KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - Jewish Philosophy #08
KMTT - Topics in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Shiur #08, by Rav Ezra Bick
This is KMTT, and this is Esubic. Today is Tuesday. Yom Shishidah Shabbat, 23rd day of Haudesh Shabbat. Today's share will be given by myself. It's the week this year in problems in medieval Jewish philosophy, and today we will continue our discussion of Baya Tava, the Pahma Mavival, which we started last week. After the Shiyur, I will be back, and I will continue in this case, with the Al-Akhayomit. Last week we began to discuss the Pahma Mavival, and we discussed some classic approaches, specifically elaborated on the approach of the Ramban. On one hand, the approach of the Ramban is classic in the sense that he starts with any discussion of the Pahma Mavival in Judaism has to begin with. Namely, Sadik Vittovlo Rashabaralo, that suffering from the evil in the world is a response to sin. What I didn't mention last week, I thought it was obvious, but it is important to stress, is that this is based on a prior assumption that free will is a good, because God could have eliminated all suffering by eliminating all sin, and he could have eliminated all sin by not granting man free will. So, the Ramban's discussion of how evil begins with the assumption that he doesn't even think he has to defend what's known in the philosophic literature as the free will defense, that evil in suffering the world begins with man's free will. And man's free will is a good thing, even though it may and probably will be used to commit sin. The interesting point about the Ramban is that of course the Ramban realizes as anyone in Jewish tradition has realized, is that there are cases of Sadik Vittovlo, of the righteous who are suffering, and we don't see the connection between sin and suffering in that case. The righteous or the innocent, children, etc. There are many cases where we find suffering that does not appear to be connected or could be connected to any possible sin, and the ingenuity that Ramban's approach was to widen the definition of sin in such a way as to include not so much punishment as necessary suffering. By widening it, he basically changed the equation, it's not punishment, it's not justice for crime, but suffering meaning atonement, atonement or cleansing for dirt, for things which contaminate the soul. This of course fits in to Ramban's general perspective on the relationship between the pure soul, with the sense of this world, and is necessarily contaminated by its context with the world, but nonetheless retains its connection to the pure divine, his source in which it comes, and its goal in life, and God's goal in life, is to return the soul to its pure and holy origins. I would today like to take up a different approach altogether, one that I think you'll see the parallels between it and the Ramban. In a way, it's using the Ramban's categories, but turning them on its head, and an approach which is in fact immensely influential, not so much directly. The person I'm going to quote is Vrastai Kreskas, who was not well read, not often read directly in later generations, but in this particular case, I think his influence will be clear. Vrastai wrote a book called Orashem. Vrastai was probably the last truly great Spanish philosopher. He died in the beginning of the 15th century, 1411. He had an interesting personal life. He was very close to the king. He lived in Saragosa, he was the Ramban of Saragosa in 1391, when riots, anti-Jewish riots spread throughout Spain, his son in fact was killed. He was then subsequently appointed by the king to rebuild the Jewish community, something which frankly was never fully done, and of course, 100 years later, the Jews were expelled from Spain. Vrastai's approach to the problem of evil is based on what he says is one basic principle, which he has the state in the beginning, and once he states this, he believes everything else will fall into place. The principle he states is a moral psychological principle, and in his words, it's as follows. Shema asim yiknu, trunot cruot banefesh, bakoshu ka'in chie hecha schoolotam, imheim shikfah. The principle states that actions bring about good qualities in the soul, and surely they strengthen or develop those qualities if those qualities already exist. Vrastai says is the most important principle of understanding why evil does not appear to be connected to previous sin. I'll like to remember who says it is connected. I'll show you somehow that it's connected. Vrastai says it isn't connected, at least not always, but there's another principle involved, one which in fact explains why specifically certain kinds of suffering and certain kinds perhaps of evil apply and occur specifically to the people who we think are most deserving of reward, of benefit, and of happiness. The psychological basis for the principle would appear not to be revolutionary. It is true that, I think we all know this, that the actions that a person does, a person habitually engage in certain activities, this affects his personality, develops his personality in the direction of the actions which he is doing. For instance, an example that's actually quoted widely, it's mentioned in the Seifah Hachinuch, which was written before of Rastai Kraskas. Why does God, the Seifah Hachinuch asks, command us to give charity? Is the reason because God is worried about poor people, and commands us to give charity so the poor people should have money? Hachinuch basically says, if that were true, then God should give them money. Why does he need us to do it for him? He says no on the contrary, God commands us to give charity so that we should be merciful. Because the way to become merciful, the way to have a personality of pity and mercy and empathy for others is by taking care of them. He who gives stakah, he who gives charity, will become by virtue of the actions he does more more merciful. He will co-create within himself the quality of rachamim, of mercy. And Rastai says, this is in fact the principle of the entire Torah. The Torah does not address man directly and say, have a good character. The Torah tells us to do actions because actions develop character and not the reverse. I stress not to reverse because the mamban, in a famous passage in the commentary to the aqidah, to aqidah, it's rak, in Balaishit, says the exact opposite. He says, God sends trials. The word in Hebrew is misayon, verdokim nisa et avraham, and God tried avraham. And the question that all commentators ask is, why would God try or test a human being? Normally one gives a test in order that the tester should know something about he who was taking the test. The teacher gives a test because he wants to know how well his students are doing. But God doesn't need to give a test in order to know how well his students are doing, since God knows. So what is the purpose of aqidim nisa et avraham and imaban's answer in the commentary to the Torah is that God wishes to bring out from the potential quality of the human personality, he wants to reach a point where the person is expressing that those qualities in action. Why God wants actions, not just personality is not explicitly explained by the ramban. You have to figure that out on your own. But I think the point here is that ramban sees the relationship between what he calls levtov, the good heart, good personality, and the asymptovim as the first is the cause of the second, the first is the leads to the expression, it is expressed in the second. And therefore a person has a certain character which ramban does not ask himself how he achieved. And now God will try him, which could be seen as a form of suffering, under the avraham shavrin who suffered as he marched for three days with his son towards what he believed would be his son's death on hammalia. But that suffering was necessary according to the ramban in order that avraham should express his yerathashem or abattashem his commitment to God in a real action and not merely have it in his heart. Of course, that turns this equation on its head. And he says explicitly in the section I'm quoting about the aqidim, abattavraham, and it's not. He says that God told avraham to sacrifice his son not to express avraham's yerathashem but to cause avraham's yerathashem. And his proof is the pursuit that says that after the aqidah the angel says to avraham, atta yadati kirei alokim atta. Now I know that you are fear, fear, God fearing, fearing of God. And the famous question in the middle ages would be what do you mean now I know surely God knew beforehand? And the fastest answer is that no God didn't know before because it wasn't true because avraham was not God fearing, not God fearing on that level beforehand only by enduring the experience of having to take israq up the mountain of taking the knife in his hand and preparing himself, God forbid. The kiliitraq only through that experience that avraham indeed reached the level of yerathashem of which God says, now I know that you are God fearing because now you have become God fearing beforehand you want. What if Christa is introduced into Jewish philosophy is the nature of development. We don't say what a person is let him do actions to express his personality. We're saying let a person do actions in order to develop a personality that's comparable and compatible with the actions that he's doing. And although psychologically I think we all know this is true, metaphysically it's not easy to understand how it could be true. Where does the quality, the virtue that is being developed, where does it come from? If it wasn't present in man beforehand, then where does it come from? And if Christa is saying it's not present in man beforehand, but as God would have seen it, whatever man speaks of potential qualities being expressed, if Christa speaks of future qualities being developed. We're not going to discuss the metaphysics of how this can take place, the simple reason that it's not discussed by a Christa either. But if Christa uses this to explain suffering in general, because man must develop and if Christa has a whole theory that explains that God's purpose in the world is to lead men to better themselves, to bring men closer to God. And the only way you can become closer to God is to develop a better soul, to develop a better personality, to become better, more good, more charitable, more merciful, more brave. Any inequality that's a virtue has to be developed and you have to strive to transcend the state you're in beforehand. How does God do this? How does God lead us to better ourselves? And if Christa says you can't do that by saying I want to be better, the way to become better is not to think about good, the way to become better is to do things. And these things that we do may very well involve suffering. In fact, I suspect of Christa believes that they will necessarily involve suffering because the only reason why this action makes us a better person is because it's difficult. It's because we're called upon not merely to express what we already do. If a person has, let's say, a certain level of charity. He pities people, I don't know how to express this exactly, but quantitatively give him a 25. That's his mark. He has 25 units of pity. And then he gives charity, which is expressed as that. He gives them $25 or whatever the amount of effort on his part that simply naturally flows from his personality. He won't achieve a higher level. He has to give more. He has to feel more. He has to overcome a greater obstacle so that then he becomes a person who pities and has mercy and has empathy on a higher level than he had before. That by nature will be to some extent painful because it's calling upon him to do that, which is not easy, which doesn't flow from his personality. But in fact, we flex a higher personality than he indeed has. The case in discussion, the case of Amavino is an extreme, but nonetheless typical, typical but extreme example of their principle. "Ah vatashem" or "Yeratashem," of Kastai does not distinguish. The person of course says "Yeratashem." I now know that you are God-fearing, but for Vrastai, as for the Vamamis, for many, we show them when discussing the Akidah. They don't actually distinguish between love of God and fear of God. The quality that God is looking for here is the quality in which one sacrifices for God, and sacrifices by definition of course involved suffering, involved giving something up, something valuable, something dear up for a greater principle. But the only way to achieve the willingness to sacrifice is to actually sacrifice. And so therefore, if we were living in a perfect world, there would be no suffering, but it's not sin which causes suffering, but merely imperfection. Imperfection isn't sin, at least not in a normal sense. Any person is imperfect because he's merely a person, he's not God. But God wants you to become closer to God, to become more God-like, and therefore your imperfection, your lack of perfection, your lack of not being God creates a necessity to become more like God, and that necessity can only be met through a physical psychological activity, which by definition, involves some suffering. From this principle in Vrastai, so later commentators and philosophers, and in fact, not merely Jewish philosophers because the idea becomes quite common at later times, will point out that certain specific qualities always involve overcoming, for instance, the quality of givoura, of bravery, of fortitude. If the only way to achieve bravery is to express bravery, the only way to express bravery is to have something threaten you and nonetheless stand up to it. If there's no evil in the world, no danger, there can't be bravery according to Vrastai's psychological principle because no one will be brave, where he's never had to experience standing up to danger. Well, in the original example, I mentioned the example that's taken from St. Paul, no one will be merciful unless there is some misery, some need, some poor, some poverty to which his mercy is expressed. If there is no misery in the world, there is also no mercy. And how much misery need there be to achieve mercy? Well, since mercy is an infinite quality, mercy is the mercy of God, and your mercy is always less than that, so achieve the next step in mercy, one needs continually to meet misery, and if we take this to his extreme, you'll have to meet greater and greater degrees of misery in order to achieve greater and greater degrees of mercy. The upshot of this is that, this is actually similar to the Raban. Not merely is it always Sadik Vitovlo, Rasha Gurado, that the righteous benefit and the sinners suffer, but it's almost the opposite. They who are sinners, why should they suffer? God has no purpose in challenging them to improve because they're not on the path of improvement. As of Rastai says, this whole principle of God bringing you closer to him applies to those who have a certain measure of love of God, and therefore God loves them, and he's trying to help them. But those who are completely detached from God, the attitude of Rastai thinks would be most appropriate would be to be ignored by God, and ignored by God means they don't have to suffer either. But specifically because Avamavino is so great, therefore God is especially interested in in accelerating his path to become even closer to God, and therefore perhaps paradoxically, perhaps even ironically, and perhaps even sorrowfully, specifically Avamavino faces the greatest challenge and perhaps the greatest suffering that is described in the in the Torah. Now, lest we think that by standing the relationship between suffering and righteousness on its head, that Rastai has a simple solution to everything that Rastai admits, and in this sense, he is different in Rambani as in a corrected character. He says everything is true. It's also true that justice is a good. So frankly, evil should be rewarded with suffering. In other words, penalty, have a penalty of suffering. And frankly, righteousness, justice is also a good. God should do good. He should reward the righteous. But it's not the main, it's not the main element in God's attitude towards the world. God's attitude towards the world is to benefit the world, and the benefit to the world is by bringing the world closer to God. What's interesting about this approach to the form of evil is that in principle, I stress in principle, it'll always work. Because no matter how great and evil or suffering, we find that Rastai is able to answer, I stress theoretically he's able to answer, well, the greater the suffering, the greater the good that could come out of it. Because facing up to that suffering or fixing that suffering or even surviving that suffering will in fact bring out in the personality that went ahead and fought and struggled with that suffering will bring about in that personality greater and greater good qualities. And you can never say though, but this suffering is too great because no matter how great the suffering is, there'll be a greater good, he's defined it, there'll be a greater good paradigm, the greater the suffering, the greater the good. I stress theoretically because like all theortices, all theories to explain God's actions in the world, they present principles to the person who is suffering, to the person who is being engulfed by suffering. I think the theories can help, but they don't provide the answer, the answer we found was in and that was in the books. C.S. Lewis who wrote a book on the Pama-Vivo called The Pama of Pain writes in the very first pages, he says, "I'm not writing about my suffering, about your suffering and that's why it's very easy for me to write it. I think I'm writing good philosophy. However, I'll be the first to admit that I don't know whether or not this would provide an existential answer for myself while I, while I suffer." And that's an important point, it's at a point of point to mention. We're dealing in theory, existential existence of the suffer is a different, it's not a different question, but it's a different experience. If you take philosophy seriously, then you tend to believe that it can help, it can help to suffer, but the background to the Pama of Evil in Jewish philosophy was the question it posed to the theory of God. Can we believe in God if God is responsible for all this evil? And if Christ says yes, you can, because it makes sense that God should be responsible for all this evil. Now, another difference between the ramban and rafchastai, the ramban theory of suffering is really an answer to a question. The world doesn't seem right, we see there is suffering and it's not justified. Now, not just it is justified, now you can go back to what you were doing beforehand. Rafchastai's theory of suffering is not merely an answer to the question called the Pama of Evil. It's a theory of existence. It's part and parcel of a theory that explains not merely how can I believe in God despite the evil, but how I should relate to evil. Rafchastai says when you meet evil, when you meet suffering, you should see it. It's there as a challenge. It's a cause of what will be not a response to what was. Ramban, like the ramban, speaks of suffering as a response to a previous existence, a previous action. That's why, as I mentioned last week, torata Ibu, kind of transmigration of souls. If it's a response to what to place, it could be a response to place in a previous life or in a previous existence to this soul. But for Rafchastai, the cause of suffering is what will be not what was. Suffering exists and is justified not by previous sin, but by future virtue. And therefore, it's a theory of everything that happens. When we walk through life, Rafchastai says, the problem of evil, the problem of suffering is one particular and perhaps common. But nonetheless, one part of a general theory that says we are facing God and God is sticking of ways to not let us rest, to keep us on the road to self-perfection which might involve sometimes suffering. It might involve sometimes pleasure. It will always involve a challenge. It will always involve getting you to transcend yourself to be more than what you are, not to be true to yourself as it's found in the Shakespearean and play Hamlet to yourself be true, but to your future be true. Be not honest with what you are, but be greater than yourself. And because of the psychological principle that says that one cannot directly be greater than oneself, God sets first situations which change our lives by calling upon us to act in a certain manner. Extending this further, this becomes a theory of Torah, because Torah consists of actions in not a philosophy, not even direct morality. There's very little, some, it's very little direct morality, Torah says be good. Feel for other people. Those few exceptions, in fact events, questions, in the first game, what does it mean? You should love your fellow men. What are you supposed to do? And because I'll say it means act in a certain manner. The hapto verha kamocha means do not do unto others what you do not want them to do unto you. Hillel, Hillel's definition of hapto verha kamocha. But basically the Torah consists of actions. Acts do this, do that, do this, do that. And of course they say yes, because that's the way in which personality develops. The Torah is really not interested in the actions themselves. That, of Christ I admits, Torah is interested in personality. Personality in the end will be he who will dwell in the world to come next to and close to God. But the only way to achieve personality, to achieve a developing personality, is by action if our God doesn't even speak to the personality, or at least not usually, but speaks directly to the actions of, of the person. A question for a hrastai would be if we could find cases of suffering that could not possibly result in a better personality. Now we're not going to find a case like that in this world, but with hrastai says, if karete, the punishment mentioned in the Torah, of being cut off means being cut off in this world and the next world, then nothing could come out of it. If it's the end of the soul, then that's a punishment which is not or a suffering. It's an action of God which is not conditioned to producing a better soul. And if hrastai admits it, that's true. He says it's possible that there are some souls on which God has given up. They can't be bettered by the challenges of this world. And therefore, they simply cut off, which they're not punished, they're not tortured. They're cut off, they're ended, because the only reason to exist is to become closer to God. He suggests another answer. Hrastai is very, it's very typical of him to have three, four, or five different answers for the same question, because as I said, he's eclectic. He believes that only by understanding all the possibilities, God has a lot of methods to achieve the same goal. So he says, well, it's possible that sometimes other people benefit by seeing the suffering of a person that has to be justified by justice in his case. He also has to have some benefit from it. But it could be that if you ask me ultimately, what comes out of this, what comes out of it is that other people will have their souls be developed, will develop their own souls in light of God because of it. But again, he says, it's a little bit hard to say that in the world to come. We don't know much about the world to come, but will create of one's soul benefit of the souls. It doesn't seem like it's hard to imagine a context in which that would be true. Again, this doesn't bother with Christa so much. He's not saying on giving you a total theory that is in your case. I'm explaining to you why Sadik Virado is not an anomaly and is not a question on God's justice on the contrary. Since he's a sadik, he has to keep moving. He has to keep moving, something is going to happen to him. The Christa's discussion reminds us, he doesn't quote this, reminds us of Ighmarah at the end of the Succet Muayt Catan. This entire chapter which discusses the laws of death and mourning. And Ighmarah ends with a, indeed, a typical statement about the world to come. Ighmarah ends with a statement, Sadikim, Ein Lam, minuja, Afidu, la Atidlava, that the righteous will not rest, do not receive rest, do not merit a retirement. You don't retire if you're at Sadik. Sadikim, Ein Lam, minuja, they do not have peace and rest even in the world to come, even in the future world. And what they seem to be suggesting is that specifically, perhaps mediocre people will receive peace and rest in the world to come. They've done the best they can and now they can rest on their laws. But Sadikim will not rest in the world to come because you can get more out of them. Therefore, although we don't know how this could exactly take place, but even in the world to come, they will keep moving, they will have to keep, they will have to keep moving. Same thing suggested by the famous mamah kazal kodibai rashi in the beginning of Prashad vayyashiv, bikeshya kobla shavat be shavar, Yakov had a rough life, he came back to Israel, he thought now he gets to enjoy life. Yakov watched wished to live in peace, bishalva, miyad kafatsa love, oh so show your safe, immediately, stressed on the word immediately. It's impossible, how can you possibly rest in this world? Immediately, he had the problems associated with your safe, no explanation of what is expected from Yakov, but the point is, Sadikim, daftka, specifically Sadikim, do not have, do not have rest and suffering and rest here apparently should be taken as opposites. Rest good, sweet life, flower evocation, khando in Palm Beach, that's not for the Sadikim. In the Sadikim, they will remain in struggle and something very close to what we call, sadik virala. This ends our discussion of the palm of evil, obviously, there is much, much more which could or should be said. It's an entire discussion that I mentioned in Prashad Krask has even shorter, much shorter at the narrative on Ban, when Ban had like 15 pages. In Sephita Rata Adam, the Prashad's discussion is, the positive side discussion is all of three pages long. He introduced that with an entire chapter discussing all the wrong answers that he knew to the palm of evil, but his final answer is no more than three pages. He provides a principle, the development of this principle will, would and will require a great deal of elaboration, which in fact, let's take place profusely in later in later first topic literature. From this discussion of two weeks ago, Ashkaha, in the last two weeks to the palm of evil, we will continue next week widening the world, widening the scope even more to what is the purpose, the final purpose of man's existence. We will discuss two approaches to this question, the approach of the Rambhan, which is the Atashem, knowledge, knowledge of God, and the approach of Vafrasdai Kraskas, which is heavily indebted in this case to the Rambhan, and that is Aavatashem, the love of God. And now for today's alahayomit. The language of the Shoshanaruch is Nashim Vavadim to Rimmi Kriachma, with nation whom it's not Asai Shazban Grama. This is an uncontested alahr. Kriachma is a Mitzvat Asai Shazban Grama, a time-dependent Mitzvat, and therefore women are exempt from Mitzvat Kriachma, and this Shoshanaruch is the Mitzvat Kriachma. But it's correct, it is right, it is proper that women should accept upon themselves the yoke of the kingdom of heaven, to which the Mitzvat Kriachma adds, which she Karula Fakhod Pasuk Rishan, and they should read at least the first Pasuk. This is based on a statement in the Meijossef, the Meijossef quotes from the Seifor Oenroed, which is a Vishani Kalahriq work, who says that even though women are patot from Kriachma, but they are obligated, they are obligated in the acceptance of the unity of God, which is the first Pasuk. And the Meijossef quotes that, it doesn't argue with it, and then Shoshanaruch writes what I call it, it's proper to teach them to accept upon themselves the yoke of heaven. There's a huge discussion in the acronym as to whether or not the intention of the Meijossef is to say that women are obligated to read at least the first Pasuk, or language seems to be a lot less categorical, it is proper for them to accept upon themselves the yoke of the kingdom of heaven and according to the member, and therefore they should say the first Pasuk. I think the explanation of the Beijossef's attitude here is really very simple. Kriachma has within it two different Mitzvat. There is one, a tactical Mitzvat, to read this Pasuk, the first Pasuk, the first Pasuk, the first two Pasuk, two Pasuk, different opinions in the Yishanar, but there's a Mitzvat to read these things, meaning the Pasuk, that's a Mitzvat to read, to say certain words. There's another Mitzvat, which to remember, in fact, lists in the Sefa Mitzvat as an independent Mitzvat, no connection to Kriachma, called Ighud. Remember the language of the Omo, it was, Kabbalatha Ighud, the unity of God. Now the unity of God is not a Mitzvat to read a Pasuk nittara. It's a Mitzvat. It's basically a composition fulfilled in one's heart. It's a Mitzvat of belief, and that's why Dhamm has in the very, very beginning of Sefa Mitzvat, because there's a basic, basic, essential Mitzvat. For even Mitzvat of belief, one has to do them in some way. This is especially true, if I can comment, based on the principle in this year today, in the philosophy share, actions create hearts. It moved out that philosophical basis. How does one go about doing Ighud? The Pasuk of Kriachma is a fulfillment, not an obligation to say Kriachma in order to unify God, to accept the Yoga of Heaven, but it's a fulfillment in the acceptance of the Yoga Heaven. And I think this is what the Beethu Sef understood from the Oenmaweid statement. He's not arguing or disagreeing. He's saying what the Oenmaweid said is that women are partur from the technical Mitzvat of Kriachma, which has a time by day and by night, by morning and by evening, and therefore women are exempt. But the Mitzvat of Ighud, which is found in the Pasuk schnai, you have to believe this. That's not a time-dependent Mitzvat. When I put on that late at night or in the afternoon, you're obligated that at all times. And therefore women have to do that. The Beethu Sef then devises what does that mean? If they have to do that, what should they do? It would be a really good idea if they would say Kriachma, at least one Pasuk, as Rama, as Rama states. But they don't have to say this Pasuk, they could lose another one. But this is the way the Jews go about reminding themselves of Mitzvat Ighud. And therefore, the sort of in-between languages of the Mahabair. The Onoi is correct. Women are obligated in Ighud, and therefore it is proper that they should accept upon themselves or train themselves to, every day, say at least one Pasuk of Kriachma. A second question relates to the Beethu Kriachma. According to Mose Pasuk, Beethu Kriachma is also a time-dependent recitation. At the same time, it's Kriachma, which means either one by day and one by night, or perhaps even only in the morning and now in the afternoon, etc. So therefore, women would be exempt from Beethu Kriachma. There are some Pasuk, who think this might not be true. As I mentioned, when we talked about it a couple of days ago, it's possible that Beethu Kriachma are not actually despite the name Beethu Kriachma. They're not really Beethu Kriachma. They're independent Beethu Kriachma, which are merely associated with Kriachma, and therefore the time is in fact all day. And if we do not accept the Shagat Ighad, the Shagat Ighae's argument, that these Mitzvat Kriachma, Beethu Kriachma are two different Mitzvat, one of which is only by day and not by night, and one of which by night and not by day, then it could be the Beethu Kriachma, Mitzvat Kriachma. It's not at the time-dependent Mitzvat and women are obligated. But most people can really do conclude the women who are exempt from saying these Bakhod. May they say these Bakhod, so there's a basic argument between the Balleta spot and the Rambam as to whether women are allowed or permitted to make a Bakhah on those Mitzvat which they're exempt from. For instance, Shofam, Ludav, which felt which are time-dependent, but surely women is allowed to take Ludav or to hear the Shofam, but may she make a Bakhah on it. The Rambam says no, and Telusvad of Enotam says yes. Aloha lamaisa, all Ashkenazim follow the opinion of the Telusvat, which is called Enotamah. And many study them in that all, follow the opinion of the Rambam which is accepted by the Makhaben. However, in this particular case, there's a further twist. Why are women not permitted according to the Rambam to make a Bakhah on a Mitzvat, from which they are exempt? There are two possible reasons. One would be because any Bakhah which is not necessary should not be made, we call the Bakhashay Notsriachma, making Bakhod stan, just like that, without a valid obligation, should not be done. The second reason is because it makes no sense. The Bakhodamitzvat say vitzivanum, we bless God who has commanded us. If you have not been commanded, meaning obligated, you cannot say that. Now, the Bakhod, they were talking about Enot Bakhod and Mitzvad. At least not in their language, Enot the most possible scheme, Enot Bakhod and Mitzvad, or the Enot Bakhod and Kriachma, the Bakhod, which are not on a Mitzvad, which is time-dependent, the Bakhod themselves are time-dependent. So according to the banal time and the testosterone, women can do anything. They can obligate themselves or anything they want. But even according to the other opinion, this is a woman should not make a Bakhat and it's very conceivable what the reason is, and this is what the Vash argues, because they cannot say vitzivanum, but in Bakhod Kriachma there is no vitzivanum. Your blessing God who has created the sun and the moon. Your blessing God has given power to Amisa. Your blessing God who has redeemed the Jews from Egypt and has given us the concept of Gulat, these things have nothing to do with time and nothing to do with women or men. And therefore, although technically women might indeed be exempt, but there should not be any problem for them to accept it upon themselves and to make the Bakhat. This was the opinion of Vashlamazaman Obakh specifically addressing people who follow the Makhabir's opinion, Oriental-starredim, it's supposed to Moroccan-starredim, and he said, nonetheless there's no problem to make the Bakhat. The Bababadi yourself has expressed many times his opposition to this opinion, and he says that women, namely Svadi women, who accept the opinion of the Makhabir are not permitted, are not permitted to make to say any Bakhat which are not obligated, including the Bakhod of Kriachma. So again, Al-Aqal-Amisa, this is also the common practice, is that women in Ashkenazi tradition do say Bakhod Kriachma, as well as certain Svadi congregations as well, communities as well, and of course the medical scheme anyone, even one who accepts the Makhabir in general about Bakhod-Amisa can say Bakhod Kriachma, there is an opinion most possibly expressed by Bababadi yourself, which is a post. And that's it for today. You were listening to KMTT, this is Azubic, which in you call Tov, we'll be back tomorrow, the share of Arab Benjamin Tovavi, the weekly mitzvah. Until then, enjoy the Torah you've learned, have a nice day, this is KMTT. [Music]