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KMTT - the Torah Podcast

KMTT - Parshat HaShavua Shelach

Duration:
36m
Broadcast on:
21 Jun 2006
Audio Format:
mp3

KMTT - Parshat HaShavua Shelach, by Rav Shlomo Dov Rosen
"KMTT, kimitsu ontetsetora, and this is Ezurek and today is kravvav, kravvav sivan. Today's shuyu is in Parshatla Shavua, and shuyu is dedicated, as all the shuyu in this week. We're dedicated to the memory of Ruth Kalman. "Kravvav, kimitsu ontetsetora, kravvav sivan, dedicated by her family, the Gutenberg and Kalman families. Women who love learning Torah and imparted their love to her children and grandchildren of the very Hunua. Today shuyu in Parshatla Shavua will be given by Harav Shlomo Dov Ozen. And after I'll be back with the Medrash Yomit, the Daily Medrash. In this week's Parashat Parashat Shlach, we read about the Maraglimt, the terrible spying attempt to the land of Israel, which fell flat on their return. In getting the Jewish people to lose faith, in the power of God to bring them into the land. Immediately after the Jewish people turn into a terrifying mob and are about to stone those who speak positively about the land, Haquloshpohu reveals himself, his kavod, his honor to the whole Jewish people, and declares to Moshe Rabin that he will now destroy the people and start a new people, a new Jewish people, from Moshe Rabin himself. Moshe Rabin, as an honest and good shepherd, defends the Jewish people, prays on their behalf, and Haquloshpohul saves us. Although we are not allowed to enter the land, that is to say that immediate generation is left to die in the wilderness, their children will continue the Jewish people in the land of Israel. We would liken this shit to take a deep analytical approach to understanding what precisely happened in the Tfilah, the speech and prayer of Moshe Rabin to Haquloshpohul, what exactly God's response was to Moshe, and therefore how we are to understand the punishment that we received in having to have to die in the wilderness, how we are to understand that what Moshe Rabin presumably prayed for, he did not receive in its entirety. Firstly what we must notice is that Moshe Rabin's speech includes two distinct parts, which are completely and very deeply disconnected. The first is a practical argument about how the power of God is to be seen in the world. In the 13th chapter, that is to say the beginning of God's argument to Moshe Rabin from the start, "For yom rashendon Moshe ad anye nazun y haa amazhev, ad analoy aminu bibhol haotot ashe haa siti bikyobot," until when will they not believe in me? And Moshe Rabino answers calling out, "For yom rashe al Haquloshpohul," the Egyptians will hear that you took them out, they'll hear what you did to them in the wilderness, that you did not let them survive and you did not bring them into the land, and they will say concerning or to the people who live in the land that it was because of your lack of power, of your lack of ability, mibilti yachol et ashem, to bring them into the land and therefore they did not make the journey. After making this practical argument about how God's power should be seen in the world, Moshe Rabino continues with an ultimate and final argument, which is perhaps the prayer, vata ye gdall na koh ashhem kashil dibar pallemo, and now the power of God should be greatened or perhaps expressed, revealed, as you have said, saying. And he quotes God's attributes of mercy, ashhem, er hapaim, brah haa said, no se avon fasha, vinake, loyenake, poke da bonavot albanim al shilashim balri ba'im. And then he argues, o' calls out in prayer, slach na la avon haa masek godil hastecha. Please forgive the people in your great kindness, rashe nassat al amazim in sama adhina, and a kodushposh is immediate responses by Yomra Shem, the famous phrase, two words, salah tikid varecha. I forgive, as you have said. Now the phrase, as you have said, kid varecha, would give the impression that exactly what Moshe Rapin was asking for was actually granted. However, it is hard to get that impression and to hold it much longer because the immediate following, pasuk, reads, volam hai ani, however, in schwa by God himself, God proclaims, vi mallekh wadashimid kolarets, the honor of God and the third person God proclaims will fill the whole world. And this is an opening to the next sentence, kihor lana shimawimid kobodibetat, ai all the people who saw my honor and my miracles, literally, my signs, asha sidimimid sign wa wa hai in asha sidimid kolarets, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid, vi mallekh wadashimid kola alitz, the honor of god, third person, almost a response, echoing Moshe Abbeim, but turning it over, the honor of god must fill the whole world, this is a very different type of response, it's not talking about power, it's talking about honor, it would seem to be a response, echoing and objective phrase, demanding something from humanity or from the world itself, because god continues to speak in the first person, kihola anashim hau imid kavo diva tautatai, all the people who saw my honor, those who saw my honor, imid swive in the mid-bar, will not see the land, they saw my honor, they won't see the land, that is necessary for the honor of god, the word kavod repeats itself, and seems to echo or to mirror, Moshe Abbeim's speech about the power of god, the gdarna kakhashim in the third person is mirrored or echoed in the inverse by vimala kavod hashim et kolarets, the demand that the honor of god shall fill the world, the idea that the honor of god is, to some extent, the reason for existence is an idea that we have from, for example, the angel saying baru kavod hashim mimcomo from his place, the angels it's not necessarily the world, the artes, and the idea that's expressed in the pasuk often developed, kol hani kra vishmih villekhwodibhilatib yitzaltibhaphositiv, that basically one reading of the pasuk would be that everything which is created is created for the honor of god. Now if we try to develop this idea of honor, replacing or mirroring the idea of cover, that we see that we can develop it quite a bit further, if we take a look, for example, at the whole speech of Moshe rabbina, we find that the word kakh is said twice, the word kavod is not said once, and yet in the response that god gives, the word kavod honor is repeated, but the word kakh does not appear, this is made slightly more radical by the fact that the last verse before parakiyot gimbal, before god's original speech to Moshe rabbina, reads vayyomru kol haidalo gomatambhavaniim, everyone threatened as a mob to stone the, those of the maraglim who stood out for the honor of god, ukhavod hashim mimcomo, the honor of ukhavod hashbar ho was seen in the royal mo'ed al-kobeneh self, the holy jewish people, god expressed himself by bringing his honor, however we ought to understand that, an expression of honor, and yet Moshe rabbina does not speak about honor, and ukhavod hashbar ho responds repeating the word kavod, Moshe rabbina speaks about kakh, he says in his first sentence, vayyom and Moshe la shen, visham ul mitzreim, kiha elita vilchohaha eta amhazemikilba, the Egyptians will hear that, or will know, that you took the jewish people out of their midst in your power. He later says they will then say it was out of the lack of ability, mibilty ukhole, it certainly needs to be understood as lack of power of god to save the jewish people and bring them to the land that they did not survive the journey. And yet he still repeats the word kakh itself, and when he prays in his last part, which is a distinct part as we have mentioned, when he prays out to god, asking for mercy, not a practical rational argument, but rather a prayer calling out to god, he opens with the words vatah, and now yikdalna kakh ashem, the power of god to have mercy should be expressed. Moshe rabbina in two sentences, both in his practical rational argument and in his tfilah, in his prayer, speaks about the concept, through the word of kakh, the concept of power. Now Bhifoshan generally speaking understand the idea of kakh, in tfilah, talking about mercy, in that the greatest power is to be able to stand up against those inclinations you might have not have mercy. In generally speaking, for example, in human beings, it's a very powerful thing to be able to be merciful to those who did something against you. And therefore, in an anthropomorphic sense, you call out to god talking about his power to have mercy. Now Kudushbokhu, as we have said, does not use the word kakh. He speaks about kavod, and what is the difference fundamentally between kakh and kavod, certainly for example in the first half of Moshe rabbina's argument, the argument about how god's name should be seen in the world. I think a fundamental distinction, which is clear to all of us, is that the idea of kavod does not necessitate the third person's spectator. For example, we may talk about a man of honor, someone who keeps his word. This is not necessarily something which is appreciated by another person, or seen by another person, or known about. Somebody who is a man of honor will keep the will of a person after he is deceased. To be a man of honor means that you keep your word and you stand by your principles. Honor can be an objective concept, which has nothing whatsoever to do with how you are seen in the world. Power is something else. An expression of power is something which has to be appreciated by others. And Moshe rabbina talks about power in talking about how the Egyptians would see god. Because god did not care too much about how the Egyptians would see him. Perhaps Akkadoshpohu was talking about a more fundamental objective, almost metaphysical concept of honor, that the world is created for god's honor. And if you stand up against that honor, if you see his honor, and then you rebel, you cannot see the honor of the land of Israel, something has to happen to the person who rebels for the honor of god to be upheld. We notice, for example, in the Tfilah, the Moshe rabbina calls out to god, quoting the medotar Ha'amim, that he has heard from Akkadoshpohu after the Masaiga. He does not quote all 13 principles or attributes of Ra'amim of mercy. A few are missed out, and one of them, which is missed out, is a med. Truth. He does not want to talk about god's truth. He wants to talk about god's chesed, a shem, erachapayim, vera'af chesed, nousi'avon buffasha v'nakeleu'inake. He doesn't say vera'af chesed vera'af chesed, vera'af chesed, because the concept of truth is a concept of honor. It's a dangerous concept for his purposes. He's talking only about mercy. Now the Christians often speak about god in their terms as being infinite and therefore having infinite mercy. They often level the argument against the Jewish conception of god and our understanding of the truth, that we don't have this idea of infinite mercy which works whatever. Now leaving aside the Christians general idea of switching the Jewish people is not exactly working along those lines, we first notice that in this piece, Akhle Shbohr responds by saying, "The issue isn't just Ra'af chesed, the issue is kavab." And while Akhle Shbohr will save the Jewish people because of his chesed, you can't speak about god's infinite mercy in the sense that you can speak about his infinite power because it would go against the idea of Kvod Sharmain which is the reason of the creation of the world. It used to go into many understandings. The idea that god's honor has to fill the whole world and come to expression and humanity and in the way he deals with humanity. And if he completely forgives in an absurdly irrational infinite manner, not appreciating not taking into consideration what actually happened, this is an infinite power of mercy. This is a lack of honor, as an objective concept of kavab and therefore while the Jewish people will survive and those people will not die immediately, they cannot see the land because they have seen god's kavab and they have acted in an inappropriate manner. Truva can completely fix up and clean up your slate and your relationship with god. It cannot, ontologically, objectively speaking, completely change how things are seen in the world. And if a person has behaved in that manner well, he can fix his relationship with god. He cannot change what that means for the world if a major cliche and a desecration of god's name had happened. Now Moshe Rabiner argued from the point of talking about the problematic aspect of desecration of god's name. And Akhoshpoh responds also from the same type of argument but from a different direction. This isn't a question of the desecration of god's name, the sense of kah, it's the problem of the desecration of god's name in the sense of kavod. Koshpoh doesn't speak about kah, about power in how others might see him, in other words human beings, human beings don't have to exist as far as Koshpoh is concerned. But rather as far as honor is concerned, something which has an objective metaphysical meaning in itself, a sense of the honor of god in the world. Now if we now turn back to the first half, and Moshe Rabiner speaks to Koshpoh where he asks for Akhoshpoh to forgive the Jewish people, we ask ourselves if Moshe Rabiner made a mistake was unaware of the issue, or perhaps Moshe Rabiner was perfectly aware of the issues. He didn't even expect to bring about complete forgiveness. That wasn't the attempt, but rather Moshe Rabiner was calling out for as much as he could get. He was asking that at least the Jewish people should survive, Akhoshpoh had spoken about destroying the Jewish people and starting in for Moshe Rabiner, and at least he wanted that much forgiveness. The fact that the word Emet doesn't appear in the attributes of mercy gives the impression like the Rambhan also suggests that maybe Moshe Rabiner was not going for the whole lot in the first place. Something else which would give that impression is that, for example, even in the Rambhan we see that the idea of Khilazhem actually has two aspects. In Hillhottisodiatura, the Rambhan speaks in parake, the fifth chapter, about the idea of Khilazhem and Khilazhem and generally speaking this comes to expression in the idea and concept, that a person in all situations, even when being forced, when standing in public, must never ever turn against the faith, desecrate the name of God. The idea of Khilazhem, a desecration of God's name, has a public aspect to it. And yet, in halachayud, he says the following, "Kon hau vermida ato bla ones, alachat mikol mitzvotha amorot batora, bishat nefeish, la chis, hares de mechaleleta shem." He then continues to say, "Vim hau var baas aram yisraelariz echaleleta shem barabi." That is to say, there are two types of Khilazhem of desecration of God's name. One is objective, if a person, not because of an unpleasant yearning or appetite to do bad things, which in itself is terrible enough, but a person goes against the Word of God because he wants to rebel, that is a desecration of God's name objectively. The second is, if in public a person went against the religion, went against the halachah of a fundamental nature, he has done something to desecrate God's name in public, ima vaal baas aram yisraelar. And there are a lot of halachah talking about what exactly would constitute such a vaira in public, what types of things are forbidden, or rather what types of things would be so terrible that truvah is almost impossible, although it's possible, it's almost impossible as the Ramam explains. And here, for example, in our parcher, we see that truvah is possible, but not necessarily 100% accepted. Most Ramayna presumably knew that there was an objective Khilazhem, an objective desecration of God's name. It's though he didn't try to ask for everything, that's one possibility. I would like to suggest another possibility as well. Perhaps Moshe Rabbeinul did his best from his subjective consciousness of a human being to pray, to plead for the Jewish people's cause. But Moshe Rabbeinul is still a human being, as the Ramam speaks, particularly in the Shmoana Prokhim, developed very much in the Moan of Ukhim. The idea of aspaklaria is the idea of a screen for the Ramam, as opposed to others like the Ramhaal. The idea of a screen standing between the Novi, and the source of his Navur, the source of his prophecy, Hakul Jibol, and each Novi is a greater Novi because more screens come down, and for Moshe Rabbein only one screen was left, the fact that he was a human being. And the fact that Moshe Rabbein was a human being meant that he could not rise above being a human being by definition. And perhaps Moshe Rabbeinul spoke about Khovad, about Khakh, because he was a human being. Because as human beings we have the concept of power, and the name of God, the honor of God expresses itself in the expression of power in the world. But as far as Hakul Jibol was concerned, perhaps Khakh, power was not the issue at all. It was an issue of honor, and therefore for the two times that Moshe Rabbeinul speaks about Khakh, Hakul Jibol repetitively says, "Kavod." That suggestion is suggesting that Moshe Rabbeinul was not aware of the weakness of his speech. The weakness of his tephylla, perhaps the tephylla could not have been stronger. And there was a weakness perhaps then in both halves, that is to say both in the practical rational argument about how people would see Hakul Jibol, and in the tephylla when he says, "Vatayikdallna Khakhshm," he should perhaps have said, "Vatayikdallna Khovadeshm." I would like to suggest an alternative possibility, and that is that perhaps the tephylla was completely in order, the tephylla was Vatayikdallna Khakhshm. In fact, if we think about it, human beings often forgive out of kavod, and yet human beings consider their honor in public being a question of Khakh, of power, but when they forgive, they often forgive because of honor. Perhaps Moshe Rabbeinul was saying, "Yikdallna Khakhshm," because God is God, he is not affected by desires, by weaknesses of character, therefore the power of forgiveness is completely expressed in God, because nothing stands up against it, "Yikdallna Khakhshm." In that sense, Hakul Jibol says, "Salahtikid Varekh, your tephylla is completely in order, your arguments before were not, because they used the word kavod Akhach, you should have used the word kavod." Perhaps it wouldn't have helped to use the word kavod, because the problem is a problem in itself, but still the word kavod should have been used, not the word kavod Akhach, like, for example, kavod Akhshm Nilabhaykh, El Kavadesk. It was the honor of Akhshm, which was expressed before, and Moshe Rabbeinul should have spoken about the honor of God in the world, not the power of God in the world. Moshe Rabbeinul saw God's forgiveness as a question of power. He should have seen God's honor and expression of honor in the world as a question of kavod. By this suggestion, we are basically saying that the first half of Moshe Rabbeinul's speech was actually not accepted, or rather did not deal with the issue in entirety. The problem was the honor of God objectively in the world. This has nothing whatsoever to help people see Akhoshbokhel. Akhoshbokhel doesn't need anyone to survive. The problem is that the discretion of God's name is an objective principle in the world. God created the world for his honor, and this is something beyond our ability to understand the kavod Akhshm, as an objective concept in the world. We can't understand that, and Moshe Rabbeinul could not argue from that point as an even being. He could speak about subjective honor. In other words, power. Niltiyokhel Akhoshbokhel can't do it, and therefore, look at what they'll say. The issue is not power when we're speaking about Kavod Akhoshbokhel responds, "That is not the issue. You are correct to speak about my power in being able to forgive, but the issue is not power when we're speaking about Kavod Akhoshbokhel. The issue is an ontological, metaphysical, objective concept, something way above human ability to comprehend. It is something objectively about what exists in the world. The world can disappear. The honor of God must remain. Y malle kavod Akhshm, et cola aris. That is something that Moshe Rabbeinul perhaps could not fully comprehend, as a human being, because of his last rasbaklarion, the Ramas understanding, the last screen, the last maritza that will hell, withheld his comprehension of the divine. I would like to go over the few possibilities to understand his parasha. I think it's clear that there's a difference between Moshe Rabbeinul's speech and Akhoshbokhel's response on the changing of the concepts of kwhach for the concepts of Kavod. There seems to be some kind of mirror in the phrase y malle kavod Akhshm, et cola aris, in relationship to the phrase ikdalma kakhashim. The question we are left with is, was Moshe Rabbeinul aware of the weakness of his argument, the weakness of his tfilah, A, B, perhaps he was aware, perhaps he was not aware, perhaps it only corresponded to the first half of what he said, or perhaps everything that Moshe Rabbeinul said was colored by his being a human being. And being understands all concepts as questions of power. The idea of kavod of honor is ultimately reduced to the question of power, but as far as God is concerned in objective reality, the question is not power, the question is honor. As an objective concept, nothing whatsoever to do with the fact that human beings exist. And therefore, you can't speak of infinite mercy, you can talk about infinite acceptance of repentance, to change the relationship with that human being and his past, corresponding to his closeness with God. You cannot speak about God completely ignoring how people desecrate his name in the world. Because that is not just a question of mercy, that's a question of the fundamental metaphysical concept of the honor of God in the world. You have been listening to this year in Pashat-a-Sha-Rua, of Pashat-Slaq, of the Rav-Slamadur-Rosem. And for the Medrash Yomid, the Medrash-a-de-dei, towards the end of the Pashat, we have Pashat-a-tiht. Pashat-Siht was given to the Jews after Pashat-a-Margly. There's a Medrash, doesn't necessarily refer to the particular words of this Pashat-a-Slaq, and it expresses an idea which is about Siht-a-tiht, but it's about everything else as well, but a very important idea. Pashat-a-M-siht, Hado-de-tihtihv, O Zarua-la-tze-deek. And the Pashat-a-tih-tih-tih-tih-tih, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek, O Zarua-la-tze-deek. If it's talking about Torah, the Torah is like a light that is planted. So the Midrash refers to the word planted, Zarua-a-kadosh-ba-choo-ta-ta-la-ba-mitzvat. God planted, He's seated, He's sowed. The Torah and the mitzvat. La-and-chih-laym vise-la-la-la-la-maba. In order to give Israel, to give the Jews a portion in Olam Hab, in the world to come. We will see what it means by looking at the examples that the Midrash gives. There is nothing in this world where there is not some mitzvah concerned with it. Yitzvah-la-chosh, the person goes out to plow his field. The example from the Gama-la is of course relevant to their time, a typical day, a typical Jew's life. He goes out to plow, tes-a-mitzvah, lo-ta-chosh, be-sow-a-choo-mo. He has to remember not to plow with mixed breeds, with an ox and a donkey. La-la-chih-la-la-choo-ta-la-la-cha-ma-cha. When he goes to seed, he has to remember not to do kilayim, not to do different kinds of seeds together. When he comes to cut the wheat, kitek tikzok tikzok tikzok tikzok tikzok tikzok tikzok tikzok tikzok. concerning kishviyyit and payah, leaving past for the poor people. Lash, when he needs the dough that he's made, a shit arisot echhem chalalim, it's faf chalat, when he slaughters an animal. Nattan lakohain has a robah rahayam, the portions that have to be given to a chalain from each individual animal that's been slorted. kant si pore, if he's slaughtering a bird, then there's nitzvah of shiloha kakan of sending away the mother before you take the children, makhayah, uboh vot, shahadobik sahobah phal. Some animals, you have to cover up the blood after you slaughter them. When you plant trees, phalatam, olatam, olato et purio, nitzvah of olat. kavar mate, when you bury somebody, lotit goududu, the laws of mourning, the prohibitions, but how to mourn. Meghalayach sahaha, he shaves himself, lotakifu. The law is connected to how one takes a haircut or how one shaves. When he builds a house, so he has to make a fence, a parapet on the roof. And he has to write this result. When he gets dressed in the morning, fas sura haim tzitzit, you have to pep tzitzit on your clothing, that clothing, which is abducate tzitzit. But that was a standard piece of clothing for Hazan, you put on a regular cloak, then you have tzitzit on that clothing. In other words, what does it mean? That, zara hakato spokhata torabam, it's waatam, it's waatam, it's waatam, that god seeded the Torah, so that the Jews would have a portion to the rotakam. The idea of seeding means that there are many mitzvah in the Torah, you read them, you wander. But they all planted and they will begin to grow later on. The Torah is given on Hasinai. The Jews in Hasinai didn't plant and they didn't sow, and they didn't perhaps do many many others. They didn't build houses, but it's all seeds being planted in your life. And one day you're going to go do something. Everything you do, the mitzvah is waiting for you there. So that's the idea of all zara hua latsaddik, the entire Torah, the arkimitzvah, is seeded away in the ground. In order that when we begin to live, when we begin to do things, then the mitzvah becomes relevant. Because everything you do has a mitzvah character, or the mitzvah affects the character of everything we do, and that is the way in which this world, our actions in this world, become our nachalah, our portion in the next world. And that's it for today. You heard today Pashat as a vuashir, for Pashat Shlach from Ahraf Klamadov-Rizain. Ahraf Shlach is followed with the medrash of the day, also taken from Pashat Shlach, medrashraba, from the end of Pashat Shlach. We'll be back tomorrow with the Arap Shabbat program for Pashat Shlach. And until then, this is as we'll be wishing you call to Vibakat Atora Mitzian, and we'll be back tomorrow, till then Motora, in KMTT. Kimitzian Tizetora with Vashamirushalayim.