KMTT - Topics in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Shiur #11, by Rav Ezra Bick
KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - Medieval Jewish Philosophy #11
I will be given the weekly share, I weekly share for Tuesdays, the share in major issues and problems in medieval Jewish philosophy. In the past few weeks we've discussed first provenance hash kaha, and then the problem of evil, which is a particular problem inherent in the doctrine of hash kaha pratid, kaha does, and is responsible and watches over the world, then why does it appear that he's not doing that kind of job, there was evil in the world, the problem of evil, and then we discussed prophecy, without connecting the two. Today I would like to speak first of the connection between the two, prophecy as being part of a doctrine of hash kaha, of provenance, and from that to, to get to a wider understanding of dalke hash kaha, the modes and the means of provenance, not the theory of provenance itself, but how does God actually go about, watching over and having his will carried out within, within the world. And to begin, I would like to introduce a philosopher, who I don't think we've spoken about often in this series, and that is the dalke bag, the dalke bag is called the sonneties in Latin and English, Rabbi Lebi Bengyoshan, the dalke bag was a great grandson of the Vambhan, and his position in, in the field, in the field of Jewish philosopher, meaning major Jewish philosophers, the ones we consider part of the normative canon, is to occupy the most extreme possible position of an Aristotelian in Jewish philosophy, positions which the Vambhan will express minutely and somehow fix and tone down will appear in the dalke bag in their purest and most extreme form. One of the most crucial of those positions, one of the most crucial distinctions between the Vambhan and the Vabhag, concerns hash kaha. For in, in, in formal Aristotelian philosophy, hash kaha becomes almost impossible. One, the Aristotelian God doesn't know what goes on in the world. To be exact, there are two kinds of knowledges, there's knowledge of particulars and knowledge of universals. So God knows what is man. He knows what is cow. He knows what is white. He knows mathematics. He knows all those things which are universal, meaning they apply to categories. But according to Aristotle, God does not know particulars, meaning he doesn't know you. He doesn't know young girl. He doesn't know what you've done yesterday or what young girl has done tomorrow, because that's not included in the theory of man. What's more God, for Aristotle, also doesn't do anything. There is no means for God to actually be active in, in the world and to, and to change the course of, of the wind, or to split the sea, or to bring, or to bring rain. And therefore, practically speaking, there is no hash kaha, for tit. When the Vambhan discusses hash kaha, for tit, and does ascribe a theory of hash kaha, to the Vambhan he means, and to God, excuse me, the Vambhan describes the theory of hash kaha, to God, the second opinion. In the Vambhan's five opinions on hash kaha, is that of Aristotle? It means that God, who is truth, who is wisdom, is responsible for those rules of the world which provide a providential atmosphere for people. Because since the world is created with wisdom, creators of course are word, Aristotle will speak of creation, but since the world exists according to wisdom, or in the Vambhan's version of Aristotle, since God has made the world, has created the world, in accordance with the divine wisdom, therefore, wisdom says, and wisdom operates in such a way that those who behave, act in the proper manner, in the manner of wisdom, which includes morality, because morality is logical and national, will more or less benefit, if you're foolish, and you don't obey the rules, and you don't understand the way the world operates, and you don't understand what's good for man, what's bad for man, you're undoubtedly, you're undoubtedly suffering, but undoubtedly is a very strong word here, it wouldn't appear that this kind of providence, the providence of being wise, and living in accordance with wisdom, could be foolproof, too many accidents within the world. It might be true, I understand that many people would disagree even with this, it might be true that crime doesn't pay, and that living a well-balanced, wise, moderate existence will give you the most happiness and the best possible life in general, but it's undoubtedly true that individuals, well, statistically, it might be better up, individuals will occasionally fall into the hole that opens up during the earthquake, and their wisdom is simply unavailable to help them. We'll get to the government in a few minutes, but the world bag faces this problem straight on, because the world bag really says, "Yes, it's true, God, first of all, does not have knowledge of particulars in the world that the world bag does subscribe to," and the way that the wise and the virtuous, it's almost the same thing, the way that the wise and the virtuous are protected, and the world is by their wisdom. And he admits that that can't be a hundred percent, and to close the gap between knowledge of the rules, knowledge of what's wise, knowledge of what's moral and beneficial, and, in fact, having a good life, the mobile introduces prophecy. Prophecy for the world bag, similar to the way I described prophecy for the ramban, two weeks ago, one of the last spoke of this. Prophecy for the world bag is a natural process, it's a kind of wisdom, it's a wisdom which gives you knowledge of things which rational wisdom wouldn't give you, but it's available to anyone who opens his mind and develops himself on such a way as to grasp these objects of knowledge. And our bottom states that because prophecy exists, remember it's not a, it's not sent by God to you, it's your ability to grasp the knowledge which exists, which is out there. It's to know the truth, to know the truth in not the normal way of wisdom or rationality, but through a combination of imagination and wisdom, and I mean you get to know more things. And this helps to close the gap, so there may not be any room of wisdom which would keep you from harm's way, if there's going to be a sudden earthquake, but prophecy might, in fact, warn you that the earthquake is going to take place and then, if you're wise, you will move to a safer place. So here we have an example of someone looking at prophecy one in a relatively pragmatic manner, and this prophecy helps you out. It's true that knowledge and wisdom for the whole body is a goal in and of itself. So prophecy is a goal, but the result of prophecy is to exhibit God's providence, or the providence of wisdom and truth in general, in order to maintain the gap between Sadik Vittovlo, the good that comes to the Sadik, and Rasha Varallo, and why the evil who are fools and foolish will eventually trip up in the course of things because the ignorance, both of wisdom and of prophecy, will eventually cause them to stumble and to fall. We'll get back to prophecy in a second, but we're on the Vambam, the Vambam's position on the molds of Hashkaha is very, very difficult. There are dozens of opinions in the students of the Vambam to this day as to exactly what the Vambam means as to how Hashkaha works. The truth is that it avoids facing the problem. On one hand, the Vambam says in the 17th chapter of the 3rd section of the medieval hymn that one, the providence results in that there is no injustice in the world, aing Lefanab Avril. God is just, and therefore, you cannot have a case of Sadik Vittovlo, at least theoretically. And that is accomplished because that's what Hashkaha does, Hashkaha is God's justice in the world. On the other hand, the Vambam says that the way that Hashkaha works is in accordance to one's Hochma, in accordance to one's knowledge of the truth. That is expressed in the amount of Hashkaha that one has. He doesn't say that the Hashkaha consists only of the knowledge, which is what the Robox says. He says that there is a direct proportional relationship between one's knowledge, one's knowledge of God, one's knowledge of the truth, and the amount of Hashkaha one has. And therefore, he says animals have no knowledge and therefore they don't have Hashkaha. And people who are heretics, and basically non-Jews, who don't have the knowledge of the Torah, have less Hashkaha. And Jews and then philosophers, who have even more Hashkaha, it's in direct proportion. Now, of course, people assume if it's in direct proportion, he's probably saying what the Robox says. Why is it in direct proportion? Because it's the same thing. Hashkaha is the knowledge. He doesn't say that explicitly. And I think it is, there's a problem in saying that's what the Robox means to say because the Robox introduces this statement about the relationship between knowledge of God and Hashkaha with the statement that, "Ain Avil, there is no injustice." Now, if I'm like admits that only knowledge of God, only knowledge of the truth, only wisdom, couldn't prevent all cases of injustice. But the Robox not only thinks that both those things are true, that there is no injustice before God, and that there's a connection between knowledge and providence, he in fact states the two things within one page of each other, in one chapter, almost in one sentence. It appears that the Robox is deliberately avoiding explaining exactly how it works. And on the third hand, the Robox may, way later, at the end of a matter of time, states that he has another opinion. He admits it's a different opinion, in which he says that those people who, those few individuals, who maintain a constant state of knowledge of God, their minds are engaged in a constantly seeing before them the truth of God's existence, they in fact have miraculous providence, which will miraculously, through direct intervention of God's miraculous hand, prevent any evil from before them, except, or unless, they even temporarily go down, decline, and the direct connection, the knowledge of God is broken. The Ramam says that's not the same opinion I expressed in the 17th fact, it's a different opinion. So somewhere between these opinions, the Ramam is apparently trying to achieve the result, which the more common opinion, that God's providence is God pulling strings over the world would achieve, protecting the righteous and punishing the evil doers. Ramam wants that result, he says that is that, that is the only opinion, which is the opinion of the Torah. On the other hand, he wants two other things, one, he wants to say that there are different degrees of providence, something which is agreed to by many, many Jewish philosophers, the better people, in the Ramam's case, the wise, who are also the righteous, have more providence than those who are not wise, and two, the Ramam wants to say that, in fact, the connection is not between virtue and providence, between wisdom and providence. So therefore, we have the Babaag, which, there are many people who think that's the Ramam's position, which Ramam doesn't want to say. We have the Babaag who says, providence is wisdom, add to that prophecy, a special kind of wisdom. I suspect Ramam doesn't agree to that extreme view, but, and I have my own opinion, it's what Ramam really says, but it's not that important because there are, it's a constant battle, constant discussion, constant disagreement, and so exactly how to define the Ramam's position. I suspect very strongly the Ramam deliberately try to obfuscate the issue, and does not explain exactly how he thinks it could work, because he does want to achieve the maximus result without giving up the idea that providence is at least a reflection of one's connection with God, and one's real connection with God, according to the Ramam, is knowledge, is wisdom, is intellectual. This I would like to contrast with the opinion of the Christi Kraskus. We saw, we discussed the evidence, that when the Ramam speaks of wisdom, the Christi speaks of love. The Ramam speaks of the knowledge of God, the Christi speaks of the love of God. But the Christi's love of God is also reflected in a different love. The love of God that the Christi speaks about is that we, the goal of man's life, is to love God. But the Christi also says that God loves man. And the word love in those two sentences, man loves God, and God loves man, so if Christi is the same exact love, it's the same thing, meaning the same kind of thing. In a very, very striking, a Jewish, basically a Jewish, that if Christi says he compares God's love of man, to man's love of God, as reflected in the verbs used in the Torah. The Torah says that man should love God, the Ahafte et Hashem et Okecha. You should love God. The word is Ahavah. But when it describes God's love of man, the Torah says, or love of the Jewish people, it says rak bachhem hashak hasham. God loved you, but the verb is hashak. What's the difference between Ahaf? We love God, Ahafte, and God loves us, hashak. So if Christi says the difference is one of the Greek, not one of meaning, it's not a semantic difference, it's merely one of the Greek, hashakte is stronger love. And then he goes on to explain a very, very interesting point. He says, you were expected that, in fact, it should be the other way around. We should love God more than God loves us, because we love God because he's great. So God incites, elicits, provokes, as it were, the response in man of love. But for God to love man, man isn't so much worthy of being loved. He's not so wonderful, he's not perfect. So how much love could one have for man? So you would have expected that God loves man, he makes a big effort, but surely we should love God. God is infinite, we should love God, the ideal be the love God infinitely. And God should love man in proportion to what man says. He says, no, the Torah says it all the way around. You should let Ahov, but God is Hoshak, and Hoshak is more. And he explains the reason is because there are two separate considerations here. The first consideration that we mentioned is, in fact, true. The amount of love one has towards an object is proportional to the value of the object. And therefore, first, if I love two people, one of whom is better than the other, then I love the better person more than the less good person, where he says love is also proportional to your ability to love. God's love is a moral quality, and therefore, God who is perfect also loves perfectly. And even though the object of his love is this world, and man was in it, and the Jewish people was in man, an object not that worthy of love, but God's ability to love. Love is the expression of God's goodness, and since God's goodness is infinite, so too God's love is infinite, and encompasses man and the world and everything in it in a manner which man who is not perfect, and his goodness is not perfect, is incapable of expressing. Even when the object of his love is God himself. And therefore, if Christ says God loves the world and loves man far more than can be expected or commanded or ever achieved by imperfect man, even when he is loving the most perfect of all when he is loving God. Now if Christ says that God loves the world, how do I know God loves the world? He has a particular definition of love in mind. He says I know God loves the world because God made the world, and there was no need for God to make the world, so why did he make the world because he wanted to do something for the world, he wanted to give the world existence. That indicates perfect love. In other words, love for Christ is expressed in service, in doing things for the avoid, to serve, let a ho of, to love a very, very close concept in Christ's definition. In general, there is not a topic today if you go over not just the Middle Ages, but all Jewish thinkers. I think what we all think is, in all the ages, and look at how they define love, major topic in Jewish philosophy is a havah virah, the difference between love of God and fear of God. As I suspect that as many philosophers as you read, that's how many different definitions you'll eventually find. It's a notoriously elusive concept. Love for a Christ day is his service. We know God loves the world because he does things for the world, and he doesn't do it for himself. He's doing it for the world, and it's pure, he doesn't get anything out of it. So that, in fact, is pure love. When a Christ day calls on man to love God, he means to do the same thing the other way around. He means to serve God, to do his will, to do things for his name, not for yourself, but for, but for, but for him. So, we know God loves the world because he made the world, and once he made the world, he continues to love the world by doing things for the world and for, and for man. The greatest thing that God can do for man, the greatest good that he can give man, is the beikrut basham, is himself. How does God give himself to man by making, by helping man become worthy of this closeness to God? What is the closeness to God? The closeness to God is avat hanshem. You just close the circle. It's not a paradox, it's an equation. God's love of man leads him to help man love God because when man loves God, love is real. If man loves God, then that is the beikrut, that is cleaving, that is a kind of union. When two people, two persons love each other, they, they are combined, they are connected. So, man's love of God is a connection to God and that's the greatest good that could possibly be gotten, be achieved by man. And so, therefore, God's love of the world is expressed in his leading, at least human beings, specifically Jews, to the closest possible relationship with him. And how does he do that? He does that by making them better people. Here I return to the point I mentioned before, love is a moral quality. Shasta in an important sentence says that tov, ohev et hatov, vahashalem, ukefi, el echatov, kain, el echahava. The good loves the good and the perfect. Love is the relationship between a good, a good person and the good, the good and the perfect. He is the good and the perfect and therefore good people love God, the better you are, the more good you are, the more you love God. So how does God make us have more, how does he give us more fantasies of himself? He does that by helping us become better. How does he make us become better? Ooh, one, he gave us the Torah. Two, he arranges things. He spoke about this with Nissahyun, he arranges the one such a way that we have experiences which elicit from ourselves better and deeper virtues. That was the idea of Nissahyun, of trial. That was the Hashakar practice of actions. Three, another example, nivu-ah, nivu-ah exists, not because God wants to talk to you. If I exist because for certain people, those who are very around the level where they're close to God and can most benefit from a little bit of an extra push, for God will speak to them or speak to someone else to speak to them, makes no difference whether God speaks directly to you. The main thing is the message, but God will give a specific message beyond the message of the Torah in general which will correct, which will enlighten, which will bring you even closer to God. God by giving you intellectual knowledge, but by helping you again become a better person. So the purpose of nivu-ah is to make you a better person. Why is that the purpose of nivu-ah? Because the purpose of everything is to make you a better person. Nivu-ah is merely an expression of Hashakar pratit, when Hashakar pratit is defined as being God's love. And here, of course, I return to a point I made in the past, there's a very important difference between Hashakar as justice, the way the Bible speaks of Hashakar. It's a reactive thing. God reacts to virtue or to crime by judging and punishing or giving reward. And Hashakar as love, because Hashakar as love is God is looking for ways to make you better, whereas Hashakar in the random is God is committed to doing justice, to giving the good a good reward and giving the evil the proper punishment. So there isn't any necessary reason for the random to connect prophecy with Hashakar. He could include it in the general Hashakar of the rabbi, but in the person Hashakar the man doesn't draw this connection. Person Hashakar is one punishment, but when Hashakar is just one more prophecy, it's just one more example of the multifaceted way that God all the time is pulling strings, giving messages, giving the Torah, expressing his love of man by having man become better, improve his ways, become closer to God, and therefore achieve the greatest good that can be achieved, the closeness and the cleaving to God himself, deveikut, deveikut, deveikut, deveikut pashem. We spoke the last time about how it was in the history of Jewish philosophy in Spain, so nivua becomes less and less central as a religious experience, and mafchastay is a prime example of that. He says nivua is important if God wants to make you better, ahava love is the most crucial and most important and central religious experience. Nivua is not love. If God loves you because you love him, those if there's a loving relationship that exists between you, it's very possible or likely that there will also be nivua. Those who are far from God, then are on the level that this special kind of providence is relevant to them, but it's merely, nivua is merely there, you will spite nivua because it might help you more if you need it, or even if you don't need it, because one, you have to, ah, two, you read nivua. Three, mafchastay gives an example. You might have a friend who just gives you a muscle, helps you out, corrects your ways, helps you get to God, then you don't need. There's no particular reason for a message of nivua. So nivua is an important tool, but only one among the many tools that God has that apply to the Jewish people as a whole or to even individuals to help them achieve their greatest potential betov as good, as good individuals, to develop their personality and in consequence their relationship, their relationship with God. I mentioned that revchastay says that love means to serve, to do things for. God is engaged in constant love of the world by the very fact that he keeps the world in existence and runs it, and in all the time is looking for ways to bring individuals in the world to their greatest potential. Man, man's greatest potential is to love God, because love is genuine, cleaving unto God. So vchastay has the following, the following vote, it's kind of a drush, it's important not to assess it twice. In Pequea vote, we read the following double sentence. One hour of Torah, in good deeds, in this world, is worth more, is nicer, is better than all the existence in the next world. One hour of pleasantness, of enjoyment, of enjoyment, in the next world is worth more than all of this world. A deliberately contradictory and paradoxical statement. Now Kastak explains it as follows. He says, "From our point of view, if we love God, we're not trying to get things for ourselves. If you love God, you want things only for God. And therefore, the righteous prefer correctly one hour of Torah or my sin-to-beam of doing things, of serving God in this world. Because the next world is an assumption which is difficult to prove, but it was an assumption made by most nickers in the Middle Ages. The next world is nothing to do. Lohami Timya Halaruka. In the next world, you only have the benefit. You only have the kaurat ruach. You have the enjoyment, the happiness, the feeling of being loved and in love, but not the actions. But the love that doesn't want to have that particular pleasantment and enjoyment. That's not his goal. That was his goal. He's not really loving, he's loving himself. He wants to serve God. So therefore, from the point of view of man, you're feshahat shal, torah. You might seem to remember them as them, mikol, hyaye, hola, maba. But from the point of view of God, what does God want to do? God wants to bring man to achieve his greatest good, his greatest good is the cleavage an to God, which is called the kaurat ruach. That's the enjoyment of the next world. These aren't two separate things. They're the same thing, but they're two different sides to the same coin. Because love is, from the lover's point of view, it is service and from the objective point of view, in this case from God's point of view, it itself is the greatest good for the one who loves. And so therefore, God wishes us to be on llama bus the weekend, achieve the closeness to him, and benefit and enjoy that particular psychological metaphysical existence. But the love is not interested in that. If he weren't interested in that, he'd be undermining the love in which he's engaged. And therefore, both statements are true at the same time. And in fact, they express the same truth, but from two different points, from two different points of view. That's the end of our discussion for today. Next week, which will be the last in this series, we will return to the question of the love of God, which we introduced today in La Traste. And we will discuss it in other thinkers. As I said, it's a major theme in and of itself. Specifically, we will talk about what the women thus say about the love of God, the love of the fear of God, as well as the behavior of Bachia and others. And we conclude, we will conclude today's show with the habaha'i yomit, the m'habbi paskins in shuchanar, sariq, shiaquf, or shalmahat, shiyi'u enav le mata la arads. We are shaqif yu omei dvaitamig dash, over the bow ya habhein, the māla la sha maim. So, m'habbi says that when one davins, you should bend your head down so that your eyes face the floor. When the reason is, you are shaqif yu omei dvaitamig dash, you should feel just standing in the vaitamig dash, and then you look down. But billi bow, in your heart, you focus, concentrate, you focus on the heavens. If you recall, when we spoke about the direction of tfila facing Yushadayim, so we saw that one who does not know where Yushadayim is, one who was blind, or was lost one's direction, sense of direction. So, there are two different versions. The way it says in our gamara is yikhavain libo, the Yushadayim. He should focus mentally on Yushadayim, but the vermim says he should focus mentally on the heaven. And I think it means the same thing, but he's focusing mentally on any event. But here there's a real distinction. Here it says you should look down and think up. It's based on a gamara in Yvamat, davif yu dafqif yu and with padaatsa l'chitain enav le mata, billi bow, le māla. Your eyes should face down, and your heart should face up. Interestingly, there's a statement found in Seifah Hasidim, which is quoted by the mangana vermin from there. It's quoted in the Mishnehbuhr as well as Halacha. The Seifah Hasidim says there are some people when they dafqif, they look up, they stare at the ceiling. They're trying to look up to the heavens. It's a kind of religiosity. And the Seifah Hasidim, which is not a book written by a kaltalitvak. It's not written on it. Seifah Hasidim says the paiatist work. He says, anashim ha-makbih imu rasham bishatat phila. Kimabitim aragat, people who raise their heads and look up at the ceiling of the shul during the phila. Malachay Hasirayat law agimlan. It says the angels ridicule them. It elicits cynicism, it has a cynical reaction in heaven. It's the wrong kind of religiosity. The way to davan is to look down. And the very expression looking down seems to imply that you're looking at the ground, not just tilting your head down. The madas we mentioned tilting your head. The madas we mentioned tilting your head. The madas says, "But that's actually tain a navelamata. You should place your eyes down." The makhab has said, "Bend your heads, let your eyes look down." You can even be proven from the vamvam. The vamvam has a makhab that says you should not be looking at colored pictures, which could distract you. So the particular pasture of looking down has to do with kavana. Maristi being servile and subject to the majesty of God. You're standing the way that we got. So you don't look. Moshevain was afraid to look at the snare at the burning bush because God was there. You don't look directly. You look down. But your eyes apparently are open. Or they could be open. That's why the vamvam has to say, "You shouldn't be looking at pictures or something else." And we mentioned naha'u'llah once that a shul should have windows. And Rashi says the reason is that people can look outside and see the heavens and this will put them into the right mood. So the hawanamas talk at that building, where says, "You know where to look up? You should be looking down." So the answer they give, the bach, the makhabam, is that Rashi is saying that before when the hawanamas one takes a look up, or one knows, one feels that it's there, you sort of subject to the influence of heaven. But you're actually not looking at the sky, which would distract you from papakavana. But you're looking at the floor and your heart is soaring in the sky. There is, however, a halakha which derives from the za'a. In the za'a it says that one should have one's eyes closed somewhat more strongly. It says one should have one's eyes covered when one darvans. But the reason is a different reason. It's not because of kavana. It's because the legend of the za'a, the language of the za'a is "began de loy estacko berschrintha." You cover your eyes so that you should not see. You should not look at the shrina. Again, I refer to the definition. I mentioned a few times in the last week or so. One who darvans is standing before God. You're not talking to God. You're not sending emails to God. You're not talking to God on a telephone. It's a personal standing. It's an audience in the presence of God. So the za'a takes us to an extreme. If you're standing in the presence of God, then God is God's shrina. God's presence is directly in front of you. And that's something that you can't even imagine looking at. Kiro yirani adamvahai. Man cannot behold God. And therefore the za'a says you have to close your eyes. And if you keep your eyes open, the za'a speaks very, very strongly, macadema lei malachamabat. You're inviting death. And a person like that, who has done it with his eyes open, could tapuk nafshay. When it comes his time to depart, he will then not see the clarity of the divine presence. Valloyam utmanishikah. He won't merit the kind of death called vavat nishikah. It seems to be clear this was not the saka'le vishanem. But the stamat of the za'a had a great deal of influence on later post-kim. And therefore they definitely recommend nafya lei malachah. But they recommend having with the one's eyes closed. It would appear that it surely fits in with the idea expressed in nigga marah that where one looks affects one's kavara. One looks at the floor. If you don't look at leaving it at the floor, you perhaps told your head down to show, to show subjugation to God. But you keep your eyes closed so that nothing to pass be brought to you, you definitely would increase kavana. But again, this is how I was talking about kavana. This is how I was talking about a reality that when standing before God and therefore one doesn't look. One doesn't look at something which is too great to look at. So it's not halacha, but it's a very strong recommendation. In any event, this halacha does not apply in all the post-kim say to all dhammas from a siddhu. Because the idea of the kavara, having kavana, shawri, trumps any other consideration. And if you dhamma with a siddhu, because either because you need it, because you can't have it in my heart, but because you have more kavana, we dhamma from a siddhu. I think this is a personal psychological thing. Some people dhamma better with the outer siddhu. Personally, I generally do not use a siddhu and I damage from an astray. I find that reading the words detracts from my kavana, but I know many people who have the exact opposite reaction. Even if you know it by heart to well, but looking at the words and reacting with them, "O tiyot makhkim out the letters, the letters make it easier or better." And if that's true, then kavana trumps any other consideration. And therefore someone who dhammas from a siddhu is shouldn't even think twice. It's "lachatriva," there's no problem. You keep your eyes open. You look in the city and look around. You look at the siddhu. Looking at the siddhu is the same as looking internally. You're not seeing the world. You're seeing to feel it. There's no difference between keeping your eyes closed, only seeing yourself and seeing the siddhu, which basically means seeing only your own words. If, however, you do dhamma by heart, then the words of the zoa are a strong recommendation to dhamma from those eyes closed. In any event, the words of the gamara is that one looks down and not up. You're dhamming very privately, very modestly, very tendua, very internally. But one's heart. One's heart is travelling, it's concentrating, it's focused on the heavens above and before the presence of God. That's it for today. We're back tomorrow with the weekly share of "hara bina mintivari," the weekly mitzvah. Until then, this is Azruvik, wishing you kaltov and continued enjoyment and participation in Torah. We have a kata Torah mitzion. You've been listening to KMTT. "Kimitzion tece Torah, o devar hashem miyoshalayim."