KMTT - the Torah Podcast
Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages - #10
Issues in Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages, no 10, by Rav Ezra Bick
This is KMTT, and this is Esribic, and today is Tuesday, Zain Adar. Zain Adar is the Yomap Tierra, the day of Mushua Banu's death. Mushua Banu who died outside of Erazisrael, on the wrong side of the river, in a place from which you could see the land, but could not arrive. Today's shoe is the weekly share in problems in medieval Jewish philosophy, and will be given by myself. Last week we spoke about two different approaches to the ultimate goal of human life, there of the Vambam who defines the goal of human life and the goal of the Torah, as Yidi Ahtashem, the knowledge of God, and the opinion of Abhichaste Kreskas, who defines both of those, both the goal of human existence and the goal of the Torah, as well as the goal of creation, as being Ahtashem, the love of God, and the union with God that love involves and produces. Today I'd like to talk about a different topic, one that is, at least in its initial stages, not directly connected, but as we shall see, I believe, to be intimately connected to that question. And that is a topic of Nivu'a of prophecy. I think on first glance, for most of us, this would seem to be a topic far less central and less important in the topics we've spoken about in the past. I think it's a fact that if one looks at books of Jewish, Makhshava, and philosophy, the past three or four hundred years, a very small place would be occupied by discussions of prophecy in Judaism. The reason of hand is obvious. These are books about what we do, what we mean, what is the significance of our lives as Jews, and well, prophecy doesn't play a very large role there. For the simple reason that prophecy, as far as we know, does not exist. It's not a factor in modern day or present day Jewish life. So we know that they're once for prophets, we know that they're books of prophecy, but we don't tend to list, if I had a list of most important topics for you to talk about. So I know if you talk about God, if you talk about Torah, you have to talk about the goal of life, you have to talk about divine providence, but I won't offhand think it's important to talk about prophecy. However, if we look at the literature of the Middle Ages, we discover immediately that these discussions of the nature and the purpose and the method of prophecy occupy significant portions of the discussions in the medieval philosophers. The several chapters in the moment of Rome, in the Seif of a Fras de Kreskast, R. S.H.M., it's one of the six, Pinaute, one of the six central principles of the Torah, in Seifah Kuzare, long, lengthy, and significant discussions of prophecy. It's a cardinal principle in the ramban, and receives a lengthy discussion in Seifah i Krem, and Seifah Kedati Trakav, R. S.H. Karmah, and in Ebab and Elle as well. Now why is that so? Well, one reason is a technical reason. A technical, perhaps important reason, but nonetheless, a reason which, if we wanted to, we could perhaps avoid. One reason is that the books in the Middle Ages were written dogmatically. In other words, many of them set out to explain the truths that are necessary to maintain the Torah, to support the Torah. And obviously, the existence of prophecy is very important because the Torah itself is based on prophecy. If there is no prophecy, if God does not speak to men, and the Torah does not exist as a message of God to men. The Torah is a prime example of prophecy. That's for instance the, at least, a sensible reason of why there is a discussion of prophecy in the second section of Seifah or Seifah or Seifah Kreskus. The section which deals with the peanut, the corners of the house. There are six corners of the house that's called Judaism, and the pastor says these are the principles which, if they are forced, the house falls down. So that's really a reason to, you have to include a discussion of prophecy because basically you're writing what we call today defense of Judaism. You're discussing Jewish principles not because you're explaining to Jews what they should feel or accomplish, but what they must believe in order to have a rational defense, a logical defense, and understanding of what it is they are doing. While this is undoubtedly true, I don't think it really accounts the length and the importance of the discussion in the Middle Ages. A second reason why prophecy has a large part in the discussion in the Middle Ages is because to at least some of the philosophers, but not all, to be some of the philosophers, prophecy was the prime example on a practical level of the goal of Judaism. Although prophecy does not seem to exist in our lives, nonetheless they discussed prophecy because prophecy represented the goal where a Jewish life is heading, and if you don't reach that, quite that level, nonetheless it's significant because you're on the path. And this I take is a basic, basic, basic question in the philosophers in the Middle Ages, and it's interesting, we'll discuss a timeline here because the general Jewish attitude of prophecy changed in the discussion of the philosophers that we consider through the great medieval philosophers, beginning with a Sadrigal, until the expulsion from Spain, time with the Bhavanel and the Sephak Gedapit Srak. The discussion changed in the understanding of the importance of prophecy as being a religious experience changes, I believe, totally, at least among the philosophers. I'm putting it on the side, which we call Kabbalah, from those who are non-Kabbalah. Among the philosophers, there is a distinct change over the years. What does that change consist of? I'll give you an example. The Vambam introduces a discussion of Nivu'a, of prophecy by saying there are three possible opinions. Well, there are three opinions. There are three opinions which exist. One, which you call the opinion of the philosophers, says that anyone who prepares himself properly and has the right talents, the right abilities, necessary for prophecy, will prophesize. He will be a prophet. In other words, the ability to prophesize is a natural human ability. It may have to be developed, but nonetheless, it's based on human traits, which you may or may not have. To give the example that the Vambam is thinking of, you need a certain amount of intelligence, you need a certain amount of imagination. Those are the two ingredients for prophesy. And you have to train it. Just like in order to achieve wisdom, you need to have intelligence. You also need to train it. You need to have a certain amount of discipline. You need to learn how to use your intelligence. But nonetheless, when we understand something, when we learn geometry, it's based on the training and the abilities that we have. And anyone who has those abilities and trains them will indeed understand geometry. That's the opinion of the philosophers concerning prophecy. There's another opinion, Vambam says, which says the exact opposite. That prophecy is simply a gift of God and makes no difference what you've trained. There is no human training, which will lead to prophecy. Because it's not basically a human trait. It's not a human accomplishment. It's simply God intruding into your mind or into your lives. And if it makes no difference what you've done previously, it's all an act of God. And then there's the third opinion, which Vambam says the opinion of the Torah, which Vambam says explicitly, the first opinion is exactly the first opinion. It's the opinion of the philosophers with one provisor that if God chooses to prevent a natural philosophy, a natural prophesier, a natural prophet from achieving prophecy he can and will do so. But that will be like a miracle. Just like other miracles, God can always change the laws of nature. He can also change the laws of nature of the prophecy training. You've gone to a prophecy school. You accept it because you had the right marks in in in in preparatory school. They had the best training. You don't achieve it because God thinks you're not worthy for some reason. Marule, or some other reason. And if God prevents it, the way he prevents fire from burning a piece of paper or prevents the lions from eating from eating doneeel. On this comment of the Vambam, the Ababaneel, who lived 200 years later, the Ababaneel introduces a lengthy lengthy lengthy retort. General of the Ababaneel, the man of Urem, isn't he the commentary? He explains things. That's his main purpose. Usually he explains things admiringly. Here it hears, I believe, I'm not sure I believe it's the longest comment of the Ababaneel to the man of Urem. A lengthy lengthy attack, on this position of the Rama. And basically what the Ababaneel says is that there is no possible training which would lead one to become a prophet. The word of God is greater than any passable, humanly trained or human ability to contain. And therefore there is no difference whatsoever between a wise or virtuous or well trained person prophesying and a fool prophesying or an animal prophesying. To instance "Khamoroshil Bill Am", Bill Am's donkey who spoke words, that were the words of God. And basically the Ababaneel says, at that moment Bill Am's "Khamor" was indeed a prophet like any other prophet. The Ababaneel's opinion appears to be very extreme but he presents it with such vehemence. He says, "What the Ababaneel is doing is completely overturning the meaning of prophecy." Now one question here is whether or not prophecy is initiated by people or initiated by God. But I think there's another topic that stands at behind the Ababaneel's attack. The Ababaneel is be taught. The Ababaneel's comment. And that has to do with whether or not we view prophecy as an achievement and something to which our lives, our spiritual lives, should attempt to view as a goal. Do we aspire to become prophets? Very simple question. Do you aspire by acting in the proper manner? Whether it's intellectual training or religious training that makes the difference. But whether or not prophecy is a end result of the life that has been lived in the proper manner. And the Ababaneel is basically saying no. There's nothing to do with what you've done till now. It's something which happens. And the Ababaneel is saying the exact opposite. Now of course the Ababaneel's version of of prophecy, and this is not really our topic, is very close to the Ababaneel's version of wisdom. Ababaneel is not here contradicting what he said. When he said that the goal of life is idiatashem. Because prophecy is another form of idiatashem. There's the purely rational philosophic knowledge. And there's also knowledge that's achieved through prophecy. But in the end you're talking about knowledge. Knowledge of things that otherwise you wouldn't know. And therefore the same goal, the same human aspiration to know, to know the truth, to know God, is expressed both in wisdom, intelligence, philosophy, and in prophecy. The philosopher and the prophet have different means of achieving slightly different goals, but both and belong to the same, definitely to the same family. Now you can disagree with the Ababaneel about his description of the nature of of prophecy. And yet share the basic idea that prophecy is the goal of every religious life. If you've chosen a different picture of religious life to begin with and nonetheless include prophecy as its goal, so prophecy will look different. So for instance in the Sefrakuzami, very very different attitude towards life and towards religion and towards prophecy than that of the Baba. And yet nonetheless, I think on this point, the Sefrakuzami is very similar to the Baba. A well-lived, religious life has as its final goal. This is essential to the Kuzare. A state which is very much akin, you see, the prophecy exactly as it's described in the Naveem, or something very very similar to it. Ainyan, Ainyan has a key of the Sefrakuzami means that one's mind is communing with God. And that's what religious life is all about. Now it's true the question I raised before, and as to who initiates it, so indeed the Kuzare makes a point of saying that although prophecy is a human trait developed by certain practices, namely following the Torah, however it has to be initiated by God. Because the Kuzare does think that prophecy is a conversation. It's God speaking to one, you can't just grab God's word out of the air. And so it's true that it's on one hand a faculty of man, which is also called Ainyan Eloki, by the Kuzare. So then we're developed by leading a life of Katusha, however it has to be initiated by God. So that's an important point is to who initiates. The Baba presents a picture as though prophecy like wisdom is simply truth. The truth is out there. You have to have the right mechanism to grab it. You have to have a kind of a radio receiver. And if you develop the prophetic radio receiver, you will catch the prophetic radio waves. That's not possible on the Kuzare, but that I think is a side point. The important point here is that communion with God by hearing his voice, healing the truth that comes from the meeting of man and God, as more or less described by you Shayao, when you're meow, when you're meow, when you're meow, and you're Rasker, and Moshe Babena, that is the basic goal of the religious life. Now, there's another question which we've just sort of mentioned, which in fact is an important question. Is prophecy primarily intellectual content, as it is a member, or is it somehow super rational content? Is the experience central or the content delivered through the experience central? It's a very, very important question. Most of the prophets that we read in the VM have content. But you also have the idea that perhaps prophecy is simply an experience of feeling a certain closeness with God, which maybe you couldn't wait or put into words and write down in the book. That's closer to the opinion of the Kuzavi. It includes words as well, but it's more than merely the words. It's a very, very important question as well. But again, both of them still share this idea that you work at Torah, you work at Mitzvot, you develop your personality, and you become closer and closer to achieving a prophetic state. In order to bridge the question as to, but we don't ever achieve prophecy that's apparently, since the end of Beit Rishaun, in the end of the prophetic books. So you have to then expand the notion of prophecy to be on traditional prophecies. The vitamin pincens has ten levels of prophecy, the bottom which, the bottom levels are, in fact, achievable. They're called, they mean basically some kind of inspiration. They're not, they're not classic prophecy on the Isha'yau Yumi'au level. The same thing is true of the Sefa Kuzavi, who doesn't so much talk about prophecy. Prophecy is an example of Iñana Elokie, a certain divine spiritual ability which a person has. We find that as the years go by, specifically in Christian Spain, we find developing from one philosopher to another, an attitude towards prophecy which basically takes it off this pedestal, this central pedestal, of being the goal of the religious life. If in the Ramban, who talks mostly about the Bhikut, but combines the Bhikut with prophecy, it is still true that it's one of the central goals of human life. In the 15th and 14th century, you find a steady erosion of that idea. The Ababa Nel, who I caught in the beginning, is the end of this process. The Ababa Nel is basically the last of the great Spanish Jewish philosophers. And what the Ababa Nel is saying is that it could be a marvelous and incredible thing to have prophecy, but it indicates nothing about you. And it's inconceivable that the Ababa Nel is saying that the goal of spiritual life has nothing to do with what you do. It's not an accomplishment of terrain, it's felt in spirituality and you're saying, if God wants something to be known, he will make it known. And he can choose you, or you, or a frog, or bilam's hammer, or bilam, it makes no difference. Because God is super using someone as a messenger to convey, to convey content. Going back 100 years, we have rastakras in his definition. He gives a definition of prophecy. He didn't have to. As I pointed out, technically he's talking about prophecy, only to indicate that it serves as the basis for the Torah. But rastak is a definition of prophecy along in complicated definition, which I will not quote, but what he says is that what is prophecy? It's content of knowledge, mada'i, mada'i in the medieval sense, not scientific, but being meeda. It's knowledge imparted to a man who did not have that knowledge. In order to help him achieve a better way, to correct his ways, or that he should correct other people's ways. In other words, rastakras is saying that one, it's content, and not an experience. Two, he says it's content for he who doesn't know that he should know something. And the purpose is that through this knowledge he can fix something. Le asher oto. He can straighten either his ways or someone else's ways. In other words, it's purely utilitarian. It's pragmatic. God has something which he wants to tell you because he wants you to know it. It's important for you to know it. You'll use this knowledge to achieve a better state. The knowledge is not the better state. But through this knowledge you will achieve a better state. And that's why God tells it to you. Obviously, classic prophecy in the ancient time really does meet this mode. Almost all papacy is telling people who are sitting that they should do chuva. If the prophet comes to tell us to observe the Torah, they tell us we should better our ways. And if they tell us we're doing bad things, and they warn us, then if you do this, something bad will happen, etc. But what Le asher is doing here is he's saying it's not that I wish to achieve papacy. I wish to achieve something else, which is in this expression he calls haisharat dakot, to make your way straight. You wish to achieve the goal of human life. We know what it is very, because we're better for Christ's day. It's avata sham. Papacy may help you achieve that goal. And if it will, then God will give you, or someone near you, papacy, to help you along the way. The prophet then goes on and explains that, you know, papacy is basically the same thing as Hochma of others. God, in order to help me, might send a wise person to give me advice, or he might send a prophet to give me advice. My point of view is the same thing. I assume the experience of the prophet and the experience of the wise man is different, but from my point of view, he was getting the advice. There's no difference whatsoever. I meet my teacher, my master, the maschir and theishiva, and he's wiser than me, and he tells me something which can help me. Well, I might have met a prophet who was sent by God specifically to tell me something which might help me, or which might help him. What he's basically doing is, he's ignoring. The Christ's day is denigrating the experience of papacy and looking only at the utilitarian motivation for papacy. This is taken one step further, in a book written some 40 years later, "The Safe and Hide Green" of Abjonssef Alba, who doesn't, I tricked you before. He doesn't actually have a section on papacy. What he does is he has a long section called "Tara Manashramayim." That's one of the three great founding principles of Judaism that the Torah is given by God from heaven at Sinai. Under that discussion, he has a long discussion of what is papacy. Torah is a classic example of papacy. In Joseph Alba, what I said in the beginning of this year is exactly true. The only reason to discuss papacy is in order to support the Torah. But Torah is what is important to you. Now, we say the Torah is important, Torah is papacy, but it's not the experience of papacy. I don't receive the Torah from God in my head. I get it from a book and from my teachers. But it's the same thing as the original generation or even much of Abain who got the Torah, because what's important is the content. And the content doesn't need to be transferred by papacy once it's been given once. After was it transferred by teaching, or by reading, or by some other method. And the experience of papacy, the closeness in the communion with God, is not in itself an important and important stage anymore. And the final example of this is a book written another 40-50 years later. The comment of the Ababanel who simply says, "You can prophesize the stone. God could prophesize the stone." The experience of papacy indicates nothing about the level of a person. The pastor at Kraskah is who isn't willing to go as far as the Ababanel. To him, it's apparent that prophets must be greater people than non-profits. So what he basically does is he changes the equation. He says, "If you've achieved the goal of human life, if you want and behave Hashem, if you love God, and God loves you, you have a loving relationship with God, then it makes sense that God should prophesize you. He'll talk to you. Papacy isn't the content of the love. It's something which simply accompanies it. God speaks to his friends. Why should God prophesize or go out to help those who have fought for him in any event? The goal of papacy is to bring a person closer to God. So he was on that path. We'll also receive this aid. It's one method of aiding people, as is Hashem, in general. God does all sorts of things. He gave us the Torah to bring us close to him. He sends us wise men, teachers, and otherwise men Israel to bring us closer to him. He might send us prophets to bring us closer to him. He might prophesize you yourself to bring you closer to him. It's a indication that you're on the right path, that you're close enough to God, that God wants you to bring you even closer. Those who are far from God, in other words those who are evil or perhaps foolish, will probably not receive papacy because there's no real purpose in it. So the equation has been inverted. It's not that one achieves papacy and thereby achieves the goal. Therefore, it makes sense that one should have papacy. On the other hand, again, if there's no need, if there's no particular knowledge which you are lacking, which you need to know in order to better your ways. And there's no reason for God to prophesy, to prophesize for you. And I suspect that what we have has to say, and say, for Eucharim, and never, but I would say, when asked, why is there no papacy today, they would say, because there really is no particular need. We have the Torah, which is the ultimate papacy. It's in front of us. It's explained. And we have to do that. And if we would invest ourselves more on learning Torah, and understand the Torah, we would get just as far as if there would be some momentary papacy to you or to me or to somebody else in these times. So we have here is a process whereby the goal of human life is transferred from direct communion with God to something else. Now, Avata Shema of Prastha is also kind of communion, but it's one. It's not an intellectual communion. And it's not expressed in the thing that's called nivua. Nivua doesn't need to exist today for me to nonetheless achieve the goal of human life. At a side point, I would like to suggest that in this particular case, there is an outside influence in a negative sense. You're dealing with Spanish Jewry. Especially in the 14th and then the 15th century, faces a continual crisis of direct attack and pressure and propaganda from the Christian environment. Ultimately, expressed in the expulsion of 1492, but the Prastha experienced basically the pogroms. I don't know how to say pogroms in Spanish, but the pogroms of 1391, 100 years earlier, which his son was killed. And even before that, and definitely after that, the phenomenon of Christian sermons in Jewish synagogues takes place. There's a surge of conversion from Judaism to Christianity, all through this period, way before the expulsion. And the Jews under attack. And they're basically under attack among other things by the fact that Christianity is a living religion, which claims to have the spirit of God expressed in it. God profits and ex-statics in Christianity. And Judaism is presented as being a fossil religion. You have a Torah that's 3,000 years old, nothing's happened since. And there are a number of ways you can answer that. You could say that, no, we also have faffes. There is a living gush of faffesing. And I think the kabbalah goes, some parts of the kabbalah go on that course. But the other possible answers is to say so what? Exactly, we have the Torah, and it's at that point, 2,000 years old. And that's worth more, and it's more living. It tells us more, and it gives us more, and it brings us closer to God, than the ecstatic experience which we associate with the person being overcome by the spirit of God falling on him, and speaking in funny tongues, and falling on the floor and rolling, etc., etc., etc., which Christians do so well. Alright, I'm putting this in parentheses. I think this is part of the influence here, since we do see a distinct historical pattern. But the question itself, of course, is independent of history. The question itself is, what does it mean to be a prophet? Is it a utilitarian tool that God uses in his graciousness and love of man and goodness to help man along? Or is it a goal that man seeks, not because he needs some information, but because he seeks God, he seeks God himself? And that's a difference which is essential and integral to the discussion throughout the Middle Ages. I've tried to exhibit it in a number of different Jewish philosophers, including several who are on the same camp in this question, but totally different in the attitude towards the internal workings of prophecy. In order to illustrate, I think it's a crucial point for us. What is our attitude toward today, where we have really lowered prophecy below the horizons of our concerns? What is our attitude towards this particular element within our understanding of Judaism as a whole? In, I would say, the last few years, the influence of the book. In order to other thinkers, prophecy has, in fact, made a comeback. Prophecy in the Rambam or the Kusari sense. The fact that the Kusari has been rediscovered in the 20th century has contributed to this. And especially in Toronto of Cook, there's been a new emphasis on Nivu-ah, something similar to Nivu-ah, as being certain to which we aspire. Part of the return to Eretis Sol, the land when Nivu-ah can take place, has brought Nivu-ah back as being, among certain kinds of thoughts, a central motif and a desired goal of Jewish life. You have been listening to this year on problems in Nivu-ah philosophy and now, for today's Al-Qayomit. The Gomara in Barahat says, "I am in that problem with Bet. "Kola Kueh-weh-makom-litzvilator, el-okay-apra-hambe-ez-ro." He who establishes a place, he makes one single place for his tphila. So the God of Abraham will help him. Uk-shamait-om-lima-lav-e-anav-e-he-shas-it-mitam-litzv-sham-lav-imavino. When he dies, he said that he is like a student of the disciple of Abraham-avino. For Abraham-avino made, established a place for his davening, when Abraham-avino made the place for his davening. This is a process which takes place a number of times in the sakapra-hot, where the Gomara traces a certain situation, it becomes a davening. Here the man says, "If you do it, it's a wonderful thing. God will help you. Shokan-e-wok-sas-i-k-ba-makom-litzvilator. The person should establish a one place which he davens. "Sha-no-you-shan-no-you-m-litzvilator," which he will not change unless there is great need. What's more, the Shokan-e-wok-sas, not only does that mean you should have a given Bet. But even in the Bet. You should have a given place. In other words, two different halak-hot, one is you should have a set shore, not wander around each time God is in a different shore. If you have a shore, will you daven? And two, ensure you should have a place. The Gomara doesn't say that. The Gomara says, "Yikvam-a-kom." How does the makhaba know that there's two different halak-hot, a shore and a place? This is based on the rush. The rush says that aside from having a given Bet. Can I say that one has to have a given place? He says, because this is in the Ushami. You should have to establish a place in the Bet. The Tambi-dara-benu-yana-denai. The Beni-dara-denai is this. In fact, it denies the Ushami exists. The Beni-dara quotes a different Ushami, which says the exact opposite. Called a kawai-am-a-kom, the tri-la-to-bib-beto. The hit-by-the-el-kid-hik-y-fama-hik-soch-o-bazam. Says the Ushami is talking about not ensure. In sure, the whole show is in my kom-to-fila. What do you want us to make? We're in Daven, says the Beni-dara. But if you're davening in your house, because you're going to go to shore for some reason. So there, a house is not in my kom-to-fila. And if we're losing out on the quality of having a place for the tifila. So then you should make one corner in your house. Every time you davening the house, you davening that place. That is a different halak-hot, specifically a third halak-hot. What halak-hot is, you should have a shore. The rush says, ensure you have a place. Beni-dara says, ensure you don't need a place. But in your house, if you davening there, you should have a place. If you davening, oh, you have a corner, one corner, in the living room, one corner, in the downstairs in the basement. That's the place where you davening. These last halak-hot are alternative. The question is, where does the Ushami actually say? There are apparently different gifts out in the Ushami. Our gifts out in the Ushami is different than both of those gifts out. It's hard to say what the Ushami is talking about according to us. Ushami says, hamit palil bhivato. Kiyilomakifochomashobasal. That's apparently the statement that veneone is quoting. It doesn't say you make a single place. It says, he who daven is in his house, is as though he was surrounded by a wall of iron. It's a strange gift, but that's the gift that we have. And so, the question is, where does Ushami really say? If you're saying whether one should pass the Ushami, interestingly enough, most pass can pass all three halak-hot. Although a veneone clearly was disagreeing with the Vash. The Vash has no knowledge of a veneone as halak-hot. But, halak-hot are married to the Mahabras. As I said, pass it on the first two. You should have a shul too. You should have a place in shul. And the pass can bring a veneone as well. Not as disagreeing, but as adding, if you daven in your house, you should have a place where you daven. The idea being, and as I said, agreed upon all of them, is that Vila requires a special place. It might sound like a nice idea to daven everywhere, because I believe that Vila is out of the ordinary. It's also out of the regular course of life. And one should daven do more com to Vila, which is what abateness it is in the first place. That's how we talked about it in the past, last week. Vayana says, "In a shul, you don't need a special place." The shul is a special place. But it could be that each individual, and this is the halak-hot is saying, even in a makam-shul to Vila, but you need makam-to-vila-shul. You need makam-to-vila of your safe dove. Every person has to have his makam-to-vila. And the same thing would be true if, for some reason, when daven is outside of the shul, but you need a place of Vila. And if you should make your own place of Vila, even outside of Shul, Vila is a meeting between myself and God. And it doesn't take place in the field. It takes place in a location, which has become special, and assigned the purpose, the meeting place between man and God. That's all for today. Tama will be back with the share of the weekly mitzvah of after-vory. After-vory didn't give the share last week, so we're eagerly expecting his share this week. Until then, Kultov, the best. This has been Azubic, in Gushitian, in Ishivataritian, speaking for KMTT. Kih mitzian te tse toda. Udvar Hashemia ushalayim.