KMTT - the Torah Podcast
KMTT - Jewish Philosophy #01
KMTT - Medieval Jewish Philosophy #01, by Rav Ezra Bick
Good morning. Today we are beginning a new series of lectures on major issues in medieval Jewish philosophy. This morning I would like to, as an introduction, concentrate on the importance of studying Jewish philosophy. It's not a simple question, not one that has an obvious answer, and in fact, as I'm sure we all know, there's been a great deal of controversy over the ages about the importance, and perhaps more importantly, even its immiscibility of the study of Jewish philosophy. In the middle ages, there were two great outbursts of controversy, of dispute, even violent dispute, which centered on the writings of the Rambam, which is called historically the Maimonidesan controversy. And while many of the issues were directed specifically to the Rambam's writings in the line of the whim, but naturally, the discussion continued to the benefits and injury that could arise in the study of any sort of Jewish philosophy, meaning the use of one's mind, the use of reason to try to understand the basis for our faith and our beliefs. Obviously, if we're studying the great Jewish writers of the medieval period, all of them are adherents of the study of Jewish philosophy. This is not as simple as it might sound. There are undoubtedly great Jewish figures in the middle ages who were opposed to not nearly the study of official Jewish philosophy, meaning those books which are called Jewish philosophy, because they adhere to a certain kind of intellectual basis, which in middle ages, they should be meant as skewing philosophy. But they themselves want to have the using reason and their mind to try to understand, and a prominent example would be the Papsil and Ban. But the other name, who thought you shouldn't use the reason at all, you should believe which another taught you or your father taught you, and engage in other sorts of intellectual activity. They would learn Torah, but not engage in rational understanding of the tenets of the Jewish religion. However, generally speaking, people who have that attitude towards Jewish philosophy don't write lengthy books describing their beliefs, because there's not that much to say. Those great works of Jewish philosophy which we have to know you with, are funded on, because they read, they've done them, because they clasped us, they're running through the Ban, they were down in hell. Obviously, people who believe in some sense in the importance of rational understanding, that's what they could write about it. If you don't believe in rational and the rational enterprise of understanding Jewish religion, you're not going to write a long book describing and descending your attitudes towards Jewish philosophy. So, the odds are stacked somewhat in favor of Jewish philosophy, and it's important Jewish Makhshava in a wider sense, Makhshava Tifael in a wider sense. The odds are stacked somewhat in favor of its adherence, because we relate to the written record. To the books, to Pilshem, which elaborated on intellectual Jewish understanding. And therefore, it is important to at least, before we begin, to consider the two sides of this question, historically and theoretically and intellectually, before we actually begin what will naturally be in the course of the coming months, will be a positive evaluation of the importance of Jewish philosophy. The question that I think we have to ask, and I would like to assume that we would give a better answer to this question at the end of the lectures that we are hearing. In other words, I personally really believe that the shared enterprise that we are going to be doing now, understanding different issues, debating different issues, will in fact, my personal belief, will add to our sake, to the depths of our relationship with the court of Shbokhel, and that is why I think it's not an intellectual exercise, but it's part of a relationship with God. But the question we are asking is, is that true? Just understanding that the use of reason adds to faith, adds to a relationship with the creator or not, or even more extremely, does it detract from the relationship with God. I'd like to list some of the negative answers we should give into this question, put them on the table so we should be aware of them. The most common argument, and one that I think a lot of people feel, is that philosophical understanding almost all cases introduces doubt into one's face, and therefore we can face. A very prominent and well-known historical example of this argument was given after the expulsion from Spain, after it was spread. We think of the expulsion from Spain, but in fact, we don't know the exact numbers, but the enormous numbers of Jews were not expelled from Spain because they agreed to convert. Hundreds of thousands, no one knows to show. But historians assume that something in the area of 50% of the Jews in Spain stayed in Spain, and into one extent or another accepted conversion. But if you are writing a few years after the expulsion, raising the question which undoubtedly was found in the hearts and the minds of all those who had left Spain, why did this happen to us? How is it that this tremendous catastrophe, the greatest catastrophe that took place to any Jewish community since the destruction of the temple? How did it happen? And have you asked if Yabbat did answer once it happened because of Jewish blasphemy? He explicitly compared the state of Spanish Jewry to the state of Askenazi Jewry, which for years before, a hundred years at least, before Spanish Jewry had been subjected to different sorts of persecution, different sorts of pressure to convert. And generally speaking, had not done so but had, in many cases, gone to the deaths, was led eastward to Poland, but the widespread phenomenon of slag of conversion was basically unknown. And if you have to be able to say the difference between us and Askenazi Jewry's, Askenazi started him, he was starting to think between us and Askenazi Jewry was that they did not look for Asken we did. And he said in the Jewish philosophy had implicitly weakened the entire Jewish community. Not merely those people who had studied Jewish philosophy and had become heretics and had become culture, which there was that of us. Not merely those who said when I read their books or linings, I said that's wrong. But even those who were, when they studied philosophy, had been ostensibly good in believing Jews, but he said in the times of pressure, in the times of crisis, in the times of trial, they had failed at that moment in 1492. When he was a Belmont and further anchetta than either convert or leave, so the practical problem, you don't want to leave not to go to the philosophical belief that Spain is an important country, but because it's difficult. But their fate had been weakened by two centuries of philosophical discussion, the intellectual milieu, that based one's belief in God and one's connection to Jewish religion, on philosophical abstracts was inherently too weak to stand up to the crisis, as opposed to those Jews, children Jews, in France and Germany, who had spent an intellectual time studying Torah. And the times of crisis had been willing to force big divides, Mr. Dasek sent some time to die of keep the session. This is basically a psychological role, a psychological argument, and it undoubtedly has a great deal of truth. One cannot simply reject it out of hand, one because of historical evidence. We lost a job, it's mentioned, and I think because we all understand that there's some truth to this, that someone who is able, how one does this to a different question, but someone who is able to achieve a deep sense of faith is expected of a intellectual argument, and that has a strong taste. When measuring simply strength, the ability to withstand such. The question is of course how one meets it at that level, as well as whether strength alone is the only thing which interests us. In times of crisis, perhaps that's true. We basically want to know, or a person wants to know himself, will I withstand a child, will I remain true, to the tradition of my father, and to my belief in God. But there are, I think, other measures of faith which would make not merely to strength but to death. And to those of the measures, this argument doesn't attack itself or doesn't even address itself at all. Second argument is more extreme. Second argument argues that essentially reason and faith are opposed. Why is this? There's popular and widespread conception that faced by definition, a Munna, by definition, is the belief in things which cannot be proven. We wouldn't use the word "Munna". We wouldn't use the word "face" to describe my belief that I am now standing in a room. I know I'm standing in a room. I don't believe I'm standing in a room. We only use the word "face and belief" for those things which in some sense are unknowable, are unknowable, are beyond rational or clear. Now, if you don't believe the sun is shining, then you believe that there is a God in the heavens. And this is not merely accidentally true, but some people would argue that this is essentially true, that the value of faith, if you want to say the myth of faith, the value of faith, it sounds precisely in that it involves a leap into the unknown. The term "a leap into the unknown" was introduced and popularized by Mapaju, by Sarn Kirtigar. But the idea has a great deal of attraction for many, many people, and I think it's found, at least in my own discussions, of a Munna as well. Even a moderate familiarity with medieval philosophy and medieval Jewish philosophy will definitely lead one to the conclusion that to be shown him didn't think so. Obviously, the Raman didn't think so. Raman thought the exact opposite. The Raman thought that you can only believe in the true sense of the word "A Munna" in that which has been proven, which is as clear to you as that one and one is true. Anything else the Raman says is merely a opinion. And I suggest a word merely, merely a opinion. I believe, believe it a weak word. I believe that Chinese living claim. I don't know it. And therefore, if you only believe there is a God, but you don't know there is a God, the Raman says you a Munna is deficient. The Raman is a relatively extreme. A church would discuss this in one of the coming weeks. But even the others would be showing him. It's very hard to find someone who would see the value of belief as being based on its non-truvability. Nonetheless, I think we have to consider this possibility. It definitely appeals psychologically to many of us. When we see somebody who insists on believing the spicy indications or apparent proofs of the contrary, we do tend to admire that. And it is so that in the Munna world, irrespective of truth, the Munna world with intellectual climate is a nimical to religious beliefs. There is no question that we tend to value very much and to stress the importance of one believes despite the illogical believing, but definitely the not accepted way of thinking to be a believer in God, in academic campuses in the western world. It's not an irrational endeavor, but surely one which goes against intellectual milieu and which is what truly accepted. And to some extent, we developed a, perhaps only as a defense measure, where we developed a step that says, and that was so beautiful that don't go along with the common herd, you don't go along with intellectual currents, you believe in what you believe because you know it's true, not necessarily because you can demonstrate it's true in an argument or discussion with someone who opposes your belief. That's point one, point two. There is an idea, same thing, but one step more extreme, not merely that faith has an essentially untrue and aspect to it, leap into the unknown, leap into the dark, but sometimes people argue that faith is faith because it's illogical, because it's absurd. It's a common faith in books and articles that are used for philosophy that no one in history is use for aspiration. The statement has been made a number of times. Two never reached the point of a rationality that claims that belief is believed because something is absurd. The most famous expression of that position is attributed always to someone who's from the Church Father's total id, who said, "I believe because it's absurd." He specifically said it in relationship to both Jews and Greeks. He said, "That which the Jews and the Greeks do not believe in, one because they think it's absurd and one because they think it's scandalous. That is what we Christians believe in. We believe because, that's in the word because it is absurd." Of course, there's a necessity for Christianity or an attraction for Christianity to reach that kind of position. Because the core belief of Christianity and definitely to a Jew appeared to be not merely wrong, but appeared to be absurd and scandalous and perhaps even ridiculous, the belief that God could become man. It's generally claimed that Jews do not accept reposition. I'm not sure that's true. There might be some exceptions. Some of the statements attributed to a Tanakhmani Betslas definitely approached that position almost a desire to show that something was absurd in order to, in the next slide to say, that is what we believe. Surely, in the Tanakhman, there's no fear. There's no repulsion to approaching the area of the illogical, of the absurd, of something which is logically made from the sense. They might play well in certain places and attraction to reach in that point. The true believer ventures fearlessly and with joy into the early absurd. It's definitely an exception. It is definitely an exception. In the Middle Ages, it's unknown. Even those who attached Jews for us in the Middle Ages, except for Kuzare, so part of the Rambam, introduction to the Seyter, or a Shem of the Krassekras. Even when they attached Jews for us to see, they all stressed that that which can be shown to be illogical, that which rationally can be shown to be natural, can not be part of the Jewish beliefs. Philosophy, rationality, reason sets for all of them. Without exception, the outer bounds of what can be included in the belief. You cannot believe in the fourth. You cannot believe in that which is untrue. A third variety of this argument says not that belief is essentially irrational or essentially untroven, but nonetheless that there's a psychological opposition between knowledge, irrational knowledge, and belief. This argument simply compares simple space, that's the word which comes to mind, simple space, the face of the simple person to the face of the great philosopher. Or if you wish, you can appear the face of a little child, the pure simple face of a child who believes in his father and his mother and his god. But as they complicated, more developed, more sophisticated, but somehow less pure, less simple in the fine sense of the word simple, the face of the great of the great Jewish philosopher. I don't have the book in front of me now. There's a section in the in the in the Tanya. The developed Tanya explicitly makes this point. I think it. I really should look this up. I think it's it's, it's. The first time I skim up. The first time it says that true face is the face of an animal. A person to aspire to believe the way a cow believes. Well, Tanya doesn't say how one reaches that face in the fact that we're not cows. And it makes very well being, obviously the Tanya is not an anti-prosastic book in the sense that it's an anti-rational book. It was that would be much shorter. It could be that it's very complicated. I would have to do a great deal of thinking and inner, I would admit inner work on one's soul, in order to reach, in order to progress retroactively to the state of simple belief. And nonetheless, in terms of the comparison at the end, about Tanya says that the belief of a simple child, the belief of a cow in the field, is a higher degree, a higher level of the of belief. In quotes, mama has our peti yya amin, the whole dara. Most of the stink is a negative statement about fools. That a fool believes anything. About Tanya explains the mama's kraja al ditzili. And he said it means that belief, true belief, is the belief of the peti. The fool truly believes, peti yya amin, the cow dara. The fool has belief, people who aren't fools, people who don't make themselves fools, people who don't turn their fate into the fait of fools, don't truly have the belief, which the toggle, which do you isn't interested in. Very quickly, I'm leaving these points on the table saying I'll leave them there for a few months, and we'll try to judge them at the end for ourselves. But very quickly, I'd like to review the basic attitude of the great figures that we will be discussing in the Middle Ages, some of them in an event, towards this question. I mentioned before the Ramam. The Ramam holds the opposite. The Ramam maintains that fate and knowledge are the quittling, the identical. And knowledge means for the Ramam, even more than it could be for us, the Ramam thinks that knowledge is knowledge which has been proven logically. The motto is geometry and pure philosophy. And if it not only has a truth to the existence of God in the beginning of the second Shrelekam and the Ramam, first chapter, but he says explicitly that any belief not based on this truth of the existence of God is not fate, is not Emuna. The Ramam says to the Ramam and the Ramam, that if you believe because your pen taught you to believe, you don't believe in God. You believe in an idea found in your head, but you don't believe in the God who's really there, who's really in the heavens, or really outside yourself, because nothing about that God has impinged itself and self on your consciousness. When you believe, when you see a wall, the wall, and you have a connection, when you believe in God because it's been proven, then intellectually you have a connection with God. But if you believe in something because you've been told to believe in it and you accept that, you don't believe in anything at all. You believe in yourself. You believe in an idea that's found in your head. That's the Ramam. It's not a notion which is easy to defend today because of the basis in freely and softly which it has. But in some sense, although not popular today, the Ramam's idea is something which we should consider and we will consider in the future. Taking less extreme attitudes. You mention a class by class class. In my own personal opinion, the greatest two class class for the Ramam, it's not always accepted. It's not a universal opinion, but it is mine. And we'll be mentioning a class by orphan in this class. The class by introduces his book with an anti-philosophical in it. He says about the Ramam when the first people to use his succession which later on became more common. He says about the Ramam, there has to go sausya ha'au rahik'i'it'a 'battal'. The evil, the cursed philosophy, meaning of securing philosophy. The cursed philosophy has distorted the Ramam's mind, the Ramam's beliefs. Then he has a polemics against philosophy. Nonetheless, the class by says that philosophy in general, trap of thinking. Fashionality is the container of any faith. The use of the word container means that the actual contents of faith will include the things which cannot be included in philosophy. The reason why the book is called 'O Hashem' is because the deepest level of faith is dependent on the light of God that should shine on you, something which is inner. In other words, trapezi, revelation, the total, et cetera. But nonetheless, philosophy is the container, meaning one. It defines the outer boundaries. You can only have faith inside philosophy, but not outside philosophy. The point you mentioned before, if something is wrong philosophically, it can't be an object of faith. So once philosophy prevents mistakes, it doesn't let you wander in areas which you should be wandering. But two, and this is exemplified throughout the book, the RSM, philosophy is also the basis, the springboards for the extra, extra added content of the all Hashem of the light of God. In other words, it's not nearly a negative point. Don't go with what we told you not to go, but any decent faith, even for a class they begin on the basis of what philosophy has found it, of what rationality has found it, of what thinking and understanding has found it, to believe without understanding is impossible according to a class. Or though to believe is more than to merely understand or to merely rationally see. I'll mention a third example, some who is considered sometimes, and I think it's wrong, but some of this is twisted as a anti-vationalist. When that's a lumban, what happens in discussions, when one learns different things, that this is a radical division. He learns just for us, that he sees, he learns a number. When we bring to murder, we learn on violence. Anyway, these two parts of our mind, who is the greatest figure of Spanish curies, I remember, he was the greatest communist in Spain, and he said, "Who is the greatest figure of Jews for us, who came out of Spain?" He said, "That's the word you say the number. The mind is a great figure of Jews for us, the way of Jewish for ourselves, but he is an anti-faller for us, I mean he's again a Presbyterian for us. He's very often listed as being an anti-vationalist, I think that's a tremendous exaggeration. If one looks in the background, the lumban all the time in the pill shall look at that, cites principles that he learns from the van, the lumban is looking. The lumban is a very unique attitude towards understanding Torah and relating to God, is that one can affect on its least two levels. I say it's least good to be there more than two, but this is a woman who learns eight per foot in a Torah. There's the shat, our deader hapsat, in the lumban language, and then there is sometimes al-deder haimest, meaning a dea haqaba lah, I can't believe it, I understand it. And the second doesn't override the first, the same shooting should approach such understanding. The lumban says, often, that this is what our rationality teaches us, and it's correct and true, and a valid and important level, but it's also a deeper level. I think what I quoted before some, of course, the Kreskast is a sort of a translation of the lumban principles, of course I lived 100 years after the lumban - more than 100 years after the lumban - a translation of the lumban principles into more philosophical terms. Lumban is speaking on the relationship between philosophy and kabbalah. He doesn't say that kabbalah is anti-philosophy, he says kabbalah is deeper philosophy. But one doesn't go through the philosophical training and understanding and argumentation and discussion, one cannot reach the deeper level that the lumban is holding out in his hints, or subsequently, under the kabbalim, under the heathens of kabbalah, could possibly teach us. But nonetheless, philosophy is at least the first step. Lumban doesn't explain why. What I suggest, what I would like to suggest, I suspect, is similar to what I said in the name of the class I. One, philosophy prevents straying where one shouldn't be, but two is that the philosophical understanding is also the beginning, the clarity of philosophical understanding is a sign of kwannan to go on deeper. Deeper understanding is the kabbalah, or deeper understanding in terms of one's soul, one's mental connection to God, above and beyond the content of a particular philosophical understanding to be written in a book that might be and is a goal. But it's a step that's within and above and through clarity of philosophical thought. It's not merely that one shouldn't say things that are absurd, it's that it's a process of deepening, a relationship to God, it's a process of deepening our philosophical understanding. We are the pure philosophy, perhaps, I could say. And that's really my goal in these lectures, in these few of them, which will be participating in together. Very often, we will engage in controversies and disputes, just like in Devada and just lastly, there are many opinions and violent arguments between the figures that we'll be studying. It's not so much that we're trying to find out what is the bottom line truth. The darkness of Jewish beliefs. What we're trying to do is to clarify our understanding, because the clarity of understanding, I hope, personally I believe, and I hope so, the relationship with God, or the Nuna, or Bhutan, or faith, and belief is deepened, not because now you think correctly and before you thought incorrectly, but the very process of understanding better, the issues involved, that their process will enable us, help us achieve a deeper relationship with Akkadoshvohu. We will begin next week and each week discussing various issues, and we're not going to do this historically in terms of one thing last to another. I'd like to raise certain topics, and if you're there, this is more or less the way one would learn a topic saying in Halakha, Augmarah, he learned Sugyot. You ask a question, you see the different opinions, and you raise different topics, and try to examine them in light of the various answers, the various sightings, the various arguments made by the great figures of medieval Jewish philosophy, which is the basis for all philosophical discussions, which came in the years, in the years after. Thank you very much. The cold truth. [BLANK_AUDIO]