KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - The Weekly Mitzva Parshat Naso
KMTT - The Weekly Mitzva Parshat Naso, by Rav Binyamin Tabory
Monday, Beth Sevan and this is KMTT. This is Ezra Beck. We're starting the fourth week of the summer session of KMTT. This week's Shuvim, a dedicated in memory of Harav Chaim Barabbat Salel by his descendants. This is the outside falls this Friday on Shavuad. Today Shuvim is given by Harav Bin Yimin Tavore, the Shuvim in the week, the Mitzvah for Pashat Nasal. After the Shuvim, I will be back with the Halah Ha'yomit. Pashat Nasal has in it the Pashat of Sotah, the woman who is suspected of adultery and the Torah says the entire parasha of how to deal with it, and eventually how the Torah developed a method of testing the women to verify either her innocence, hopefully, or has to shalom her guilt. The Homikr at the end, it's supposed to ensure shalom by it that the husband's suspicions should be laid. There's a makhlokas nighimaran south of Dafkimmo, whether there's the Mitzvah, Ahovah, or Rishis. This idea, the kine is east of the husband, somehow is very jealous, nervous, and he suspects his wife and he warns her not to enter any indiscretion with the assumed, the purported person with whom she is accused. So makhlokas, is that keenly, if that act of, call it, warning, should be a considered a mitzvah or Ahovah, a mitzvah, or an abrogation, or a Rishulah, or an optional thing that the Torah told us what to do if he so desires. The ramban in it, say for a mitzvah, says there's a mitzvah of dealing with Ahovah. But interestingly enough, he doesn't say the mitzvah is on the, on the husband. The mitzvah, according to the ramban, mitzvah, Rish of Gimmom, mitzvah, say, 223, should sibalu bitin sotah. The mitzvah is like to deal with the laws of sotah. The ramban explains that this mitzvah means how to do it, how to give her the water to drink, how she should bring her carban. It seems it's not an abrogation on the husband at all, it's an abrogation, if anything, on the bed, they're on the group that works with this particular issue to do it properly. The ramban in general has a category of mitzvah that apply to judging, to dealing with laws, not specifically being involved personally in the law, but just making sure the law takes place. The ramban has the mitzvah of being a shamachina, a mitzvah of guarding something, somebody gives you something to watch, and you watch it without receiving any, any financial reward for it. So obviously there's no real mitzvah like we wouldn't say, it's like putting on cylinders, saying kreishma to be a shamachina, to be a such a, such a guard, such a shamir. But to do it properly is within the gamut of the world of foreign mitzvah, and the ramban again in the introduction to Hilchosota in the ramban in Nishin Torah. The ramban says that the mitzvah is like sot, like sotah, beto'atek, beto'atek, beto'atek, to do with the sotah the laws of the Torah which are in our parasha. The husband's role in this according to the rambam is apparently not required by the Torah. The Torah told us what to do in case it happened. However the rambam says in this is the way he actually concludes the laws of sotah. Nisvah kahimimah venei sall le kannot le machehem. Nisvah kahimim according to the rambam seems to be a de rabamam. That rabamam said it is a good idea even though according to the Torah it's totally a rishulah. That's what it seems it's optional. The rambam seems to say that it's a good idea. The hahimim said it's a mitzvah sasay, a mitzvah kahimim. And the rambam says based on me, argument in the numeric kala makhanaevlish don't listen to sabbal rah tahara, a person who is does this act with his life. It's doing it out of purity of spirit. But he should be careful eashim to interfere in a fit of anger or a fit of fear or trying to instill fear in the family. It's only if he has his pure motives for doing this. The rambam again in hilkhos eashos says that it would be a good idea to do it but there he used a little different language. Hovah o kolishli cannot lishto. Hovah, there is an obligation whereas in the rasota the rambam said the mitzvah kahimim. Here he used the word hovah. And the rambam says a muqah kahimim in the incretaceous. He goes back, a muqah kahimim. Ain't that damn it, can they be sholim, can mitzvah rah tahara? The same type of segmenting made in rasota. Here he did say it's a hovah. So the rambam seems to say that the biblical requirement, the mitzvah, it's only to deal with the issue when it arises. But there's a hidrah blannan, a mitzvah drah blannan at least, for a person who with cool calmness, without levity, without fear, does such a thing when the source situation so warrants it, goes around the mitzvah drah blannan. The many muqahim have raised this issue whether we really ask him that it's a mitzvah or a hovah. I'd like to quote the just the sephah kahimuk, who says that the mitzvah is mitzvah shin samahhe in the sephah kahimuk. mitzvah sotah shi vihir, shi vihir, vihir, vihir, wa bala wa kong. Mitzvah sotah is that the husband should bring you to the kong, apparently according to the hinuk, it's a mitzvah on the husband. Vihah sotah kimishvah dah katos, the dual accordance with what it says. Vihah sotah seems to be the husband. He completely seems to be on the husband. The sotah hinuk therefore says at the very end of the smitzvah. The hovah al-zah, the king al-ishtah. The nistra of al-ohid-l-a-kohim. The kina says if a person did warn her and yet she disobeyed the warning and entered a secret place with a suspected person and then he does not bring you to the kohim to continue the process be ta-la-saysim. So he transgressed a bit-la-says. He did not fulfill the mitzvah and it seems to be the mitzvah upon him. The mitzvah has seen us here for a raise of the issue. Well, in such a case, would we actually employ some sort of force, kif-fiyat, in order to force him to fulfill his mitzvah. The mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah, the mitzvah. Bethin should actually force the husband to do it and it seems to be according to this line of reasoning it would be a mitzvah on the husband to do it. If it is a mitzvah on the husband, then it's like any other mitzvah, any other mitzvah which could imply coercion of the certain circumstances. In general, we have a Gomara and Kuvissah, take off, if Bethin says he doesn't want to do a mitzvah, we would try to coerce him to do the mitzvah until he finally does it of his own position, as is well known, the position of the rambam in Helchos Gewishin. How can you force a person to submit and say he wants something? This, of course, is not operable in our times, but the idea of coercion for this mitzvah seems to be logical according to the opinion of the of the Hinoq that it's a mitzvah on the husband. However, in fact, the opinion itself that it's a mitzvah on the husband does seem rather strange since the Hinoq generally follows the footsteps of the rambam and considers the who considers the mitzvah a few of and Bethin, but not a few of an husband. It's a little strange of the said that Hinoq seems to take his own path. One might add that even according to the rambam that there's no mitzvah directly in the husband to do this act of kana'ult, this act of warning, but yet the husband would see his life for conversely. In any case, women would see a husband not behaving in a proper fashion, the mitzvah of Hijakh certainly would apply. The mitzvah of Hijakh is to admonish your friend to put him in a better path to taking off the wrong path. This mitzvah obviously applies between husbands and wives, and it would seem though Sola Purlow says in his edition of the Safar Mitzvah of Rebenasajikon, that certainly the chilah of Hijakh would apply in this particular case as well as in other cases. And therefore even according to the rambam, there would be a physical mitzvah, not just the nitzvah of Bahman, but you won't have to do it in this exact form in the form the way the Torah told us with all the ceremony, with all the certain rights that you have here, but the mitzvah of the husband to Hijakh or as I said, in any case where people see any other people doing, acting in an improper way, the correct approach of poison tar would be "Ochir tochir", and therefore it would be a mitzvah anyway. From our Tarsah in Tarsah of Solta, whether it's a mitzvah or not, we learned from here the general laws of a case of adultery, Rechmanah of Islam. And we know from the derivation of the Sukhin, from the words nitzvah that were repeated a number of three times, the Torah says that a woman who did commit adultery is therefore not allowed to remain married to her husband, and not only is she not allowed to remain with her rich husband, even if she would get divorced. According to Jewish law, they would have to get divorced. So if they get divorced, then this woman could not marry the person with whom she committed adultery. The same way she is forbidden, from staying married to the husband under whom she committed adultery, she is not allowed to remarry or marry the person with whom she committed adultery. Very well known that the Ramban passed in that, in Asia, she's inside a woman who committed adultery is also to her husband. But of course, there are three basic types of adultery, where we want to actually, in English, call it adultery, but we'll use the words and heed relationships each of them. So the women who, for lack of a better translation, which we'll be explaining in a few minutes, I'll say again, a woman committed adultery. There are three examples as a case where a woman would be mizanah to make. The woman would do this with prior malice, a fourth thought, she intends to commit adultery. And then the extreme case would be where, God forbid, in the case of rape, when a woman would be a married woman would be raped. In the case where a married woman is raped, of course, she's not us or to her husband. It's only us, to us, and when it's quote or fault, unquote. But if it's, if she were raped, have to show them. So then she's allowed to say married to original husband. The knit points would be in Asia's issues instead of a showgate, a woman who committed adultery, but unintentionally. The, in such a case, the Raman Paskin in Para Croft Island, which you should, that a woman who committed adultery with Chicago, a woman who committed adultery, either against her will, in the case of rape, or in the case of showgate, where she committed the act unintentionally, which we'll explain soon. The Raman says she's such a case, she's Mutarasalbala. In an unbelievable tour de force, the Maarik, which is one of the most famous opinions of Maarik, well known in the Yeshiva world, Maarik made up his own Nuhidush, his new idea, and he based it really on the simple shot of the tasak. Maarik, distinguished, for our purposes, will explain their two different types of showgate yourself, unintentionally can be one in two ways. One is, in a case, where somehow the woman was misled into thinking that this is really a husband. In such a case, the Raman would say, and the Maarik said this is true, that Asia's issues. And so, the showgate gives Mutarasalbala, a woman who committed adultery, the showgate unintentionally, so she's ushered, she's permitted to her husband. However, there's another case. The other case would be in a case where she knows that it's not her husband, and she's quite aware of what she's doing, but she doesn't realize it's us, she doesn't, she doesn't, she's not aware of the laws of the Torah, and doesn't realize that adultery is permitted in the morality of certain worlds. She thinks this expression of free love, which she doesn't really see as any sir. Maarik said that in such a case, she would definitely be forbidden to her husband, because the Torah said ish, ish qi to say ish t'o, umah, alah zomah al. Now, the word m'ilah, we'll get back again too later, but the word m'ilah, for our purposes, I'll translate as she does something bad, she doesn't injustice, she takes away something from her husband. So the Maarik says, anglers will be shogage, shogage, this is not the case of the shogage of it, unintentional act which we could therefore permit to her husband. [speaking Arabic] Because she doesn't intend to do something bad to her husband. [speaking Arabic] The Torah didn't say, point out the Maarik, ish, ish qi to say ish t'o, malah mah al-vashir. The Torah didn't say a woman who turns away, becomes a sotah, and does something bad to God, which would imply that she has to have intention for the ish, but malah mah al, the Torah said she did an injustice to him, she did something wrong to him. In such a case, the Maarik said she still has to her husband. As long as she is totally unaware that she is create, that she is doing something wrong, she thinks that her husband, then the Maarik says she's permitted to her husband. But if she knows that it's not her husband, and she knows well what she's doing, but she doesn't think this, and if she's involved, then she would be permitted to stay with her husband. One thing seems very surprising about the continuation of the Maarik is that what would happen in a case where a woman would commit adultery knowingly with prior intention, but think that the ultimate good of what she's doing without way this particular action. And let's make it even stronger. In the case where the halacha itself would say that under such circumstances it's better actually to commit adultery than to refrain. How could such a case be? The Maarik himself brings the case of Esther. The Maarik in the Gila says that based on the Pasluk in the Gila's affairs that Esther said Kashaabati about. She wants losses. What? And the Gilaik explains in the Gila the same way I'm lost, I'm lost from my father's house and lost from you. Until now, the Gilaik assumes that she was married to Mordecai. And even though she has relations with Ashvayros the entire time that was considered a case of rape on this. But from going willingly to the king it was Bihason, it was with her intention. Even though at that time she went with intention to save Thayusrael, to save the entire community. And the Maarik adds it's obvious the most elementary question. It's more obvious than any elementary question that Esther did nothing wrong. There was not even a trace of a sin. It was a great mitzvah. And you should know he says there's a lylus named Amelah when she came before the king. They say that Esther somehow attained Raghha Kodesh. She attained one of the actual prophecy and she knew what she was doing and she knew that it was right. And therefore the Raghha Kodesh itself was right. But still she's also present. I find this very surprising because If the Esur are according to Maarik, he's defined by Malavomal, if the Esur is defined as doing something wrong, something done as an injustice. So in a case where her purpose is to save Thayusrael, why should this be considered Malavomal? In fact, later Raghronim raised a discussion about this particular point and said that in a case where the husband actually is endangered, a case, well known case, shown in the case of a certain group of travelers that was taken captive. And the obvious intention of the villain who took them captive was to kill them all. And one of the women there decided that she could try to seduce the leader of the band. And by doing so, she would rescue her husband and the entire community. If this is indeed the case, and her purpose was really Leshim-Shamayi, that sometimes we would call an Avera Leshmah, an Avera, but for good purpose and that itself would be a major topic to discuss. What is the status of an Avera Leshmah within the context of Judaism? But assuming that this is true, why should she believe the answer to harassment? The concept of Malavomal doing justice or harassment doesn't seem to apply. But nevertheless, the Nauriki himself probably would have thought that this is Usser, not only is it Usser, as a matter of fact, it might not be Usser. It might be the act itself, might be permitted, but the east of harassment would still obtain, even though what she did seems to be the right thing to do under the circumstances. When we say that in Asia's ish shazintah, a Sur-liballah, a married woman who committed adultery becomes forbidden to harassment. So we could say that in a even sharper fashion, there are many Afro-Nim who discussed this issue. I think Raphshek de Rode about this in a safer era set to thee. The normal kiddushin when a person is married to life, it means that from now on, once she accepts kiddushin from her husband, she's allowed, according to biblical law, to have relations with him, but she is forbidden to have relations with anyone else. In the case where a married woman commits adultery, then from now on, she's Usser to her husband. This then, that not only she Usser to the person with whom she committed adultery, but she's Usser to her husband, this to herself, is not just, could be interpreted. That it's not just an Isser to her husband, but since the Hatha to her husband is gone, in a sense, there is a lack of total kiddushin, in this case, the Boel, the person who came along, the adulterer, who committed adultery with this woman, actually, by this act, they caused the kiddushin to be somewhat dissipated. Now, it's not completely dissipated. She is still an Issus Ish. She's still Usser to the entire world, but somehow the Ishas may be considered lacking. It's not considered a total Ishas. And that's a idea that's found in a past look with a novel interpretation of Rashi and Ahronin. The Torah said, in Devarian qim, if a woman sleeps with a married woman, sleeps with a man, the Umecha Ghashayim, and they both die. So Rashi, on the past look of Umecha Ghashayim, raises the issue, what is the word Gham for? Why does the Torah say, they both die? Umecha Ghashayim, is not, it does not apply. Shnayim is two people. So why does the Torah say, Umecha Ghashayim? So Rashi says, "Lirabotabayimacharyim." The words itself of Rashi are very enigmatic. Umecha Ghashayim, in fact, in Rashi, if you'll study, look it up, you'll see the two texts of exactly what the words are, are, are written Rashi. I'm using the texts that are about Abotabayimacharyim. So some people interpret this as an abnormal manner of sexual relations. But the Bhartanura in his parish in Khunesh, and this is quoted by the student of the Torah, and this is, again, this code for Abhishekthim, his book, Erasatsvi, the Bhartanura says, with Me to Ghamshayim, the Torah told us here that, "Lirabotabayimacharyim," someone who comes later, which would mean as follows. Let's say Rashiel committed adultery with Khayim. So when she committed adultery with Khayim, so now Khayim and Rashiel are both Khayimisah. But let's say Rashiel's then commits adultery with barrows. Now, in a sense, she's Khayimisah ready for the first time. But would Barrow be Khayimisah? The Torah told me that Abotabayimacharyim, even if there's another case. And according to the Bhartanura, even if someone comes later, they're both Khayimisah, both Ruhvang, both Rashiel and Khayim and Barrow, they're all Khayimisah, thematically, both Khayimisah, and Khayim and Barrow, both Khayimisah. What would be the rationale to think otherwise? So this is what I explained here, and in saying that, since the kedushin, the original kedushin, was somewhat dissipated by the fact that the white committed adultery, therefore, there is not as severe, perhaps. It's not as severe, and I say to us, as a regular Asha's ish who committed adultery. He and the Isha's was not complete. So now, if we would learn that happening, if we would learn that with the thought behind the reasoning, so now we should really explain two ways. The Torah at the end said, "My whole logic is wrong." Asha's ish ish ish inhah, the kedushin ish inhah, she's a regular Asha's ish, and therefore, if she committed adultery, God forbid another time, then of course, about Khayimisah, and the only reason towards all this is to reject this line of thinking. The other possibility would be that our whole line of reasoning is correct, and Asha's ish ish inhah ish ish a sur al-Aballah because there are some sort of half-class issues, there's a removal of partial ish of from them, and therefore, the Torah really had to tell us, are you Khayimisah even in such a case where you committed adultery, but not the adultery of married woman who has complete issues, but even for mixed-class ish ish, even for partial ish, and then the Torah would tell us that perhaps even for partial ish ish ish ish ish. A similar type of question could be raised in the general bin that a woman who committed adultery ish, she committed adultery. Part of the reason may be that he actually committed adultery, the second person committed adultery, not only did he committed adultery, but he created an ishir on the first husband, he also took away as we explained a little bit of the condition of the first one. So if this is true, one may raise an interesting question. If a person did not take away the ishis of the original person, would he still be usher himself? The case, of course, would be a woman committed adultery, and therefore, she's usher to her original husband. And now, a second adulterer comes along, and he commits adultery with the original lady before she receives the divorce. Now, it's true we just learned that you're devocha imisa. That's true. But nevertheless, you might argue and say, "Well, why should we usher to the boelve?" Because the ish of the boelle might be contingent upon the ishir to the bow. If there's no ishir created by the ishir to the bow, then perhaps, she's mooted to the second boel. This is a suffix raised by the hulkafilov. The hulkafilov in evanerzer has an entire question, "Ishiziz insa pamayim in esa the boelcheli?" At the end, he compares this to the case of a coloring who raped a married woman. I said before that if a married woman commits adultery, she's usher to usher to usher. If she were raped, if it was considered onus against her will, then she's definitely muterister husband. Unfortunately, this is not the case of a coloring. If a coloring is married to a woman and she is raped, according to Jewish law, sad situation, she must be divorced. In such a case, we could argue that although, generally in the laws of onus, a woman is real out to marry her husband. Since she is real out to marry her husband, she is allowed to marry the boel after she would get divorced because he did not create an ishir on the husband. With a ishir alith, a woman was married to a ishir al, who is raped, is not usher to usher. If she's not usher to usher so then she's not usher to the boel either because the ishir to the boel is contingent upon the ishir to the boel. If this is true, then we could say that in the case where she is really not usher ala boel because of this original, because of the second adultery, because she was really usher before that. So in such a case, maybe she really would be mutter to her husband even though, not to her husband, she'd be mutter to the person with whom she committed adultery even though she committed adultery as a nation's ish, even it bemazed it. But since she, this ish, did not create an ishir in the original husband, so perhaps in such a case we could say that she's mutter ala boel. The main discussion we began today was really the definition of the mitzvah of sulta. Is it really a mitzvah or not? If it is a mitzvah, on whom is the mitzvah? We mentioned there's a mahlokas between the rambam and therinuch. From there we discuss a little bit what is the nature of the ishir of znus, for which a woman is usher to her husband, for which she is kayv misa, and for which the result would be that she's not only usher to her husband, but she's usher to the person with whom she committed adultery and the purpose of course of this mitzvah of the mitzvah of sulta is to obviate this discussion, to make it only a purely theoretical discussion of la'idil ta'rah, la'idira, but the ideal should be habezvah, shalom a'hable, there should be shalom b'aiif ne'viju wa shalom. You have been listening to our abi yum intivore, the weekly mitzvah for pa'shat in asar. Today's alahai yumit, we started bikat kahanim in the last ta'lahai yumit, where the hazen says, and the kin of the kebotain uba, bakhin uba bakhah, in place of bikat kahanim, because in hudstarats the minig is, in Ashkenazi communities, not to say bikat kahanim every day, but only on yumim intivim. Since this week is going to be shalom and the kat kahanim will be recited, recited every day in Ashkenazi, but even in hudstarats it will be recited on shalom. So I think we'll devote a few days to the alahat of bikat kahanim. One alahat, there's gonna be no special order here, but more or less in the order of, I think, importance, because people, for instance, sometimes make mistakes. One alahat of bikat kahanim, mentioned explicitly in the qanim, is panim, kineget panim. The faces of the qanim and the faces of the mitt bakhim, of the sibor that you see in the bakhah, are face to face. You face each other. The logic, I think, is abi. If you're getting a bakhah, the bakhah comes from he was given the bakhat that he was receiving the bakhah, and face to face is the abi swing, which they should be, it should be situated. They might be deeper, more spiritual, and perhaps mystical reasons, but the shat reason is really clear. Because bikat kahanim has a special order of antiquity and holiness about it, and I think because of the fact that it's said relatively rarely in hussards, and there is alahat, that in the beta miktash, one was not allowed to look directly at the hands of the qanim. So people, the minnag is a reason for people to if you rather extreme in not looking at the qanim. It's coming even to see people who turn around, seeing people who actually turn around and have their backs facing the qanim, or if they take their children underneath their talism, protect their children so their children are gathered around them, the children are facing backwards, are facing the back of the shawl. This is explicitly against the way in which bikat kahanim should be received. I think it's actually spoiling the bakhah, so it's very important to be marked with the idea of not looking at the qanim outside the beta miktash is not even alpidin, it's merely a minak. It's sure you should not lead one to appear to be rejecting the bakhah by turning one's back to the qanim. In fact, as I mentioned, the basis for the entire idea of not looking at the qanim was in the beta miktash, where the qanim had the shrinah resting on their hands. In outside the beta miktash, today, in shawl, in fact, the halaqah does not hold, there's a minak not to do it. How does one not do it? So you have to face the qanim, you should look down, not turn to the side, qanim canigat qanim. You should be facing the qanim, and if you don't, you'd wish not to look at the qanim, it's in rapid look at the qanim, so one gazes down towards the floor, such a way that you're not looking directly at the qanim. For the same logical reason as facing the qanim, and even more obvious, one should not be talking during bakhat qanim. It's not being recited in the background. You're not even supposed to be listening. You're receiving a bakhah. It would really be incredible if, let's say, a child came to get a bakhah from his father on Erevim Kippur or del Shabbat, and while the father was given the bakhah, the child was talking about something else. You're in direct cudication with the qanim who are representing the qaddish bohu, the samu, echmi al-banayis, well, the qanim put the name of God on the Jew's wa aniyya bakhim, and I, God, says I will give the bakhah. So it's obvious that one should not be talking or doing anything else other than not only listening, but trying to absorb, trying to receive the bakhah from the qanim. For that reason, you answer a man after each pashok, because that's how one receives and accepts a bakhah by answering a man. You also answer a man after the bakhah, the qanim, but that's the general qanim, advancing a man after every bakhah, financing a man after the bakhah, and yah el, and yisah, that's an act of receiving the bakhah by the qahal, by each individual in the qahal. And that, I mean, is part of the process of getting a bakhah, and therefore has importance in and of itself. Okay, that's it for today. We will continue with different halakhals having to do with bakhat qanim. How it is said, halakhazan, says the role of the qanim, the role of the people in the next few days before shavu'at. You've been listening to KMTT, kimit xi'on, te cetara, the tarah, the tarah, the tarah, the tarah, the tarah. Again, I'd like to remind you to recommend KMTT to your friends, acquaintances, cousins, etc. There is nothing, I think, I think there's nothing like it. How to spend a half hour in the morning in your car while walking while jogging, etc. And, in the meantime, shavu'at qanim, kimit xi'on, ume'at xi'on, here in Gushit xi'on. This has been Ezra Beck, and we'll be in touch tomorrow with the shu'on, on Essentials of Adata Shem, of Harab-Noshataran. Call to f.