The Duran Podcast
How will US political upheaval influence Ukraine; John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris Glenn Diesen
- Hi everyone, my name is Glenn Diesen and I'm joined today by Alexander McCurris and Professor John Mersheimer. Welcome, it's great to see the both of you again. - The pleasure to be back, pleasure to be speaking to John. - Yeah, it's a pleasure to be back and to be speaking to both of you for sure. - So a lot has changed since the last time we spoke. I think we can safely say that the front lines in Ukraine are collapsing and Israel is certainly struggling in Gaza and the wars obviously are also expanding. But I thought we could perhaps start with the United States. Obviously there's political crisis across the West but I would argue that as the only real decisions are being made in Washington, it makes more sense to focus on the United States. So I guess my first question would be, what does all the upheaval and well, we can call it reshuffling in the United States actually mean for its foreign policy? Indeed, what are the foreign policies of Kamala Harris? I expected to be a continuation of Biden, I could be wrong. But given that Biden had a very central role in the Ukraine war ever since 2014, one could expect some changes. And also, what would the VP pick of Vance mean? Also he's been quite outspoken, especially on the Ukrainian war. So yeah, a bit wide or broad question perhaps, but what is happening in America and how will that affect the world? - I would just start off by saying that if you tell at this point what the consequences of having Kamala Harris as the presidential candidate will mean, she's not a person who said very much about foreign policy. She's not a very experienced person. And it's just very hard to tell at this juncture how well she will do against Trump and Vance. Trump and Vance are a formidable duo. I don't think there's any question about that, but they have their liabilities, especially Trump. And you can make an argument that a Democrat with the right message who can really campaign could beat Trump and Vance. But on the other hand, Kamala Harris has zero experience running as president. She was not good when she ran and as a candidate in the primaries in 2020. And she has not done a good job as vice president. There's just no question about that. She had very strained relations with the White House and the few things that she did for the administration, especially with regard to handling borders and immigration. She did not do very well. So this is not a person that one can just right off the bat have a lot of confidence in in terms of her ability to run a contest against Trump over the next 15 weeks. Assuming that she runs a good campaign, the question is what are her policy views? I think she's basically gonna be more of Biden. I think that's doing part to the fact that she has never been an independent voice on foreign policy. Domestic politics has been her forte. She'll be heavily dependent on her advisors and her advisors will be basically on the same camp that Joe Biden's advisors are from. So I think on the Russian crane issue, which we focus a lot of attention on, I think there'll be no meaningful change in terms of her news versus Biden's views. I think the situation that she is walking into is a fundamentally different one than the situation that Biden walked into when he became president in January 2021. As you said, Glenn, and as Alexander knows very well, the front is collapsing in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are in deep trouble. And she's gonna inherit this problem over the next 15 weeks. And if she wins, she'll inherit this problem as vice president for Trump in a really different matter because there's a lot of Biden Biden's in, which is the Middle East. Lots of people argue that she is softer somewhat than Biden is with regard to dealing with the Israelis. But she's not gonna want off the reservation on that issue. And she'll be supportive of the Israelis over the long term as Biden has been. So I don't see much difference in Kamala Harris's foreign policy positions than in Joe Biden's foreign policy positions. - I find that I think I'm sure you're right. It is though a bit disappointing because with Biden basically withdrawing from the scene, one would have said, if one was looking at this from a distance, that this is a good moment, a good opportunity to start distancing oneself and the United States from policies that are not succeeding. The war in Ukraine is going very badly. The conflict in the Middle East is going very badly from a American perspective as well. Netanyahu's coming to Washington, which is awkward to put it mildly. I noticed that Kamala Harris is going to stay away from Congress when he's addressing it, which I think from her point of view is a wise move actually. But this logically could be the moment to say, well, this was Biden's policies. They're not working very well. This is my opportunity as the new candidate for the Democratic Party to start coming up with new ideas and to suggesting alternative approaches, which might get the United States out of the whole, which he'd find itself in, in both of these conflicts. And of course, that might also just possibly help Kamala Harris in this contest with Trump and Vance, who seem to be taking a much more skeptical approach, at least to the Ukraine conflict, which I think, well, I mustn't exaggerate, but I think it's probably a reasonably popular stance as well. I mean, continuity Biden doesn't seem to me a very successful line to take going into this election, just saying. - But, Alexander, just think about it this way. This is a person, Kamala Harris, who has hardly any experience in foreign policy, has never had independent views. And all of a sudden, she's thrust into this contest where she's the presidential candidate from the Democratic Party, and she has only 15 weeks to wage the campaign. Even if she agreed with you, do you think she's in a position politically to execute the sort of policy switch that you described? Say it away, you've just said. But I just think, if you look at the sort of context in which she's operating, she hasn't hardly any room to maneuver on the foreign policy front. - I'm afraid you're probably right. But anyway, I just wanted to throw out the idea. As I said, he is, Biden is leaving. He's leaving, I think, a terrible mess. One would have thought politically, it was wise to distance oneself from that mess, but I completely take your point. I mean, she doesn't appear to have the authority within the party or the experience or the authority, not just within the party, but within the political world generally to be able to take a different course. But one might just propose it and hope for the best, that's all I can say. - But two quick points, Alexander. One is that the Democrats, excuse me, the Democrats are spinning the years lead article in the New York Times this morning about the Biden presidency, foreign policy front. And it tells a very positive story, right? So it's important to understand that lots of people in the foreign policy establishment believe that Joe Biden has been a great success. The second point I'd make to you is, and this is a point that you made in your initial comments, it's the Republicans, in particular Trump and especially Vance, who are interested in fundamentally changing American foreign policy, both Russia and Ukraine. And I think the interesting question is what we do if they get into the White House, because they want to radically alter what has been Biden's foreign policy on Ukraine. - Well, given that it does look, at least from my perspective, more likely that Trump will take the presidency, I thought it's interesting what it signals the pick of Vance, because when I was watching the Republican National Convention, well, first we had the David Sachs giving an opening speech where he was stressing the point that this war was provoked. And then of course the picking Vance, I thought it was quite interesting, given that he's been also very vocal about how this war can't be won, and also why it's a war, which is not in the interests of the United States, and the need for something fundamentally different. So there seems to be a push towards all hardening the idea that we have to end this war and making it effectively a Republican platform. There was even an interesting headline by CNN in which they point out that, given the likelihood of a Trump victory, Zelensk is already considering negotiations, which I thought was something he should use, because even the prospect of him becoming president apparently is incentivizing peace negotiations. Now, of course, these are just headlines, but nonetheless, it seems that, I guess they're clearly signaled that a Trump presidency would move to end this war quickly. This is my main takeaway, I guess, from Vance, but again, to what extent is it actually possible? I keep hearing that Trump would like to end the war in 24 hours, and I'm guessing it's gonna put a deal to both the Ukrainians and the Russians, but if it doesn't go down on either side, of course he has a lot of pressure on, he can put on the Ukrainians by simply cutting off the weaponry, but on Russia there's less influence unless the Russians get what they want, and that obviously would have to be neutrality for Ukraine in some concessions on the territories, even if the Russians don't get everything they want. So what is your expectation? Do you see anything different or any greater insights on the Trump presidency based on his pick? - Well, I think your description of what Trump and Vance want is correct. And I'd be very curious to know what Alexander thinks about this because he follows what's going on on the battlefield so closely, but my view is that what happens between now and the end of January matters greatly. In other words, if the Ukrainians lose on the battle, there's a collapse in, let's say some, but I think we will agree it's a possibility, it's a serious possibility that the Ukrainians collapse. If the Ukrainians collapse, Trump and Vance, assuming they win, they inherit a very different situation than one in which the Ukrainians managed to hang on and the war on February 1st, 2025 looks a lot like it does today. So I think events on the battlefield really matter. And by the way, events on the battlefield matter for Kamala Harris because Kamala Harris is running on Joe Biden's platform. And if we lose in Ukraine before the election or the Ukrainians look like they're crumbling, what's the fact you come up to? I'm just curious what you think about that, Alexander. - I think that the Ukrainians will be able to hold together before the election. I don't think we're going to see a dramatic collapse before then, even though it's getting more difficult for them by the day and their commander, General Siski, today or rather yesterday, made statements which I think show how difficult the situation for them is becoming, but I think they'll just be able to hold it together until then. About January, I'm not social, to be frank, I think the situation is becoming much, much more difficult. And the question is, what is the United States going to do as the situation deteriorates? Will there be an attempt to help the Ukrainians to stabilize the situation which might be very difficult and very dangerous? Or will there instead be a shift in gears? And people starting to say maybe a time has come to negotiate and to talk. I still think, by the way, even if there is a Ukrainian military collapse on the front lines between now and January, Ukraine remains a very big country. There's an awful lot beyond Don Bass, beyond The Kneaker, and I still think that the prevailing mood in Moscow is that they would prefer to negotiate a solution to the crisis, the longer term crisis, than march all the way to the Western border. I think there are divisions in Moscow about this, but I certainly think that Putin himself would still prefer to negotiate. I don't think he wants to take over the hold of Ukraine for the many reasons that we've talked about. And I still think also that he would welcome some kind of a return to a relationship of some kind with the United States if he could have it. So even if there is a collapse in Eastern Ukraine over the next few months, I think, surprising as it may be for some people, I think that a new administration, or indeed the current administration, if it's reelected in some form, if it were to start making serious overtures to the Russians would probably still find them willing to sit down and listen. What would come out of those negotiations? I don't know. - But I'd just be like to ask both you and Glenn, what you think Trump and Vance would be able to do if the Ukrainians basically hold on through January and where Trump and Vance get elected, you willing to make the necessary concessions that the Russians demand to put an end to this war, because the foreign policy spokesman in Russia has made it clear that she thinks, and the Russians think that the Trump campaign statements about Ukraine really don't add up too much, and she's telling them to get realistic. The Russians know they're in the driver's seat. They're gonna drive a hard bargain. They want the Ukrainians to recognize that they control these four oblasts forever. They want NATO to cease its talk about bringing Ukraine into the alliance and so forth and so on. I find it hard to believe that Trump and Vance will be able to accommodate the Russians because the Russians will be driving for good strategic reasons, a hard bargain with whoever is elected. So I'm not optimistic that even if Trump and Vance come into the White House, that they can put an end to the war, where we get some sort of meaningful peace agreement. And I'm just curious what you two think about that. - I think that Trump could probably deliver on restoring Ukraine's neutrality, something similar along the lines of what was done in Istanbul two plus years ago, which was then sabotaged by the US and the UK. But of course, the territorial issue is the main issue and the main problem. And you mentioned the four oblasts, which have been annexed by Russia, but a key challenge is that Russia doesn't control all of the territory, territories of all of these oblasts. So I think what Trump probably would have more in mind is he comes into office, they're willing to find a way of accommodating, restoring Ukraine's neutrality, but then in terms of resolving the territorial issue, I think at most where the troops are at this point in time. So this is why I'm thinking if it looks like Trump's gonna take, or either of the party's gonna take the presidency, I think Russia would like to control as much as these four oblasts before the American presidential election, because if negotiations will start then, it's better to sit on what you're not willing to trade away by the time of the elections. But of course, it's very hard to say Trump doesn't share much of his plan, besides, because you have to take into account the communication as well what you're allowed to say. And these negotiations, we have to be honest, it's gonna be humiliating for the West as well, 'cause we gamble a lot on this. So they probably don't want to admit what kind of concessions they want to make just yet. That's why I think the territorial issue will be the main problem, which is why I think that the Russians will push very hard from now until January as well. - I'm gonna just quickly say, I think the first thing that Vance and Trump need to do is to reopen contacts with the Russians. The major problem is that we are not talking to them, and they're not talking to us. So we probably will not be in a position anyway, whatever the military situation is on the 1st of February 2025 to come up with a proposal and to agree to discussions. And I'm not even sure that the Russians really have formulated their own ideas very clearly beyond what Putin said a few weeks ago at the foreign ministry session, which I would suggest is not really a negotiating position, as rather a stake out of, you know, Russian, general Russian positions, which could be discussed further over the course of negotiations. So the first thing to do is for the Americans, for Vance and Trump, to tell the Russians, "Look, we want to talk to you. "We want to meet with you. "Maybe not ourselves, not president to president "or secretary of state to secretary of state, "but, you know, we will point a representative. "You will appoint a representative. "Let's have more discussions, maybe in Ankara, "maybe somewhere else, "start getting into a situation "where we're talking about things "and looking at where and how we go forward "from this impossible situation that we are in." And that can take a while to try and, you know, through a discussion process, start to develop ideas and find common ground. But I think that is the first step that must be made. As it is, we really don't know very much about what the Russians would accept and what the Americans would accept, because they're not talking to each other. The Americans are constantly expressing maximalist positions, which are unachievable, as is now obvious. The Russians have shown a little more flexibility, but they haven't really fleshed out exactly what their ideas are. And from a Russian point of view, it's gonna be even more difficult, actually, if the Russians have gone beyond the four oblasts, if they've captured territory in Harkov, are they gonna give that back? What does that mean? If they do give it back, you know, is that going to be an easy sell-in Moscow now? And what about the general security situation? Not just whether Ukraine is part of NATO or not, but the Russians have been talking about new security arrangements in Europe. What do they even mean by that now? Are they going to go all the way back to demanding what was previously rejected in December 2021? Lots of things, but a proper discussion, it seems to me, is the place to start. It's fascinating the lack of diplomacy because it shows how poorly each side understands each other. You probably read the article in The Daily Mail by Boris Johnson, in which he was arguing, you know, Trump can bring peace, and then Boris Johnson outlined what kind of peace he envisioned. For those who are watching, it's worth noting that there was the Istanbul Peace Agreement in early 2022 based on restoring the trial to Ukraine and Russia would pull back to where it was before it invaded. Now, it seems as if Boris Johnson would like to revive some of this. Of course, he had a key role in sabotaging this. This peace deal by instead telling the Ukrainians, "Listen, US and UK will give you all the weapons you need if you choose to fight instead of making peace." Now, he seems to suggest something along those lines. We can, obviously, Russia would have to give up those four oblasts. This, he made it seem like this was just common sense. And then the Russians could get what they want the most, which is to restore relations with the United States. And yeah, they could also speak about restoring some language rights for Russian speakers in Ukraine. And this was the extent of the concession. So it doesn't, it didn't touch on the two key issues, which was neutrality and of course, resolving the territorial issues because this is now a territorial dispute. I know many people don't like to see it as such because these are the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, but for the Russians, this is now considered to be Russian territory. And indeed, what Russia says matters as they're the one who's controlling this territory. So I just find it fascinating how, what the piece that Boris Johnson's now selling, it sounded a lot, of course, a lot like the PC canceled, but there's been a lot of death and destruction and the battles since those days. So it just, yeah, I've just thought if there have been some diplomacy, we could have perhaps had a discussion which will be more, well, bound to reality, though. - A couple of points. One is that Boris Johnson is as delusional today as he was in March, April of 2022. You just wonder did these people ever take a course in strategy 101? Do they understand how international politics works? It's really just remarkable that he's talking like this today. And therefore, he's not to be taken seriously, except as an indicator of how delusional the West is in general. Second point is I agree with the two of you that diplomacy is essential and we have been remarkably foolish not to talk to the Russians at all, all along. So we all agree on that, excuse me, but I would argue that if you're the Russians, right, well, let's assume we're playing the Russians hands, hand, you want to get everything you possibly can. You cannot trust the West at all. Putin has made it clear on numerous occasions that he was foolish to have trusted the West in the past. And all this talk about Trump is pro-Russian and Trump didn't support the Ukrainians. I mean, Trump ended up arming the Ukrainians. He is the one who decided that the United States and the West more generally would arm the Ukrainians in 2017. And furthermore, he ended up as supportive of Ukraine as his predecessors. So Trump was no great anomaly with regard to US relations towards Ukraine. And if I'm Putin, I don't care that Trump is in the White House or Biden or Harris is in the White House. It doesn't matter to me. And furthermore, even if you tend to trust Trump, Trump is not forever White House for four years. And you cannot be sure that his replacement won't be some second incarnation of Joe Biden or whoever. And you're back to square one. So if you're the Russians, in my opinion, you want to grab as much territory as you can without running into those areas where there are lots of ethnic Ukrainians. But if I'm the Russians, I'd want to take more than the four oblasts that they have now annexed. I'd want to take more territory than that. I'd want to make sure, of course, that Ukraine cannot become part of NATO. And I'd go to great length to sever security relations between the West and Ukraine. And probably the best way to do that is put significant limits on how big the Ukrainian military combatants will push very hard in this direction. Well, this is to say the Russians are going to drive a very hard bargain. And from their point of view, not from the West point of view, but from their point of view, it's the smart thing to do. And then the question is, what are we willingness? And I think it's going to get, it's going to be very difficult to get the West, whether Trump is in the White House or Harris is in the White House, to reach a deal that makes the Russians happy. I hope that I'm wrong, but that's my sense. I agree. And I think-- I think this-- Now you're going. Gold, then. I go in a glut, then go forward, go ahead. Sorry, I'll keep it short. I was just going to say, this is how the two components usually have threats, how you determine threats. You would look at the intentions and the capabilities. And obviously, as John pointed out, the intentions will always change. And this has always been a point which Putin makes time and time again. Like he's seen a lot of American presidents come and go. And they usually make these lofty statements and promises. But after a while, they continue-- well, the policies which have been laid in front of them. So there won't be many changes. And even if there will be changes, they could be reversed again shortly thereafter. So-- and furthermore, intentions. I think we're quite obvious open about our intentions in NATO. We keep saying Ukraine has to be bulwark against the Russians. They will eventually become a part of NATO. At least they should be in our orbit. So it seems as if any peace agreement is obviously just going to be temporary because time is not on our side. So we're telling the Russians very openly what our intentions are. That is to put a pause on this and come back and fight later. So I couldn't agree more than the Russians will have to then look at the capabilities. And for Ukraine, it's to a large extent a territory they hold, which can be a vulnerability to Russia. And the key area of this war, I think, is the Black Sea. So this is why Odessa, the idea of Odessa becoming a NATO city, I think it's unbearable. But this is a very difficult target. Kharkov, they could take with greater ease. But Odessa, you have to cross the Nipur. And they need more time, unless there's a complete collapse in Ukraine. Sorry for interrupting. No, please. I agree with all of this. But I think the key thing-- and it goes back to a point that, John, you've made several times-- is the severance of security links between the United States and whatever Ukraine comes out of this process in existence. So I think this is going to be for the Russians a major, a major thing. Now, one of the things that has been said by people who look to be close to the advanced Trump team is that Ukraine is basically a European issue. It does not concern. It is not an interest of the United States. Now, just possibly maybe that opens a way towards accepting that a security connection between the United States and Ukraine can be ended. And by definition, a security arrangement between NATO and Ukraine can be ended as well. So that Ukraine becomes, again, purely neutral in ways that secure its future without posing a future threat to Russia. Because that thing, which the Russians most fear, which is a connection between Ukraine, the United States, the other Western powers, that's been put an end to forever. I think that some of the language that's coming out of the Trump advanced team-- I'm not saying that's what they're saying. I'm not saying that they've accepted that. But some of the language that they are using suggests to me that maybe over the course of discussions and negotiations and the negotiations would take place whilst the war was still happening. The Russians would be advancing. We would still be getting a fluid dynamic situation on the battle fronts. And that would also shape the understanding of what's going on in Europe. And in the United States itself, maybe the combination of the two, the talks, as I said, the original premise that Ukraine isn't an American problem and the changing environment, maybe we could start to move towards that point over time. I mean, what I'm thinking about is something more like the Paris negotiations between the United States and the North Vietnamese, which ended with agreements which were completely different from what either the Americans or the North Vietnamese would have started with. Of course, it all fell apart later. But anyway, perhaps with the Russians, something that comes out of this might be more enduring. Let me ask you to another question. What is your sense as to the position that Russia is in today? In the mainstream media in the West, occasionally read pieces that the Russians are suffering enormous casualties. There's pressure on Putin and on Moscow to put an end to this war as quickly as possible. But my sense is that that is not true. And I just read a piece by Anatol Leavin in responsible statecraft. Anatol had been in Moscow. And he was amazed at the calm there. And he believed that many of the people who originally left Russia when the war first started because they feared they would get drafted, have come back, because they don't think they're going to be ready. Anatol says that the Russians have carefully limited the draft in both Moscow and in St. Petersburg. And they're drawing mainly on people from the Hinterlands and that the country is able to sustain this war and continue this war. And they have lots of troops and so forth and so on. And if you sort of buy Anatol's basic story, the Russians can hang in on this fight for the foreseeable future. They're not in bad shape. Of course, nobody wants to see Russia continue to die, they're capable of sustaining. But if you're reading a lot of the stuff in the West that's coming out these days, which is designed to make it look like Ukrainians are doing quite well, and Russians are doing bad, you get a different story about the state of the Ra and where Russian politics is today. I'm just curious what you two think about this issue because this matters enormously for the issues that we're discussing. - I don't know, whenever I speak to former colleagues in Moscow, I get the impression about Anatol Live and saying that there's a lot more optimism now and its scientists made itself more comfortable with the direction of the war as well. So I just don't see why they would want to put a quick end to it as well. And keep in mind that this has been a war of attrition. Now, one of the key rules in the war of attrition is you want to deplete the adversary's resources before you go for the territory. So you don't spend all that resources and manpower to take over small chunks of land. You'd rather destroy the enemy and then take all the land. Now, this seems to be, if you look at how little territory shifted hands initially and how it's escalating now, every day there's some new towns falling to the Russians. It just seems like a strange time to stop unless there's a very good peace deal on the table. And so I think a lot of the media reporting, it always goes into the same whenever we need to boost the motivation in the West to continue the war. Whenever things are going our way, we get the same story. So the Russians are running out of weapons. Some of them might take out Putin. The Russians want this war to end as quick as possible. I just don't see any evidence for any of this. And on the contrary, I think all the things we're communicating to the Russians, we are creating all the wrong incentives because we keep saying as soon as the war is over and NATO's gonna come in and secure Ukraine. So this won't happen again. Well, what's Russia gonna do? First it will take as much territory, whatever territory they don't take will end up with NATO. So then they have to take a lot of territory. And second of all, you wanna really mess up the rest of Ukraine because if you listen to the language of JD Vance, this shouldn't be our problem. In other words, Ukraine is a problem. So the more you can mess up Ukraine, the more it's gonna be a drain on resources. The less interesting the country will be to the United States. So you strip Ukraine of its main economic territories. It's coastal regions in the Black Sea, anything that might interest NATO. And then you ruin the rest and make sure that it's a huge drain on NATO. And then they lose interest. It becomes a problem instead of an opportunity. So I think this is direction Russia's going, which is why I find it so horrific when all the people are labeled to themselves this, you know, the pro-Ukrainians, friends of Ukraine keeps sending out all the wrong signals and centralizing all the wrong things. But no, I would have to agree 100% with not all leaving on this issue though. - I too, I mean, I have not been to Russia recently. I mean, the last time I was in Russia was in 2018. Glenn has been there much more recently. I think he was there quite recently, in fact. But my colleague, Alex Cristafaro, has just been to Moscow. He reported, he's been telling me actually before that Anatol even peace came up that he found the city very calm, that he was talking to people there. There doesn't seem to be any wavering of support and resolve. And of course, he is talking much more, I suspect to a wider cross-section of Russian society than Anatol even would have done. I'm guessing, maybe I'm discharging this, but I suspect that Anatol even inevitably is going to talk to more elite Russians. Whereas Alex is going to be been talking to more, you know, the people who are, or perhaps would not be defined as elite Russians. And in Moscow and in St. Petersburg, they seem to be generally supportive of the war and very confident about the way that they're going. And I have a number of contacts beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg and for what it's worth, and these are purely anecdotal impressions, I get the sense that Russian society generally has in fact become increasingly confident about the direction of the war. They sense that things are going Russia's way and that the population in general has largely accepted the view of the war, the perspective of the war, that the Kremlin has been giving them, that this is an existential threat, that they are defending Russia's security and national interests, and that for that reason, the war has to end on Russia's terms. And I think that's the general feeling across Russia based on the sentiments that I've been able to tap into. And can I just quickly add that some specific steps and that the European Union took right at the start have solidified those feelings very considerably. The fact that there was this basic travel ban on whether these restrictions on air flights from Russia to Europe gave the Russians, many, many Russians a feeling that Europe was closing its doors to them and was hostile to them. And I know also several Russians who've been complaining to me that money that they placed abroad in Europe is no longer accessible to them. And that has also made some people, I know very, very angry and very hostile to the West as well, to the point that one of them, even though he's able to travel to the West, no longer is prepared to do so. Now, I stress these are anecdotal discussions, but I'm fairly confident that they are reflective of what most of Russian society thinks about this war, that the war is going well, that it's in Russia's interests, the Putin and the Kremlin are right, and that the war needs to be continued until it ends successfully. - Well, I was gonna ask how would you answer your own question, John? - Meaning what exactly, how do I think the Russians are doing? - Yeah, they think they were the... - In terms of public, everything I read come out of Russia, and outside of the Western media tells me the Russians are doing fine politically, and that meshes with how they're doing on the battlefield. The Russians are dominating the Ukraine, they're depending heavily on firepower, and not on frontal wave attacks, which would cause huge amounts of casualties, and might generate real problems that it must go. So I think when you look at what's going on, on the battlefield, it's consistent with the argument that things are okay. So I don't see any reliable evidence that Russia wants to end this war quickly, because it is in deep trouble politically or militarily. This is not to say the Russians wouldn't end the war very quickly if they could get the right deal, but I don't think they're gonna get the right deal, and I think they are resolved to winning this war of attrition. And again, I think you're doing well on the battlefield. - I found it fascinating how it changed over time, because after the Russians invaded in 2022, I went for quite a few conferences in Russia. I was in Sochi, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Moscow, and all, every time people were very anxious, I felt, well, at most academics, and people linked to all the politicians I would speak to. A lot of them thought that they'd walked into a trap, which was set by them by Boris Johnson, all that they would make no deal except invasion. They went into invade, and then effectively the West had a proxy fighting for them. But so yeah, there was a lot of pessimism, especially towards the end. I remember I was in Vladivostok around September or no, October, I think of 2022. But when it was back again in 2023, the mood was quite different. It felt, you know, the ship was going the right direction, just don't create too many waves, and the confidence was already there. But when I went back again this year, they were already planning after the war, like, well, how will the new trade arrangements be done? Because no matter what peace they get with the West, the economic ties will still have to be towards the East. So, you know, all economic connectivity has to go to the West while, not East, while, you know, the military deterrent is built up pointing to the West. And, you know, so all the discussions now are effectively post-war, what would we do afterwards? And that's why, yeah, I also agree, I think, given that the new period that time is now, the Russians don't lose that much and more in this war, because, you know, the Russians, the Ukrainians don't have air defense, so they can just smash through a lot of the defenses with these fab glide bombs. They, you know, the Bakhmud, they seem to be behind them, where they pay such a heavy toll at taking cities. So, again, nobody who wants to have, you know, the best young young men come home in coffins, but given, as you pointed out, they consider this to be an existential threat. I can't imagine why at this point, everyone having their favorable nutrition rates, they would start to, you know, purpose you on unfavorable peace agreement. So, it just, it doesn't seem likely. Sorry, I'll accept it. - No, I was just going to say, the economic situation has been absolutely fundamental, in the sense that the greatest worry and fear that I detected, you know, from a distance in Russia was at the very beginning, when the sanctions were imposed, people were very, very worried. There's been, you know, a succession of economic crises in Russia going all the way back to the 1980s. People were afraid that everything was going to fall apart, that, you know, industries were closed, factories were closed down, people would lose their jobs, people would lose their savings. When that didn't happen, when on the contrary, the economy actually started to grow and real incomes started to increase. That not only came as a surprise to people, but I think that has enormously boosted confidence. And unless that changes, I think Russia can absorb the level of losses that it is suffering. You know, putting aside, you know, the actual numbers, which we don't know, I think what we can say is that they're not high enough to demoralize Russian society overall, given especially that Russia has a history of fighting wars and absorbing losses. It's a harsh things to say, but it's true. But provided the economy remained stable and continues to grow, then I think that confidence in what the government is doing will remain strong. And I think that that will ensure that the Kremlin has the freedom it needs to continue to prosecute the war in the way that it wants. - I agree completely with Alexander's point about the economy and the fact that in the beginning, the Russians and the West thought the sanctions would cripple Russia's economy and cripple Russia. And that didn't happen. In fact, in many ways, the opposite happened. And that accounts for a great deal of the change from pessimism to optimism. But I wanna go back to the military dimension that you started with, which is the other strand of this issue. Important to understand this. And it was an army at the time that was not designed for offense. It was an army that was built in Russia against an invasion. So Ukraine, 22, with the equivalent of the Wehrmacht. It was a very small army. It was not designed to conquer territory in Ukraine. It was designed to coerce Ukrainians into going to the negotiating table. And it almost worked because we got the Istanbul negotiations. But that's what the army was designed to do. But once the Istanbul negotiations, and of course there was an Israeli track as well with North Tali Bennett, once those two tracks fail, you're in a war of attrition. And the Russians are in a war of attrition without an army that was designed to fight that war. They were anticipating this war that they got themselves into. And what happens is in September, Putin mobilizes large numbers, 300,000 Russian troops. And then over the course, 2023, and now in 2024, huge numbers of Russians are enlisting. They're being trained up. They're gaining battle experience. And the fact is that the Russian army today is a much more formidable fighting force than the Russian army of February 2022. You'll hear this talk in the West about how we've decimated that Russian army of February 2022, implying that the Russians today are much worse off than they were in February 2022. This is a laughable argument. Exactly the opposite is the case, right? That army that existed in February 2022 is gone. It was not a highly efficient force for fighting a war of attrition. And you now have in its place a formidable Russian military. Again, it's not the second coming of the Wehrmacht, but it is a formidable force. And look at how it compares to the Ukrainian military. Oh my, the Russians have a great advantage since we've talked about that noisium in terms of quantity and quality of weaponry and in terms of quantity and quality of the manpower at this point in time. So I think the mood has changed, Glenn, not simply because of what Alexander said about the economy, but also if you look carefully at what happened in the military, you have a fundamentally better situation for Russia today than you did in the beginning. I would say both aspects have helped though, because if you look at organizations like BRICS, they've been there for a while, but it was more of a talking club, even after they started to develop the new development bank, they didn't really gain that much speed. I think once the Western sanctions really came in hard against Russia, a lot of the BRICS country woke up. It's, this is why I think you've seen this huge decoupling now and de-dollarization and the development of BRICS really take off. So I think a lot of this had a lot of optimism. It wasn't just economic, it also showed that there was a wide world outside the West and that Russia could successfully decouple. But I agree, I think a lot of the optimism also derives from the battlefield. And this is why there was a lot of pessimism when I was in Russia in 2022, because as you said, they sent in this army of what, 100,000 they had available, it wasn't really built for such an event. But again, on day one as the army there never tells us, and on the first day after the invasion, the Russians did contact Zelensky and they started already on the third day and agreed to start their discussions and negotiations. So this was obviously the purpose to push through what they couldn't get through in Minsk. But then when they realized that the Ukrainians would fight to the last man and with all of NATO's weaponry, obviously there was a good reason for pessimism, but this is what they did. They boosted their industrial production, they recruited men and they built a huge, very powerful and effective army, which could then handle this task, which is why by the time 2023 and 2024 came along, the optimism has only been growing and confidence, of course. But it's, yeah, I think this is another shocking thing in the West. We don't reflect that much on our mistakes because this has been very, very foolish, not just on the economic side. We don't seem to learn much and actually we want to ask about, ask from you, John, because the whole idea of realism, the principle assumption should be that, you know, the rational actors act in accordance with the balance of power logic, but we seem to be doubling down on all our foolish policies, be it economic, all our sanctions with Russia failed now. In New York, they started discussing seizing Chinese assets as if this would be a great decision to make, but also we're not learning much from the war in Ukraine. We just keep doubling down and even when we're losing the war, we keep discussing whether or not we can deport Ukrainian refugees there so we can send more people to die. It's just, if you look at politics in Europe, one gets impression, we're not acting in our national interests anymore. This should be a defining characteristic of a rational actor. So I, yeah, I would like to know what you think as well. I'd like Sandra, 'cause this is really something standing out in Europe especially. One could argue the same would apply to the US with the Israeli question, of course, but in Europe, it's quite shocking to see this is why we're having all this political crisis as well. - Well, can I just quickly jump in? Because going back to what John was saying, and in TQ said, just the other day, General Kavoli, who is the NATO military commander, he comes along, he says, we're going to end up with a Russia that is very powerful militarily, led by the same people as it's been led with today and seeing us as a threat and very, very angry. And he's absolutely right. This is what we managed. We managed the situation where we have a militarily much more powerful Russia than we would have had, one in which the population is now mobilized and prepared to think of us as adversaries, enemies in fact, in a way that many Russians before did not, a Russia which is pivoting towards other countries that are unfriendly to us in Iran, China, North Korea, things that have turned out very badly for us and Russia which is economically thriving on the back of all of this. However you look at this, this has ended, this has turned out absolutely terribly for in terms of Western interests, which is why, going back to our earlier discussion at the beginning of this programme, one would like to believe that with all of this now coming and becoming clear and obvious somebody would seize this opportunity of a change in administration and the fact that Biden himself is slowly fading from the scene or quickly fading from the scene to at least finally call a stop and to look for a way back, we have this expression, I don't know whether they have it in the US, when you are in a hole, stop digging. Now that seems to be obvious, but anyway, whether we will do that, I really, truly don't know, but that's, it seems to me, what we have to do and sooner or later we will have to do it, we are going to have to speak to the Russians again at some point and we're going to find them are much more difficult and awkward people to talk to than we had before, but there it is, we have to do this. Now, if I can just say something about the Vance Trump team, one thing I will say for JD Vance, you can say many things for JD Vance, but one thing I will say about him is he does seem to understand that power has its limits and that you have to start setting priorities. I was listening to John Bolton, which we all know who he is, and he doesn't seem to accept that there are any limits to what power American power can do at all. He wants to confront China, he wants to confront Russia, he wants to confront everybody everywhere all the time in every place, at least the Vance Trump team seem to understand that that isn't achievable and that trying to continue with that line is going to end up creating exactly the kind of nightmare situation that we have in Europe, which General Cavilly was talking about, of a much more powerful Russia on NATO's borders because Cavilly made that point as well and a very, very angry one. - Yeah, let me just jump in here and respond to a couple of points that both of you have made. Just started with what we're saying, Alexander, I think there's has what I would have limits of power in ways that the neoconservatives, and this would include John Bolton, you do not understand. And so I think there's no question that Vance is a great advancement in the Republican ranks in terms of foreign policy. And he and Trump should be able to move a somewhat forward in solving the Ukraine problem. Another point I want to make is one does not want to underestimate what a sophisticated strategist Putin is. It's almost verbotent to say that in the West, you'll be accused of being a Putin apologist or something even worse than that. But the fact is that the West is up against a highly formidable adversary and he has done a superb job, not a perfect job, but he's done a superb job of managing Russia's situation since February 2022. And the Russians are in very good shape today in large part because the leadership has done its job. And it's not an argument that you'll hear in the West where people generally portray him as a fool and somebody who committed an egregious error by invading Ukraine and now he's just making a bad situation worse and so forth and so on. But I don't think that's true. You don't have to like Putin, but I think you should respect his abilities as a strategist. And then finally getting back to Glenn's point about why contrary to basic realist logic, the United States continues to sort of double down Ukraine. Let me make two points about Ukraine. One is that we got into Ukraine, we got into the mess during the unipolar moment when we thought that we showed NATO expansion down the Russian's throat. As you know, we did that in 1999, we did it again in 2004. Those were the first two big tranches of NATO expansion. And in April 2008, we set off to bring Ukraine into NATO and we thought we could shove it down their throat again. And in 2014, when the crisis broke out, we doubled down because we still thought we were powerful enough. It's still the unipolar moment that we could shove NATO expansion down their throat. Now, that proved not to be the case, obviously, and we ended up in this war in 2022. Now, why haven't we corrected? One lesson I learned as a young man during the Vietnam War is I like to tell people I was in the American military from 1965 to 1975, which was co-terminus with the Vietnam War, to have learned a number of important lessons during those years. And one lesson that I learned is when you're the United States of America and you get into a war, it's almost impossible to get out, right? Or to put it in slightly different terms, it's almost impossible to turn the ship around. It's like a super tanker in the water and it takes a long time to turn that super tanker around. And just look at what happened in Afghanistan, Glenn. I mean, we were in there for 20 years and there were many people who did not want Biden to pull us out of Afghanistan. And in Vietnam, we'd still, if Congress hadn't issued an, no, I mean, there were just all sorts of people who wanted to continue the war. So my point is that when the United States gets into a war like this, it is very hard to turn the ship around. And this is one of the reasons I'm very pessimistic. I hope I'm wrong here, but this is one of the reasons I'm very pessimistic about our prospects, whether Trump is in the White House or Kamala Harris is in the White House, our prospects of actually settling this diplomatically. I tend to think, and I'd be curious what you guys think, but I tend to think that the only way we can really settle this is if correspondingly, we have a disastrous defeat of the Ukrainian military on the battlefield. I think if the Ukrainian military suffers a serious defeat on the battlefield, that will open up the opportunity for us to reach some sort of meaningful peace agreement with the Russians. I may be wrong on that. Maybe absent that we can work out a deal, but I don't see that happening. - Well, I guess it's a good explanation for the American side, I guess, because this big boulder we're going to be pushed back in 2008, obviously, by promising future NATO membership for Ukraine. But even then, of course, you had people like Robert Gates will in burns warning that this would be a disaster. We shouldn't go down this road. But what's interesting is with the European side, because at least in 2008, you had the French, the Germans, they were pushing very hard back against Bush's attempt to push NATO on Ukraine. Again, they ended up folding on the condition that a membership action plan wasn't provided. But back then, at least, there was a bit of backbone. But if you look, we seem to have gone the other way. There's no more efforts to stand up for how we see our national interests being different from the United States, it seems. It's Germany, I guess, is the most extraordinary example with they can have their pipeline blown up and they still stand there bowing and not really pursuing any national interests anymore. It's very hard to explain, that's all. - Well, in fact, I would go further than that. I'd say that the Europeans are now extremely worried that the Americans are going to show realism and are going to seek peace in Ukraine. Even though it is the Europeans who actually would benefit from peace in Ukraine, even more than the Americans would. I mean, the Americans, all that they're going to suffer in Ukraine is a prestige loss. That's all, whereas in Europe, we have a basic problem of insecurity now because we have a crisis in Eastern Europe with the Russians. We have major problems in our economy, which the United States does not share. So, we have a much more pressing interest in seeking peace than the Americans do. But the Americans are talking peace and instead of being happy about it, most of us in Europe, at least our governments, aren't happy about it at all. They're worried. And some governments, some of our governments, like the new British government, is actually calling in Zelensky, telling him again, we're going to give you all that you want. We invite him to attend the British Cabinet. He's the first leader to have done so since Bill Clinton did in 1997, when Tony Blair invited Clinton to the British Cabinet. Well, now it's Zelensky, apparently. And we're all very, very worried that Donald Trump and JD Vance will come along and will somehow agree peace in Ukraine. It is anybody who has been a student of European history would be absolutely bewildered. The great nations like Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and all the others should have reached this level. But there it is. That is the reality at the moment. What exactly has to happen to shock the Europeans back to their senses? I really don't know. But maybe it is exactly what John says. A major defeat by Ukraine, in Ukraine. Maybe we need it even more than the Americans do. And this is the-- Sorry, John. Let me just quickly jump in here and just sort of build on this discussion. If you go back to the 1990s, there was huge opposition to NATO expansion in the United States, huge opposition inside the Pentagon, from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all sorts of outside strategists, including hawks like Paul Nitza and, of course, George Cannon, who was not a hawk, but was a very prominent figure. So there was huge opposition to NATO expansion. But the decision was made. The first tranche went in 1999. And that opposition in the United States disappeared like snow on a May day. There has been hardly any opposition after that initial wave of opposition in the 1990s. To go back to where Alexander and Glenn, where both of you were talking about what happened in 2008, if the Europeans had had their way in Bucharest, in April 2000, there would have been no NATO expansion. Angela Merkel understood full well that expanding NATO into Ukraine was the equivalent of a declaration of war against Russia. She was adamantly opposed. But what happened is the Russians-- excuse me, the Europeans caved. And after they caved, you never heard a peep from a European leader for a long, long time against NATO expansion. And that's the situation that Alexander's described. And it's analogous to what we saw in the United States. And this supports my general point about once you launch the boats and you get going down the road on a major policy decision, and it involves a great power like the United States and major powers like Germany, France, and Britain. You're really kind of locked in. And it's quite difficult to turn the boat around. It's really amazing and funny. And why we find it so incredibly difficult to get out of it. Yeah, there is something about the status quo. Once a decision has been made, the narrative is developed. Everyone aligns with it. This is why I find it so strange to all the debates, which were being held quite open, the positions, the positions that people were taking in the '90s, the arguments. All of this now effectively equates to being a Russian propaganda. It's quite strange, because I tried to often, when I give speeches and all the remind people and use some of the actual quotes from our own leaders from all back in the '90s about the war. What would happen if we choose to start to expand native? How would the Russians react? And they quite explained why they thought it was a bad idea. They predict how it would end, how the Russians would react. Everything they predicted has played out. And if one brings it up, they don't want to hear. Because, as you said, John, we already picked our course. And now we have to get in our line, so it's quite extraordinary. I can't add anything to that myself. I mean, it's been extraordinary to see a player. I mean, the British, I should say, to my memory, there was never very much debate or opposition to native expansion in Britain, which there should have been. I mean, the British should have known a lot better, but anyway, they didn't. I mean, Blair and Brown in the '90s and the 2000s were very much in favour of it. And the British governments ever since have been. And they've now all got onto, they've all clambered onto this ship. They can't get off it, even as it's sinking. As I said, I was beside myself, actually, when I saw that Zelensky had been invited to the war cabinet, to the cabinet meeting in Downing Street. I mean, I just couldn't quite bring myself to believe that that would be almost the first step that the new incoming British government would take in terms of foreign policy. At precisely the moment when the situation in Ukraine is going militarily so wrong that they would recommit themselves to this obviously failed policy. At the very moment, when in the United States, there's at last now the beginnings of a debate about it. But there it is. I mean, I don't understand how decisions like this can be made, but that's how it is. It seems that in Britain, at least, whether it is because of historic reasons, you know, antagonism to Russia or whatever, we have now so boxed ourselves into this strategy that we simply don't know a way out. - John, before we rock this off-- - You know, Al-- - Have any final thoughts? - Can I just, yeah, I just want to jump in on what Alexander was saying. There's a real paradox here, if you think about it. Britain and the United States, you're effectively saying. I think quite correctly, have been the most NATO expansion and continuing the support to Ukraine. But historically, Britain and the United States have had, one might call, an isolationist outlook towards the continent unless there was a potential hegemon in the region. Remember, the British used to talk about splendid isolationism, right? Michael Howard wrote a famous little book on the Continental Commitment, which was all about getting the British to commit to fighting on the continent. And of course, the United States has a rich tradition of isolationism, and many people feared when the Cold War ended, when World War II ended, that we would go home as we did after World War I. So you have this paradoxical situation that it's the British and the Americans who have historically avoided a continental commitment, who not only want a continental commitment, they want to push NATO down the Russians' throats more than the Europeans on the continent. Very interesting. - Well, this has been a lesson taken from the Americans in British, this idea that, yes, everyone has alliances during times of war to restore an equilibrium, but peace time alliances. This has been something that especially political realists have been cautious about. So if you look back at Morgantau and many other sins, simply because you instigate new challenges, new formations to balance you, and furthermore, it locks you in into conflicts which you may not want. John Hersey referred to this peace time alliances as something from having the right to go to the war to have the responsibility to go to war. And also, of course, instigating these counter alliances. So there's always been a big literature about the dangers of peace time alliances. And obviously, the British and Americans have, due to their offshore balancing, have always embraced this perhaps a lot more than the continental Europeans. But it's, again, this is why I was curious where it will happen to the rationality of the actors, but. - Well, rationality has been in short supply, as all I can say, at least recently. I do hope actually that with the recent developments in the United States and on the battle fronts in Ukraine, at least some people will come down to Earth finally and start dealing with the situation as it is and not as they would want it to be. - Great, and with that fingers crossed. - Oh, indeed. Okay, well, perhaps we'll wrap it up there. That's where, yeah, almost reached our time. John Merchheimer, thank you so much for your time. - Absolutely, John, always a pleasure. - My pleasure, likewise, I enjoyed it thoroughly. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) [MUSIC PLAYING]