Torah does not, is not metami to his wife she is not called shee rho and the rivet kept quiet. The question itself needs no answer per se because the rivet may not have been consistent in writing every single place where he disagreed with the ramam. It's a famous question that scholars and tamarika hamam have argued whether you can bring any proofs from the fact that the rivet did not argue with a particular ramam. The professor torski has written a book both in the ramam and the rivet and he raised this issue a number of times that an argumentio excellencio the argument from silence is questionable in the rivet because there's many rambams that are obviously or seem to be so out of conforming with the accepted opinion the rivet is silent. It's very doubtful the rivet would agree to every right ramam that he there was silent about. There are people who disagree and say if the rivet was silent he automatically agreed with the ramam. So therefore my question really is not such a great question because perhaps the rivet disagrees with the ram by Manuel Manuel as well and he thinks what the Torah meant as shero includes the laws of avelas as well and husband asked me to his wife according to Zabel Alisht al-Minat-Minat-Torah. That could be the truth of what the rivet thinks. However if we would want to say the rivet is totally consistent and he did not disagree with around Manuel Manuel we would be left with a following situation the rivet thinks that a husband and a wife in a sense are related because he does inherit his wife according to Biblical law. On the other hand he may agree with the ramam that a coin is not matami to his wife. How would we reconcile these two opinions if they indeed exist? I think this opinion although it's not specific in the rivet could easily be explained by our main question. When the rivet says that a husband doesn't inherit his wife does he really mean to say that a husband and a wife are related according to Biblical law like I said it might be maybe inferred from the Ritzvah in white cotton or perhaps the rivet thinks that I agree in principle with the ramam. A husband and a wife are not actually related but there's a schuss mamonit there is a schuss that a husband gets in his wife's estate which the Torah gave him it's a Biblical law that he is Yahweh's wife but not because of kurva not because of relationship not the normal type of relationship and therefore to be matami to his wife you would need a law of kurva for there you would need a law of relationship not just a schuss mamonit which is caused by a lakic concept of marriage for that in order to allow the coin or require the coin to become tame you would actually require a definition of kurva maybe the rivet thinks kurva doesn't exist they're not really kurva maybe they're called she-air for the purpose of of Yurusha but that concept would not apply to the laws of ill as well to summarize we've learned two famous makhlokas to be found in mishonit a kowain is allowed to be matami to his wife but it's a question whether it's the arisa or the abunam a husband inherits his wife but it's a question whether it's the arisa or abunam are the two questions interrelated perhaps they are perhaps they're one question are they related or not related or perhaps we could distinguish and say that a kowain it needs to be related to his wife in order to inherit in order to become tame but a person need not be related holastically to his wife or perhaps related holastically is true but not related by marriage by blood in order to inherit her so the line of the the opinion of the ramam is that a kowain is not allowed midarisa to be matami to his wife midrabana is allowed a kowain of a regular husband does not inherit his wife according to biblical law midrabana he does and we saw their other opinions and both questions you have been listening to our abunam interverry the weekly mitzvah for poshat pinchasa now the medrash hai yomi the daily medrash today's poshat poshat pinchasa meaning from medrash that appears in the beginning it actually refers to poshaka appears in the middle the medrash is out of place i'm skipping i'm staying i'm sticking with the order that appears in the medrash although it's not the order of the poshukim this goes on the poshuk that appears in the middle of the poshah when god appeals to masha arbanu to appoint someone who will replace him because he knows that he's going to die because god has told him that he will not count erica sir but will die and masha says to god if god adonai rahirahirahirahiruhat lakhal basam ish al-hahidah in unusual and unique appellation for god masha says to god you should appoint you who god ashem who is the god of the spirits of all flesh you should appoint a man over the congregation the medrash referring to this expression a lokay haruchat lakhal basam the medrash says halaqah there is a halaqah it's not a medrash it's a halaqah im ra'a habei urusinsho binayadam omeirah bawokha ta ashem a lokayinum ra'aolam haham harazim in the list of brahat that are made of a special occasion special experiences kumari in vahrutat nunhret it appears this brahat aware and infrequent one if one sees great populations of people one says bawokha ta ashem a lokayinum ra'aolam haham harazim god is the wise of the secrets you'll ask what is the connection between saying huge masses of people and saying that god is wise of that which is secret so the medrash explains "kishaym shaym shaym part su fei hen part su fot ei hen tomim zalizak hain d'attansha bin zalizak" because people in great masses are not a mass of people just as their faces are individual do not compare do not are not similar one to another so to their minds their opinions their inner lives are not equal one to the other just as their faces are not similar so to their minds are not the same but each one has his own mind his own they are similarly it says in iyobra "asot le ruach miskal le ruchot" so called "briya ubriya" so explaining the halaqha it means that when you see a lot of people and the god relates to all of them that's an amazing haham which is really impossible because we whenever we relate to people we relate by rules you have three kinds of people four kinds of people if you teach a class or you you show if you six six hundred thousand people you view them as a mass and you think of some mass psychology rule and you apply that to all them but god is not like that god knows the individual ruach of each person and that is almost multiplied infinitely each individual person is an individual and god relates to each individual level that's haham hazim that's an amazing and transcendent degree of chhahma of wisdom which is not found in the world except in god take the rahana back to our parasha shaken shaken how do i know this is true that each person is different and god's relationship and understanding of in his defense shaken moshima bakesh makash bokubishat mita when moshia comes to ask for god when he's dying the request that i opened up with a malle from every bono shalam he said to god it is clear to you galoud be a dul ifanecha the atansha called echad bechad you know the inner life the intelligence the spirit the mind of each one the aim that tansha banecha domim zavashe and the mind of each of your children the jews is different one from the other is that a good thing or a bad thing that is so individual it sounds good but for a leader it's very very difficult and when i die he says to god please appoint someone over them who will be their leader who will be able to carry to suffer each one and each individual one according to his own mind according to his own personality that's the word dahat really means shanema you've got Hashem haruachinomir he doesn't say god who is the god of the spirit but haru hott god is the god of the spirits of all flesh and okay haru hott the whole basa why was that the appellation that moshia gave to god nispa suk because he's asking for a leader and the whole problem of a leader is the differences and divergences individualism of those whom he is leading to be a leader is not to lead a herd to be a leader is to lisbol to means to suffer the suffering the in the medieval sense to carry to bear the burden of each one and one the fida atal according to his own individuality his own inner spirit and that's okay who caught the whole basa find somebody just as you really and truthfully understand man in his individuality find a leader who will be able somehow similarly to you to do the same to do to do the same thing we will continue with this medrash tomorrow because medrash in a slightly different manner continues in the same vein but a different vein an interesting understanding of god's answer to moshia based on the the request and and and and question then moshia had addressed to god as understood by the medrash in today's medrash you've been listening to kmtt the shoe of harav bin yamintavore in the week limits fafapasat bin ras followed by the medrashayumi the daily medrash given by myself as a bick and you were listening to kmtt the tower podcast wishing you all the best cult of you should have kriyut in learning a regular time for learning i think kmtt is a great day i just came back from africa and i met people they were listening to kmtt i was very pleased first i met i met real people who actually listened to this and not just my computer but the real purpose is you should have a kriyut a set time since we all have time for which is appropriate whether it's in a car on the train or when you're walking or jogging who knows get yourself a waterproof ipod you do when you're swimming but it is time half hour a day that's the real purpose lunchtime find the time and spend a half hour with us bibakat a torah mitzi on this has been as a bick and we'll be back tomorrow with the shoe in the for us free in the essentials of a vudata shem aparav moshitaragan and until then cult of the analysis sale and we'll be back tomorrow