KMTT - the Torah Podcast
Parashat KiTisa
Parsha shiur for Parashat KiTisa, by R. Shlomo Dov Rosen
This is KMTT, the Torah Podcast and this is Esubic broadcasting from Ishivata on ASEON, English It's Your Own, and today is Thursday, Yom Hei, Tet Zain Adar. One day after Shushan Turim, it's one day after Shushan Turim, and two days after Purim, and we should remember that even though Purim is a very, very happy and joyous holiday, because as I was saying this in the KMTT, when Adar, the Cholish Adar, begins. One increases, one happiness, one's joy, one's celebration, but actually explicitly says that that's because in Cholish Adar comes Purim and after it's better. In other words, it's not that you prepare for Purim by celebrating from the beginning of Adar, but the entire season is a season of celebration. Pessa has a greater gudah than Purim, but what she is saying is that Purim is the precursor at the beginning of gudah at Cholish Nisan, and therefore, michineh klamasadama, rimisimkhah applies even after Purim, so you should not decrease, you should not decrease your Simkhah, your celebration after Purim. On the contrary, you maintain it throughout Cholish Adar, and even more will be in Cholish Nisan for the Cholish Adar, for the Cholish Adar, with springtime of redemption. So, we're still in a month of happiness. Today's show in Pessata-savua will be given by Harav Shlomo Doh Roden. In this week's Parsha Parsha's KITI SAW, we read about the making of the Agalazar. In this context, after the state where the people have been arranged and people are putting things back together again, Moshra Benu goes up to Shpokhu and asks for forgiveness for the people. In this context, we read of the 13th Midotarachamim, the divine qualities of mercy, and the monks then we find Tumidot which, coming together, seem quite extraordinary. The Raphresen the Emet. Raphresen means "great, bountiful, in loving kindness." Emet means "truthful." It's quite hard for us to understand, in what sense the word Emet could be a divine attribute of mercy if we have already found that it is preceded with the words Raphresed. If God is full of divine kindness, why is the aspect of truth an additional quality? Where it to be in the other order would be easier for us to understand. I think trying to understand the relationship between truth and kindness, especially in the context where truth comes after kindness, brings us to a deeper understanding of, in the deeper sense, the place of truth in the relationship between Aklashvocha and Man, and also in the relationship between Man and Man. In Mishle, we read Hesset Vermeht Al-Yaz-Berkah, Al-Yazvocha Qashim, Al-Gagra, Tehakotim Al-Wahri-Berkah. Trying this in truth should never leave you, and you ask yourself what meaning there could be to truth after the word kindness, in the same formulation that it exists in the Pasuch in this week's session. Now some commentators don't see these 13 attributes, necessarily as attributes of mercy. The Sverna, for example, clearly understands that Enet, in this context, is not a form of mercy. God pushes over in judging us towards the side of mercy and kindness. God has Rachmanos, has mercy for us up to a certain point, and then he demands. And then justice has to have its place. In this he connects to the idea that Loikar Shoshad, I'll explain that God does not take a bribe, even a good deed does not erase something bad a person has done. If this is the case, we ask ourselves, in all seriousness, what meaning there could be to emit as a divine attribute of mercy? And according to Swahreno, it comes out that there is not a form of mercy. It's a divine attribute if anything moves in the opposite direction of mercy. However, the general understanding is that all 13 attributes are attributes of God relating to his kindness to us, his mercy to us, in judgment. And this is opened up basically by the Grah on the postoc we brought before in Mishle at the beginning of the third chapter, the second verse. The Grah says, "Hresse nikrama shayna adamu kuyavli tayna kha virah." Kindness is that which a person is not obligated to give to another. Vermeir, "Truth wamishalem gumu lah virah." Truth is when you give to your friend what you had to give to him, because, for example, he gave to you something before. Mipneh shasal al-okay. Wumasha didna tinshi itayna, that which by law you have to give, that which by right is his, that is called emet. And then he carries on with our question. Volef is there. According to this, ema ala khalba emet, there is no value whatsoever to truth, kikrama shaysse because kindness had already been mentioned. He later brings the postoc we have here. And he explains that Raphresse relates to much kindness, because when a person gives out a kindness, he gives a lot more. When a person gives because of truth, it is only exactly what the person should have received. And then he explains this sukim here, differently, of course, to this vole, not that emet is the additional amount of goodness that God does not give because of kindness, but because really of what we did good, paying us back. So to say even after the loving kindness, and so on the girl, we have to ask our question why emet should come after she says, because it makes much more sense, of course, to have them in the other order. So of course, with the girl, it would be because there would be a reason to suggest, to assume, to mistakenly think that if already loving kindness has already come, then emet wouldn't have much of a place. So we have to try and understand what that would mean, why we should have thought otherwise, otherwise, and what value there is to emet coming after she says. And I would suggest that it's slightly more than how the girl presents it, that it's a bit more because of emet, but that there's a fundamental meaning to emet, to truth, coming after she said, after loving kindness. There's something particular and additional in the idea of truth coming after the idea of kindness, that which God gives because we by right, if we can possibly say that, should receive something, because we have done something good, and not just because of divine kindness. Now if we widen our discussion to ask what this means generally speaking about God's relationship with us, we find that in Judaism and Jewish thought, generally speaking, you have a very important connection between the ideas of Rahmim and Din, which is crucial to the whole way we understand Tashqah, God's interaction with human beings in a providential manner, and very, very different to many of the other theologies around us. So if the Ramban in the third volume of Moan of Uchim, the guide to the perplexed, brings in the 17th chapter where he talks about Tashqah, brings the position of Dasherinam Atazala, which are very similar in certain aspects to, in this order, certain Protestant forms of thought, and certain Eastern forms of thought, and then presents Judaism against them, it is very much at some extent moving around this issue, that the Matazala, or to some extent Protestant thought, develops the idea of divine grace, but not by the rights that a human being has because of his behavior, but because God acts to us in a manner of mercy beyond what we could in any way ask for, or have rights for. If so, when you develop this idea to the extreme, it comes out that there's no rhyme or reason why God does one thing, for one person and one thing for somebody else, he just chooses who he will have Ramon as a divine grace, is eternal, infinite, but not at all connected to any rhyme or reason or form of judgment. This of course has changed slightly in all forms of theology, but the basic idea is fundamentally different to Yadu, the basic idea is that there's no attempt to centre around the concept of justice as the prime reason for Rahmim, because Rahmim would stand irrelevant of Emmet, basically Hresez stands in the place of Emmet, you can't have both, once you have one, the other one falls away, and that's basically the impression you get from the next position at Matazala, which is actually some extent similar to certain Eastern religions that we are aware of nowadays, that said that everything goes by wisdom, not by grace, that is to say that everything goes by what is fair, even an animal who dies, it's because God is going to reward him in the next world for his suffering here. It's not connected therefore to Bukhir Ahropshet, the choice to do good, because even in animals, the world runs that way according to this particular position the Ramon brings, and therefore you can't exactly talk about any form of Hresez, but rather a certain kind of Emmet, but an Emmet which is not connected in any way to Tzedek or Mishbat, and therefore not connected in any fundamental way to Hresez, and it's a very different kind of Emmet, it's what the Ramon calls Rahmah, by wisdom, but not really by fairness in any deep sense. Now the Ramon explains there in the 17th chapter of the third volume of the Moan of Hreimah, the Guide to the Proplex, that the Jewish position is fundamentally opposed to these claims, that we understand that although we don't see how it always works, that Akhushbokhil runs our world in a manner of Mishbat and Cedek. Kael and Wunah the Enavel Sadikvi Ashar, who we can't see, it's our problem, but really ultimately everything goes by the rules of fairness, fairness in the sense of justice by how we have behaved. Obviously this is tempered by a certain amount of Hresez, which the Ramon does not develop there. However if we realize what the Ramon is saying, he's basically trying to explain that both of these positions are falling off on the side in one direction or the other, not able to see how Hresez and Emmet can come together. Now the Ramon in Mr. Tzedekvi Asharim develops an understanding that ultimately everything is a question of Emmet, and ultimately everything is a question of justice, but that Rahmim of God, God's mercy, intervenes by certain rigid rules of fairness, that is to say, that really theoretically a person should be punished and immediately collapse as soon as he went against what Akhushbokhil says, because he has rebelled against the creator of the world, that Akhushbokhil gives him time and he lets his true of a process be a form of punishment instead, lets the person bring it down in scale, in time, given time in order to turn around of his own accord and not receive the punishment and not receive it in the same manner. However, Akhushbokhil in the same way that he rewards everything that a person does good, Akhushbokhil also by definition, his justice demands that a person is punished for what he did wrong, if he is not able to do trouble at some point in time. So here we have the marriage of Hresez and Emmet coming together, that Hresez comes around to close up around to change the style and the nature of Emmet, but Emmet still has to stand in its entirety as it really takes place in this world, not just a question of Rahmim, this of course is connected to the famous discussion in Hazal about Sheim Yudk-Vovkhil which is connected to Rahmim and Sheim el-Ochim which is connected to Deen and Hresez and Gavura and Hresez and how Akhushbokhil wanted to create the world with one with the other and the two need to run together and this is basically an explanation of how that could work, how we understand that to work. The Rahm develops in a similar parallel context, a very similar idea, talking about the idea of subjective and objective truth, that is to say that God has an objective truth that often when learning Torah and trying to see how to behave in reality we cannot always be in contact with, we cannot always understand an objective truth, instead our minds can give us a subjective truth and that is for him what the Suga and the Gmoth, Tanushal Akh-Nai, talking about explaining the idea that shalabah shamaimi, that the Torah is no longer in the heavens it has come down to earth, what it means that it has come down to earth is that the Torah works by the subjective truth of man, and now for the Rahm in the Jewish Rashotah Rahm, this is a way of explaining why even when we are mistaken it is certainly still the correct thing to do, running on the assumption presumably that we are generally not mistaken, however these ideas that the Rahm develop are developed somewhat further by in the time of Rahm in the last few hundred years by people like the Kzotah Hosh and based on Kabbalistic ideas and the Kzot in his Akh-Domins introduction to his book he discusses the problem of Khidush, that we know that when we are innovative in learning we often say things that perhaps we are not how the subject matter was understood in previous generations and the question is how you can know because to lie that comes to something which is not true by your own pure subjectivity is of course a terrible thing and how these things can be brought together is a fundamental problem and he brings the mama Khazal that talks about the idea that Akh-Dushal creating the world needed truth and he did Rahm in and that he had to throw truth to the ground in order to create the world, the world has to be built out of mercy and cannot be built only out of truth, human beings will not be able to stand in the face of truth alone and for him this issue connects directly with what the Rahm has been saying that there is a form of subjective truth and he develops the idea based on mama the mama Khazal of course with a mystical ideas in the background that Emmett, the truth grows out of the earth, we could understand the mama Khazal simply to say that this is a proof that got through it to the earth but as far as the ksol is concerned this is a proof of the subjective value of Torah, that Torah has to grow out of the earth in other words out of our own reality, based subjective reality which is connected to our abilities, connected to our kind of existence and not a completely objective theoretical existence that God has on high out of our physical world. Now for the ksol this is very very important there, you shouldn't misunderstand and think that because of that you can do just what you like, the ksol is innovative within the halakhic system and he explains that this is of course depends on the fact that you've checked yourself several times and you find that your ideas are along the lines of the ideas of those who came before you and then you can understand that your own subjectivity is playing within the field of jewish thought and is part of the masala and then you can say that your subjectivity and your own innovation in itself is the definition of the Torah of course only on the conditions that you're playing within the rules of the meaning of the corpus of knowledge and form of thinking that has preceded you and that you are continuing. If you think about what this means for our discussion it's fundamental that the thought brings in the run into our discussion of the relationship between keset and amet. That truth for us is a subjective truth which is affected, tinted, changed in color and style by the idea of kreset that precedes it, that comes to close it and now we can understand what it means for amet to come after keset. We go now to another stage of thinking what that might mean for our behaviour, let's try and develop the ideas of the grah and then we can move over later to the consult. The impression you would get is like this, that a person in relationship to a friend, one person to another often feels that because there is a good relationship they would like to behave the other with a lot of keset and the question is does this erase the possibility of amet. Now I would argue that that's exactly to some sense what's in the grah there, the Vilna Gond's explanation on the puzzle commission and otherwise I would suggest it's perhaps the meaning of the puzzle commission that kreset should never take away the necessity and the meaning of amet in a relationship between people and also relationship between God and man. There will always be a place for the rights and the obligations of one to the other even after you have done good to the person beyond expectation, that is to say that you have been incredibly kind, still there are certain demands, rights and obligations you have towards your friend that might be much less than what you feel you have already given but still stand in their own rights. A person who is very, very kind to somebody else still has to feel that he has certain obligations towards that person that he cannot waver because he has already been very, very kind beyond the call of duty. Beyond the call of duty is a great thing but it's not something which can erase our responsibilities to each other otherwise Laura and Order would all fall away and any sense of responsibility and something that people can depend upon would no longer stand because everybody is just too friendly, you would maybe get some kind of communist state where everybody is very kind on the condition of course that everybody stays in contact and has use for each other and the second that things fall away there were no responsibilities and no rights and no obligations in society and therefore in marriage, in friendship between people in all forms of responsibility you will never be able to erase the aspect of a myth through her said perhaps that's what the puzzle is trying to teach us. How does this connect not just to these people who came in this week's Sedger but to the Sedger generally speaking I would like to argue that the whole built of us, Sedger actually the whole all the partial in this area of schmott are built around to some extent the idea of Kresset Vermet in this form that and met has to be clothed in Kresset and then the next stage is to realize that even within a met there is another form of Kresset that comes in even within the judgment and this of course is connected to the whole question how and why the issue of the building of the Egl could be brought in such an obscure manner in the middle of a Pasha like our week Sedger after two weeks where it seems two or three weeks where we've been reading about other issues which are connected to Matan Tora and connected to Mitzvah thrown in here just before the building of the Mishkan after we've been come on in a kind of obscure manner almost hidden in a certain sense what is this hiding mean obviously everyone's going to find it what meaning could there be in hiding something if it's going to be found. Now I'd like to connect this to another issue which is that Shabbat continuously comes up in the context of the building of the Mishkan and as I'll explain that the laws of Shabbat learned from the laws of the building of the Mishkan obviously philosophically there are a lot of connections in the sense that Shabbat is thinking of the creation of the world the Mishkan is a kind of creation of the world a kind of Shabbat but it doesn't go against Shabbat etc but you do bring up on it in the Batemikdash and is connected to various mashavti and that is say both philosophical and halocha, londous forms of learning and connecting between the two in the types of sivoyin comes up in the Akadama of the, in the Pithihal of the Egletal to his Seifrin Hall Hocha but however on the level of understanding our week's part this week's pasture in this particular context we find something particularly obscure here in the sense that it's done in incredibly obvious manner and seems to be saying something slightly beyond that just before we talk we read about the making of the Egletal of the Golden Carve we read about Shabbat and just at the end at the beginning of the next week's pasture we read again about Shabbat that is to say the build, the creation of the Golden Carve and God's mercy for us in that context but still with judgment is brought not just sandwiched between the orders and the halocha of creating the, of making the Mishkhan and the actual making which come afterwards but actually also sandwiched between Hilchot Shabbat the rules coming to teach us how to keep Shabbat and the centrality of Shabbat and in this context perhaps we should read the Sukhim that come just before the Eglet and I think the message that's coming in about Shabbat is very pivotal in this context. If you speak to the Jewish people saying why is it so incredibly crucial to keep Shabbat because it is some type of proof of my relationship with the Jewish people that I am God who sanctifies you, the people who keep Shabbat, the people who keep Shabbat, the people who keep Shabbat, the people who keep Shabbat, the people who keep Shabbat, it is an everlasting proof statute between me and the Jewish people. In other words, we keep Shabbat because the world was created and this is not connected to the Jewish people but the fact that we keep Shabbat copying God in his resting and stopping at the end of the physical development, maybe showing the importance of the spiritual development that comes from the physical and that the physical doesn't have a meaning in itself, that idea is particularly crucial and particular to the Jewish people and connected to the idea of the relationship and a proof of the relationship between God and the Jewish people. It can also be understood something to remind us like the feeling. It is a remembrance as well. It is a proof to ourselves of our relationship. It is very much connected to the idea of relationship, this is clearly the perspective in the Torah which developed the idea of the relationship between God and the Jewish people on the issue of Shabbat coming to expression and now we can start to understand why not just being sandwiched between the ideas of the Mishkan but even more particularly sandwiched between the ideas connected to Shabbat and particularly the idea of Shabbat which is related to the concept of a relationship between God and man between God and the Jewish people is crucial to the presentation of the terrifying story of making the golden calf just after Matantua that is to say that the Jewish people broke in a certain manner their relationship with God and God forgave them and with justice in a merciful manner carried on the relationship and a way of showing that is to show that this is sandwiched between the ideas of the Mishkan which are about how the relationship between human beings and God on how Sinai or Mount Sinai continues through Akkadosh Boho bringing his Shrinayes divine glory into the Jewish people on a normative manner in a daily sense through the creation of a Mishkan a form of a temple within the Jewish people bringing Shkana into the Jewish people and more particularly the idea of Shabbat which is connected to us also nowadays that we have a relationship with Akkadosh Boho which is a proof of this relationship with us every week one day a week showing how God sanctifies us this idea being able to stand in the face of our terrible mistakes even when we in some sense left God at the crucial moment he was able to bring us back to him and prove the continuation of the relationship through the idea of Shabbat in a larger sense through the idea of the Mishkan in that sense the whole story of the making of the ego is sandwiched in this context of Hreaszad. Hreaszad in the sense of relationship bringing a mat into that relationship of Hreaszad that is to say that in Jewish thought we understand that the divine providence, Ashkaha functions in a form of justice in the context of Hreaszad but there's another form of Hreaszad the Hreaszad that comes in the middle of Emmett in other words it is sandwiched but it also comes in the middle and that's exactly what we are reading the set 13 attributes divine attributes of Hreaszad or those that come sandwiched in the middle and here we can understand how Emmett really is a form of mercy in Rachamim that God continues this relationship and stands this relationship up in its full meaning in the context of Hreaszad also in the positive sense because he does it also in quote unquote the negative that's saying the judgment sense is also in the positive sense out of Rachamim that is to say that just as us in our relationships with other people we have the obligations of Emmett even beyond the obligations of Hreaszad so God relates to us he remembers the Zrud of Avrami Trakvi Akhav most Rabinu stands up in front of Akhav Dushbokhu in the middle of this crucial and terrifying moment and reminds him of his responsibility to Avrami Trakvi Akhav so to say or his responsibility to his name in the world there are questions of Emmett that stand up in the middle together with Hreaszad which are forms of Hreaszad which are forms of mercy which are connected to the idea of truth, the idea of rights, the idea of obligations even in the context of terrible, terrible leaving of God, Kalash is in Tabithah. Now if we just conclude and bring some of these issues together we realize that the idea of Rachamim, Hreaszad, coming inside Emmett but being circled and being sandwiched up in the context continuously of a relationship between human beings and God is something that we are being taught by Akhav Dushbokhu in the manner that Hshkaha works it's the fundamental idea that other forms of theology miss that is to say that the world doesn't function just by infinite kindness which of course will then not apply to all human beings quite naturally it doesn't work just as an idea of divine grace which can fall on anybody just because of no particular reason but it works by Mishpat, it works by justice and yet this justice is tempered continuously with Hreaszad, with Rachamim, with mercy. If it was mercy alone infinite kindness there would be no place to justice and there would fall there would also be no meaning for a human being existing he wouldn't understand what his function in the world would be except for just to receive divine grace without any value or meaning. It is rather that there is infinite kindness in the context of justice it's not infinite in the sense that it can receive anything, receive the excess of any delight it is infinite in the sense that is able even to come into a very rigid system and this is deeply connected with the idea that the thought developed in the explanation of innovation and in Jewish thought of a subjective truth working within the rules of truth to some extent this is exactly connected to what we are saying that our relationship with Akhoshpohu is always a relationship of the subjective human existence, our subjective human existence having its own form of truth it is not the objective truth we are not able to stand in the face of objective truth but on the other hand that does not mean it's purely mercy and it's just a form of divine grace infinitely answering to anything and therefore taking away the meaning of human endeavor rather it is a question of divine judgment deeply and very deeply connected to the ideas of Kresed, sandwiched up within Kresed dressed in the clothes of Kresed and also bringing Kresed into the judgment itself like the Romchal explained at the beginning and that is the meaning basically of Emet coming after Kresed that Emet has something to say after Kresed and has a different meaning after Kresed and it is even a midakra khamim in this context it is not just a question of terrible judgment it's a question of judgment in the context of humanity. You have been listening to Rachlomo Dovrozane and Prashat Asevua, Prashat Ki Pisa. Today's have a hyomet we continue in Himkhot vila. Tvila means s'morese every time I speak about Tvila in the next couple of Hala Khot, next couple of days. Tvila kraskot vila means s'morese. Tvila is said umad, it says standing. Ramban includes this Hala Khah of standing in a chapter in which he lists eight things which one should do when one does it but if one doesn't do it's okay. So this is the Khattriva and that's the damn it. It doesn't destroy, it doesn't take away, it doesn't negate the kiyuma mitzvah of Tvila and one of them is amida. Let me say right away because this will apply to today's shure and I think to quite a number of the khamim shurem and also to some of the previous shurem we talked about tikkun maqam. All these Hala Khot basically come down to one principle and that is that Tvila is defined as amida lifnehamella standing before the king. And you should understand that in a medieval sense, even before medieval in an ancient sense, standing before the king is not standing before a powerful person of whom he was afraid, standing before the president, standing before the dictator, kingship is something which has ceremonial importance. Standing before the king means you have an audience before the king and therefore for instance you have to dress in a certain way and you have to stand. You don't sit at the king's presence because it indicates a certain comfortableness and unimportant and lack of importance lack of respect which is inappropriate. When it could be that if you met with the president you would sit in his lounge. When you meet before the king, it's an audience. The king sits, you stand, talks about the understanding because the soul finally moved from the ceremony. The laws of Khot, the laws of royalty and the practices of royalty which were once in here and I think in everybody in the world. But you have to put yourself into that same of mind when Davening. So one of those laws is amida, you have to stand. There's a mother who has a story about Dravashi who dabbened when he was sitting and later on he dabbened again when he was standing. Tostos there seems to imply that that's a halacha, that if for some reason you have to sit because the halacha is that if you can't stand for one reason or another, you will have to sit. Nonetheless, when you have a chance later on, you should have a standing. What is the example in the Gomorrah of someone who dabbens when he's sitting? So the Gomorrah's case is someone who is traveling. The Gomorrah's case, traveling on a donkey. You're riding on a donkey. The Gomorrah said you don't have to stop, get off the donkey and stand. In fact, you don't even have to stand meaning arrest the movement of the donkey. The word amida in Hebrew has two meanings. It means to stand as opposed to sit and it means to stand as opposed to go, or made below there. So neither one of those things you have to do. You can continue riding on a donkey and say, "Shman, say on the donkey." Even though the halacha requires that the Hukhilah one should stand and what to stand in one place when davening. There are two reasons for this halacha, and it's important to distinguish between them. One reason is because it's essentially a cooler. If you're traveling and let's say you're traveling with a bunch of other people, and they don't want to stop, and it's difficult for you to stop as well. You'll be late. So you're allowed, it's a bit de-evid. You're allowed to shut our track because you need to keep going. You're allowed to keep going and remain on the donkey and not stand. But the post came out of further reasons, and they said that if you would stand, it would affect your kavana. Because you're traveling someplace, first of all, for other people, they might await you. Now, it's not talking about that it's dangerous. If it's because of an effort, then that's simple. It's not because of an effort. You're not going to get killed if you're alone because it's a dangerous place. You must stay with the rest of the caravan. However, the fact that other people leave you and you don't have to catch up with them is uncomfortable. It's mentally uncomfortable and that affects your kavana. And kavana is more important than the ceremony of davening. Remember, I mean, davish namana has to do with ceremonial. It's the proper way. It shows the top attitude, but kavana is the life. It's the smell of davening. And to stop on the side of the road will affect your kavana. In fact, even if it isn't, then there are other people. There is no caravan. But the post can believe that someone who is going somewhere, he's rushing, it's on his mind. That's what he set out to do. If he stops, so it'll affect his kavana. He'll be thinking all the time about how the minute that he's losing. And therefore, you should, or you may, you can't, and perhaps you should. Once we introduce the principle of kavana, then it's not merely a cooler, a dispensation. You may daven, while traveling on the donkey. But in fact, maybe even you should, because it's better to daven with kavana, on the donkey than daven without kavana, while standing on the side, or standing on the side of the road. So, the gamart says of ashti, when he got to where he was going, he davened again. And from the compass in his pistol, implied other be shown as well, who say that, that's a feel. And that's how the makhabana shokanaro poskans. The one who davened sitting, because he was traveling, let's update it a bit, he was traveling in a car, and he's going somewhere. And it's not a simple matter to stop. You know it'll affect your kavana, or the driver doesn't want to stop, to ask him to stop. I'm sure he affects your kavana. You feel bad, you know, that he, he's not davening. So, you feel the pressure of the other people. So, in all those cases, the gamart says that you should daven, you should daven in the car, sitting. But then the makhabana password, you get the way you're going, you should daven again. Many, many, many poskans disagree. The original case of ashti can be explained in one or two other ways. Either it can be explained, and this is what appears to be from ashti, that if ashti did it, it was, he wasn't davening with ashti, he felt that, if he wanted to daven again, he went daven properly. He wasn't able to daven again, he daven again, there's not a truth. Other poskans say that in fact the ashti's case is a different case, that while davening, while traveling, he felt he didn't have kavana, and we didn't have kavana, we didn't even have kavana, which we don't normally follow today, but according to the real kavana, one who davens without kavana, it's not the other way to daven again. Why don't we do this today? The other poskans that we never have done with kavana today, so therefore there's no point in davening again, because you won't do it any better. Strange, a la kha, a little bit of a cynical attitude towards dvila, but a la kalamaisa, because kavana is so hard to achieve, we don't normally daven again for lack of kavana, but they explain the righteous against davening, and even davening sitting with kavana, they claim, would not obligate one to daven again. In fact, some people say that even you can't even daven it to daven it to daven again, because we can't, we don't daven it to daven today normally, we don't have an extra dvila, to volunteer if you love, and therefore you will say, if you will say, you cannot daven again, that's the plus of the tides, and the mug and above, and the mission of burr later on, and the, and many, many other poskans, that once you're not packed with like a shokanavu, but among you, incidentally, there's not this agree with the shokanavu, but later akhwanim do, and they, and they pass skin when there's not daven again if one daven sitting at the first time. A lot on the maysa, which has a lot of implications, in, in, if you in a car, let's say you're travelling somewhere, if you're the driver, so it's coming in out to see people stopping the car, and davening, davening on the side of the road. I think it's acceptable, but there's a problem there, I mean, I've done it many times myself, you don't necessarily have the most kavana in the world, it does affect your kavana, to daven the side of the road, and the public place wide open, you're a bit nervous, you're looking around, make sure nobody steals your car, and nobody drives into you, and once you definitely do it in a manner which will eliminate as many of those factors as possible. And a more common case, which I think, it's very questionable if the coming minute is correct as well on a plane, and while travelling on planes, plane goes as to sail, it's quite common to see people, going to the back of the plane, making a minion, so one they want to govern with a minion, that's one thing, two they want to govern standing up, the standing up there is very, very problematic, it definitely does not contribute to your kavana, for a number of reasons, first of all, because it's difficult to stand, there are other people passing by, there's students, there's other people, you've been all the time getting in the way of people, and you can have 10 times more kavana sitting in your place, two, we had over half a few weeks ago, and I mentioned two weeks ago, that we should not govern at a high place, which many post game air decides on the reason, given in the kamara, of mima amakim kratih kashem, that simply being low is part of the nature of addressing God, but they're standing on a stool, on a small high thing, it's a time for kavana because you don't have proper balance, anyone who's ever tried to govern on a plane knows that you don't have proper balance, the plane is pitching all the time, and part of your mental concentration is dedicated to standing, to holding on, as opposed to, as opposed to speed up, so for those reasons it's clear that alphidin is better to govern sitting in one place, than standing in the back of the plane, that's without discussing the question of governing with the minyan, which we discussed in the past, which might indeed count here, although, first I think, the case is so extreme, the lack of kavana is so extreme, and it's true, not to mention the fact that people down next to the bathroom, there's a smell, such as such, there are a lot of problems involved here, it really would appear that it's much better to govern, or sitting in your place with proper kavana, and then the question of, does one govern again, if one doesn't, if one lands in time, does one govern again, those people who practice the lack of kavana, add to not only should you govern again, if you land, or you get to where you're going in time, but even if you get after the time, but within one time slot, the next vila, you could govern tush lumen, you could, let's say you govern chakratsit, you could govern mincha twice, standing, so again, most postkin disagree with the shukhana ugh, and patskin against the shukhana ugh, in this case, and say you should not govern again, nor should you govern a qila vintava, and that's really, that's, because the most postkin is ala ha, ala halamasya, before I mention the case of travelling in a car, I think it applies there as well, although sometimes one can manage, but again, managing here, it's not a question merely of, okay, I could have a qila, I could govern sitting, or I could be a better Jew, I could govern standing, the way the postman is ala ha is that you have a better governing sitting, and a worse governing standing, you gain standing which you lose cover now, and if you take cover now seriously, that should be a very, very serious factor, and if you're hitching, you're, you're taking a hitch with somebody, or somebody who you know is, is not as considered but you have to feel out of it as you would be, so that really does weigh on one's mind, and because that was no different, you're riding on a donkey, because I thought you own worry about getting to be gone on time would affect your kabana, and they therefore thought it's better to govern while riding than to take off the fume, to take the doven, and to, and to govern what's standing, it is one caveat that should be added, it should be added, some postkins say that the first bhokha, the kat avot, about which the mother says it's the most important to have kabana, so that if possible, one should stand for that, in other words, it's a very small matter of time, they say while riding on your donkey, you don't have to get off, but you should arrest, you should halt the movement of the donkey, at least of the kat avot, and then continue, and the assumption that that won't have that great effect on your kabana, in the country you could have more kabana, by standing, then by traveling, especially since it's a very short period of time, so I'm supposed to hold that, if I look on myself, it's possible, that would be a good idea, but essentially, that I have to first, fira with kabana, with less ceremony, then fira with less kabana, and more ceremony. That's all for today, we'll be back tomorrow with the program for Eref Shabbat, Pashaat Kitisa, my guest tomorrow will be in Harav Moshe Lechtenstein, until then, koltov, kibbutu tashandasimcha, ybondesserin tu, kmpt, ki mitsion, tece toa, wudwah hashand miru shalain. [ Silence ]