KMTT - The Weekly Mitzva Parshat Behar Bechukotai
KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - The Weekly Mitzva Behar Bechukotai
This is the beginning of our third week of "KMT-2" since Pesach. This is the beginning of our third week of our third week of our third week of our third to automatically transfer files from your computer to any MP3 device. I never actually tested the method myself, but this week I was trying to translate those instructions into Hebrew. I got up to the last point and for the lifetime I can't figure out exactly what you're supposed to do. After you've set up the Windows media and you connect your MP3 device, how do you get them to automatically sync? The instructions at least to me are unclear to me as soon to be unclear to some of the readers as well. So, if anyone who has successfully managed to do this, if you have your Windows media on your computer, transferring MP3 files from KMTT to a MP3 device, I would appreciate it if you would write to KMTT, it's KMTT at Kimi Tionog, and explain it to me. In the meantime, I'm holding up sending out the Hebrew instructions for the Hebrew programs for Keshet, but if anybody can help me, I'd very much appreciate it. Today's share is Monday's share, the share of Rabbi Nimmin Tovori, the weekly mitzvah for Pashat Bahar Bakhokotay. After the share, I'll be back with the Al-Akhai Umit. In Pashat Bahar, the Torah tells us, Vrittim Kilminka, La Mitecha, Okonomia de Mitecha, Al-Tomushitahik. If you buy something or sell something to your friend, do not defraud him. The price should be fixed according to fear measures, and the Gomara in the fourth part of Masea has a long topic about the laws of fraud on the Internet. We'll discuss one particular issue, and that is, the laws of fraud, as it applies to hiring people to work for you. The Gomara in the fourth part of Masea says, raise the question, if there is al-Nah of the sryus, if there is a dinner fraud, the concept of fraud, when you rent something. The Torah said, Vrittim Kilminka, the laws of fraud apply to sales when you sell something. The Gomara then says, how do you look at rental? Is rental considered a type of a sale? For a certain amount of time, you do acquire rights to the rented item? Or do you say no, it's a different type of transaction, it's not considered mecha, and therefore, the laws of fraud on the Internet do not apply? We'll discuss the laws of renting that property and not renting either real estate or movable objects, but we'll discuss the issue of polling workers. Rambam said, raises the issue in Hilchau's parakid gimma, the laws that do refer to sale. Rambam says, in connection with the halacha, that there is no, the laws of fraud do not apply to land, because land in general is not considered to have the laws of al-Nah, because perhaps the value of land is very dependent upon location and other factors. So the Rambam says, there's no been of fraud for buying land or even for renting land, and that connection continues with the laws of hiring workers. The Rambam says, in Hilchau's parakid gimma, the law that does not apply to the law. If the issue could come to the law, the Rambam says that if you hire a worker, a worker when you pay by the hour, the Rambam says, I don't care what you hired him for. If you hired him to work on the land or to work with movable items, you might give, for example, give someone the laundry to do the laundry. The Rambam says, the laws of fraud do not apply. It says, if you bought him temporarily, somehow you have a payment, the payment that you pay him is actually for himself, or the person whom you hire. There's a special law that there's no been of Allah by slaves. So it seems the Rambam relates to a worker actually as a slave. For a temporary time, he's considered a slave. The Rambam agrees, in general, to the principle of the Rambam, that there is no been of fraud by hiring a worker. But he says, because it's not considered a sale at all. The Rambam apparently thinks two things. One, that the law of fraud only applies to acts of actual sale. In general, rentals are not considered sales, and therefore it follows that there's no been at all of Allah by any rental. The second thing, the point of the Rambam, is that when you hire a worker, so it is considered an act of rental. It's not considered an act of buying him. You do not acquire him. We will deal mostly with the opinion of the Rambam because of the time constraints that we have. But let's return to the Rambam, that there is no no, but not for the same reason as the Rambam. The Rambam said that there is no no, because it's not considered a sale. The Rambam seems to say that it is considered a sale, but it's a sale of an effort. A sale like that you buy at least partially, you buy a slave. And therefore there's no law of Allah. The Rambam contrasts this in halacha yutres with a shiddish that he made up. Yevra'ali, whenever the Rambam says Yevra'ali, it seems to me he probably means that this is the law that he imagines, follows logically from his train of thought, but he did not find a sword directly for it in comedic literature. Yevra'ali, the Rambam says, it seems to me, "Sha'ka'blan yeshlo na" that a person is called a ka'blan, the laws of fraud do apply to him. What's a ka'blan? A ka'blan is what we would call a person who undertakes a certain job. And what's the difference between halacha, between a po'al and a ka'blan? A po'al works by the hour. A po'al means a worker. And you hire somebody at whatever price you pay in per hour to work a mouse. Or outside a ka'blan is the person you hire for the job. Like he undertakes a certain responsibility. And his responsibility is to finish the product, return it, or fix it, or do whatever he's supposed to do. And then he finishes responsibility. The difference would be very simple if a po'al works five hours. But he didn't do such a long, expensive job. I hired someone to clean my house. And I paid them by the hour. After five hours, I'm disappointed they did not finish cleaning my house. I still have to pay them for five hours because I hired them as our workers as po'al. If I would hire a ka'blan to clean my house, it would mean I would say I'm going to pay you an extra amount of money to clean my house. I don't care if it takes him 20 minutes or it takes him 22 hours. His responsibility is to clean the house. Until he finishes cleaning the house, I don't have to pay him if he says. For whatever reason it seems that he didn't clean the house, I don't have to pay him until he finishes cleaning. The ramam says there for yerua'ali it seems to me sha ka'blan yashlona as opposed to a po'al worker who works by the hour. There is no fraud, there is no concept of fraud in hiring a worker. When you hire a ka'blan, there is a law of fraud. Okay, that's it. Kigansh, Kibel al-Avela, I wrote Beggazeb asarazuzim. Oh, it's far haluk zebishnaizuzim. Habeishlona. The ramam says if I hire someone to tailor a garment for me, whatever price we make up, I hire a tailor. And whatever price I make has to be fair, just and adequate. Otherwise, it's ona. And ona, besides the ether, creates an automatic cancellation if the ona is over a certain amount. If the fraud reaches more than a six over the price, or below a six or over a six, and the whole transaction is considered invalid, you can just stop and start again. So we see from the ramam that a ka'blan, which does not really seem to be a type of machira, a sale, but nevertheless, the law of ona applies to a ka'blan. However, in Efid, even though there seems to be a type of machira here, a type of sale, but nevertheless, there's no fraud because he's considered a slave, and there's no law of fraud by slaves. The commentators in the ramam raised the issue that the distinction between a ka'blan, and in Efid, the ka'blan and the poe out, the distinction between the day worker, as opposed to the person who's hired to do a job, seems a little difficult. Because we bask in, which follows, that ain ou man connede schwachkele, the worker who works on an object. Let's say I gave him metal, and I asked him to make a ring for me. So you could learn that really what I'm doing is giving him raw material, which he forms into a ring, and then he sells me the ring as if it's a new ring. If that would be true, then I understand that he's selling me an object that the laws of fraud should apply. But we follow the opinion that ain ou man connede schwachkele. The ou man, this worker, does not acquire the ring. He doesn't sell me the ring. I do pay him for the work. If I pay him for the work, why is he inherently different than a regular poel? This is a questioning raised, for example, by the Macad Mishnah. The Mishnah the Melach, one of the commentaries printed on the standard editions of the Ramban, tries to answer this question, and he said, "There is another distinction between a poel and a compliment." The Gomara says that a poel, a worker, can change his mind, can back out of the deal, even if he's started working. Why? Because he leaves and they use to a la fadim. The Torah told us, actually, in today's Sedra in Bihar, that we are all slaves to God. The Gomara explains, the better he says, even deeper, a vadaihein vu la fadim evadim. They are my slaves. They're not slaves to other slaves. It's problematic for a person to sell himself, or be sold by Bezden, by the courts, into slavery. The poel, the worker, is not a slave, and we don't want him to be involved in this particular problem of selling himself in the slavery, as it were. And therefore, because, in certain respects, he sounds and seems to be a slave, we gave him the right to back out. Apparently, the right to back out would preempt the problem of being a slave. He leaves and they sell a vadim. Therefore, it does make sense that in evad, the poel, the worker, is considered as if he's selling himself. He is selling himself. He is, in certain respects, like a slave. However, he must be able to have to change his mind to back out. In order for him not to really be considered a slave, the purpose of Kileveness, or vadim, that he really seems to be a slave. So the mission of Allah has, but a kablan cannot change his mind. Why is it that a kablan cannot change his mind? Once a person enters an agreement to be a kablan, the worker who works for to supply a finished product, he cannot change his mind. What's the reason? Apparently, there is no reason to allow him this special right of changing his mind, because he doesn't seem to be a slave in the first place. Only slaves are exempt from the laws of fraud. The law of fraud does not apply to slaves. However, a kablan is not a slave. He never was a slave. Therefore, he has no right to change his mind. Therefore, the mission of Allah wants to explain that the Ramadan thinks that a kablan is not a slave. Therefore, the law of fraud does apply to him. This, however, this idea raised by the mission of Allah, however requires a little bit more analysis, because the Ramadan really does think that there is some no sort of ownership over a slave. The Ramadan found in shlukh invishusim, in the section of the Ramadan which regards workers who are partners, messengers, the Ramadan says in parakdala halakhabays. The Ramadan says they are not considered really partners, because there is no such thing as selling yourself to someone else. If you say, for example, you and I will work together, it will make suits with people. But you can't make some sort of a Kenyan, a mode of acquisition on the suits, because the suits do not exist. You cannot sell or buy anything that doesn't exist. So, the Ramadan says, therefore, they're not considered partners. To rise it on the spot says, he could, because a person could be makhnip asmala kavego, bikinyan kiddinavadim. A person could somehow become a partner with another artisan by selling himself to the other person. And how can you sell yourself? A person can sell himself to his friend as some sort of slave, some sort of debture. It seems that the argument here between the Ramadan and the Reifit would be whether there is a really Kenyan in the body himself of the person who's selling himself to Ewa as if it were. He's trying to rent himself out to someone else, and the discussion is there actually a Kenyan in such a thing. The Ramadan says, there isn't. If there isn't, there's no Kenyan at all in the Ewa. There's no formal mode of acquisition, which I acquire him, and I really don't acquire him. So why is he considered an Ewa? Why is he considered, in our case, like an Ewa, that the laws of fraud don't apply to him? I didn't really buy him. I don't really own him. So why is it that the laws of fraud don't apply the same way laws don't apply to buying a slave? Moreover, the mission of Malak raised his observation on the fact that there is distinction between the rights to change your mind in the middle of your work between a poel and a kabbalah. A poel in a kabbalah. A poel, the Damari says, can change his mind at all times because he needs to avert the real problem of being a slave. But a kabbalah cannot change his mind at all times. Apparently the mission of Malak said there is an inherent difference between an evident kabbalah. However, it seems that the Ramam itself disagrees with this point, too. The Ramam says that in Hilchos, there is a section in the Ramam and the laws of rental. And the Ramam in that section has laws of rental of all types of things, all types of rentals of land, of moveable objects, of workers, all that is found there. In Peric Test, Al-Acha-Baled, the Ramam says, "Kaysa didna poel-Shikazado." What is the law of a poel who changes his mind? The Ramam, preceded that by saying, "Poel can always change his mind even in mid-work, mid-day, because the Damaris caused the Pasul-Killipanesalah Vadim." The Pasul-Killipanesalah Vadim. And the Ramam goes on to say, "And what is the law?" When he does change his mind. After he worked, you have to pay him according to what he did, and he receives the money. Then the Ramam says, "The incablamu shamin-la-masha-sib-lassa." And if he's a cablam, then you have to assess it based on what there still is to do. So, the issue of how to assess it is not our issue right now. But it just seems from the Ramam that he thinks that everybody can change his mind, whether he be a cablam or even more. Both of them can change their mind. So, apparently, in a certain respect, there's no distinction between a poel and a cablam as their relationship in being a slave is. They're both some sort of workers for other people, and therefore they could change their mind. The law, this right, of changing your mind applies according to Ramam because of Adayim. And that applies to a poel and a cablamun equally. So, we're back to our original question. Why did the Ramam really say that there's no law of fraud as opposed to a worker, as opposed to a poel, because he is likened as it, whereas a cablam, the law of fraud does apply to him, and somehow he's not considered as it. It's just an inherent difference. So, I'd like to explain the answer that many people have given. This is printed, for example, in Everna Azel, and this is Al Men's Sator, in the Ramam. So, he gives the following explanation. There is an inherent difference between a poel and a cablam, not whether there is really a Kenyan in what they... in the person himself. The Ramam might really say there is no Kenyan in them. However, the question is, at the end of the day, when you do pay them, why do you pay them? As far as the law of Balthalim goes, as far as the law that says you're not allowed to hold back the wages of a worker. Both... you are required by law, but you're multitamed to have a... someone works for you, you have to pay them that very day. You're not allowed to wait till the niggas say to pay him. You must pay him on that particular day. That law apparently applies to a poel and a cablam as well, which is another reason to assume there is no difference between a poel and a cablam. In both cases, I have to pay them on the same day. So, we're back to our original problem. Why did the Ramam distinguish between the laws of poel and... ...cablam? Why did he say that with a poel, a worker, there's no law of... oh no, because it's like you bought a slave. But even though the Ramam thinks that there is no ownership of a slave of the poel, like there is ownership of a real asset, nevertheless, there's no... oh no, there's no fraud by a slave, but there is no law by a cablam. The answer that Ibn Zalman says is that although I neither own a... ...an evet, a poel, nor a cablam, neither a Kenyan, neither a poel or a cablam is really owned by the Adon. And indeed, that we must pay them both on the same day, on the same time, there's no distinction between them. When I do pay the evet, the poel, who is like an evet, there is an inherent difference what I pay him for. I pay the evet for the hours that he worked. His work requires payment. The cablam is not paid for his hours. He's not paid for the time that he invested. He's not paid for his work at all. He's paid for the finished product. In that respect, a poel is like an evet that I pay him for his time. It's as if the time that he worked is sold to me. That, of course, is not involved in an unusual case of sale. It's like an evet. It's like a slave whose time belongs to me. Although there might be a difference that, in the evet, I might own him. Whereas in the poel, I don't really own him, but I do pay him for the time. Paying someone for the time is as if you're treating him as a slave, even though you do not really own him. Therefore, he can change his mind at any time. Therefore, the rabbit thinks there's no law of fraud when I hire a worker. However, a cablam, even though he does not really sell me the finished object, we, as I said before, a uman konibishla keili, means that uman really doesn't own the keili that he sold to me. It really retains its original ownership, the metal that was formed, for example, into a new thing, really always belonged to the original owner. It's not that the cablam is selling it to him. Nevertheless, when you do pay him, what do you pay him for, you pay him for the fact that he finished the product. You pay him for a product rather than for the time of work. In that respect, he doesn't resemble a slave, and therefore, it's as if I'm paying him for a product, and therefore, the rabbit thinks the laws of fraud apply to this as if we're considered a type of a sale. On the other hand, once I pay them, I have to pay them both the same way. I pay them on the same day because the law of baltalea, not holding back the payment, the payment that they would apply equally to the case where I pay him for his time, or that I pay him for the finished product. Like to conclude, the difference between the poelna cablam is well known in connection with the beginning of the other parashas that we read the shabbat. We've discussed the law of fraud as applies to, as is found in parashat bahar. The beginning of parashat bahar kotai begins in bahar kotai telejo, that means rotational. You should follow, if you follow, walk in the ways of my laws and observe my commandments. The famous rashi begins havul amelim batora. A person should bahar kotai telejo, the laws of adhering, walking according to the laws of the Torah, means to work in Torah. The word amal means really heavy work. Adhaml amal yulad. A man is created with the concept of heavy work. What the work would be if it's amalah, shiltah, amalah, shiltah, is found in the Muslim books. The work that a person was created to perform. All the people who have dealt with the ethics of Judaism have tried to point out very often that amalim batora doesn't just mean to learn. It means to invest time in learning Torah. The idea would be that when we learn Torah, we learn Torah really as a poel and not as a cablam. The difference would be, of course, when you learn what are you accomplishing and what needs to be fulfilling. When I gave the example before of cleaning a house, let's give an example of fixing shoes. If I give my shoes to a shoemaker and tell him that I need new souls. And he worked on it for four hours. At the end, he comes back to me and said, "I really worked for four hours. I tried my best to do the job, but I couldn't do it." If he's a poel, if he's a person I paid by the hour, I would have to pay him what he did for those four hours. But if I hired him as a cablam, which is the way normally I think we would hire a person who a shoemaker today, we tell him I want to use a fix, put a new soul. If he did it in four hours or he did it in two minutes, I wouldn't pay him any differently. So he radically, if a person would know some magical trick that he could do this without any effort whatsoever, I would still have to pay him the same amount of money that we arranged originally. So the chakme amus are explained, we learn Torah, we're actually learning like a poel and not a cablam. It's not our responsibility to finish the finished product. We can't finish everything and we do not get paid by the finished product. And nailing by Torah means the effort that's put into Torah is what we are rewarded for. The amount of time that we learn, the amount of energy and effort that we expend in studying Torah is really the requirement that we have. In the world of Yeshivas, they say in the name of one of the godoleum of the last generation that he gave a shear, and at the end of a shear someone asked him the question and he really had no answer. And that somehow seemed to reject the entire principle that he had suggested in the shear. And his answer to the student was, I am not a toil. I'm not a cablam, I'm a toil. I'm not, I did not undertake, when I became a rebby, when I became a rushishiva, I did not undertake the responsibility of answering every cash in the world. I never promised, I never thought that I could give a finished product and everything I do. But what I did undertake is to spend the time involved in learning Torah. I'm a Poel, and since I'm a Poel, I in that respect, I'm like an effort to Akkadish Barakal. It's true that regular eva and gushokanli, but your time belongs to the Adonim. In that respect, I'm a Poel when I learned Torah, I belong to Akkadish Barakal, and that is the way we fulfill what Rashi's idea is. In dukkukotai te laikal means "heavyu amalim batola". You've been listening to a rabbina minta viri, the weeks imtsra, now for the halakhayomit. At the end of smanaswe, when we cite the Pasot ihiyu, the ratsan, imrei fi vegyeongi bitha finacha shamsu riba gawadi, this is mentioned in the gmara. The gmara says that "pifoshmanaswe", when says ashams fattaiti phtayti phtaykhafiyagitirataka, and after smanaswe, when says yu the ratsan, concerning the Pasot i foshmanaswe, the gmara says it's called 'fira arikta'. That Pasot ihiyu is a long dabbering, in other words it's part of smanaswe. There's halakhayic necessity for that, as we explained a few weeks ago, because one is not allowed to interrupt between gawadi-sail and smanaswe. But you had the Pasot, ashams fattaiti phtaykh, then when says that's part of smanaswe. There is no such question, there's no problem at the end of smanaswe. But by inference, since both these sakim come in the same statement, they were added to smanaswe, so to speak. In the same package, it doesn't imply that ashams fattaiti phtaykh is part and parcel of smanaswe. For this reason the Pasot Kim, going back to the ratsan state that if one is towards the end of smanaswe, and the hazzan has already begun to daven, and he's about to say ktushan. You'd like to answer ktushan, but you cannot answer ktushan if you're in the middle of smanaswe. If you're after smanaswe, then of course you can. So, alokai, and if so, the paragraph we add after smanaswe, and then indeed it's after smanaswe, it's called pakhanunimshala akhahat phtaykh. It's extra petitions after the phtaykh. So, one can answer ktusha then. But the ratsan says you should say you'd like ratsan first, because you'd like ratsan is part and parcel of smanaswe. And therefore one should not be massek, even by saying ktusha, between vahrekhatamoy saba shalom, and you'd like ratsan. Now, in many sidurim, all the sidurim, you ratsan did not appear immediately after the vahrekhatamoy saba shalom, but appear at the end of alokai nizah. And the logic was alokai nizah has been added to smanaswe, and you'd say you'd like ratsan at the very, very end. However, the shokana look past kins that one should say before lokai nizah, because you'd like ratsan is part of smanaswe, lokai nizah, is an addendum to smanaswe. The vahmah on the spot says the minigas both ways. There's a minute to say it only at the end of a lokai nizah, and he doesn't criticize the minak, depending on the minigas. He's okay in his eyes, and he accepts the possibility. But many paskim say, even after the vahmah, that you really should follow the sakalamah, and say it immediately after smanaswe. However, you can say it twice. If you really want to end, you feel it's important to end smanaswe with the uda ratsan, and you should say it once right after lokai nizah, vahrekhatamoy saba shalom, then you add things. And when you finish that, you can and should perhaps say uda ratsan again. But in any event, until you say uda ratsan, you cannot be mastic in any way, and therefore it's important to say it only. The same problem arises on a yum kippa. With the end of smanaswe, we say vidu. We say ashamdul bhagandul, when the alchats, and it comes after the vahra of vahrekhatamoy saba shalom. In all traditional makasawim, there is no uda ratsan there. Uda ratsan again is waiting for the very end, the end of the orkain itself. But the same logic, one should add it and say it before the vidu, because the vidu vidu is extra, it's part of the petitionary added parts, the smanaswe. The basic body of smanaswe should end with uda ratsan. And again, in terms of being mastic, before the ratsan, you cannot say anything. After the ratsan, when saying uda ratsan, we'll talk about this more tomorrow, when saying uda ratsan, so when it has the ability to permit it to interrupt, under certain conditions, we'll discuss those conditions tomorrow. And that's it for today. You've been listening to the Monday broadcast of KMTT, the mitzvah, ashar vuit, the weekly mitzah, vahra phejamitavoi. This is as we bake, I brought to the hara hai yomit, and this has been KMTT, the Torah, the Torah Podcast. Wishing you kultur vukat hatera mitzion, umi eitzion, and a happy lagbaomer. Kultur vukat hatera mitzi yomitavoi lansfert, we'll be back tomorrow with the sure and essentials in a badata sham of harav mesh tarragan. Kultur. 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