KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - Jewish Philosophy 2
Wed 11-01-06, Rav Bick on Medieval Jewish Philosophy - 02
This is KMTT, and this is a spectrum is, I saw the visit, Yom Song, the day in which new Khadnatsa surrounded the city of Ushahran, which led eventually to destruction of the botanic class and the city. Today's Qiyu is the second in the series on issues in Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages, which I will begin with. This Qiyu is 32 minutes starting immediately. Last week in the introduction to the course in Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages, I presented a number of possible attitudes basically against studying Jewish philosophy, basically against investigating the logical basis for faith. We don't have to put that behind us, we're going to examine the different texts, different opinions expressed in the great things of the Middle Ages, assuming to learn a couple of weeks that we think it's a valuable enterprise. The beginning of nearly all discussions of Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages begins with troops of the existence of God. While in the rest of the course, I don't plan to restrict myself to what is properly called philosophy in the sense that that word "hand" in the Middle Ages, meaning that which can be proven for lots of Jewish thought and lots of Jewish, "lakshava" in the Middle Ages would not fall into that category, but the beginning of our discussion will be in fact a purely philosophy topic with belief that one can present a proof, a logical and a logically compelling proof for the existence of God. I want to say the answer that this has born out of style in the modern world for the last 300 years. Basically of all the troops prevented during the Middle Ages, of some Jewish and non-Jewish sources, it's definitely believed that in manual account, this proved over them, overthrew the variability to present a logical proof for the existence of God. There is some controversy about this point, but nonetheless that is the generally held opinion. When we examine the proofs, we will first of all examine them as the Middle Ages and if a lot of us in the Middle Ages believe they could be understood. We also wish to try to understand the meaning and relevance and value of the truth, of the endeavor to prove, even in a world such as us where most people will not consider the truth to have actual evidential value. They will not actually prove that God exists. Nonetheless I think we can still learn a great deal both from the attempt as well as from the actual conclusions of the Middle Ages' proofs. There were basically three attitudes I think that one could have towards having a truth of the existence of God. The first would be that of the Lambda. The Lambda is an unusual case here, although the Lambda is not as enormous in the Middle Ages, but the Lambda needs for a proof of God is essential because to the Lambda the basic relationship that one can have with God is one of knowledge. And knowledge for the Lambda is the knowledge that one attains from the truth. In other words, if you could not prove that God exists for the Lambda that would mean you do not have a genuine relationship with God at all. Therefore the proof of the existence of God for the Lambda is not a preliminary to the religious life, but is the actual content. It is the essential content of any religious life. It is the goal of religious life. To know God is what you exist for. It is the meaning of being human and to know God means to have a logical and rational truth of His existence. Of course in Lambda's class they listen to proof of anything, of existence. One cannot prove that anything exists and is very little the one can prove in general in Lambda's class. But for the Lambda the model was the Greek model, something more or less on the level of Greek geometry. I must not believe that all natural laws could be proven. They had logical validity. And the culmination and the highest developments of that rational endeavor are the ability of man to truly understand, to nationally grasp his environment and existence and the alley was his ability to know to know God, meaning first of all that God exists, as well as other possible things that one can know about God. So the Lambda was three things that one can know about God, one can know that he exists, one knows that he is one and one knows that he does not have a body, that he is not a body, that he is not embodied. So that's one possibility, namely that the truth of God is the central goal of religious life. Another possibility exemplifies by the way that God exists. And in some particular manner of a classic class class, it says RSM, sees the truth of God not as the contents of the relationship with God, but as a basis for a connection and a relationship with God. You have to know God in order to have a relationship with him. The relationship does not consist only or even primarily of knowledge. But you can't have a relationship with something you do not know. This is a parent even by looking at the structure. For instance, I'll say, I'll talk about how to revolt by the way of God. The first one is called Sahihihood, and consists primarily of the truth reasons of God. It's the first of 10 gates. The last gate is given very quickly, if you'll excuse me. To the end of the book, the last gate is Saar Abattasen, the gate of the local God. Clearly, to Beno Bhakya, the genuinely relationship with God consists of love. The first step to loving God is to know that he exists, and to know that he exists, Beno Bhakya means to know in a rational, philosophic manner. It's an interesting historical site. Sifakavata about has a certain popularity in, if you see the circles. However, they skip the first sound. On the basis of a site of certain building, very much admired. Beno Bhakya is about style and content. The member has suggested that he start the books from the second sound. He skip the pure philosophical parts. Beno Bhakya has many, many moralistic parts. He talks about human characteristics, about the feeling of dependency upon God, the feeling of trusting God, the feeling of love of God, love of great parts, skip the first part. The Beno Bhakya himself says that's impossible. He says you can't do that. He says it explicitly in the beginning of Saar Abattasen. If you don't go through Saar Abattasen, you cannot get to the other side. In a quote explicit in the meaning of seven, these are gates. You have to enter the outer gate before you can enter the inner gate. However, in comparison to the random, if there were a Saar Haihi who would be the last of your gates, Beno Bhakya is only the first. The philosophy knowing God is an essential prerequisite to having a true relationship with him. But philosophy is not the content. It's not the goal. It's not the body, and it's not identical with true religion. The same thing is true, although in a different manner, or just to be somewhat later, in the greatest of all Jewish pastors after the random, in that classic class test, who also presents a truth to the existence of God in the very, very beginning of his work, of the positive side of his work after he criticizes that length, tremendous length. The random truth in another suggest the truth of his own. And then to see to show why the truth itself is insufficient, not wrong, but insufficient, as one has to add things which one cannot truth. Specifically, the knowledge of God is truly one. The vegering expert in the Ramlan Suf, the Prophet says here that he is the proof has fallen. The name of the Prophet's book is called "All Ashem," and "All Ashem" means, "All Ashem," the light of revelation, the light of prophecy. Because without that light, you don't really have much of a connection with God, but philosophy provides the vessel, the container, into which one can pour the "All Ashem." So this is the third use of the proof of God, which today is probably more popular than the Ramlan philosophers, and that is the use of the proof of God in order to steal down, in order to refute Hellatics, in order to convince somebody who does not believe in God, he should believe in God. This is a very small place, at least explicitly, in the literature and the memorization. For one, even though there were very few Hellatics around, and those Hellatics who actually doubted the presence of God, there are also the people who have arguments with you about the tenets of your belief, but people who didn't believe in God were in fact of the anything. And, secondly, it wasn't the purpose of the books that were writing to address that question. There's an interesting section in the beginning of the book written by Anandjal, which is by Anandjal, of Kankarbaring, with a question. And he has a proof to the use of God, which in fact is not found in any Jewish, in any Jewish self. Before he begins his proof, he prays to God. He says, "God, please help me, grant me the wisdom and the assistance I need to prove your existence." And after he says his proof, he thanks Jesus. Thank you so much for helping me prove your existence. I think he was aware of the paradox in and out in praying to God to help us prove that he exists. But, nonetheless, the answer to what he was saying is that he knows God is this. He believes in God. He's not proving God in order to convince himself that God exists, but he needs the truth for other reasons. What I'd like to do in the remaining time today is to examine quickly two medieval proofs to the existence of God. In order to understand the difference, not a logical distance, but the difference in the result, the different implications it has. In order to illustrate a secondary point altogether, not what purpose the proof has in your philosophy, but what are the implications that arise because there has a particular proof or not. The random proof of the existence of God in grief goes more or less a sorrow. Everything that moves has to have a cause. This is an authoritarian precept. The random lays out as an axiom of God, but as the effect has a cause. So, if it moves, there must be a cause of this motion. The cause of this motion is itself something a motion. This is true both logically because it cannot be in an effect more than it is in a cause. And therefore, the cause of motion is itself motion. It also is more or less true in our experience. You might think of cases where it is natural, for instance, magnets cause motion. It leads to a focus lens, or outside of a focus lens, but only motion could cause motion, that he had a motion explanation to magnetism. It is not our job now to criticize the truth. We needed to try to understand it. That which causes motion is filling up the motion. For instance, a billiard ball that is moving across the table has gotten its motion by being hit by another billiard ball which itself was in motion. But, since the random, it is impossible to have an infinitely regressive chain of causes. In other words, it is as the effect of motion is caused by a cause of motion, and that cause itself is in effect. And what cause its motion must be a previous cause, which also has to be in motion. And therefore, it requires a cause, but this sets aside an infinitely regressive chain. But if you have an infinitely regressive chain, how did you get to the point you are today? If point A, we are now, it is caused by point B, which is a previous cause, because the cause must always precede the effect. But B is caused by C, and C is caused by D, and D is caused by E, and E is caused by S. How do you keep on going forever? How do you ever get to A? And therefore, there must be a first cause of motion, which is not itself in motion. And therefore, it is not itself caused. It is not an exactly cause and explanation. And that is what we call the unmoved mover, or the uncorried cause. In other words, that is what we call God. Now the random truth is not the only truth to the random truth, but it is like a group is not all that different. The random truth, which like any random thinker, is being somewhat tenuated. The random imagine that some of us follow this truth, agree with this logic, and go out, and all of a sudden become a believer, after not believing God is one. Believe in what? In fact, our religion, our relationship with God, based on the belief in the unmoved mover. Not mine, not yours. And it would be hard to say that that is the God who exists and acts throughout the Tanakh, for us than Haraka. And then I'm going to do that. The random explicitly distinguishes over time between the truths of the Torah and the truths of Amuna, the truths of the Torah, and the truths of belief. Now it's faith, in other words, philosophy. Again, the random didn't present his truth to convince the non-believers. He presented his truth to give us a handle on knowing something, knowing that there is something which has a different relationship to everything else in the world than all individual things. Everything else is in a chain of causation. The random says many times that once you consider the world as beings, you teach ahead. The qubah. Everything is sent to everything. This would be called today nature. The system of nature is such where everything is in relationship to everything else as a cause and as an effect. But there is one thing the random says, which we call God, that is outside that thing. Everything else is an effect related to his cause, its cause, but it is not caused by anything else. And that says the random is what we mean by God and he has proven its existence. Let's read the truth aside for one moment. The random is a text, gradually, to an alternative to it. It should be to the Islamic school, called the matakalam, the qalam. Then in fact, the random is aware. He just doesn't wish to use his name, but this is the truth of a saggulam. And it's a truth based on creation. The random says, "I don't wish, nor do I think it's correct to prove the existence of God on the basis of creation." The unmoved moover didn't necessarily create the other things, but he quoted them to move. The saggulam had a truth based on creation. You see the world exists, the world must have come from somewhere, therefore it must be created, but there must be a creator. The creator is himself not created in it, but you have God. This is not because of what many people, kind of people who sell God and speak on it would probably be present. I think most children, more or less, would say, "Is there the least in God that created the world come from? Who made it?" And I should discuss why the random is a text, to the logic of the truth of the qalam and of a saggulam. And I want to think out the difference in the significance of the truth. Anyone learning the random truth is immediately struck by how seemingly irrelevant it is to what most of us think is the context of religious life. Does one say to the unmoved moover? Not likely. The Aristotle, who hadn't unmoved moover, didn't say. Does one have faith that he will help you? No particular reason. Does one tribute to him, the fact that the rain fell yesterday? Does one hope that tomorrow he will regain the Jewish people? None of this things follow from the randomness truth. What does follow up with randomness truth is that one can know that there is something metaphysically different on a totally different level than anything else I know. On the other hand, the saggulam's truth by definition does not speak of God as being radically and totally different than anything else in the world. The relationship of God to the world as the creator is not totally different than the relationship of a spiritual truth. It's true that the saggulam also speaks of the ideation of the eye and that God created the world out of nothing, which is, in these ways, something which we have no other example of. But the logical step of including God's existence and the fact that it suddenly exists, it has to come to somewhere, so unless it's made it, that logical step is taking some other experience in the world. And therefore, the saggulam news is what the random apparently is a crucial point. The truth, let me say the belief, but the truth that God is totally different, wholly other than the things that we are familiar with. On the other hand, and this is almost the same point on the other side of the hand, that saggulam's truth divides to a whole range of actual ideation given by the name. It's God made the whole world, and you're indebted to everything you have, right? The possessions, the air you breathe, all that comes from God. He gave that to you. But I'm an explainer not interested in having a relationship, a relative ability to measure God to man. But of course, if you're interested in devising how one should react, then the saggulam's truth is much closer to the contents of our actual ideation slice. Specifically, in a saggulam case, when saggulam draws the conclusion that the basic attitude that man has to God, the basic religious value that he writes on his truth, is that of gratitude. And the saggulam's views gratitude as the basic religious attitude. Obviously, if God has made anything, then you are indebted to him, and you must be grateful to him. On this, the saggulam explains that's why we have to observe the truth, because we all got part of our being grateful to him. It's to do whatever he asks, and he develops this in a number of other areas as well. The basic religious attitudes that would arise on the man-man's truth is not an emotion, it's not gratitude, it's not a moral value. But the advice and the man-man's truth is knowledge, not a moral value but an intellectual one. And although both the man-man and saggulam is supplemented with other kinds of two things that are provided to us, then here we find an additional value and importance of the truth in view of saggulam. We don't really see the truth that God exists, but they set the stage to really go from there on. The man-man proves God in a certain way, and then proceeds to say that the value in my life set the power once of me. What exists in the man-man's truth is to know God, and to know God is to understand the truth of the man-man's faith. Now, saggulam proves God in a certain way, and then proceeds to say that what the power demands in me, what lies in the man-man's love me, what lies in me, is to be grateful and indebted to God, who has done infinitely amount of things for me and to address the mankind. This is a crucial point in understanding the truth. While the entire intellectual point of view of history at last week's point of view, we would now take the truth apart, please, for getting measured. I'm assuming in advance that these truths are natural. But if you do not wish to accept the conclusion, you will be intelligent enough to have to do eight of ages to last, but like a nine-year-class of hundreds and hundreds of people in this document, for hundreds of years, you'll be able to disprove the truth, to refute the truth. But a far more important point for us is, how does the kind of thinking that went into the truth give the taste of some typical error, some loop of non-totally proven assumption? But where does the kind of thinking that goes into these truths lead one in terms of one relationship? There is an implicit connection between the highly attenuated intellectual truth of the great two philosophers and the very basic human attitude of what is really decided to do so. In a study done, it's a positive example of someone who is a Jewish philosopher, highly intelligent, very intellectual, but doesn't see the basic attitude, the basic basic man to God as being an intellectual one. So the intellectual reality of the truth serves as a basis for something else, as a basis for a moral virtue, for an attitude of gratitude, dependence, obedience, a whole slew of values, of religious values, which for a study done derives from his choice of a particular kind of truth to prove God. The number rejects that truth not nearly for logical reasons, but also because he doesn't want to base his knowledge of God on how God acts in the world, which would place God as a relative power to myself. He doesn't want me to have as a basic truth that we should be grateful to God in more or less the way we are grateful to the King or our parents or some other provider, perhaps multiplied a million times. The number one, our basic relationship to God to be that, which doesn't compare to any other relationship because the relationship to that, which is totally outside the chain of relations which exists within nature, because he's the guarantee of all nature, whereas nature has no effect whatsoever and can have no effect whatsoever whatsoever on him. We will, next week, examine the actual logical basis of the Raman suit. The Raman suit is not particularly unique to the Raman, it just is more or less holy with a few changes, unless it's an Aristotle, it has a number of variations that are just placed in the middle ages among Jews, such as the Raman, among Muslims, and among Christians. The truth is called in its largest collection of variations the cosmological proof of God, so the word cosmological means that the truth is based on the existence of the whole world and not in any particular feature of it. I don't prove God because there's a tree outside of my house which defies my other kinds of explanation. I don't prove God because, yes, there's some miracle to place and I can't possibly explain it and if God must have acted, that's what God because of basic features of existence. In this case, one I mentioned briefly beforehand, the fact that there is motion, there is change, and if there's change, there must be something which causes the change, but a cause of change is itself a change and that's why it's such an intelligent, aggressive change we've spoken about. I will, as an exception, next week, in fact, reach out beyond the text of the medieval Jewish philosophers because the discussion of this kind of cosmological proof will clarify what the landland is looking for and therefore we will deal this one time, take a half an ocean, we'll deal this one time with a statically discussions of the cosmological proof made which took place beyond the period we discussed in the Middle Ages and also beyond the social group that was speaking about. It won't only be Jewish. As a side, I would like to point out, the landland will not be suspended at all. Jewish philosophers in the Middle Ages, or the Sicilian Jewish philosophers in the Middle Ages, is not inherently a only Jewish occupation. I think there's always a Jewish input, the landland has a obligation and a commitment to understanding these philosophical ideas within the context of the Torah, but nonetheless, as the landland understands philosophy, its logic, and logic derives from human reason and not from human validation, that's because God spoke to Moses because reason can grasp these things and reason belongs to all men. Therefore, it wouldn't talk about him at all, it doesn't talk about him at all, that he, in the fact of having a discussion, was not used, the landland quotes legally, from Islamic philosophers who were his sources. There's knowledge of Aristotle and Christian philosophers. This will be discussed in other cosmological tools, is in fact, not purely. I'm saying that purely, a Jewish discussion. The proof of the Partagon is also another Jewish discussion, but it achieves a much greater degree of absorption within the context of Jewish thought because it immediately leads us to ask him a question of what has God done for us, and then Jewish history begins to enter into the question. God has created the whole world, too, but he's created other things since then. He's manipulating and controlling Jewish destiny in a manner which in fact is different than others, and so the passage from a general proof based on creation, to a particular truth based on, to instance, the truth in Egypt, or God continues to happen instead of Jewish people, as a natural president of that kind of path of a political place in the U.S. The very term I use cosmological tools is not found. In just last days, it's a term in general philosophy, used by Christian, later Christian philosophers in the late Middle Ages, and when they classified the different kinds of tools used. In the last days, the classic Jewish truth in the Spanish era, in the year after the Raman, in one version or another, not necessarily in exactly the Raman version, as I point out, the classic trespass. We text Raman's version, but then to see if it's to give another one, which you'd have to pay very careful attention to see and notice the difference. We don't end on this point. Next week, we will begin by examining the Raman's truth internally. I will compare it to another famous truth, not found in Jewish or similar ages as a proof of God, but the argument is found. So other purposes was known in classical, philosophical terminology as a teleological proof of God, which is found in the Cephalcusli, it's found even in Raman, but not for this purpose. I would like to know why we will compare the two and understand, and we did today, one of the consequences, one of the significance of using the certain tools, and how does it affect the continued beliefs, development, how does it affect my attitude, how does it affect my relationship basically, the important religious question, how does my use of particular proofs affect my relationship with God? You have been listening to the second CO in the series on issues and Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages. So today's hara hai yomit. We will discuss one more issue having to do with the day, the fast day yom hatsom, hara de tat. We have two different kinds of fasts in the Jewish year. One is Tishaba als. We all understand Tishaba als is a day of mourning, and there are many hara hai tantishaba als that are specifically laws of mourning, such as sitting on the floor, not saying hello, not saying shalom to other people, many hara hai tantishaba, the restly parallel hara hai hai hai hai as a result of mourning, all of which comes under the general title, the general heading, phased in the Mishnah, in Mishnah atani, Mishnah atani, Mishnah atani. (speaks in foreign language) (speaks in foreign language) Another song is Yom Kippur. There's no sadness on Yom Kippur. On the contrary, it's a food to be said on Yom Kippur, a morna and other who comes to Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur ends. Here's a very little site, other holidays, and other holidays. There is, in fact, the hope that a dispute among the 10 are in, whether that's true, but we will be passing like the opinion in Mishnah that says that both Al-Sushana and Yom Kippur end of it, because very day of Yom Kippur is a contradiction to a morning, 12 or later, it's a Yom Simkhar. It's a serious day, a very serious day. It is a psychological pattern how one could be in a state of judgment, in a state of din, at the same time, in a state of happiness. You have to work the house when we get closer to Yom Kippur, but it's not a day of mourning. Fasting accompanies both of those days, because fasting is connected to the repentance. Yom Kippur is a day of repentance, as well as, to say, "Well, there's also a day of repentance." The act of mourning is itself a course, so reflection, and repentance, and suva, and kind of closer to that. What about the other sum up? What about the, one of which is asana bhaktadet? Samgadavya, shiva asana bhaktamalas. Do they have the aspect of mourning? Instinctively, we tend to think they do, because we know the reason to the fact that these days are fast days, are occurrences, historical occurrences, which are connected with the destruction of Yushalayim and the temple. Just as, to say, either I was the day of major mourning, for the feeling that arabity is there today, which (speaks in foreign language) laid seeds to do with them, and athletes would lead after months, to the floor of the city and the section of the temple. So we're dealing with the beginning of the destruction of the temple, and we say after mistake, that seems right, there should be some measure of mourning on this day. In point of fact, one cannot find a source for this feeling, and in fact, test it in two places, and it's just recorded by the Mordecai, and other sources having all of its asana bhaktadetam, asana bhaktadetam mentions a case where there was a kupa on a salabity that they don't question the fact there was a kupa. So, in another case then, how under this kupa, when you eat, when you don't eat, that the fact that there was a kupa, that they celebrated the wedding at seven to eight is assumed fact in the beginning of this particular story. Some tell fear when they did the story couldn't be the capacity of being, and if they suggested an invasion of the text, that perhaps it's a mistake. It's not the kupa, it wasn't the wedding on a salabity that. It was a bhaktadetamida, the baby's born in the eighth date, and his birth. It is a bhaktadetamida, of course, he's really good, and then, of course, that asks about the suda, the meal, which had to take place. But since it's found in more than one source, and then, once we have caught another source, it seems quite clear that, in fact, it really was a kupa, until it couldn't take those anything strange, when having a kupa and a salabity that. Other questions, (speaks in foreign language) for me, a suda, in Radiosa, where he also assumes, as a matter of a simple matter, that, of course, after every day is a day of mourning, not deep mourning, but some sense of mourning, and therefore, he tries to argue that, perhaps, since, obviously, at this kupa, they didn't have a festive meal, there was no suda, so that was, when the film was over at the end of the day. So, just having the wedding without the meal, perhaps, is not that great a level of some kind, since the sassa is not that great a level of mourning, a contradiction, denied, and still are untensible, obviously, you can be both happy and sad at some time, but, however, since the necessity to mourn, it's not that great a necessity, as opposed to to sabbat, and the amount of rejoicing you're doing, is not that great a suda, so, as one was able to accomplish both on the same day. Now, it was in principle, it was a contradiction, but, a locha, la maisa, certain forms of, minor forms of celebration, and he tried to demonstrate that a hatuna, without the meal, would not be that great a form of celebration, perhaps, would not contradict the mourning, the dustic place on a sabbatte day. Before the rise from a discussion, which already arises in the canal, and later on, the post-kin, nothing one has a wedding, but, suppose, you get married three or four days before a fasting. Hatana has seven of your hopes, the seven days. There's also days of rejoicing, that could easily contradict commit to some sort of conflict with a day of mourning, including the beginning of cholis, for instance, or quanta alma nal, where we start the mourning in hours, very essentially, the sabbatte month, but one could get married, a day before she was able to come, and then we would have so your hopes, and the post-kin is got for having the mites, and it's more likely to be public and national mourning, and you could work out some sort of a cholera of a customized agreement. A simple askameen would be, if someone, for instance, was married on Zion, to date, two days ago, three days ago, he has served on us. Our men are good, that Hatana comes to show, you don't say tachmin, so when we would not say tachmin on a sarah, it says yes. Today's mourning, if you shouldn't say tachmin, I mean, he maybe has a sense of what about us. We all be joyous, music joyous, and when we also say speak mourning, to us love it today. So the post can discuss this, and one should obviously try to avoid, one doesn't, nobody will schedule a wedding on a fast day today, and if the wedding was before end, there is a kind of conflict with a different post-kin, as for instance, this particular side of the USA, tachmin, or not. I just wanna point out that I'm not 100% sure that in fact the assumption is correct. There is no source that says there is mourning on a sarah to date. It's an assumption with databases, without a proof. I think it's conceivable that there will be reason to the establishment of these days, whilst at these days of disaster. But today, we are not recreating for ourselves to the action to the disaster. Days of a style, but disaster, of course, for retrospection. And introspection. And self-searching. In other words, the days of chuvah. But that holically, there should be mourning on this day. I'm not 100% sure that it's true. It still might appear to be inappropriate of a wedding or a day when you're doing chuvah, but every katanda's chuvah on a day is wedding. But perhaps the seriousness is also simpler contradiction to the simhavahatam. Nonetheless, it would require a great deal, more searching and searching, before one could actually prove that a day like a sabote day is a day of even minor mourning. Nonetheless, hara misa, it is more or less accepted by the first skin that at least in principle. Even if there are no haraic manifestations, positive manifestations. They don't do anything than a vast mourning. But if the general state of the day should include a measure of sadness as well as chuvah. No question that the most important part is the chuvah. And therefore, I recognize that we're gonna avoid happy, happy expressions on the tundish, like a saboteis. A question I say, is whether you could listen to happy music. I don't know anywhere in the post-kin way, so that is a feel. But there's a feeling among the post-kin that it might be inappropriate. That's it for today. Tomorrow's seal. Wednesday will be given by an after-borry, and literally in the sra, in the sra, so pass out very soon. So then, call tools, read this section. This is KMTT. Timothy, on, et cetera, with rasa in the ocean line.