KMTT - the Torah Podcast
Jewish Philosophy 03
Issues in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, by Rav Ezra Bick. Shiur #03
KAM T-T-T, this is Asubic. Today is Tuesday. You assign that to that. The day share will be given by myself. It will be feature in major issues, in medieval Jewish philosophy, and this is the third share in the series. Last week we discussed the idea of proofs to the students of God. And today we wish to examine the proof offered by the Ramban. Both understand the actual proof itself, and more importantly understand its implications and modifications, especially even after as a formal proof, it's been more or less peculiar. The Ramban's proof is also in the beginning of a second head of a medieval KAM. I'm going to skip much of the technical details. The Ramban introduces the entire second head of a medieval KAM with a list of axioms, logical axioms, heavily embedded to the traditional institutional philosophy. And on the basis of those axioms, it represents the proof in the first chapter of the second head. Once we're not actually interested in the technical form or basis for the proof, we don't have to examine fully the axioms. We want to get the general idea of what the Ramban was trying to do. The Ramban's proof belongs to a general category called cosmological proofs. Cosmological proofs are those which are based on general features of existence. In other words, they don't prove the distance of God because everything happened yesterday. If I were to walk in the street and a miracle would occur, I would predict that in 10 seconds it comes to vain, green thoughts. In vain, green thoughts, some people might be convinced that this is a proof that God or something similar exists. That would not be a cosmological proof. It's based on who we accept the historicity, the activeness of the event on which I am based in my proof. For instance, if one has a proof that this is of God, based on Ramban's first proof, is based on the event called the form. The fact that things move, which is an example, the fact that things change. Ramban's first proof is based on the event called motion. Ramban makes the form of assumptions. If something is a motion, it has to have a course. It's basically a situation, assumption. Every effect has a course. The course of an object, a physical object, a material object, which is moving, has to be motion. There's a logical basis for that, and that is that there's nothing in an effect like in a course, and if only motion can cause motion, that's an assumption. It's also based on our experience. In order to get something to move, we have to move it. We have to hit it. Therefore, motion is recorded as motion. However, the course, which is also motion, is also an effect. It's an effect, and it also requires a course. Its course must be motion. And the cause of that course must be a motion. We're going backwards in the chain of causality. But every cause that we find is motion, which requires a course, which is motion. The next assumption says an infinite regressive chain is impossible. If we have an event that exists, that can't stand behind it and an infinitely long regressive chain, of course, is because if the chain is infinite, we could never have transverse the entire chain. If the infinite number of steps, which one has to pass through in order to reach, and observe the event, but one can possibly pass through an infinitely long chain, and therefore, that explanation is impossible. Therefore, there must be a first cause, which does not require itself a course. Otherwise, we can't get on the road. We can't get on this change. Since motion exists, and its course, there must be at some point in this chain, a first cause, which is an unloved movement. It is the cause of the first motion, but itself is not motion, so that there's no need to explain this motion comes from the unmoved movement. The first cause, the cause that is not in effect, is what we call God, according to the number, and yet we have proven logically, given the fact that motion exists, that there must be a first move, there must be an uncours cause, and yet we have proven existence of what the random cause, God, the random cause, I love him. Before we continue, we'd like to make a small change in the random's truth. As I mentioned, there's an assumption here that an infinite depressive chain of course is impossible. It's hard to justify that assumption. There's a certain logical appeal. Plus, we don't accept it. We're not dealing with a change in which one has to spend a certain amount of time on each step. Even if we did, we don't know that time is not infinite in a aggressive manner, although I have a style as soon as it was not. But there's a simple inundation to the truth, which avoids the problem of the infinite depressive chain. And that is, let's assume that it is an infinite depressive chain. There's an infinite number of causes which altogether are the result in a given motion which I see today. Taking the entire chain at a unit, the entire chain requires a cause, because every effect requires a cause. So even if each individual motion is in the chain has a cause before it, infinitely going back in the chain of causes, we would let the entire picture as a whole. Put into modern terms, it could be that everything within nature has a cause with the nature, but what is the cause of all the nature in the entire system? That also requires a cause. And therefore, there must be a cause outside of nature, which does not require a cause itself. It's an uncorzed cause, and that I call it. Aside from the logical problem of the infinitely aggressive chain, which we are exubally solved by switching to the cause of the whole chain, rather than the cause of the first link in the chain, there are also some other advantages to putting the proof in this manner. The wrong one does not do, this is a later development, but there are certain advantages. And one of these advantages, again other than the logical or subtle one, is that it appears to be much closer to what we actually mean by going. The wrong one's truth of the first cause has the effect, if we are believers in a written religion, of at least leading the philosophic notion of thought, the philosophic proof of God, extremely just, but you've proven that everything that exists today has, in some point, in some kind of a chain, a first, first a very distant cause. Now, of course, so I have to realize, on the wrong one's truth is in this of God, he doesn't merely read it at that. Once religious life is not merely to pray to that which has been proven, one's a basis, a logical basis of what the revelation and tolerable end. Nonetheless, the God has proven my philosophy in the random, is the first in a very, very long chain, whereas we today are connected to the rap stages of that chain. The reason why you exist could be because of the cause, and that cause us a cause, and that cause us a cause, and only if some amazingly long line of causes wouldn't want to get the God. I don't think this deserves a moment very much, but it doesn't serve many people who have tried to connect the random truth to their revisions, to their belief, their actual belief, their heart and mind belief in God. What the inundation that I did to the random truth does is that God is the immediate cause of everything, taking everything as a union. And at least that's what we see in psychology now, at least ecologically, that gives a God whose connection to our lives the place to be much more immediate, and much more than much more trust. But there is a second, and more important, we saw the dissemination, one which actually gives us the importance of custom logical proofs. Today, the proof is not normally accepted by most philosophers. Including those who have believed in God, not many problems, basis, basis, basis. As I pointed out, the assumption that there is no entry to the aggressive chain is not accepted. But even the idea that there must be a cause of the whole sivan of the entire chain, which has to be this outside of the chain, is merely an assumption. After all, the whole proof is based on the fact that the effect has to have a cause. Therefore, we say it must be a cause for the entire chain of motion. But that cause, I propose, is not a cause, because it's the cause of everything else. So in the end, I do assume that there can be something. I truly think there has to be something, which is an uncours cause. But once you say that, you could claim that. Perhaps the entire chain of existence does not need a cause. But it's the cause of itself. It's an uncours cause. Everything with any chain has a cause, which is our experience. But when you ask about the entire existence of everything, perhaps that is not vehicles. After all, both sides of this question, if God is a cause of everything, or if everything is a cause of itself, both assume that there can be an uncours cause. There's this one thing, which is not of a cause, which is the explanation for itself. Therefore, the question merely arises as to whether I think it's more logical that it should exist. It's a specific thing, which we call God, which is different than everything else. It's an uncours cause. Or we make a distinction between individual things and the entire picture taken as a home. Individual things have causes. But the entire picture, the world as a whole, the cosmos, nature taken as an entire system, that does not have a cause. It's the cause of itself. It's very difficult to say that there's a logical preference for one picture over the other. And if, logically, we no longer have a group. What we do have is a very, very important distinction between two different pictures of the world. The second picture, the one that says that nature is the cause of itself, is, in fact, a apprehension, a picture which lies at the way in which science works today. It can actually emphasize that any given event must have a cause. You can't even say what that happened. You immediately search for the cause. That's how science works. That's what gets science into driving a cause. But if I were asked, "But what's the cause of anything?" it's trying to disrupt the shoulders. It's not the kind of question that science can begin to answer. And therefore, the working assumption is that at least with any science there won't be an answer. In other words, nature is a destination for everything, but there is no explanation for nature. And that's what we would call a naturalist explanation. Anything finds its explanation within nature, because nature is the explanation. Explanation is going to need an explanation. So nature does not need an explanation, but everything else finds an explanation in nature. Theism says that nature itself needs an explanation, but God does not need an explanation. The question is, is there a difference between the whole and its cause? Or is there a difference between one particular thing and everything else? That is, in fact, what the lambda was searching for in its book. The lambda was extremely important to show that God is different than everything else. That which we call God is by definition and by logic and by proof. The whole need of everything else has an explanation. Everything else is not independent, but dependent on everything else. But I'm as an expression that uses very often to serve that in within nature, all things are connected to all things. The chain that's called "coordinate effect" connects all things. If you hit something high enough, it will be hit. It will be broken in action. In every event, at least in theory, every event has an effect on every other event and every other object. But there is one thing who is in the pain. And that's also so important to the government to define about God that he is not dependent at all on anything in the world. To say it in a simple manner. Nothing that happens will cause a change in God. Whereas God can and thus cause changes in everything else. That is what we mean, not in the common sense, in the word supernatural. In common usage, what supernatural means, weird, huge, strange, undefined. But the much we use in the word supernatural and theism is a supernatural system sensitive. It is something which is above supernatural. It's above nature meaning that nature does not affect it. But it affects nature. The realm of him, the Yataphasaka, not in the morning of the morning. The Yataphasaka, which is not meant to be a philosophical. He merely summarized in the beginning the basic points. The first thing he says about God is that God is independent of the world. If there is no God, there is no world, but if there is no world, there is still a God. The existence of the world is not a cause or a basis for God's existence, but the opposite history. And after science see what naturalism does not wish to set. Naturalism says that there is no individual object which is different than any other object. Obviously science can imagine one thing which is beyond and different than everything else. The whole base of science is that we have the tools in which to examine objects. And we use the same tools for everything. Once you go beyond what science can examine, you are no longer a site in that particular act, in that particular thing which you are examining now. So when we think about God, you can't be a scientist. Because God doesn't have the same nature of existence as everything else. Because science examines causes and affects. Whereas to examine nature as a whole doesn't bother scientists because you never examine nature as a whole. It's in science only examine particular events. The idea that nature as a whole is the cause of itself. And of course everything within it. In other words basically I give to nature the definition that this gives to God is basically a form of pantheism. Pantheism says that everything is God. What does that mean? There's a kind of spiritual sort of wishy wishy kind of pantheism. You say, "Well then say everything is God." You're just feeling that the evidence that people give to God, I used to get that everything. But the magical nature of pantheism says that within the context of Adam's truth, it can round up and imagine that there is one object which is supernatural, which is the cause of the world, but the world of not the cause of it. I say that the world is the cause of everything in the world. And everything in the world is not the cause of the world as a whole. So the logical basis for what the platform calls God, naturalists. If these good naturalists attribute to the entire world. They don't actually have no God. So if the platform defines God that's how they define nature. And therefore what the truth, because the logic of the platform has helped us through is to define a basic question. I'm not saying there's a truth one way or the other, but the basic question is, do you think that the basic existence of the world is an unexplained fact, which is explained only in terms of itself, but has no explanation outside itself as opposed to every individual object, anything that's within the existence. Or do I explain the whole picture, the entire existence of the world and of the cosmos and of all of nature as being determined by something which is totally not natural, being not part of the chain, not connected to the chain, and not sharing its nature, but supernatural, but outside it. And that thing, which means a little bit of a bracelet here, that thing we call, we call God. There's an expression in Khazal, which expresses a non-philosically, but a similar idea. One of the names of God in Khazal is Makon, which means place. Why is God called Makon? He whom the commotion of Allah, the anger, Allah, and the common. God relates to the world, it's like he is the place of the world, the world is not his place, he's not in the world, literally the world is in him. I think what it comes to say is that God is on a different level of existence. Things exist because of the relationship to God, but God does not exist because of his relationship to the world. Again, I'm not suggesting that Richard now choose which explanation is more logical, as more logical appealing. I think he could choose on the basis of which it appears to be more in terms of the way you think, but logically there is no way to choose between two of them. Both are making a assumption that there exists one thing that is written to everything else, that one thing is a set of things, God, or that one thing is everything altogether. This is the basic divide between naturalism, nature as we see it explains itself, and supernaturalism. The nature as we see it requires an explanation, just as everything within nature requires an explanation, and I give it an explanation. In this sense, as the man in the software, figures and is not opposed to scientific thinking. On the contrary, figures and is the continuation of scientific thinking, just as you ask for an explanation for the movements of belief in the wind, or of the sun, or of the earth. So, to you ask an explanation of the movement of everything taken altogether, or the movement of that which causes the movement of that which causes the movement of that which causes the movement. You're extending scientific thinking to its furthest limits. And what naturalism says is that scientific thinking works until you reach the limits, to reach the boundaries. Science works within nature, but not on nature. With this and says that, scientific thinking, the question, what is the cause of this effect, works even on nature taken as a whole. Even when I view everything as being one thing, I still require an explanation for its existence, or for any other phenomenon which takes place, for instance, the phenomenon of motion, which is what the random express proof of God is based on. Now, a cosmological proof is very different than another common proof that is a sense of God, called the teuleological proof. Taylor's and Greek means purpose. The teuleological proof of God attempts to show from individual, multiple individual advances phenomena in the world that there is a purpose built in to the world. And if there is a purpose, there must be a mind which designed that purpose. As opposed to the cosmological proof, teuleological proof has to correct events. You have to show that there are a lot of things, all of which reflect purposefulness, design. And if there is a design, there must be a designer. The actual nature of teuleological proofs changes in generation to generation, depending on what it appeals to the cultural and the view of the cultural assumptions of that generation. In the middle ages, design was usually shown astronomically. Why does the sun shine? Obviously, people swarm. There is a recent development that seems similar, as opposed to the intelligent design movement. It tries to show very deliberately that, for instance, if we were slightly closer to the sun, slightly further from the sun, or the sun was slightly larger. Well, certain constants in physics were slightly different, light would be impossible. It appears that anything is designed and balanced to sustain light on it. At a later time, in the early, in the early morning era, as the rise of biology, biology is festival very, very much. There is an entire book by Isha Paley, who was natural. There is an entire book written to show the existence of God tealologically on the basis of the structure of the eye. The eye impressed those scientists to be extremely complicated. Obviously, all its parts are the way they are, only to allow vision, which means someone has designed the eye, and that designer we call God. One of the reasons why evolution, the fear of evolution, was understood into the 19th century. To be anti-division was because evolution provides an explanation for biological phenomena that makes design irrelevant. Things appear to be designed, but there is a natural explanation. It doesn't have to be a designer, there is a natural explanation to show why those things, those structures, which further, a goal, will survive, and those which don't will not. The answer of teleology, to evolution is to say, it's the way evolution works. Evolution is not a logical rule. Therefore, the fact that evolution works within the world shows that there is a design behind it. And many men in the non-biological world still is some force to the theological album. Interestingly enough, in the Middle Ages, no Jewish philosopher that aware uses the teological proof to prove the existence of God. The theological proof is sound, but not the proof that God exists. If you know that God exists, teology is used to being one to thank God, to being one to love God. For instance, the Lambda uses a basic kind of theological proof as the basis for Avata Shampu, the Lamb of God. And it says, when you view the heavens, again, astronomical, when you view the heavens, you see how well they construct it. Everything has a beautiful and proper place. Everything works together. That will cause you to immediately love and desire to know the intelligence which arranged all of that. And therefore, one meters Avata Shampu. The Buddha lately in the Kuzareen uses a teological argument, similar, not the proof that God exists. I think the lady's proof of God is historical. But if you examine the world and see how unbelievably well it's constructed, to support life, when it immediately gets to know the Hesse, the grace, the love, the kindness, the intelligence of God, and one developed a popular relationship with you. But I don't think this is because I know there is no Jewish text which uses the teological argument to prove the existence of God. The logical problems with the teological argument were basically presented by the British philosopher David Eum, afterwards by Kant. And I'm not going to go into it. It has to do with basically, teology is based on probability. If you found one thing which appeared to be purposeful, if your kids had a design, it could be an action. The reason why teology works is because we seem to find hundreds of things which support to show the design. Which means basically all we're doing is we're increasing the probability that you won't accept an alternative explanation. Questions for the probability that he works here, we're not going to go into the details. But what I do wish to stress is the basic difference between a teological proof and a cosmological proof. The teology shows a God to whom you will have a relationship. As I pointed out, the middle-aged Jewish philosophers use teology in order to bring us to love of God, the thanksfulness to God, to appreciation of God. Because it shows that God has created the system which you live for your good, to allow you to live. If God is responsible for your eye, then you should thank him. You should expect him, you should admire him. Where in the reference truth doesn't lead to any emotion, any religious reaction to God. It leads to what allows us interested in the knowledge of God. True knowledge of the world involves knowledge of its first course. But God, of the teologists, is he who, true knowledge of him, leads one to have a relationship of respect, that narration, a thankfulness, taxable obedience to the God who ascends. On the other hand, precisely because of that point, the God of the teologists is by definition relative to you. You've proven that there exists somebody who could design this world. The world is not a thing. The amount of wisdom in the world is not infinite wisdom. And therefore, although it's, I cannot imagine who could possibly have designed such a wonderful world, it exceeds the amazing amount, the intelligence of any human being in any supercomputer. But it still exceeds only by a finite amount. So the God of the two realities that we've designed from the proof is he who is eight billion times more intelligent and more powerful than anything I can imagine. As opposed to the God of the Revan, who isn't eight billion times more powerful, more intelligent than any of you can imagine, but he's absolutely different than anything else you can imagine. He has the nature of absolute existence, of uncours causation, which is shared by nothing else. And therefore, one of the weaker points of teology is that perhaps, although I admire God immensely, perhaps the reverence that we associate with religion, the absolute relationship, which one gives to God, is not supported, not supported completely by the truth. He wants some much more striking example, just so we can know the rich philosopher offered a few logical proof of God. And he used it in order to answer his most important question of religious philosophy, the Tamil view. He gave a good answer. The question is whether it's an answer with which we are willing to live. The Tamil people says that there's evil in the world. And God is good and powerful, all powerful, and all there shouldn't be any evil in the world. He would discuss this at length at a later time. The John Stuart Mills answer was very simple. He said, look, the world is extremely complicated. 99.99 at the time, he said that at the time, things work. And they work well, occasionally something falls down, a little less like here, a little hurricane then. But I feel there are billions and billions of events that are being run well. I true from that existence that only a God, something has to exist who is designed this world. So he's not perfect. He's so much, much, much more, a million times more than you can imagine yourself, or, as I said, computers. People together, he couldn't possibly construct and design and run a world, as well as God's answer. So even if I imagine that the reason why there's an earthquake is because God messed up, he's still a God. It's not a job now to examine the Tamil evil. But what John Stuart Mills is admitting is that a theoretical proof is a relative proof. He's proven that God is a billion times greater than you. If that's enough, if to him you can't pray, then you have no problem, no other problem. The fact that he's that seven billion times greater than you, or infinitely greater than you. Because you accept that something which is much, much, much greater than you could be your God. I suspect very strongly that the Rambam would not worship a thing which was a billion times greater, more intelligent, more powerful than he. Only that which is infinitely greater than he, and no theological proof, no proof based on what happened yesterday, what I found under the microscope. What miracles took place could possibly prove the existence of he who is wholly different and infinitely greater than anything else that I know. We're going to end now. We will continue our discussion of the proofs of God next week. And now we will continue with today's Aloha unit. We are still in, he'll call it a sit. The house you might, that one should put on sit sit and make the brahara while standing. I certainly wasn't that great a temptation to attempt to put on sit sit while sitting, so it could be done. But the principle here is important. The making brahara while standing. It's common, custom. You have to make almost all the brahara stand. This is brahara. Most people stand while making brahara. And there is a principle found in the later person near Honeem. You want to stand for making brahara and respect the God's name. It's hard to find a source, a source for this. Some brahara will make one sit in. Especially if the thing that they're about requires one to sit. This is called Kriyashma. Since Kriyashma is sat sitting, as the Torah says exclusively, the shift of the brahara, you can make it any way you want. So the brahara is not a big sitting as well. In sitting sit, the source is found in the Seifan ashkal. A book by a former Sargisha, a bandhavir, not the rivis, the rivis, the rivis, the rivis, the rivis, the rivis, the rivis, the rivis, the rivis, the ashkal quotes a chuvat of the Goneem. It says, "Call up the brahara from Umar." Yes, Krotan, that's the past, that's how we meant. What we meant was that bhokotamitra should be said standing up, for instance as bhokotamitra. And why is that? It's then he quotes, he quotes brahba, he quotes brahbanim. He has given the names. This is the basic source, who say that there was six mitzvot which the bhokai said standing up. And they are, the first one is, omel. Sirata omel, for the being of the omel itself. Why? Because there it says in the past, "Merehev rahev rahev rahev rahev mesh bakkama, tahev mispo." "Merehev rahev mesh bakkama," the word "kama" in the Torah means "the standing wheat" before it's cut. But here there's a eit rasha, again it's tahev in the gama, that bhokkama means standing. So merehev rahev rahev rahev rahev rahev rahev when you are standing, you do sirata omel. Okay. In sirata omel, it says it's tahev lahem. You should count for yourself. Then we look for other good souls where the word "lahem" appears, and any new star where the word "lahem" appears, and any new star where the word "lahem" appears is learned from sirata omel. She also redone standing. If it starts where the word "lahem" appears, or as far as other than omel, "kiddushu-vanna," because there's a hoda sirata omel, "sizit" which says "ra'al-ahem," the "sizit shofar," says "yobu-ta-ra-yal-ahem," "lulav," the "kiddim," "lilah," it says "him-ol-lahem." Okay, there's a six-week thought which have to be done standing, and they are "omel, kiddushu-vanna," "sizit shofar," "lulah" and "lilah." Later on in a song, right, well, if this was genuinely a sirata kathura, this would generally weren't on the percirte, it couldn't be talking about the bohara, because "oh bohara" caught only the "ra'banan," the "sirata" met the mitzvah itself. However, there might be a reason, this is what a ryako ending in the mohara katias says, is that if it's "vah," would you have to stand, the bohara should also be said standing. And therefore, for "vah" can be inclined, this is any mitzvah which the mitzvah is done sitting, there's no reason to stand for the mitzvah as well. You sit for the bohara as well. If you sit for the mitzvah, you can sit for the bohara. And we're not going to run over the ass from the mitzvah of ha'poshav kala, where the town that says explicitly that one can make the bohara while sitting. "vah" can be done sitting. So, that qala can be done sitting, it's not why you're cooking, it's not why there's no reason to stand for the ha'poshav of ha'poshav of ha'poshav. And therefore, the bohara is made sitting as well. It's always, that's what the afro means, in terms of these sips in the throat, where the person could not be talking about the bohara, these mitzvah should be done standing, and therefore, the bohara should be done standing as well. I'd like to suggest an aspiration as to why it's learned from the word "l'ah'hen." Of course, it's a pecked account, if you have two words which appear in two different pashions. So, we have a cloud called "xera sha'vah" that the words are designed to learn a'pum, b'im, b'im, b'im. And if you could run almost any a'laha. In other words here, I think what the explanation is, why if it says "l'ah'hen," based on the fact that "omah" should be done standing, and I learned that at least things should be done standing, does "l'ah'hen" mean that these mitzvah God is giving you. And therefore, the doing of the mitzvah, you're expecting something from God. When we blow sha'vah, it's God is giving us a chance to blow sha'vah. It's giving us a chance to stand in front of him and to blow sha'vah. Similarly, for "l'ah'hen," God is giving you a chance to, what is "l'ah'hen," is expressing one's simcha. It's expressing one's rejoicing rifne asher in front of God, which is what the pursuit of "l'ah'hen" says is this of me. Similarly with the others, in "mohl'ah'hen," you enter into a brit with God. And "kiddushavanna," which Khazal, which Khazal says, you imagine this, when we say "kiddushavanna," that it's kabbalah, tne'a shrinah. It's meeting God. When the moon comes back to the Jews, it's a form of being subject to a meeting with God. And apparently it keeps it as well. Putting on to it, although we don't have a source that puts it specifically, it's just atmosphere, or putting on to it's it. Nothing is no tradition, God. But as I pointed out in the Drash in the past, being surrounded by its love, perhaps changes the Jew. So it's "l'ah'hen." God is giving you the "l'ah'hen" himself to you, and therefore you have to accept the sindra. And accepting something from the hand of God is done, is done while standing. The basic principle that I mentioned in the book of ending is endorsed by another opponent as well, by the grub, and others. It says that it's thought that without standing, the bahat should be set standing, and it's thought that can be done sitting, or if without a done sitting, there is no need, there is no need to stand. Live for the manhara, the manhara says to stand. But it says both not just to the bahat, but it should be put on standing, and therefore also the bahat should be made. It's possible standing, and how that is thought for which this is not true, and you do not have the same on the hai. If you then, for example, so there's a mahalke controversy how to pronounce to you then, based on the mahab and the shakan al-rof, which is actually based on the zala. So, at least within shayyad, Sahadeem and Makubalim put on while sitting, and make the bahat while sitting as well. If within shayyad, they put on all their standing. It's totally different consideration. And it's not included in a six-less note, which they ask all others to. That's it for today. This is Ezra Vick, speaking from Buschitzel, 4K NTT, he miti al-tedzei-to-la. This time for Mahashat Shmoop, until then, kal-to mihar-tis-a-er, kwa-yitim-a-to-ra, we hope that we are helping you have a regular period for learning Torah. Here in Er-tis-a-al, we say goodbye until tomorrow. [ Silence ]