KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - Gemara Berachot #09
KMTT - Shiur in Gemara Berachot, #09, by Rav Yair Kahn
"KMTT", and this is Esribek starting in New Week in "KMTT". Today is Monday, 29th day of Chordashvant. I was checking the budget of the "KMTT" to see how much money we have for publicity. Our publicity budget is zero, and therefore, our only publicity that's possible is by appealing to our readers, our listeners who don't have readers. So I was thinking, if each one of you would say in your show there's a bulletin, put a small piece about "KMTT" into the bulletin. You're talking a hundred words, just make sure you get the address, the web address, correctly www.kimitsuon.org, O-A-G. I just tell them there's a new program called "KMTT" provides half hour of audio for someone to take on an MP3 with him, when he gets into a sky, he goes on the train, goes jogging, goes walking, and it gives a person an opportunity to learn every single day. That's all you have to put. We really like to have "KMTT" spread throughout the Jewish community, and I'd really like for each one of you to be our ambassador and get it spread around. Today's share is by "Rav Jaya Khan", it's the share, the weekly share in "Hu'at Rahat", and after the share I'll be back again with the "Hala Khayyum". Today we're going to deal with the "Hala Khayyum" that doesn't appear explicitly in the Bhavli, but it does appear in the Talmud, you will show me. The Talmud, you will show me, he says, his follows. "Rav Jaya Khan Nasser Zaysa, Uberiklafan of Ula Khrav. Rav Jaya Khan took an olive, he ate it, and he made a brahka before and after. Vahavar abhiyabar vah mestakabe. Rav Jaya Bahaba was looking at him in wonderment. I'm a layer of Jochenan, Bahvliya mata mestakabe. Rav Jochenan told us, "Rav Jaya, somebody who came from Bahvil, why are you looking at me?" Let lay culture, huimin shiva ton brahka lafan of Ula Khrav. Don't you know that there's "Hala Khah" that if you have something which is from the Zai Minim, then not only does it require a brahka lafanaha, Bari prayer eights, but it requires a brahka lafanaha as well. The brahka of Brahka Akha's main shallows, Hala eights, Vah praya eights. Umat Suikha lai, what was Rav Jaya Bahaba bothered with? Vib nai shagal yinato, mimato, mimato, mato, since Rav Jochenan, when he ate the olive, he spit out the pit. Therefore, it no longer had a shear that you need for a brahka krona. The shear for brahka wishona is a kosu. You're not allowed to get any hana, minah olamaze, without a brahka. And therefore, even if somebody eats a small amount, one is required to make a brahka wishona. However, regarding a brahka akrona, there's a shear, you have to eat a kazais. Now, Rav Jochenan ate a zais without the pit. In other words, he didn't have the shear of a kazais when he ate this zais, when he ate this olive. Leetal you Rav Jochenan shagal yinato, mato, mato, doesn't Rav Jochen realize that spitting out the pit makes it less than the shear of a kazais, mato, abud lee Rav Jochenan. What was Rav Jochenan doing? The answer is michim barrya. Rav Jochenan thought that even though you didn't have the shear of a kazais, nevertheless, since he ate a complete fruit, which is known as a barrya, therefore acquires a brahka akrona. Nils did Rav Jochenan amra, shagain acha prayda acha shalana, even if one ate one grape, prayda acha shalana rimon, shutan brahka le fanea ula acha raa. In other words, if one eats a whole fruit or perhaps even part of a fruit, we're going to prayda acha shalana. We're not going to discuss that today. It requires a brahka le faneha ula acha raa and therefore if one eats a complete fruit, one does not have to have the shear of a kazais. That's the dinner of you, shalmi. The bhavli has a parallel story, actually the same story between Rav Jibir Abba and Rav Jochenan. However, it leaves out the entire issue of barrya. In the bhavli, Brakhos, daflamir khetamir bit, 38b, we have the following story between Rav Jibir Abba and Rav Jochenan. On Rav Jibir Abba, Anirah i sibjochenan shagazite maliyach. Ais Rav Jochenan i de pickled alov. Ubarik alov tehilavasov and he made a brahka before and after. Aam alay rab yum yum yum yum zayra, rab yochen hecham abarik alzait maliyach. Came in the shakul agar inayi bhachalay shiura. Haqr ab yochen possibly have made a brahka on this one pickled alov. Since he spit out the pit, it no longer had the shear of a kazais. Aam alay misavit kazaiit kaddal ba'inan, kazaiit ba'inan, fauhudha iit lekamir ab yochenan zayit kaddal have daf al-gav was shakul agar inayi bhachalayi, shiura, who said that you need a large zayis, it's sufficient to have a medium-sized zayis. The zayis that was brought before rab yochenan, that rab yochenan ate, was a large zayis and therefore even though he spit out the pit, nevertheless he ate a shear of a kazais of the alov. Now what's totally missing in the bawli is the entire issue of of a baria. Baria doesn't appear at all. According to the bawli, the indications seem to be that if you didn't have a shear of a kazais, then there would be no brahka akhrona on eating a kazais even though a al of the whole alov is considered a baria. So at first glance it would appear that the bawli argues on the ushalmi. However, it's impossible to say that the bawli totally rejected the idea of baria because we find the concept of baria in the bawli as well. The Mishnah, Makul, says his follows, kami yochamir a tevel viechayev, how much tevel does one have to eat in order to be cayev, tevel, is this is agricultural produce before tree moths and maestros were taken from them, and therefore it is also to eat tevel, and if somebody eats tevel, then it's cayev, makus. So the question is how much tevel does one have to eat in order to be cayev, makus. Rabbi Shimon Omer Kalshu. Rabbi Shimon said there's no shear even if what ate a small amount, one is cayev, makus. We'll see later on what Rabbi Shimon meant. Rabbi Shimon Omer Kalshu. Rabbi Shimon said that tevel is like all other makus. In order to be cayev, makus. Rabbi Shimon Omer Kalshu. Rabbi Shimon Omer Kalshu. Rabbi Shimon said don't you agree that if one ate an animal, one ate an ant or an entire ant, then one is cayev. Even if one did not eat the shear of a kazais. Amulahu, if they eat kibriyasa, because there you ate an entire organic unit, you ate the entire, you ate the entire ant, and therefore your cayev makus without eating a shear of a kazais. Amulaham, akhita akhas kibriyasa. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon said also when one eats, an entire hita that is also considered kibriyasa. That's also considered, that has a den of a baria, and therefore it doesn't acquire a kazais. The gamara in makus, dafid, zayim, and bayes, 17b, makes the following comment on the Mishnah. Rabanna, beyasa, shamakashuvah, hita lo kashuvah, and according to kahameem, who all you are abishimon, namala, regarding the mala, they're willing to concede that it has a den of a baria, because anamala is alive, is a live animal, beyasa shamakashuvah, hita lo kashuvah, however, hita, which is simply a botanical unit, is not considered important, and therefore it doesn't have the den of a baria. In any event, we find that the bawli agrees with you, shaame, regarding the basic concept of baria. The idea of baria exists in the bawli as well, albeit within the context of makus aseros. And now the question is, what's the relationship between makus aseros and between brahos? According to you, shaame, there's a den of baria regarding brahos as well, not only by makus aseros, while according to the bawli, we don't necessarily notice any indication that there's a den of baria regarding brahos, and as a matter of fact, the indication would be actually the opposite. The indication from the bawli is that there is no den of baria regarding the den of brahos. This is certainly the impression that one gets from the ramban and the riff that regarding brahos do not bring the den of baria what's at all. The den of baria simply does not appear according to the ramban and the riff regarding shaame, and apparently they felt that the bawli argues on your shaame, even though the bawli has brahos regarding makus aseros, it doesn't have baria, the den of baria regarding brahos regarding barirosanen, regarding the den of kazayis that's required for a brahaka krona. A possible explanation might be that the shear of kazayis regarding brahaka krona is learned from the pastaka vakhalta visavato uverakta, midda oraisa we need kadeis savia that one should eat enough and be satiated. According to kahame, they said that one doesn't have to eat enough to be satiated but even if one eats a kazayis, that's efficient to require a brahaka krona. But the shear of kazayis might be a minimal shear of kadeis savia. One doesn't have to eat a full meal but as long as one eats a kazayis, that's enough of a kadeis savia in order to be makayi of a brahaka krona based on the pastaka vakhalta visavato uverakta. So even though the pastaka might be referring only to eating lechem, it may not be referring to shivas aminim. Nevertheless, the idea of a halta visavato uverakta which according to our banan is applied to shivas aminim as well. Nevertheless, that is what is covea regarding when a brahaka krona is made. So the requirement of a kazayis is a minimal shear of kadeis savia. If it's a minimal shear of kadeis savia, then one has to actually eat a kazayis. If one ate a baria which might be an entire organic unit, however does not add anything regarding savia, then that doesn't help us regarding a brahaka krona. In other words, the significance of baria might be important regarding makhal sasuras because makhal sasuras don't require kadeis savia. It requires some kind of an akhila kashuvah and eating a baria might be considered an akhila kashuvah. We're going to discuss this in greater detail later. However, brahaka krona which needs the shear of kazayis for some kind of a kadeis savia, a minimal kadeis savia, baria is not a kadeis savia. Baria, kadeis savia requires a certain amount, a certain minimal amount and the kashivas of baria doesn't make it any more savia, any more satiated because it was a baria or if it was not a baria. You ate the same amount which is less than the kazayis and there is no vahalta, vesavata and therefore there is no ubei rahta. On the other hand, we find certain rishonim who claim that basically the bhavli agrees with you rishamli and the dinner of baria applies to brahos as well. However, the makhlokas, bhavli rishamli, if there is such a makhlokas, might refer to the specific case that the bhavli is referring to. For instance, regarding the case of the bhavli, Baria is not mentioned. What's the case of the bhavli, where rahbiyokunan ate azayis and he did not eat the pit. There are all, for instance, claims that the makhlokas between the bhavli and rishamli is whether not eating the pit is something which is pogain which takes away the dinner barrier from the olive, he ate the entire olive. However, he did not eat in the olive, the part of the olive that is not rolulakhila. Is that considered eating a barrier or is that not considered eating a barrier? According to the Ushalmi, even if you spit out the pit, it's considered eating an entire barrier because you ate of the barrier of the entire organic unit everything that is rolulakhila. And therefore, even though you spit out the pit, nevertheless, it's considered having eaten an entire barrier. The bhavli might argue, if you eat an entire barrier, that's considered, that has a khashivus of barrier. But if you take an olive and spit out the pit, you did not eat the entire organic unit of the olive. You spit out the pit and since you spit out the pit, it's not considered as if you ate a barrier. And therefore, the bhavli says, in the case of eating azayis, one requires the shear of a khazayis, you cannot use the dinner barrier regarding eating a khazayis. That's basically what the rah claims. In other words, the makhlokis between the bhavli and the Ushalmi is regarding the specific case of rabbyokunan eating an olive and spitting out a pit. Does one apply the din of barrier in that case? However, in general, whether the concept of the barrier applies to brachos as well, the Ushalmi agrees with the bhavli, the bhavli agrees with the Ushalmi. Yes, there is a din of barrier regarding brachos as well. Similarly, we find the Mishkros Yaakov, who says that the makhlokis bhavli and Ushalmi is analogous to the makhlokis between rahpshimon and khachamim. The Ushalmi holds like the abshimon, that you don't require barriers in this shama. It doesn't have to be an animal, but even an entire vegetable, khita is also considered a barrier. The case that the makhlokis was a case of an olive. An olive is not a barrier in this shama, it's not an animal, it was never alive, but rather, it's something that grew in the ground. It's an entire fruit. According to Rabi Shimon, the din of barrier applies to a fruit as well, while according to khachamim, the din of barrier does not apply to fruit. However, it does apply to barriers in the shama. So, accordingly, the bhavli would agree to the din of barrier, but not regarding an olive. However, it would agree to barrier regarding something which was once alive. For instance, if one ate a small fish, a small salted fish, but the fish was complete, and he ate the entire fish. Would the bhavli agree that one makes a brachachrona, a bharnafashos, even though that fish was less than a kazayis? According to missiono siaco, the halakha is that one should make a brachachrona, even if it wasn't a kazayis, because the bhavli agrees to the concept of barrier, as we see in the gamma ray in makhos, if it's a barrier to the shama, and only rejects barrier of grown items, of agricultural produce. For instance, the hita is not considered a barrier according to khachamim, and therefore, also, an olive is not considered a barrier according to khachamim. However, a barrier to shama is considered a barrier, and according to that, if one would eat an entire fish, even though it was less than a kazayis, it would require a brachachrona, even according to the bhavli. However, as we mentioned, this halakha does not appear in the riff and the ramban. The riff and the ramban do not bring the din of barrier regarding brachos, whatsoever. I suggested that according to the riff and the ramban, one needs a minimal sphere of severe, and therefore, the hiluk between berries and the shama, and agricultural barrier would have no significance whatsoever according to that understanding. There are opinions that seem to suggest that there is no makhlokas between the bhavli and the ushalmi whatsoever. For instance, the Ravya claims that the ushalmi is talking about a situation where the olive was whole, while the bhavli is discussing a situation where in the pickling process, the olive was crushed. So, since the olive was crushed, it's not a barrier at all. So, the bhavli only deals with the question of whether there was a share of a zayis. One cannot discuss barrier if the olive was crushed. That's what the Ravya claims. However, had the the olive, in the case of the bhavli, been a complete olive, even the bhavli would concede that there is a din of barrier regarding brachos. That's what the Ravya says. Similarly, the rash claims that the bhavli and the shama are dealing with different cases. According to the bhavli, we're talking about a case where the olive was removed before Ravyoh-chanan ate it, and therefore, he did not eat an entire barrier, while according to the ushalmi is talking about a case where he put an entire barrier in his mouth, and then spit out the olive, and therefore, according to the ushalmi, it was a case of barrier. But basically, there is no bhavli between the bhavli and ushalmi. The only bhavli is what was the case that came before Ravyoh-chanan and Ravyoh-chanan. According to the ushalmi, it was a case of barrier. Well, according to the bhavli, it was not a case of barrier, either because the olive was crushed, or because it was a pitted olive. The olive was removed before Ravyoh-chanan ate it, and therefore, the bhavli did not discuss whether or not the issue of barrier applies here, because it was not a barrier. However, according to the ushalmi, it was a barrier, and therefore, it requires brahah-chanan because of the dinner barrier, and the bhavli basically agree with that. They're only arguing on what was the case that came before Ravyoh-chanan and Ravyoh-chanan. What should catch our attention is that the brahah, the rahavya, and the rahsh all agree that the bhavli would agree, in the case of eating an entire olive, that dinner barrier applies, or eating some other agricultural, complete agricultural item, the dinner of barrier applies regarding brahakrona. According to the rah, the only issue is if he spit out the olive, however, if one ate a complete fruit where he did not spit out the pit, then the dinner barrier would apply even to some complete agricultural unit, even according to the bhavli. However, this seems to contradict the gamara in Makos. The gamara in Makos, we saw that Khakhamim argue on Ravyoh-chanan, and Khakhamim say that only embarrassment Shama is considered a barrier. Only a complete animal is considered a barrier. A complete agricultural unit like akhita is not considered a barrier, and that requires eating of a kazayis regarding Mahalasasuros. Why do the rahavya, the rahah, and the rahsh all agree that regarding brahakrona, even an agricultural unit is considered a barrier? In order to explain this point, we have to try to analyze why do we normally need a full kazayis, let's say regarding Mahalasasuros, and how does bhairya circumvent the necessity for kazayis? Now, basically there are two main approaches that I can suggest for the necessity of a kazayis. The first approach is that a kazayis is required in order to be defined as a maisa akhila. When I take Mahalasasuros, in order to get malkos, it's not sufficient that I ate Mahalasasuros, that I ate akh Shefsa de Isuras, something which is us who to eat, I ate, I took some Khazir and ate Khazir, but what I have to do is do a maisa akhila on that Khazir, it says lo sukhlu, and therefore in order to be over the Israel of Mahalasasuros, one has to do a maisa akhila. Regarding the status of the hefsa de object, even less than a kazayis is considered Mahalasasuros, it has the din of Mahalasasuros. However, in order to get malkos, one has to do a maisa akhila. What is the definition of a maisa akhila, boholatora kula? The definition of a maisa akhila is eating kazayis bhakta akhila's past. For instance, if one wants to fulfill the mitzvah of matzah, what has to do a maisa akhila and matzah? What is a maisa akhila and matzah, eating a kazayis of matzah bhakta akhila's past? Less than a kazayis is also defined as matzah. However, the mitzvah is akhila's matzah and therefore wants to eat a kazayis of matzah bhakta akhila's past. Parallel to that idea is regarding mahalasasuros. Tevel less than a kazayis is considered Tevel. It's mahalasasuros, but in order to be high of malkos, one has to eat a kazayis of mahalasasuros, a kazayis of Tevel bhakta akhila's past. Otherwise, it's not defined as a maisa akhila. For instance, we find as mahalas between a schlakishra bjokanan and sogit in Yoma, regarding kazishir asumaratora is an asumaratora to eat less than the shear of mahalasasuros. According to abjokanan, kazishir asumaratora. It can be explained as follows. Since you swallow mahalasuros, you intook mahalasuros. Therefore, you are over an isir. Why don't you get malkos? Because you didn't do the maisa akhila. But since it is a hefta, the isra, it's a hefta, the object is mahalasuros, which you intook into your body. Therefore, you violated an isir minatora. However, since you didn't do a maisa akhila, therefore, you don't get malkos. In order to get malkos, you need eating a kazais of mahalasasuros, bhite akhila's pass. But the hefta, the status of mahalasasuros, exists independent of whether or not you ate a kazais or didn't eat a kazais. According to this approach, what are we forced to say regarding barrier? How does barrier eating, let's say, a barrier is a shem, according to khamim, or even an agricultural value, according to Ramachimon, how does it overcome the fact that one did not do a maisa akhila? Even if it's a it's a barrier, nevertheless, one ate less than a kazais, bhite akhila's pass. If one did not do a maisa akhila, one should not get malkos. Apparently, what we're forced into saying is that since one ate, an entire unit, therefore, that has a din of a maisa akhila. The shear of kazais regarding maisa akhila is only required if one's action had no objective significance. And therefore, we have to give significance by having eaten a certain significant amount. However, if one ate something that has objective significance, if one ate a barrier, then that's considered a maisa akhila, even though one did not eat a kazais. In order to illustrate this point, let's take some apparel idea. Let's take the shear of shavapruta regarding monetary objects. Normally, in order to be considered something that has value, it has to be considered shavapruta, it has to have the value of apruta, which was the minimum mathbeya at the time of the Gomara. If it was less than a shavapruta, it was not considered as having value, it was value less. For instance, if somebody would take something that had less than the value of a shavapruta and want to make a transaction with it, wanted to buy a field with something that had less than a shavapruta, the kinyi would not be found because in order to be considered kessif, in order to have value and to be considered kessif, it had to have the value of at least the shavapruta, less than a shavapruta, is not considered a kessif. However, we find that there is a kinyin called khalipin. If one took a khalipin, one took a utensil or a complete utensil, for instance, one took a needle, a sauilin needle, one sauilin needle that was worth less than a shavapruta, and one made a kinyin by giving over this needle, the kinyin would be good and that would be considered a that's a kinyin khalipin. According to some, we show them, for instance, the rivat and others, a kinyin khalipin works because khalipin harayokkessif, it works on the same, on parallel lines to kinyin kessif, even though I didn't give money, nevertheless, I gave a klei, a complete klei, which is a complete unit that has a value, not because of its monetary value, but because of its functional value, can create a transaction even though it's not a shavapruta. This idea is expressed explicitly by the rasvah in Daflamid Testament ways regarding a bit of shmuel that normally, in order to be haivishvua, one has to make a shvua on snake-hesif. However, if, in other words, if I demand from the other party and say that you only stay kessif, and he says I don't know you stay kessif, then there is a din that he has to take a shvua in the conditions that require shvua. However, if, according to shvua, if I say you only shnei makhatin, shnei kaolin, to utensils, even though kuantar shvua, it is not a shavapruta. Nevertheless, you have to take a shvua because I demanded a tvia of something that has parallel value to money. Its value is not a function of its worth, of its monetary worth, its value is a function of its utility, of the fact that it has, that has functional utility, and therefore, since tumahatin, two needles, have functional value, therefore, it requires a shvua even though it does not have monetary value. What we see is that even though we don't have monetary value, since we're dealing with some objective item, which is a complete unit, a complete cleat that has functional value, the functional value can replace monetary value, and therefore, I don't need shvapruta, I don't need the value of apruta. The monetary value of apruta, it's enough that I have a complete cleat that has functional value. Similarly, you can say regarding mahalos, regarding food. If it has no objective definition, it's not a complete barrier, then I need a certain shear. I need a maisakhila of a certain significance. I need that you eat a certain amount. However, if we're talking about something that has objective value, objective natural value, it's a complete organic unit, therefore, it's defined as a maisakhila even though I didn't eat a certain amount. I ate a complete unit, and therefore, I don't need an amount into making it into maisakhila. The fact that I ate a complete unit, that gives significance to my action. I ate, I accomplished an active eating because I ate a complete unit, an organic unit, and therefore, it's defined as a maisakhila. However, where there is no objective unit, there, in order to define my action as a maisakhila, I have to eat a certain amount. The amount that is eating a kaisais. If you deny it, it's not defined as a maisakhila. In other words, according to this approach, the dinner barrier circumvents the necessity of kaisais by defining the maisais as being a maisakhila by virtue of the fact that you ate a complete organic unit, or a complete perhaps, perhaps a complete animal unit. That's one possible approach. The second approach is to claim that regarding maisakhila's assuros, since it's less than a kaisais, it has no jashivos, it has no significance, and therefore, it's not even defined as maisakhila's assuros. It has no dinner of maisakhila's assuros. It's not bekhlaal considered a hefta de isura. This might work better with the shita, that kratishir a no asumra tora, that eating less than a kaisais is only asumra button. It's not asumra tora because it's not even a hefta de isura. If this is the case, that less than a kaisais doesn't even have the halacha of a hefta de isura, even the object itself, the dinner mahal's assuros is not chal on the object, then what we're going to have to say is that barrier has kashivos, and therefore, circumvents the necessity for kaisais because barrier has independent kashivos, being that it's an entire objective natural unit. I would like to suggest that there might be enough community between these two different understandings. If we require the dinner barrier to circumvent the requirement from maisakhila, then all I need is a maisa that accomplished something significant, something significant on the objective level. In other words, you did an action that accomplished something. You ate something that has objective, that has some objective definition. For instance, if you ate a certain amount of cake or a certain amount of meat, it has no objective definition, it's not a barrier, then you require a kaisais. But if you ate something that's defined in objective terms, that action is considered a maisakhila because you've accomplished something. You've done something that has objective significance. You ate something which is defined as a barrier, and therefore, what kind of a barrier it is, whether it's an agricultural barrier, a fruit, or whether it's some kind of a living barrier, some kind of a complete animal, a fish, an ant, isn't significant. The question is whether your maisa had some objective significance, or whether the definition as a maisakhila requires a certain amount. If you didn't eat any objective natural unit, then we have to have a certain amount. However, if it was some kind of objective natural unit, then we can suffice with eating that unit, and it's considered a maisakhila based on the fact that your action had some objective accomplishment. On the other hand, if we're talking about having a bin of a hefta di isura, then we require a kashivos. Only something that has a certain amount of significance and importance, only that is defined as makhal sasuros. And therefore, the gomari in makhal sasuros requires, according to the kamimberias nashama. Only the best nashama has kashivos, something which is only a fruit, is not a barrier nashama, has less kashivos, has less importance, objective importance, and therefore is not considered makhal sasuros. It's less than a kazayis, it's not considered makhal sasuros. In order to be considered makhal sasuros, even though it's less than a kazayis, it has to have some importance, some objective importance. What has objective importance? A barrier nashama is kashiv, it has objective importance, something which simply grew on a tree or grew on the ground, even though it's an entire unit, nevertheless lacks that significance, lacks that importance, and would not be defined as makhal sasuros. According to what we're suggesting, we have a possibility of distinguishing between what is required regarding makhal sasuros, and what is required regarding brachos. Regarding makhal sasuros, I need that the object be defined as makhal sasuros, as a hefta de isura, and therefore I require various nashama as well. However, regarding brachos, all I require is that it be considered maisahila. If you did a maisahila, then you need a brachah krona. There is no concept of makhal sasuros within the context of brachos. We're not discussing makhal sasuros at all. All that we need is that you have done a maisahila. If you did a maisahila, then you have to do a brachah, then you need a brachah krona. And therefore, what is it that I need in order to be defined as maisahila, I need that my action accomplish something on the objective plane. Either I eat, and therefore I have to eat an entire barrier, whether the barrier is a barrier sasama, or whether it's an agricultural barrier is of no significance whatsoever. If I don't have an objective natural barrier, no objective natural unit, then I have to eat a certain significant amount, and that's a kazais. And therefore, we come to the conclusion that regarding brachos, it's sufficient to eat any type of barrier whatsoever. It's considered a maisahila. However, regarding makhal sasuros, khacham will require barriers, nishama, only a barrier of some animal unit. But an agricultural barrier would not be sufficient because it's not defined as makhal sasuros, as a hefta di isura. La halacha, the makhlokus mangu shonim, expresses itself also in a suffix regarding sak. Therefore, the khadrila, once you're afraid of eating a barrier, whether it's an agricultural barrier, or whether it's some kind of an animal barrier, like eating a small fish, some makhal definitions in which khacham says that even the barvli conceives regarding bays nishama, regarding a small fish. The khadrila is our argues, and therefore, it's a big makhlokus among the postkin. Once you're afraid from eating such items, for instance, if one eats Garinim, one eats a small little nut and spits out the shells. Is that considered eating a barrier? Does it require brachah corny? Even though one did not eat kazayas, or does it not require brachah corona? If one eats shalva, which is small little puff to wheat, over here also, we have a problem of the dinner of a barrier alongside the problem. What kind of brachah corny do you make, because it's a question of eating za'iminim, but not in the process form of kazayas. We discussed regarding kazayas, regarding all these cases, there's a problem regarding barrier, and therefore the shalva says one should refrain. If one eats a barrier, what does one do, but the evid, does one make a brachah corona, does not one make a brachah corona, also regarding this issue, there's a maclocus among the postskin, but again, it depends on exactly what one ate, one should probably work with the din of sapphic brachah lahakel, and not make a brachah corona, however, one should refrain from putting oneself into such a position of sapphic brachos le khat. You have been listening to Rabia Yucan this year in Hill Road, Brachat, today's alahayomit the makhabir in siman pitett has the father in sapphic, a su low hit a sapphic brachah, only lekh ladirah, achit pylem tvirach mon esseil. It is prohibited to take care of your own matters or to go out on a trip until one has said schman esseil. The rama adds the fathering kula, when we can hear the reluctance in his nipsak, bhi yesh miki leon, there were those who are making them, la chashamur miktat brachat, kodem shamur brachah shamar, the makhabir said, you have to say schman esseil before taking care of your own problems or going for a trip, there were those who said that it's not to say some, some of the brachat before brachah mah, in other words, some of the kod ashah. The tov, he adds, the tov lahake mibizah, but it's better not to rely on this kula, one should really hold like the shuchana ruch at the makhabir, and only say schman esseil before taking care of other matters, and not relying on the kula of miktat brachat, or some of the bhi kot ashah. This is based on a veranda second paracab brachat, there is some question as to what the gusandhi gmahir is, whether it says the sautra fatsab, as well as an algomer, but in the way if it only says leh lekh ladirah, but then unless all the other posts are called both things, both taking a trip, which you might think is a more of an interruption, more of a going away from davening, as opposed to just taking care of some small thing in the house, if you have to write a check or fix something, but an algomer, the gus, is a satsab, as well. There's also another gmahirah, in the first bhi kot bhi kot, the faimid bat, here it's not formulated as a prohibition. More like a recommendation, but the gmahir says, aba bin yamin omir. Aba bin yamin said, al shnaid barim, I eatin, it's the elkol yamai. There are two things, I was very, very marked with. All my life, I took here these two things. The first one is alt fiilati shat the heis muhrad miterati. Literally, that my tfiilah should be close to my bed. Rashi says, "I was careful not to do work, lola sot malachah, but should lola sot battara." And not to lintara, when I woke up, until achak ekra kriyat shmab et fala. So, as she says, he neither did work, a set malachah, doesn't mention going out on a trip, a set malachah, or even learning, or even learning tara. So, taking these two statements together, this is the basis for the shokhan al-spzak or postkim agree, neither taking care of your own matters, or going out for a trip, going to a traveling someplace, achit-peril, tfiilah shmab, she says kriyat shmab, bevishmab. There's an interesting sak in the prahr. The prahradash says that he thinks that, let's say, it's Friday, and you have to buy chalas bishavas, fresh chalas bishavas, food bishavas. He says, "You'll have to do that before diving." What's the logic of the prahr? The logic of the prahr is that what is the nature of the pro-vision here? It's ushit lassot-sarachah. Why is that? You're saying it's not that there's a prohibition on doing things. For a bishit is a prohibition of precedence. It's lassot-sarachah, taking care of yourself before tzar-shamayim, before God's matters. Your problems before God's problems. So, therefore, the prahrad use that, getting ready for shabbat, buying chalas, buying the filter fish. That's onyx shabbat. That's a mitzvah. That's sak-shamayim. And, therefore, there's no prohibition whatsoever. You haven't shown a improper set of priorities in life because you're not taking care of your private matters before God matters. You're taking care of God being married before God being married. There is no prohibition whatsoever. That's the prahr's argument. Many for skim when they're discussing the prahr, so they begin to try to figure out, well, is onyx shabbat, the mitzvah of getting food to shabbat, is that the oriter or the rabbana? The truth is, it's a pasuk inishayah. In tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim, tzar-shamayim. And, it's some question whether that has a status of the orite terminal Torah, or a midar rabbana. The rabbana very carefully phrases it as an in-between status, for instance. On the other hand, fila, tavrin, is that the oriter or the rabbana? We very mentioned the rabbana holds this the oriter, and tzar-shamayim holds this only the rabbana. In other words, the pasuk in which we're trying to figure out which mitzvah is more important. So, if onyx shabbat is the orite and the rabbana, then of course, the prahr is right, but if onyx shabbat is the rabbana, and fila is the oriter, then of course, the prahr is wrong. I think the missing the point of the prahr, the prahr isn't saying that you can do more important things before, less important things. And the most important thing in life, normally, you can't sigma it with the davrin, as opposed to taking care of a light bulb. Now, the prahr's arguing with the qumab is saying is that it's not more important or less important, but it's a matter of basic priorities. You have to address God before you address yourselves. So, once you're dealing with godly matters, it makes no difference. It could be that onyx shabbat is the rabbana, and fila could be the oriter, but nonetheless, where's the problem here? You're not insulting God, so to speak, you're not showing it in papa'al to towards God by taking care of onyx shabbat, because God wants you to do it. And therefore, the whole issue does not apply, but again, it's a post-graduate different attitude. Hala khammai sah, most parts can match an estimation of bulwa. As an example, are we left into relying on the prahr? They say only if there's a prahr them, perhaps there won't be any food later on, the haddles will run out, then one can rely on the prahr. And even then, they suggest relying on the vamr as well, namely saying bhakat first, it doesn't take very long, saying bhakat a shahra first. And then, if there's a prahr them, and you won't be able to find Hala's, then you can go by the Hala's first, and only go to shore afterwards, or otherwise, one should dive in first. Of course, this rama that I mentioned is based on what I said, is the prahp understanding of the prahr. Why does the vamr say it's enough to say bhakat? Perhaps, he lays the possibility. It's enough to say bhakat and nachmana saying. The reason is, because of what the prahr said, after ashmana sah, kondiramu is the right, bhakat is surely only the vamrana. But the answer is, the whole prohibition was incorrect priorities, kabseh, kab patsehra, before kabsehshamayim. So, what do you say, son bhakat? You've done kabsehshamayim, you've addressed God, doesn't make a difference, whether you said shmana sahrai or bhakat. So, at least, in my mind's head, as a possibility, bh mikilim, of course, if you've addressed God, then you can take, then it's a matter of priorities. What's the most important thing? Getting ready for Shabbat is very important, you can dive in later. Of course, this assumes that you still get the davening in time, before the time runs out. I'm not sure that even according to the prahrx understanding of the davening that he's correct. The prahrx speaks of two categories, kabtsehra and kabsehshamayim. I suspect that the davening is not talking about kabtsehra and kabsehshamayim, but it's talking about things, all things, and davening and fila. It has to do with addressing God, not taking care of the most important things, which are God things and not private things, but addressing God. The picture is that we are all servants in the court of God. When you wake up in the morning, the first thing you do is you check in. The first thing you do is you say, so to speak, hello to God. It could be as servants in God's court, everything we do is in the mission of God. But nonetheless, the first thing a servant has to do is, so to speak, to put his card into the time slot. You have to say, I'm here, I'm checking in, I'm a servant of God, you declare your allegiance, you declare your servant of God, everything you're going to do from now on is what God wants you to do. So the first thing you do is you, so to speak, ask him what he wants you to do. That's what we call fila. This is what Rashi, the Rashi I quoted on the face says, Abu Benjamin said, according to Rashi, he didn't even learn Torah before davening. Rooing Torah is surely hefsei shammai, and it's surely if it's not the only term. But nonetheless, why should one dabbit and learn Torah, as opposed to learning Torah and davening? As I pointed out, the first thing you do is you speak to God. After was you take care of your own matters, God's matters, then you'll make your priorities. But it's, but when you wake up the very first thing, sambhuq lemita to, I think Abu Benjamin said, he didn't even walk around, sambhuq lemita to, the first thing you do is one should, one should daven, of course, one has to get ready for davening, because you have to get dressed, and you have to go to show. But you're immediately going to speak to God, not going to do, not going to do anything else. Again, alaqala misa, most posts can say that one can rely on the prah, if there's a great need, so that it's going to run out, but otherwise one shouldn't. And that's today's alaqayyomit. That's all for today. We'll be back tomorrow with the share, the weekly share on problems of medieval philosophy. Until then, we wish you new a young Torah, kolto from Gushitson in Eret Israel, this is Vanessa Beck, and this has been KMTT, the Torah podcast. KMTT, it's Eret Israel. Udvar Hashem, miyokushalayim.