KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - The Weekly Mitzva Parshat Balak
KMTT - The Weekly Mitzva Parshat Balak, by Rav Binyamin Tabory
KMTT. Kimmitzi onte se toa, today is Monday, Zion, Tamuz, Shulov, Arabina Mintovari, the weekly Mitzvah for Panchat Balak. There will not be a Medrash Yumei. I'm not actually available among, I'm in South Africa and therefore, there will be only the Shul of Arabina Mintovari. Tomorrow's Shul will be by Arab-Tarragan, the essentials of Abu Dada Shah. In Panchat Balak, we know the story of the Aton, who refuses to the Baj, and Billam becomes very upset, and actually hits the Aton. The Torah then reprimands Billam and says, "Almahi kittat aton nakhazah shalosh pami." What is the reason that you hit your Aton three times? The Rambam in Morin of Uchim, Hela Kimmul, Parikyud Zion, says, "This is the source of the Halacha of Zabalehayim." The issue whether pain of an animal is a biblical law or not is a makhloket, a question in the Gimmera in a few places. The Rambam in Narnav Uchim takes the position that Zabalehayim is the Risa. This is a biblical law, the law of causing pain to an animal is the Risa, and he says, "The source is Mimash and Emmar almahi kittat aton rah." From the very sentence of Billam, we learn this concept of Zabalehayim. I mentioned that in the Gimmera in both Mitziya and Shabbits, the Gimmera is a discussion whether this law is a biblical origin or of rabbinic origin. However, the interesting point is there is no specific place in the Talmud where it discusses the source for this Halacha. It's true the Gimmera says that it might be a biblical law, but it doesn't say the source for this biblical law. This of course led to many opinions, many Rishonim, Ahronim, tried to find a source for this Halacha. We've seen that the Rambam says the source is from our Parsha. The Samesh Anand learned that the source is from the Mitzvah on the Torah of Prika Uthina. The Mitzvah of Prika Uthina refers to the sentences to the Sookim in Parsha's Mishpatin, where the Torah says where you see an animal having a heavy load on its back, even if the Khmer, this particular animal belongs to your enemy. I won't discuss now the difference between your enemy and your friend, but the Torah says, "Kitirhe Ha'mar Sonachah." If you see the donkey of your friend, suffering as it were crashing under the load. So the Torah told us there's a Mitzvah to help. The Mitzvah to unload. We learn that there's a Mitzvah of Prika and Tina. There's a Mitzvah of helping your friend load an animal when necessary, and it's also a Mitzvah of helping him unload. The Mitzvah of helping him load is obviously a Mitzvah bin al-Damlachavero. That's obviously a Mitzvah to help your friend load his animal. On the other hand, the Mitzvah of unloading of removing the burden from the animal might be based on the concept that the animal is suffering. This would of course lead to the principle that unloading would precede the law of loading. Prika would be before Tina because Prika has in it both elements, the element of helping your friend as well as Tzabalihayim reducing the suffering of the animal. So according to Sami Shounen, this is the source between the source of the concept of Tzabalihayim. Of course, if we use the source, there would be halakh ramifications. If we would say this halakh is because the halakh of Prika and Tina is based on Tzabalihayim, then it seems that we should not distinguish between the case whether the animal belongs to a Jew, belongs to a guy, and that itself is a whole discussion both in the Gemara and very questionable. The Rambam at the end of Hircus Rotsayach, the Ramb has a very unclear position whether this halakh applies equally to Jews, to the animal, of Jews, the animal of non-Jews. This issue we will not develop today because of time, but the source of Prika and Tina, if this source is derived, it probably should not make a difference between a Jew and a guy. One of the questions that we'll discuss later, is there is a halakh that this mitzvah of Prika, Tina, does not obtain to a person who is older, a person who is a Tamil khacham, he doesn't have to be involved with animals. We know this, for example, by returning lost objects. Everybody's required to help restore objects to their owners, and therefore, if you see something that's lost, you have to not only try to return it, but you have to take care of that object until the day you return it. Therefore, if a Tamil khacham would see, let's say, an animal running around, it would not be within the dignity of the Tamil khacham to go and take this animal and deal with him and do all the kinds of labors that one must do with an animal. So therefore, there's a din of Zake and Vena Le Chiflado, someone who is the literal translation of Zake and is old, but it may mean a Tamil khacham will get back to that later, so he's part of it. If Zayba de Heim is the writer, if there's really a real biblical law to remove or help an animal suffering, why would it be, why would a Tamil khacham be exempt from such a halakham? We'll see that later. So far, we have two sources for the laws of Prico T, for the laws of Zayba de Heim. The Ramam learned from Arparsha, from Parsha's Pilah, whereas we saw many, we've shown him, learned from itself. Rashi seems to say in Babmatsiya that the law of Prico Tina, this law is based upon the concept, or at least the law of Prico, is based upon the concept of Zayba de Heim. The Miri there in Babmatsiya quotes another possibility. He says, "The Torah told us that Lotaxamshar Baddisha," and say, "for Dvarim the Torah is a law that if an animal is working in a field, you shouldn't muzzle it. The assumption is the animals working in the field in this field, in the field which he wants to eat. By muslin the animal, you're stifling his ability to eat from while he's working. Apparently, this would cause him anguish, besides causing him hunger, and therefore the Miri learns this is the source of Zayba de Heim notaxamshar Baddisha. The Qasam's self-fare, already in Aqarun, quotes a different person. He says, "Virakha m'abha al-Kamasab." The person that we say daily in Aqshray, Akhadish Baruchu's mercy, is extended to all his creation, to his whole, everything that he created. Al-Kamasab means everything, including human beings, but including animals as well. And therefore, if Akhadish Baruchu extends his mercy to animals, so then we should also extend the arm mercy to animals as well. The last opinion I'll quote, although there are more, is the Ritzvah and Bhavmit Siyya suggests this is Al-Aqahun al-Mashmissinai. There are certain things that are not explicit in the Torah, but we say they are given to Moshe Bissinai as Torah Shabbat, and they are transmitted us orally, but we do not have a specific source for this halah. So we have so far our five opinions as to the source of the concept of Tzabalihayim. Is there a difference from where we learn? The source of these halah of the halah house, or the halah of, Tzabalihayim, might itself be a very important indication as to the nature of this particular halah. According to the Ramban, that we learn it from Bilam, the Torah didn't really say anything about the animal suffering. The Torah accuses the person. The Malah in the Pasha says to the person, "Al-Nai-Kitat al-Atonkha, why did you do it?" You did something here to inflict pain upon an animal. This might be a question more of Midos, more of a person's own character, rather than the issue of the pain of the animal. The Ramban says it almost explicitly. Reading the translation of Rabbi Kapach, the Ramban says he nays that Al-Dar havah atashtay mutlano. This is to perfect our behavior. Kedaysha We should not behave in a cruel manner. We should not cause pain, irrationally, for no reason, without a benefit. We should act in kindness, in mercy, in gentle approach, a phi-lu, bishay, is about hai-shiz ul-a-tib-e-tazar, and the ramen goes on to discuss other laws in this connection. According to the ramen, this source would also only tell me that one should not cause pain to an animal. Amaikita-ta-ta-ta-ta, why did you inflict this pain? If pain were, if the animal were in a source of pain, not directed by a specific person, but pain was being inflicted on this animal, this source would not say that a person has to remove the pain. The Torah said, it's me-dose, it's me-dose for you not to inflict pain. One could very well argue the same me-dose, the same characteristics would cause a person, or should cause a person, to save an animal from pain. This is true, but the source itself in the Torah only was referring to the case where the animal was inflicted by the person himself, and therefore the Torah says, this, in this case, there is a problem of sabbalihayim. According to the second source that we learned, that it's the mitzvah is based on pre-kotahina, then the nature of this mitzvah would be a positive mitzvah. It would be a mitzvah sahseh, of slothah as of imo, and this therefore would follow the general patterns of all mitzvah as of say, whereas according to the third opinion that it's based on the concept of lo tach somb shawbihi, you shawb, do not muzzle, do not cause pain, so again it would be a love, there would be a specific law of the Torah forbidding causing pain, but again, the difference between the second and the third, according to the idea that it's a mitzvah sahseh, via the mitzvah, the positive mitzvah, is to undo the pain, to relieve the pain, the animal suffering because it has a burden on it. The Torah did not talk about inflicting pain, well obviously, if you are required, to remove the pain, so to alleviate the anguish, then obviously you'd be required, you would be forbidden to cause that pain, but according to the source that it would be a zavimah, yes it's true, you wouldn't be able to cause the pain, but the nature of the halach would be a zav tach zavimah, according to the other opinion lo tach somb shawbihi, shawb would also mean, would only mean that you can't inflict the pain, lo tach somb shawbihi, shawb, do not muzzle it, the Torah did not say that you have to remove pain in such a case, but it would be a love, on one hand it's a more strict halacha, that it's a love, a negative law which inflicts, which causes greater severity to the nature of the Easter, by the way in lo tach somb shawbihi, shawb, do not touch somb shawbihi, shawb, do not, there would be malkos, there could be stripes administered to the person who did it, and this would be a classic example of a love, shi echbal mase, a love in which you didn't action, you put the muzzle on the animal, and the nature of the Easter itself would be problematic, what is the mase, but we could learn simply that putting the muzzle on the animal is a love, and you would get malkos, and according to the opinion that we learned from no tach somb shawbihi, shawb, I said that's the opinion of the miri above masea, so causing pain to an animal would be a real love, on the other hand there's no specific place where I would say that you would have to remove pain, one could suggest that we should really combine two and three, suggestion number two that I made was that the Easter, the law of tach somb shawbihi, comes from the concept of precotina, which is a mitzvah's essay, and the third idea, the third source was lo tach somb shawbihi shawa negative, so one could say well, I really should combine them both, we would use a combined, learned derivation of tzaba de hyen from precantina and lo tach somb, lo tach somb would be to impose a love on a person creating pain to an animal, which is what we said that according to the ramban would be what we could learn from villa, however the law of alleviating pain of an animal that would not be alive, or personally would not do that, would not transgress necessary a love of lo tach somb shawbihi shawa, but there nevertheless we could employ the mitzvah's essay of azov tazavino, the opinion of the hasam's sofir, veracham av aqam asav, the god's mercy extends to all his creatures, and therefore it would seem incumbent upon us to follow the ways of akadish barhu would mean that this halacha of tzaba de hyen is not really halacha of caring for the animal per se, but rather it would be halacha of emulating the ways of God. The mitzvah of the Torah of lachta bit rachav is to walk in the ways of God, emulate his actions in metatio day, according to the roves kamint, or of salivacek made a kamint, in his article rayunotah latsfilah, vera this valachta bit rachav, this concept of emitatio day emulating the ways of God is the central mitzvah of the Torah. Perhaps he meant to say it is one of the most important foundations of the Torah, that in general a person should walk in the ways of God. If this would be true, so the mitzvah of, or the issue of salivat hayim would not be a general, a specific law really of salivat hayim. It would be included in the general concept of a lachta bit rachav of walking in the ways of kaddish barakul. The last source that we dealt with that is halacha moshmisinai. Halacha moshmisinai means that the nature of the halacha cannot be well-defined by us. It was given to us by God as a law, and therefore it would be harder to deal with in types of the issues that I mentioned before, whether it's an asay, whether it's a lot as a whether the mitzvah is to is really an isthor of not causing pain, or it's a mitzvah to remove the pain, is it really a question of me? That would be difficult to determine from the opinion that it's a halacha moshmisinai. One of the ramifications of this law in general is the gimara has a discussion whether one may do one may or perhaps one should do an action on shabbis to remove the pain of an animal, even in a case where there is an isthor drabhanan. There would be a law of the rabbanan forbidding such an action, but however the mitzvah, by the haim of Sahab, the haim, the mitzvah of that we're dealing with would somehow conflict with this isthor. So what should a person do when he has a conflict between Sahab, the haim, and al-Hushabbis. The random rules in two places, I'll quote one, but the other is perhaps even more striking, but the one I'm going to quote is in parach alif of hushabbis, halacha tas. The ramam says al-la beilan bushabbis, if something is up on a tree when shabbis, there's a problem of removing it, of taking it down, which I won't go into to explain the nature of the isthor. But never the best, the ramam says bebeim, a-fiil of amazid-yawit, mishim saba al-kai. If an animal somehow treat and can't come down, so we ignore any halacha issues involved, I said there rabbinic issues involved, and we would perform the act because of saba al-kai. And the ram goes on, the haim parqim, amazid-yawit, mishim saba al-kai. We would unload the packages from an animal, even if there is a halacha issue involved, because of saba al-kai. The Vilna Gown quoted in his Bira Grunch al-Hannara, but in the edition of the Frankl Ramam, it's printed on the page of the ramam, he says, and then kaimalun shudar-aisa, and the ifwaismat. Because we follow the opinion that saba al-kai'im is a biblical requirement, and this biblical requirement, according to the Vilna Gown of saba al-kai'im, is to remove the anguish from the animal. It's now referring to the case that he was referring to in marunavuqim, where the person hit the animal, where the problem was caused itself by a person, that's the raisa. But even this particular case, where the animal is treed, or the animal has a burden, not necessarily placed by you, and you may perform the actions when shabbos, which are problematical, because of saba al-kai'im, that shows that saba al-kai'im is the raisa. The Gomara says that if these laws, if saba al-kai'im would not be the raisa, would be the rabbanun, then you would not be allowed to perform these actions, because the negative law, the isir of shabbos, would preclude the mitzvad rabbanun of saba al-kai'im. If your saba al-kai'im is a biblical law, then the law of saba al-kai'im would override this isir of the rabbanun. The red vaz has another source for the law of saba al-kai'im, and many respects, this is the most surprising source of all. The red vaz has a section called leshana-saramba. In that section, he has a number of chuvos, and in one edition, the number is 1,542. And the first question, why is it that saba al-kai'im can be overwritten in certain cases? We said before that a zak'in-she-en-al-a-fikvado, atomic raham, who is not appropriate for him, for his dignity, to be involved with working with animals, is exempt from this halacha. If saba al-kai'im is daraysa, then how could it be? In fact, the rabban asked this question, the rabban in bhavmitziya, daflamid base, says, actually the rabbans found the rabbid daflamid gimel. The rabban says kasheli, "Kavan did saba al-kai'im daraysa, zak'in-vein-al-a-fikvado, amayinuparik." Since saba al-kai'im is a biblical law, why is it that a person who is not, it does not fit his stature to perform such acts? Why is he potter? It's a law biblical law? Whose law potter? Because he's a zak'in, he answers the rabban, ik-a-le-ma'r-a-sa-dik-clot-to-ra-adif. It seems that the kavad-a-to-ra overtakes the law of saba al-kai'im. Kavad-a-to-ra means that a person should respect Torah, and people who are examples of Torah should maintain their dignity and respect in front of people. One should honor Torah, one should respect both the Torah, and those that study, and those that teach Torah. The person who is a zak'in is atamid racham, ano-lafik-vodo, it's not just his personal kavot, it's kavad-a-tar which is involved, and therefore the kavad-a-to-ra precedes the midst of saba al-kai'im. De rahm, v'ar in bhavniziyyah, ask the question, the law of zak'in, the ano-lafik-vodo literally translates, we translate the word zak'in as an old man. Now, old can be a way of explaining atamid racham. The gimam kadushin says, what's a zak'in? They break the word zak'in as it were into two elements, zak'on-na, zak'on-na-kama, a person who studied a lot of Torah. So, the rambans answer might apply to the person who studied Torah, where kavot-a-tar would supersede the law of saba al-kai'im. However, we paskin, zak'in is not just the tama-taka, zak'in is muhub-a-dhamma, the zak'in is any person who is to be respected. Zak'in certainly could mean an older person, but any person who has his personal demeanor requires respect, as part of this particular law. So, why is it that zak'in v'in al-lifikvodu, not necessarily atamid racham, is part of the nismitzvah. The rann says, the reason for this is because saba al-kai'in is a law which can be dismissed with for human needs. It's true that saba al-kai'in is the arisa, but nevertheless it's a law which can obviously be superseded for human needs and exugencies. For example, we know that if a human being's needs would include somehow causing pain to an animal, then human need would overcome this iser. So, he said the concept of kavot is also a concept which would overcome the iser of taba al-kai'in. But, in my opinion, it seems to me that we would have to explain this itself. Why is it true that saba al-kai'in is the arisa, but nevertheless, saba al-kai'in can be overridden because of human needs. So, the radvass says, the radvass says that the answer is that the concept of kavot habriyos, the concept of human dignity, which, in general, can supersede some of the laws of the Torah for those people that are interested, there's a sugibat, there's some Brahma, stuff, raffa al-bays, but the gammari there says that human dignity can overcome certain laws based on Torah. So, he says, cal-shikain-shi yitre-saba al-kai'in. Human dignity would certainly supersede the laws of taba al-kai'in, a phi lus-shumina-to'ra. Even though this law is biblical, saba al-kai'in is biblical law, but nevertheless, human needs and human dignity overcome this particular law, why? So, he says, in a very sixth sentence, saba al-n-bo-lav-vil-o'ase, because there is no specific prohibition and there's no positive mitzvah. What does he mean? The law is the arisa. The law itself, he said, is a biblical law, but what does he mean? There's a biblical law without an asai, without a positive commandment, without a lab, without a negative commandment. How can it be biblical when there's no source? One might say, the red vahs did not seem to say that, that he would agree with the opinion that I quoted before in the name of the ritzvah, that saba al-kai'in is based on a la-kal-mashmi-sinai. There is no source for it in the Torah, but that somehow would not fit in with the reasoning of the red vahs. The red vahs says, human dignity can overcome because there's no specific easter, no specific mitzvah, but hal-kal-mashmi-sinai would overcome these laws as well. What is the understanding of the red vahs that saba al-kai'in is the arisa, but it can be overcome for human needs. It seems here that the red vahs is stating a new concept completely, which in one hand is a beautiful, meaningful concept, the other hand is rather dangerous. The red vahs thinks there is a concept of something that's minatora as a value, as an ethic, which is not a specific law. We'll call it in Hebrew ratsonatora. The Torah's will is the person should do something, but the Torah did not make it as a positive mitzvah or a negative mitzvah. It just indicated that this is a value that the Torah respects, and therefore one should be careful about it. This would solve many issues that were raised in the entire sogya. For example, we said, if saba al-kai'in is a biblical law, then you can overcome the law, a rabbinic law of shabbis, but if saba al-kai'in would rabbanan, so then you would not be able to do it. If saba al-kai'in's rabbanan means that Torah does not see it as a value, and therefore there is no way to overcome shabbis, but if it's a value, once kazal saw it as a value, then they said this value would overcome the laws that we impose on shabbis. The concept of a person should anal if iqvodo would mean there are values in Judaism. The law of saba al-kai'in is a value, is ratsonah Torah, but there are other values in Torah, and sometimes we have to weigh the values one against the other. The concept of human dignity, of human needs, is definitely a concept of the Torah. Therefore, when human dignity clashes with saba al-kai'in, we would dispense with saba al-kai'in and say human dignity supersedes the concept of saba al-kai'in. So, in one hand, I said it's a beautiful concept, that there are laws of the Torah that are not written specifically in the Torah, but yet we know this is ratsonah Torah, this is what a karish baru who meant, this is what the Torah meant, and therefore these are values that we should inculcate in our own personalities and perform them according to a biblical will. The reason it's a dangerous concept is because how do we define exactly what is ratsonah Torah? Something that's written in Torah, so we accept it at face value, this is what God has told us. Something that's ratsonah Torah, something that's the will of God, so it might be that one person will interpret the will of God one way, and a person might interpret the will of God another way, and this would open up a major issue in understanding laws that are not written clearly in the Torah. The hasonish gave an example of such a case. The laws of kiburah of, the laws of respect in your parents, have specific parameters in Jewish law. The Gomara, and we pass them that way, says what is the hallah of kiburah of, makhilayu, makhniso, motsuyasu. The laws of kiburah have specific parameters, namely doing personal service for your father as giving him water, giving him food, giving him helping him get dressed, helping him travel, do whatever is necessary to do personal service for your father. It seems that kiburah of would be specifically relegated to laws of personal actions to help your father. What about things about other issues? Your father just told you to do something, but it's not for his own personal benefit. So the hasonish said in Yarudiah, Simon Kufmentes, that although the heave of the Torah specifically did not include such examples, but the idea of kiburah learns that it is so no yeet, aleshi, kabeda, dhamma, viv bhaudevah. But obviously it's the ratsanatara, it's the will of God to respect your father and your mother in all areas as well. And therefore we've considered the concept of ratsanatara is not related to one issue only. There are other examples of the concept of ratsanatara. But as I said before, there are dangerous concepts here how to use this concept according to Torah. The basic discussion we had is whether the laws of tabalihayim are daraysa and the source for it. What we've tried to do is explain the different sources of the concept of tabalihayim and explain the ramifications that would occur based on the specific types of limudim that we learned. You have been listening to al-Abinim in Tavori, the weekly mitzvah for Pashat balak. Tomorrow the shul of al-Abmoshitayagan, the essentials of Adata Shem. Until then Kortu, there's no midrash, daily midrash today. No will there be one tomorrow or for the rest of this week. Tomorrow, shul of al-Abmoshitayagan, Kortu, vivakata Torah, mih siyon. And we'll be back tomorrow.