KMTT - Topics in Medieval Jewish Philosophy shiur #04, by Rav Ezra Bick
KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - Philosophy #04
"KMTT" This is "KMTT" Kimi Tsi-yeon Tetsai-Torah, the Toa Podcast, and this is Ezra Beck. According to the server, the company that provides the home for the audio files which are listening to, we have about 300 people a day who are listening to each year. First on that, which is a very, very good number, very happy to see that number. For best in that number, I would like to repeat a request I made last week that everyone who hasn't registered for the newsletter should please go to the website www.kimitcyon.org. That's www.kimitcyon, K-I-M-I-T-Z-I-O-N.org, and register for the newsletter. It's important because we will have announcements, there will be changes, there will be advice, there will be things which we can share with each other, and I would really hope that everyone who is actually listening, and the numbers are very gratifying, should also please register for the newsletter. We've only sent out one mailing to that newsletter in the last three weeks, it's not going to fill up your inbox, but it will be very useful for us and for yourselves as well. Day is Tuesday, heft al-edtevet, and today's share will be given by myself, it's the weekly share on issues in medieval Jewish philosophy. This is share number four, this will be the last share that will deal directly with the topic of the proofs for the existence of God. This share will be 29 minutes, and afterwards I will be back again with the daily halachayumit. Last week, we examined the rambam's proof and the kind of proof that the rambam offers for the existence of God in the beginning of the second halek of the Morelle vurim. The proof that's known in philosophic terminology is a cosmological proof. I contrasted and compared it to another kind of proof called the tebeological proof, which is based on finding signs of design, proofs of design within the world, from which one can infer that there is an intelligent designer. As I pointed out, teological proofs are not found for God, for the existence of God, in medieval Jewish literature. The proof does exist to prove other things, or to demonstrate other things, or to lead to certain results, to lead one to avata-shem, or beatachon-ba-shem, once you know that God exists, and therefore you recognize that he is responsible for all sorts of phenomenon, which impinge on our lives, then one develops a certain attitude towards him. But the proof is not used in medieval Jewish philosophy, unlike later Christian medieval philosophy, to prove the existence of God. There is, however, a sort of intermediate kind of proof, technically is a cosmological proof, that is found in Jewish philosophy, and found in the very earliest of books by Jewish philosophy. It's found in Levsad Uggon, in the book of Emonaut vidaeot. This proof is a proof based on creation. The Ramam criticizes this kind of proof very, very strongly. In the first calic amorin de vorim, he does not mention Levsad Uggon by name, instead he refers to a school, a group, of Arab philosophers called Mutakalun, or the Kalam for short, in the Hebrew translation of the amorin de vorim, called Hamid de vorim. The position that he ascribes to the Kalam, is in fact the position of Asajigalun, and the Ramam was undoubtedly aware of that. He just didn't wish to mention Asajigalun by name. The proof is a proof based on the fact that we can prove that the world is created, and therefore there is a creator. To our not particularly Aristotelian ears, this will sound very similar to the Ramam's proof. The Ramam proved that there is a first cause, and Asajigalun proved that there is a creator, but the Ramam is very insistent on the difference, because the Ramam, among other things, claims that in lines of a proof, he has no proof that the world is created. Amistiles believes that the world is eternal cannot be disproven. The Ramam says that he does not accept it, because he thinks that Amistiles proves that the attorney of the world is also incorrect, and therefore the question has no proof one way or the other, and therefore he accepts the testimony, the simple testimony, the simple chart of the testimony of the Torah that the world was created. But Emunah should not be based on creation, which he thinks is basically unproofable, because Emunah has to be provable. We discussed this in the first Shure a few weeks ago, that for the Ramam, Emunah equals the faith equals knowledge, and knowledge is that which can be proven, which is proven, which I know because I cannot believe, intellectually believe the opposite. I know it to be true, because I have apprehended its truth, its truth forces itself upon me. The Ramam denies that creation can be proven, but Asajigalun thinks that creation can be proven. So from that point of view, this might be a relatively minor argument, however the Ramam's opposition I think is much deeper. Asajigalun the brings a number of variations to the proof, but they more or less go on the assumption that if something exists that has to have a beginning, it could be that it's beginning that's found in something else, but then that thing has to have a beginning in the end, there has to be a beginning for all things, and therefore things were created. But if they were created, then why did they suddenly begin to exist? You need to have a cause, which is a typical Mr. Telian claim, you need to have a cause to change non-existence into existence, and therefore there must be something which always exists and can be the cause of the sudden existence of other things, the original beginning of existence of other things, and that thing we call God, because he is the creator of the world. As an argument, I think this is what most people saw more or less believe, this is what is sold on street corners, I think that's what is taught in the philosophy, that philosophy is taught in kindergartens, it's what's taught in kindergartens. Logically there are a lot of flaws in it. If one reads modern science and they talk about the Big Bang, or they talk about steady state, previous theory, but no one ever asks, but how did that take place? There doesn't seem to be a need to answer that question, matter per se could very well have been eternal, logically it doesn't seem to bother anybody anymore, at least on a sophisticated level. But Rosagegon thinks for a number of reasons which he brings down that you have to have a beginning, and if there's a beginning there has to be a beginner, someone who caused the beginning. What's more important for our point of view, is that the difference between the Ramba and the sajagand is not merely a way of phrasing the object of what is first, a first cause and some vague metaphysical sense, or a he who actually brought things into existence. It runs much much deeper, and this can be found by the use that of sajagand puts his proof, immediately after proving that God is the creator of the world, that sajagand immediately deduces, that we have an obligation to be indebted to God, to be grateful to God, because he's created us. This kind of conclusion doesn't exist in the number, and I think the Ramam will even object to attempting to draw such a conclusion from a philosophic proof. The first cause of the Ramam is a reason why the outermost sphere in the sky and the heavens began to revolve, or revolve, began as the wrong word, revolve. And all other motion is somehow found in a chain at which the unmoved move of God is at the beginning. But that doesn't in any way impinge your lives, it doesn't create a moral obligation between you and God. Moral obligations, according to the Ramam, are found in the Torah, they're found in prophecy, they're found in revelation, they're not found in philosophy. Philosophy is about eternal truths, but in the sajagand, and this is either the advantage or the disadvantage, I think to most of us who appear to be an advantage, the sajagand's proof of God provides a God who is responsible for everything that we have in our lives, which at least on first glance, and this is for Sajagand's first use of it, are good things. We're able to breathe, we have bodies, we have food, we have water. God created the water, God created the bodies, God creates the air in which we breathe and gives us the ability to breathe that air. We are totally and 100% and beyond indebted to God, because everything we have ultimately derives from Him and not from anywhere else. And therefore there's an immediate connection between morality, between relationship. One has a moral obligatory relationship with God which derives from the proof of God. In that sense, for Sajagand's proof is similar to the theological proof we described last week. The tip in speaking that the theological proof is based on individual, unusual or striking occurrences. You find the pattern, you have to first recognize the pattern. Sajagand is not particularly interested in any particular feature of existence. That's why it's cosmological. It's based on the fact that things exist at all, not that they exist in a particular way, that they're red or green or organized or seemingly purposeful. But on the other hand, the immediate result of Sajagand's proof is the process in a very specific relationship with God. One which of Sajagand himself uses to great purpose throughout his book and it provides the starting point for an entire philosophy of religion, for an entire religious life based on that understanding. Now the particular conclusion of Sajagand's draws is in fact interesting. Is it in fact true that we would agree to do most truth for us, because the most truth is the most of us think that the primary religious response, primary religious emotion or state of mind is one of gratitude and indebtedness. By beginning with creation and using creation as the starting point for all of his religious discussion, of Sajagand has defined the most basic relationship between man and God. Man stands before God as one who receives everything from God. I don't think any of this agree that that's a very basic, very basic emotion, very basic necessary response of man before God. But the question is, is that the only or the most primary response? Now for instance, for Sajagand being one who has to give a philosophy of Judaism, continues and says, well we have to observe Mitzvah, to what do we have to observe Mitzvah, because God created you, and if God created you we have to do what he said. I can see many people arguing that you have to do Mitzvah because God commands it, not because we are indebted to God, even if we weren't indebted to God, but God is truth, God is law, God is the Mitzvah. Even if God lets say, freed you from any obligation, he says, well you don't have to do it because you owe me, but it could very well be that you have to do what God says, because it's the truth. Just as we have an inborn feeling that we should do what is moral, because morality obligates, not because we are in debt to morality, morality has served us well in the past and therefore we should do what morality wants now, but simply that's what morality means. It's the right thing to do, and it obligates a moral individual. God obligates religious individuals in a similar manner. I should point out, I don't mean this is a criticism of Sajagand to the center, I'm just pointing out the difference. There's a Pasuk and the Torah, which seems to say something even stronger than Sajagand. The success, Kilebinei, Selavadim, Abadiim, Abadiim, Ashil, Sateyotami, Arad Smithaiim, and the usual understanding of that was success, that you are my servants, you are my slaves to translate it more literally, because I took you out of Egypt, where you were slaves to the Egyptians, and therefore now you're slaves to me, and therefore you have to do what I say. It's sort of like the feeling that I think most cultures would agree, if you're drowning and I save you, you're supposed to do what I say. I sort of belong to me because I've saved your life, if I've given you life, if I've done everything, everything that is about you, then all the more the indebtedness exists. So it is a proper idea, and I think it does have roots in the Torah, but again, Sajagand is totally dominated by this idea, because it formed a starting point of what is same as a very unified theory, he begins with the proof of God, and he attempts to follow through on that truth and continue it to all areas that he possibly can. But I want to point out that there's a argument between of Sajagand and the Ramam as to what everything can be proven, as the Ramam thinks that you can prove a number of things, not too many, basically about God you can prove that he exists, that he's one and has nobody, and that's more or less the end of proof. There are many, many other truths, which can be learned only from revelation, of Sajagand is a basic position that says that anything true can be proven, and therefore this perhaps influences of Sajagand to create a more unitary system. Everything that is going to be true about Judaism should derive from the basic proofs. But it also puts him into a particular kind of ideology. Everything in the end revolves around my indebtedness to God. Because God has been good to me, therefore I have to serve him. Point, this opens you up until the argument was false, someone feels God has not been good to him. The power of evil and something which we will discuss in the future, some people suffer, and they believe they suffer unnecessarily. So God has not been good to them. I think what Sajagand's answer would be that in the balance you really still can't complain. He made you, if you are alive, he gave you life. If you were life for 10 years, he gave you those 10 years. You're talking about the difference between existence and absolute non-existence. There are moral thinkers who believe that the possibility that existence is less of a value. The non-existence can arise, perhaps in certain extreme cases, but there are certain kinds of existences. People whose lives are a net loss, they have negative value. I don't know if one could defend that position. It's a common place in Jerusalem to say that we think that life is worth more. The bare existence of life is worth more than the particulars that are its content and that's why we value life among all things. But I'm not sure that we would defend that until the very, very end. There are these case arises in the Gomara, it comes part of modern medical ethics whereby at a given point, it's justified to say that for this particular person, it's better to die now than to exist in his pain and suffering. That doesn't mean his whole life was negative, but morally, the question could arise because Versaiguan is saying you have to obey God because you're indebted for all the good he's given you. Then what to say that you have to have basically optimistic view of the good that God has given us. To show I would defend it, Versaiguan I think would state it explicitly, but again you've been forced into this one quarter corner, you've been forced into this position by basing everything by saying religion means gratitude. And is gratitude the most basic religious attitude? I think that a question could arise, is there a difference between gratitude and devotion? Is piety, is service of God a form of gratitude? The Ramam for sure would say no, not really because it doesn't accept the proof, but even Ramam does talk about what is one's relationship with God, not basic on a proof. He does intend to emphasize gratitude. He talks of love and fear, love as a form of admiration and fear as a form of reverence. God is great, God is wonderful, God is smart, God is intelligent itself. And one who perceives that is immediately filled with great feelings of love and desire to come close as well as feelings of awe and reverence and a fear and therefore he takes a step back. Those are the basic religious positions, religious emotions, religious responses that the Ramam talks about. I don't think Ramam would disagree with gratitude, once you realize that God has been good to you in the morning and you say there's a Vahrainswar essay in which we thank God for all the many things he's done. But what Ramam talks about, let's say in a hot yesterday, a torah, so he talks about a Vavirah, love and fear way before he talks about anything resembling gratitude. And love and fear itself is not based on the love of one who has been good to you, but the love of one who is extremely admirable, the love one has for a great person, not necessarily who has done anything for you. But you tremendously admire his greatness, his intelligence, his wonderfulness. You could admire a painting in the same way, it's sort of that kind of feeling of reverence based on admiration rather than reverence based on gratitude. And that's how the Ramam defines a Vahrvirah when he talks about one's relationship, one's emotional relationship with God. It is, of course, perfectly possible to have a proof like of Sajivans, but not necessarily due to the conclusions, just as the Ramam does not base the internal life of a religious person on the proof of God, at least not on the proof of God alone, and similarly later Jewish philosophers who have different proofs, but they define, they develop a religious persona not necessarily as dividing automatically from the proof, you could do the same thing with if Sajivans' proof, if Sajivans' proof, it does imply gratitude, but I have more to say about religious life than merely gratitude. Sajivan is in a certain kind of thinking where he really wants to derive everything from the proof because he believes, similar to the Ramam, but more extreme than the Ramam, that the knowledge of God is the basis for religious life. On the other hand, Sajivan is not, it's not agreed with the Ramam, he doesn't share the Ramam's enthusiasm for knowledge itself as the ultimate religious value on the country. Sajivan thinks that gratitude is the ultimate religious value. If you have gratitude, you're a religious person, if you don't, you're not. Whereas for the Ramam, if you know God, you've achieved the goal of religious life of all human life, and if you haven't, then you haven't. There is a famous parable told by the Ramam, which has a lot of implications, and we'll come back to mention it a number of times in the future, but the Ramam describes a palace. In the palace that lives a king, he lives in the finest room, the throne room of the palace. The palace is surrounded by a courtyard, the courtyard is surrounded by a wall. In the wall, there is a gateway. Ramam says that most people, most religious people, most people who are observant are found outside the wall and cannot find the entrance. They haven't even found where the entrance is. A minority of them find their way through the entrance of the wall and are in the courtyard but can't find the entrance to the palace. A minority of those people have made their way into the palace but can't find the right room and those who manage to find the right room, only a minority can actually behold get to see the king on his throne. Since the Ramam is an intellectual elitist, he admits, he freely admits that even among those who observe the Torah, only a small minority can achieve his goal of philosophic knowledge of God. This is not true for Sadhgia, although Sadhgiaan presents a proof. The proof is there to help those who are impressed by proofs. On the other hand, the Torah teaches all these things without a proof and if Sadhgiaan says if I can prove it, why do I need the Torah to tell me the same things? The answer is for those who have done out the patience for the proof, for those who wish to do it more quickly, to help those who might be misled at some point confused by the intricacies of proofs to keep them on the straight and narrow path. In other words, the proof itself, knowledge of the proof is not a religious value. The proof has pragmatic value. It teaches you the truth, which if you don't have the proof, you might not reach the proof. And also tells all of us who are intellectuals that we're right. We've proven that which we believe, but to believe is not to know, to believe is to believe. And then for Sadhgiaan, anyone who has this basic Jewish value, this basic religious value of recognizing that God is good to him, which you really can't get up in the morning and disable your heart and daven without realizing that that's what your life is based on, anyone who has that value in some sense is on the right path. You can have more, you can have less, but religious people share this value. I can't remember, religious people don't necessarily share the ultimate value. They've only done the introductory work to allow them with a much greater effort. They've arranged your life in such a way that if they make the effort and concentrate, they were able to become true philosophers and meet the goal, the true goal of human existence and of the religious end of the religious life. So you have this, what perhaps might appear to be the strange dichotomy in the rambam between what can be proven and the value of proven and the importance of knowledge. And the everyday religious life, religious life cannot be proven. On the other hand, religious life does not guarantee that you will achieve the goal of religion, the goal of knowing God. You know, such a ground on the contrary, you at least theoretically can prove all the values of religion. And two, acting out the life of religion is a great step, shares totally in the values, the ultimate values of the religious life, religious life itself. I think that on instinct, we would all tend to prefer another side of God's approach, respectively, the logical questions or intricacies of whether the proof is a good proof or not. As I pointed out, none of the proofs are going to make it past modern scrutiny. But I would like us to consider, at least to appreciate, what the rambam was trying to accomplish. It may not be a cup of tea, and it may not have succeeded. But had the rambam's endeavor succeeded, he indeed posits a tremendous and radical and far-reaching thing. Because according to Sahaja God, if you're grateful to God, you've achieved the ultimate. But what is that ultimate? The ultimate means leading a proper life. You have the proper moral qualities of gratitude. The rambam has a theory that says that if you know God, you are one with Him. Because to know God is, the reasons I won't go into today, to know God, according to the philosophic proofs, is to achieve a degree of union with that which you know. With the rambam calls "Akhutthamaskilvahumuskal," the unity of the Noah and the known. So the rambam in what would appear to be a very radical statement. It sounds almost mystical, and the rambam has been either accused or faced for being a kind of mystic, not a regular mukubal, but a kind of mystic because the rambam's ultimate goal is union with God. And the rambam claims he can explain how you get to Olam Habah, because after you die, your mind still exists, and it has as its object God, and therefore it's one with God an eternal light God. For Sadhguru, the goals would appear to be far more modest. And indeed, as Sadhguru says that Olam Habah, his God is worthy of rewarding those who did the right thing. If you've shown gratitude towards God and obeyed his misfelt out of gratitude, then God gives you reward. You get Olam Habah. He pays you also to speak. When you go into the rambam, you haven't merely merited Olam Habah, you've achieved it. You've eternalized your own existence by achieving union, intellectual union, with God. Again, as the rambam's theory defensible doesn't make sense, and philosophic terms, these are questions we're not going to discuss, but I would, I would at this moment, but I would like you to at least appreciate the grander of what the rambam was trying to, was trying to do. The rambam has an attitude, it's always explicit explicitly, but the rambam has an attitude that says about someone like O Sadhguru, that his philosophy is, I'm going to use a word that is obviously far into the rambam or with Sadhguru, it's about about it. Now, Sadhguru basically comes down and says, God tells you what to do, you should do it. And if you do it, you're a good boy. And he draws everything into that picture. So the rambam says that, truth exists, God exists, you can find him and you can, you can, you can get him, you can, you can acquire the truth. You can know the truth, la haskil, to know, to rationalize is a form of acquisition. And to know God is to, I'm tippable with the word, I'm a little bit, trying not to use the word, but I can't even hear the word to use, you've acquired God, you've made your mind a receptacle for godliness, for the object, mentally of course, but mentally for the rambam is real. So the rambam's aspirations in a religious life would appear, at least in the rambam's where I think it would be far greater than those of Sadhguru. To do that he paid a tremendous price. He basically divorced the accomplishment itself, knowledge of God, from the particulars of religious life. Living Shabbos is not knowledge, it allows you, it helps you know. Putting on to fill in is not knowledge, it, it puts you on the path to the right direction, but again the accomplishment itself is always beyond the actual midst of what you do. Whereas according to our Sadhguru, of course every religious thing we do has true and ultimate value because we're expressing all the time, our gratitude and our obedience and our relationship with God is being expressed all the time by every single midst father we do. We will see in a later lecture, the attempt by Raphras da Kraskas to basically combine these two attitudes, to show that every mitzvah that we do is a fulfillment of the goal of religious life, but that the goal of religious life is indeed union and closeness and even acquisition of, of godliness and not merely performing according to his will and finding pleasure in his, in his eyes. With this we are concluding, at least for the time being, our discussion of the proofs of the existence of God. We will continue next week with the next, what I believe is the next obvious topic and that is ashkaha pratit, ashkaha, God's providence, divine providence, specifically the word pratit means individual, individual providence over people, I think all, nearly all Jewish thinkers in the middle ages. As soon as that is a principle of Judaism, but how they define it and how they explain it will, will indeed differ. That will be our topic for next week. Today's had a hyomir, we are continuing in Sukhaidu Zimbali mentioned last week, that you are not allowed to be masked, to have an interruption during Sukhaidu Zimbala, between Babu Qshamal and Talish Dabaq, stringing together a number of Halaqah, the whiff concludes you cannot interrupt yourself from Babu Qshamal till after Shmana say, but what does it mean to interrupt yourself? So it's not really clear from the classic sources, the posts give more or less agree that it shouldn't be any worse than what the Qamaa, what the Mishnah says about Qiyat Shmana. We basically have a similar structure, there is Bukhot before Qiyat Shmana, Bukhot after Qiyat Shmana, the Upham in a single unit. And there we have a principle that says that it's divided into two, but Talqah pratkim within a section within a bhakha or the pratkim of Qiyat Shmana or Benaprakim between one section and another. So there are two categories, what basically means is that for something which you are obligated to say, it's part of davening, so you're allowed to be mafsik and Sukhaidu Zimbala can't possibly be more strict, be more severe than Bukhot Qiyat Shmana. The Shulkhanaar, the makhaba paskins, let's say you're saying bhakshamal and you say it faster than the Khazan, as soon as you finish before you begin, how do? The Khazan finishes, do you say Amen to his bhakha, the makhaba says you can answer Amen to the bhakha of the Khazan, some parts can wonder about this because let's say you made a bhakatamitzvah, meri bhakha on the luluf and then someone else made a bhakha on the luluf, so you wouldn't be allowed to answer Amen because the Amen will interrupt between the bhakha and the dhuang of the mitzvah, if it's more, if you did so, you'd have to make a bhakha again because the bhakha has lost its focus, it's lost the thing to which it relates. But the fact of makhaba paskins here that you can answer Amen to bhakshamal or the Khazan between your bhakshamal and the beginning of Sukhayd al-Zimbala, we see that there's something different. So the truth is, the obvious answer is that indeed it's different, there are different word havesq means different things in different contexts, the havesq, the interruption between a bhakatamitzvah and the mitzvah, similar, not exactly the same, but similar to the havesq between a bhakatamenen, a bhakha and food, and the food, that's sort of a havesq basically makes the bhakha into an orphan, bhakha no longer has anything to which to be late. The whole meaning and purpose of the bhakha is to be a bhakha on the mitzvah or on the food you're going to eat. If you have an interruption, the bhakha no longer relates to that food, if you then want to eat again, if you want to eat it all, you have to make another bhakha because you have no bhakha for this food, same thing for the mitzvah. If you made an untilat lulav, then you had an interruption, then when you want to take the lulav, you have to make a bhakha because the bhakha you made has floated away, it has no connection. But Sukhayd al-Zimbala is not the same kind of thing, the bhakat bhakshamal is not a bhakha that relates to the particular sukhayd al-Zimbala the way that a bhakatam itself relates to the mitzvah. If you remember the language of the riff that I quoted, the riff said, Hazal said we should say sukhayd al-Zimbala in the morning. And then they instituted a bhakha before and a bhakha after. The bhakhat are there to form a framework, to form a unit where the bhakhat of the boundaries and the content is the praise that he them, the sukhayd al-Zimbala. But it's not as if this bhakha its only purpose is to have an effect on the sukhayd al-Zimbala we're going to say to permit you to eat it or, I'm giving an example from bhakhatanen or to declare it to be a mitzvah. All the sukhayd al-Zimbala are shabbah, are praise of God. And the bhakhat are also praise of God. If you have a section based on tealim, and you have a prayer, you have something which is formulated by Hazal. So you shouldn't be mitzvah because the whole thing forms one unit. But to say that if you're mitzvah between bhakshamah, and shayd al-Zimbal, the bhakshamah now has become meaningless, there's nothing to go on, it's floated away into the net of the world, that's not the same at all. And therefore the bhakhabha paskins, that you can answer, I mean, there is another factor here. But in order to be a haphsak, it has to be a different topic. Ligamara says concerning bhakatanenen, that after you may come out, see, it's not a haphsak to tell somebody to bring the salt, even though you talked. But since bringing the salt is a necessary part of eating, you have to have salt when you eat bread, and you may bhakhatan mochi. So it's not a haphsak, because it's not another topic, it's not thinking or talking about something else. So since the topic, the content, the bhakshamah is a nice praise of God, the bhakshamah saying "Ame" to someone's bhakha is not in contradiction to that, and therefore it's not a haphsak for that reason. These are two separate reasons. The difference would be that the mission of Burya, he doesn't exactly paskin this way, he quotes an opinion, and it says, "And according to this, you have a problem." So suppose you were masik not "Ame" in the middle of Sukhaytizimah, or let's say right after Buryaqshamah, you talked about something else, discuss the sports scores of the stock market. So the mission of Burya raises the possibility, he's in favour, but he doesn't exactly say it's correct, that you have to say Buryaqshamah again. It only makes sense on comparison to Bukat Mitzvah, now they say that doesn't appear to be true here, nothing logically is even true. And so even though you shouldn't be masik, but if you are masik, you don't lose the bhakshah, you've affected the unity of the unit, but you haven't said anything wrong. Most post-games really conclude that there's no need to repeat the bhakshah, and in any event, a lakhala mysah, once there's a makhlokat, so repeating a bhakshah is problematic in and have itself, it's a bhakshah, the bhakshah, if you don't have to repeat it. So in fact, there's a doubt whether once you repeat a bhakshah, not, you don't do it. In this case, it really would appear to be more logical, that you don't have to repeat the bhakshah, because although one should not be masik, the masik does not nullify the meaning of the bhakshah. A lakhala mysah, what almost all post-games say, is that any recitation of Tfilan, as I'm talking, is stalking between the two friends, is there, is there have section to it, a recitation that has to do with Tfilan, if it's obligatory, including answering a man to any bhakshah you hear, which is a hear, one has to answer a man to bhakshah, and surely, kadushah, or yahishmihraba, vakkadish, or anything along those lines, so one should do, things which are not really obligatory, although they are customary, for instance, bhakshah, who will have to hear in God's name, or the introductory and other parts of kadushah, like nikadish, or luma tambah ukhyomego, that's not actually part of kadushah, it really belongs to the hazzan, but we have a custom that the whole congregation says it, so those you shouldn't say, because you don't have to say them, because you don't have to say them, they would be considered asik. Kind of, according to the second reason I gave, that anything that's praise of God can't be hazzan because it's not incanture diction to the theme, so you really could be much looser about what you can answer to, to say bhakshah, bhakshah, bhakshah, bhakshah, bhakshah, what the God's name is, is praise of God, it shouldn't be in opposition to the content of sakaydismar. On the other hand, sakaydismar, up sukim, they are all taken from tana, they're basically taken from tihlimdi, the chorus taken from tihlim, first another sukim, and so other sort of invitations might be a hazzak, famous example of this, is the minag to say, sheramalat, after yishtabach, before bhakshah, during a sakjim et suvah. So sakbhah is going to be worried about that, because it shouldn't be master between yishtabach and bhakshah mah, so one suggestion was, well let's move it forward, we put it before yishtabach, it's a parak in tihlimi. So it'll be another sukidismar, but the answer was that, well you're not saying it in order to praise God, you're saying it in order to basically ask for something, you're appealing to God, using the words of devanamalat, not as shirim bitush bhakshah, it's praise and song and hallel, but to say, mimamah kim kratikha sham, we're appealing to God, because these are the days of chuvah, and therefore that suggestion was never accepted and people went back to the minag of, indeed saying it, after yishtabach, which is the weakest link as I pointed out, the reason why you shouldn't be master between yishtabach and bhakshah, is the least impressive reason, it's the place where you have the most options really of being master, khalakha mais, the person would say that any devanmitzvah, you can be master clear, and so the minag is also a good enough, a good enough reason. That's it for today, tomorrow on Wednesday we'll have the weekly shir, the weekly mitzvah, al-varah bin amintebori, till then, this is asubic ingu-shiziong, wishing you a kaltov, this was kmtt, kimit-syiong, takzei-torah, udvarah sham, miru-shalayim.