The Duran Podcast
Iran's Impending Retaliation - Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen
Hi everyone, I'm joined today by Alexander McCurris and Sayed Muhammad Marandi, who is well known to be an advisor to the Iranian nuclear negotiation team and overall a huge expert on Iran and its relations with the West and the wider world. So this is, yeah, all eyes on Iran at the moment, I guess, as the world is anxiously looking toward the Middle East as a possible direct Israel-Iran war could be imminent with unpredictable consequences. So of course, it's been building up for some time, but Israel now seemingly assassinated this Hamas leader, Hania, who was also achieved Palestinian negotiator to end the war. Everything matters even worse, he is killed in Iran as he participated in the inauguration ceremony of the new Iranian president. So this is a provocation on a multitude of levels and it seems to put Iran in a bit of a dilemma because on one hand, this attack on Iranian soil under these circumstances makes it almost impossible not to retaliate. And I assume at least that there's some growing consensus in Iran that retaliation is required to assert deterrence. So I was, well, I'm still expecting a somewhat hard response. On the other hand, I guess it's no big secret that Israel is also aiming to provoke Iranian response to the extent that they can pull the Americans into a wider Middle Eastern war. So to, yeah, I think they dig them out of the hole, which they have created. So I guess, yeah, my first question would be to say Mohammed, is this, am I reading the situation correctly and if so, what do you expect Iran to do now? I think you're absolutely correct. On the one hand, the Iranians know they must respond and it must be robust because obviously the Iranian response in April was not enough. And the Israelis bombed the Iranian consulate. Iran took their complaint to the UN Security Council and the British, the French, the Americans. And I think the Germans were in the council too, I'm not quite sure, but they all opposed Iran's complaint. They refused to condemn the Israelis. So the only thing left was for Iran to strike it Israel. Now, we've gone over this in all of us before. I think your viewers, being very politically aware, don't need us to go over the threat. The Iranians carried out a limited strike. It was very costly for the Americans and the Israelis. I think it was, it, they spent up to $4 billion in missile, in anti-aircraft missiles, the Iranians fired cheap drones and missiles and except for a handful of more developed and high-tech missiles which got through and struck Israel, the rest were brought down by the Americans. So it was a limited response by the Iranians. It was an intelligence gathering operation, also it was sending a message. And again, it was very costly for the West and Israel. But for a couple of months it worked because the Israeli regime discontinued its attacks on Iranian targets in Syria. And so it seemed that that would be enough. But the attack on Tehran I think showed that to the Iranians that this was not enough and that this time around I think therefore the Iranians are going to strike significantly harder. But at the same time the Iranians don't want a regional war, for a host of different reasons. Because a regional war would mean a global crisis. If there is a regional war, Qatar will no longer have gas to exports. The Emirates, the Saudis will no longer be able to export oil. That would be great for the Russian oil industry. And I think that's something that the Americans and the Europeans should fear. But it would bring down the global economy because the absence of oil from our region would make the price of oil and gas go up so hot that the whole system would collapse. And we saw what was happening and continues to be happening in the global stock markets. The situation is not good. We are entering what is probably a very deep recession, if not a depression. So this I think would be that the Iranians would not want to happen because Iran's friends would suffer. The Chinese, the global South, Iran's neighbors, Iran's friends. So Iran wants to contain this. Iran does not want a regional war. And the ordinary Iranians would suffer, everyone would suffer. However, if the Iranians don't respond adequately, then the Israeli regime will do this again and again. So the response has to be in a way which makes the Israeli regime regret what it did. So that's that we have to see how things play out. Because if the Israeli regime strikes back after Iran strikes, then the Iranians will hit them back again and the Iranians will continue this until the Israelis stop, until the Iranians feel that the Israelis regret going down this road. They have no other option. However, I would add one thing and that is that I don't know Israel well enough. But I think that Netanyahu's interests are different from those of many others in Israel. And Netanyahu and the people around him do want escalation. They've already escalated. We already have an escalation now because we have an escalation. And what happened in Yemen where they struck civilian targets in Al-Hodeid and in Beirut, they struck a civilian target killing ordinary civilians and murdering an Arab man. So we are in and then we've already escalated. There is an escalation. But I think that many Israelis probably do not want this. But Netanyahu, because he's in a dead end, he's failed in Gaza, he's failed on the border with Lebanon, the Americans have failed in the Red Sea and the Israeli regime has become hated across the world for what it's doing to the Palestinians. He needs to change the equation. He needs to escalate to maybe achieve some sort of victory for his own self-preservation. Mohammed, on the last point, just about divisions in Israel, I don't know whether you're aware of the fact, but there was an extraordinary article yesterday in the Financial Times, clearly very well sourced, which talked about a very, very angry meeting that apparently took place in Israel last week. We're not told exactly which day, but apparently it was between Netanyahu with his war cabinet or his cabinet and the security chiefs and the security chiefs apparently pushed back. And they said that Israel needs a settlement. It needs a ceasefire in Gaza. The army is tired. And apparently Netanyahu lost his temper. And according to the Financial Times, they quoted what they lead us to think of the exact words. He used, he called his own general's weaklings. He called the weaklings and he said, you shouldn't be putting pressure on me. You should be putting pressure on Sinwar, who is now, of course, the new head of Hamas. That's the Financial Times, and that's not going from me or from some other independent news outlets. So it was very, very interesting article. But that brings me actually to another point, which is a very strange one, something I really can't get my head around at all. Israel attacks the embassy, the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Israel assassinates one of the commanders of Hezbollah. Israel attacks and assassinates Hani'i in Tehran. We've had other assassinations since then. We've had bombings, more bombing of Gaza, and yet we've had a succession of people, important people, Foreign Minister of Jordan, apparently the Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Lots of people, apparently, from the United States, through Oman and Qatar and all the rest, and they're asking Iran to show restraint. They don't seem to be asking Israel to show restraint in this situation. Do people in Iran notice this? Are they pointing out to all of these dignitaries who are coming to them with all of these messages that these calls for restraint are somewhat misdirected? Because, by the way, it's the same if you read the media here. They're all calling saying, "Iran needs to show restraint in this situation." I mean, it seems to be Iran has been shown for all the reasons you said to have a great deal of restraint, but it is the party that gets continuously requested to show restraint. Even as the other side shows none, are people in Iran noticing this? Are they commenting on the fact? Yes, and I think this is one reason why the Iranians feel that they have to respond, ironically, because every time the Israeli regime carries out this sort of attack or an atrocity or violation of international law, they get no pushback whatsoever from the West, and immediately, instead of the Americans condemning it or punishing the Israelis, they say, "We will protect them if the Iranians respond." So basically what the Americans are saying is that next time around the Israelis, if they attack Iran, we will protect them. If they do it again and again and again, whether it's in Lebanon or Yemen or Syria or Iraq or anywhere else, we will protect Israel, and that means that the Israelis can do whatever they want. So we recognize from the Iranians, recognize that from the feedback they're getting or from the messages that they're getting from the West, that the West has no intention to resolve the issue. They will continue to ... It's just like the JCPOA. The nuclear deal, from day one, the Americans began violating the deal, because the chief negotiator in Iran, he negotiated in good faith. He made a mistake for not having a structure to protect the deal, but in any case, he negotiated in good faith. And so after the deal was signed, and in fact, I told him on the day when the deal was signed, because I was in Vienna, I was a part of the team, I told him that the Americans will violate the deal. I said I didn't think this would work. And it's for the very same reason, because when that we see today with the Israeli regime, whenever the Americans violate the deal, no one is out there to punish the Americans. No one in Europe is going to say, well, we are going to ignore the Americans, and we're going to continue to abide by our commitments. The Europeans constantly would tell the Iranians to have patience. They would constantly tell the Iranians that you should abide by your commitments. So increasingly, the Europeans and the Americans were violating the deal, making life more difficult for Iranians. And then they would constantly tell the Iranians that you should continue to abide by your commitments. And then when Trump tore up the deal, the Europeans didn't come to Iran and say, look, we're sorry, we will disobey Trump, we will continue to work with you. All they said is that you should show restraint. You should continue to abide by all of your commitments. And then the Europeans, they did exactly what Trump wanted them to do. So under Obama and Trump, we received all the same sort of messages as well. And because the Rouhani government was felt vulnerable and weak, they basically did that until ultimately the leader pushed them to discontinue abiding by the deal and gradually run over after a full year of abiding, fully abiding by the commitments, whereas the Americans and the Europeans were opposing maximum pressure, the Iranians then gradually began to discontinue their commitments over a year. So it took two years for the Iranians to leave the deal completely or discontinuous commitments. So this is very similar to that. And I think the Minsk accords are another good example where the West discontinues abiding by commitments, if it ever did in the first place, but it expects the other side to continue abiding by commitment. So in this case, the Iranians are being asked to show restraint. And of course, Iran will show restraint, if it didn't want to show restraint, it would be lobbying drones and missiles from day 1,000, 2,000 every few hours. But the Iranians will have to strike back hard because the Iranians know that the only way to stop the regime from continuing this is to make the regime regretted. Because as I've been explaining, the West is not going to do anything. All they're going to do is to ask Iran to show restraint. The next time that this happens, if it happens again, that's going to be the message from the West. And the Israelis will have, they will face no consequences at all. This is why it's so difficult to make agreements under this, well, what we refer to as the rules based international order, because it's often summarized as rules for thee, but not for me. Then it's often difficult, but given what to explain with this dilemma for Iran, on one hand, it has great pressure to retaliate to have a deterrent. On the other hand, it also has an interest to be restrained. But of course, that restraint can't be seen as a weakness in a denial due to Russia, I think, or comparison is good, because this is one of the critics often here many times in Russia, is that they let NATO step over so many red lines that even out of official discourse in NATO, is that we can do what we want, the Russians, they don't enforce the red line. So it is a difficult position to be in, but what is it that the West can do, or is it doing anything in order to attempt to reassure Iran or incentivize it to show restraint? Because you brought up the previous case when Israel struck the Iranian embassy, and I assumed then that there was some behind the scene discussion between the Americans and the Iranians, where the Americans, well, again, this is my assumption that the Americans promised the Iranians who will restrain the Iranians if you either do nothing or limit your attack, but obviously the Israelis are not restrained. So what is it that the U.S. or West can do, actually, at this point? Because, as you said, they don't want to even condemn any attacks on Iran. So is there any other tools in the toolbox, is this what I'm asking for in terms of trying to bring this situation down, or is it just, are all the cards played now? Well, I think the Americans can do many things. They can stop the genocide in Gaza today if they wanted to. The point is that they don't have the will to do so, or they're not interested in doing so, depending on who you ask. So when the Americans in the Europe, I think we've all seen the footage of what happened in the Israeli detention camp where footage has just come out hours ago from Israeli television. And I don't want to explain further, I think, your viewers are what I'm talking about. Nothing is going to happen. There's not going to be any punishment. There's not going to be any sanctions. The West will continue to provide weapons and ammunition. They're going to continue to provide funding and support and financial assistance. So that the Israeli regime can continue with what it's doing in Gaza. So when I see that continuing, I don't see any reason whatsoever to imagine that the Americans of the Europeans are going to do anything different when it comes to Iran. Although they should be more fearful because it will be catastrophic for the global economy. Those countries that have the most to lose, I think, are Western economies because Syria, for example, it is strangled. The West has been crushing its economy for over a decade. If the global economy collapses, I'm sure it will have a negative impact on Syria, but not nearly as it will in the UK or in France. So North Korea, or I don't know, Cuba, countries that are heavily sanctioned suffer that much. Those countries that will suffer the most are those countries that have larger economies and which are dependent on business and trade. And I think that makes the West among the most vulnerable. So this is something that the West should be very careful about, but when we look at what's happening in Gaza, when we look at what's happening on the border with Lebanon, I find it very difficult to imagine that the Americans or the Europeans will do anything substantial. And I think this goes back to American exceptionalism, Western exceptionalism, which became, I think, a lot worse after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It's always been of the view that the United States felt true, two tragic events happened for the West. One was the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the second was the humiliating defeat of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. On the surface, these were two major victories for the West. But because in a way, the ghost of Vietnam went away, disappeared, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, we reached the end of history, as Fukuyama once said. Even though I think that's what they still believe, even though Fukuyama later changed his position. But I think this is basically what the Western political establishment has concluded. And so in their arrogance that they intensified, that exceptionalism intensified, it made it much more difficult for the world to deal with the West. But I think the reason why the Minsk Accords bore no fruit was because a change of mentality in the West. During the Cold War, the West would have been more careful about abiding by its commitments and may have tried to violate it here and there, or them here and there. But in general, it would have shown more respect. But I think after the Cold War, the West thought what the other side has survived by its commitment, we will abide by our commitments if necessary. I think Clinton once said this when he was president, and I haven't been able to find the clip, but I read this somewhere, that he said that the United States will abide by its commitments unless it doesn't want to, and the audience left. That's where we still are today. And so whether it's the JCPOA, whether it's the Minsk Accords, whether it's human rights and what Israelis are doing in Gaza or to prisoners, I think that this change in the West is largely, or at least to a large degree, new to what happened in Kuwait and what happened with the Soviet Union, and this mentality that we are supreme, we are exceptional, we have exceptional rights, we have exceptional privileges, everyone else has to abide by the rules and the rule-based order. But we are the ones who decide the rules and we can change the rules based upon what we see as necessary, pragmatic and extreme. Yeah, I mean, just on that point, I think you absolutely write about what you've said about the mood of exceptionalism. I also think that something else is now happening, which is that over the last couple of years, the West senses that all that is slipping away, they don't want to admit that to themselves, and that is causing them to double down and become more frenetic and more reckless and therefore more dangerous. That's my only idea. I wanted to ask you about the situation in Iran, because you've just had an election, you have a new president, Mr Pazeshian. If I got the name correctly, correct me if I haven't. There's been a lot of commentary about this in the West. There's been talk about the new president being somehow more open to good relations with the West and even to Israel, and there's been some suggestions that they're now divisions within Iran, that divisions in Iran have emerged. It's an endless trope that gets here, but it's now being given renewed life because, as I said, there's been this election, and there's assumptions that maybe there's cracks in Iran that can be exploited and if we sort of increase the pressure a bit here or increase the pressure a bit there, that's going to somehow change things. Can you comment about this, because it's something that I personally get lots of emails about and messages and all kinds of people tell me, and I've looked at his background, and I don't really see that myself, but maybe I'm getting this wrong. Tell me what you think. Definitely. I just want to add one thing first, and I agree with you completely, ever since the war in Ukraine, actually, I think that's roughly a good starting point where we can really see that the West has become much worse, but I think if we go back further, I think actually from 9/11, this trend began and the stupidity of the war in Afghanistan, and I was actually in the UK at that time, I was a student at the University of Birmingham. I think I was at the first anti-war rally in Birmingham against not the Iraq war, but against the war in Afghanistan, and Blair was going to the University of Birmingham to open the European Studies Institute or something like that, and there are like 60, 70 of us there. I think that was really the start where then Iraq, the West wasted billions of dollars, and then the world was witnessing or saw bits and pieces of what was going on in Iraq and Afghanistan and the deaths and the destruction, and so things began to go, I think, downhill faster, but after I was in Vienna during the negotiations, the nuclear negotiations, and we'd almost reach a deal when the war in Ukraine began, and I was speaking to Western journalists, some of them, I'm sure you know, and I would be telling them that you need a deal now because you're going to have a harsh winter ahead of you, and this winter is going to last for years, but they, in their arrogance, thought that no, we can deal with the Russians, we can deal with Iran, we can deal with China, we can deal with everyone simultaneously, and they thought, as Biden said back then, that we'll turn the ruble into rub, they thought, collectively, those who I spoke with, that this will happen and that the war will end shortly. I know your viewers know this, but I want to sort of mix this with the nuclear program and the nuclear negotiations as well. The West did not take into account its needs, even though it's declining rapidly, you would think as an intelligent person that it would be best not to have multiple conflicts going on at the same time. And if you recall, back then, when the Americans went to the Chinese to ask them to steer clear of the Russians, they were provoking them simultaneously over Taiwan, and the Pelosi, if you recall, she traveled to Taiwan. So while the Americans wanted the Chinese to steer clear of the Russians, they were also provoking the Chinese. While the Americans need, and the Europeans needed Iranian oil and gas, they were still pushing for maximum concessions from Iran, and they were trying to refrain from giving concessions to Iran, despite their energy needs and despite the crisis in Europe. So this exceptionalist mentality continues, even as things deteriorate today, and I think as you rightly pointed out, since Ukraine thinks it would become much worse, much more rapidly, but that mentality hasn't changed. Now when it comes to Iran, I often say that I don't understand Iranian politics. So if you don't understand Iranian politics, I don't either. So you shouldn't be very surprised. First of all, the names that are used in Iran don't really mean much. And for ordinary Iranians, they don't mean much. It's among political elites, and those who are very political, they make some, they make sense to them to a degree. But for example, conservatives, I don't even know who they are, because a lot of people don't, who are often seen to be in the conservative camp, don't see themselves as conservatives. And they in the conservatives don't call themselves conservatives here, they call themselves principalists, in other words, that they are people who have principles, they believe in values and principles and principles. The reformist camp, there is no reformist camp. It's the same thing. It is so broad that it's, for me, it's meaningless. I have many friends who would be considered to be reformists, and they would, they would, the first thing that they would do in some discussion, say, "Look, I'm not a reformist." It's sort of like a bad word for many, for many of them, just like the other side as well. So again, it doesn't make, it doesn't mean much. President, Hezbollah, first of all, like all of the other candidates, he would, he volunteered in the Iranian rock war. So that is a plus in Iranian society. Second of all, he didn't come in as a reformist. He presented himself as a man of the people. And the reformists are usually seen as liberal, at least among elites, again, among broader society reformists, reformists in Tehran, by the way, means something very different than reformists in the provinces. And I don't want to make a comparison, because I think politics in Iran is much more dynamic than the United States, much more dynamic, ironically. But let's say you have a Republican Senator in Illinois. We will be very different from a Republican Senator in Texas. A Democratic Senator in, you know, Trump land would be very different from an American Senator in California or in New York. So when you say Republican and Democrat in the United States, it's not, you know, the definition is not very easy to make, sometimes, in Iran it's much more difficult. It's much more difficult. So President Pézicheon presented himself as a man of the people. He was, I think, the only candidate who didn't wear a suit during the debate, whereas the reformists would, are usually the ones who would be more, you know, they would, they're the more expensive suits, they would look more like the elites. And one thing that I should tell you about reformists in Iran is that the reformists in Iran were the leftists in Iran during the 1980s and the 1990s. They were called the Third Line, they were called the Left. They were in charge of the government. They had, they pursued very, very socialist policies in economics. Culturally, they banned a lot of newspapers. Mr. President Khatami was the head of the Minister of Culture, and he banned a lot of newspapers at that time. So there was a war going on, by the way. So to a degree was understandable. But they, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this is my personal opinion, many may not agree with me, but I'm pretty, I think it's pretty clear, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, even though the Left in Iran was religious, right, the Left, which later became the reformist, and not all of them changed, but anyway, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Saddam Hussein's humiliation in Kuwait, a lot of these people in Iran, like the Left in the West, became disillusioned. And they began to believe that in the end of history, sort of, I don't know if you're getting, you can get what I'm saying. So a lot slipped to liberalism. So they became liberal, religious but liberal, maybe less, some of them less religious, more liberal because liberals, of course, in the West are secular. So their, their identity shifted a lot during the 1990s. From the mid 1990s, you can see the big change. Pezishkian is not like that. Pezishkian is a leftist in many respects. He, he's a person who believes in social justice. He worked for social justice when he was a minister of health. When he was also the head of the Ministry of Health in the province of East Azerbaijan and Tapiis, he pursued policies that were, you know, that helped the poor, that this franchise. So in a sense, he is old school left, and not so much a reformist, in my opinion, when it comes to social issues. Also, and that is actually very similar to what the late president, Raisi, was doing. He also was leftist in many of his policies on social justice, not that he wasn't friendly to a private sector or, or that Pezishkian is hostile towards the private sector. But they, they both believed in, they were both somewhat left leaning in Western terms. They say social, they pursued social justice, their policies, but their beliefs were to pursue post-social justice. So in that sense, the two are similar. And with regards to foreign policy, what Pezishkian has been saying is that he wants to continue expanding time. You, I don't know if your viewers have read his letter, which was printed in the Tehran Times. I think it's a useful document for everyone to read. Those who are interested in Iranian politics, he basically was saying that he wants to continue building relations with those countries that stood with us during the era of sanctions. He spoke in particular about Russia and also China, but even more focused on, on Russia. He spoke about BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, expanding ties with the global South and neighboring countries. And he said he would like to rebuild ties with the West if they changed their policies. That's basically what Pezishkian was saying, sorry, what Raisi was saying, because Raisi was saying. So when it comes to foreign policy, based on what he's been saying, is not different from Raisi. I mean, I'm sure everyone is different because everyone is different. None of us are identical to one another. But in general, you see that his economic policies and his foreign policy is very similar to what we had for the last three years, at least based on his statements. He will be using a different set of people in government, I'm sure. But the stated policies are very similar. Also, in his inaugural speech, he was very pro-Palestinian. It was extremely pro-Palestinian. And Ismaan Haniyeh was there and they hugged afterwards, and then literally later in an official guest house where presidents and prime ministers stay, the Israelis murdered him. And that was a personal insult to President Pezishkian. So this was literally hours after they hugged and they had a meeting together, they murdered this person in the government guest house, where foreign leaders stay, and there were still foreign leaders in the country at the time when this attack took place in one of the guest houses. So I think that the Israeli regime, while it does seek escalation, and or at least Netanyahu's exact escalation, what it has done, it has made the Palestinian issue more personal for the president than it would have been under different circumstances. I like what you framed at the curse of the collapse of the Soviet Union, because I think in the West, we don't often appreciate that the negatives consider, it has to be either or celebrated, but I think it should be recognized at least during the Cold War, there was a balance of power, and when there's a balance of power, you accept the principle of mutual constraint, that a necessity, because political realists would suggest they don't balance themselves. So I think this has been one of the huge challenges also for the West now, after the Cold War is by not being in constraints, not only does it incentivize with expansionist behavior, but these kind of agreements, which are even in our own interest, can't really be made, because why would you accept restraint on yourself? So instead, most international agreements become one where you impose restraint on the other side, but not on yourself. So earlier on, you mentioned Bill Clinton, you know, in Europe, after we decided to expand NATO and effectively exclude Russia from the New Europe, we had the Russia NATO founding act to try to promise not to put new troops into the new member states. And when Clinton, President Clinton, was given this agreement in front of him, he stated that, well, so let me get this straight, we can't put our military in the former allies of the Russians until we maybe wake up on day and change our minds, and then we can do it. And they say, yeah, yeah, that's all it means. So we don't have to commit too much, we'll just get their consent, and we're the same with the Budapest memorandum, the Americans openly said, oh, it's not binding, and they could breach it, but the Russia still had to hold on. So I think this has been a huge problem, and we see, I guess, with Iran as well, as you pointed out, with the nuclear agreement, the Americans unilaterally pull out and still will punish Iran if it doesn't still abide by it. This is not the way to do it, international diplomacy. I think that this is an Alexander, and you would know this better than I, but I think this also is true about policies at home in the West, in that, for example, the riots that we see in London, although they are exaggerated. But whether it's the English, or whether it's the refugees or the immigrants who live in the UK, the situation 20, 30 years ago was very different from what it was from what it is today. The social welfare net across Europe was much broader, and the disenfranchised, whether white or non-white, or people of color, blacks, or whoever, they had more state support. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these policies changed as well, because a lot of these policies were based upon the need or the feeling that they had to prevent their citizens from becoming sympathetic to the Eastern bloc, to the Soviet Union. So they had to do certain things that made life bearable for the poor, the disenfranchised, or the working class, so that they would not tilt towards the Eastern bloc. But when the Eastern bloc collapsed, and I'm not saying that the collapse was a bad thing altogether, but it had these consequences too, it could have been managed in a completely different way, we could have had a better world, but what happened was that the United States became more aggressive and more exceptionalist and same is true with Europeans, but also at home, they began to say that, well, we don't need to take care of these people anymore. We don't need to have such an expensive social welfare net, because there's nowhere for these people to go. And so I think that a lot of the problems today are a combination of both these endless wars, the money that they're wasting, the trillions of dollars that they've been wasting in Iraq and Afghanistan and now in Ukraine and on Palestine, but also simultaneously withdrawing the social welfare net under more difficult circumstances because of these wars. And I think it's going to make things much more difficult for ordinary people, and it will lead to greater social instability. I don't have any doubt about this whatsoever. I mean, one of the great events of the last 40 years since the Soviet Union collapsed, it even began to some extent before, in the last decade of its existence, when people sensed that it was weakening, it is the complete collapse of European social democracy, of which, of course, I was part of them. That was where I began my politics, as I often remind people. And if we're talking about the events in England today, we've had protests before. All you have to do is go back 30, 40 years, 50 years and see how completely differently governments in Britain responded to those events from the way in which they respond to them now. I mean, you know, there would have been investigations, there would have been reports, there would have been attempts to find out what was happening and why it was happening and what could be done to deal with it in a morgue in a humane way, if you like, which is not the kind of case today. But can I move on? Because, you know, we're now talking about the Soviet Union. We now, Iran has just hosted a very important Russian visitor, who is Sergey Shahyuk, who was the defense minister. He's now secretary of the security council, which is a very important position in Russia. I've had it on good authority that he's still the person who overall supervises the conduct, the military conduct of the Ukraine war, by the way. So this is somebody who's still extremely well connected, perhaps even better connected than he's been. So he's gone to Iran, he's had meetings. He met Pizeshkyan. He met the chief of the Iranian military staff. He's met other Iranian officials, so I understand. There's been a lot of talk and rumor, and I'm not asking you, by the way, to confirm this. There's been lots of rumors about Russian sending missiles and radar systems and all of those things. I don't think any of us know whether or not that is true, and we're not going to be told about this. But what I wanted to say is this. I read the Russian media, I read the Chinese media as well. There has been such a very big shift also in these two countries, not just Russia, China as well, about the whole Middle East conflict over the last two or three years. And it didn't happen, as some people think, because of the Ukraine conflict. In the first year of the Ukraine conflict, Russian-Israeli relations actually continued to be quite good. Nftali Bennett, of course, the Israeli Prime Minister, even acted as a mediator for a time between the Ukrainians and the Russians. What has happened is that policy in Israel has become increasingly hard-line, and one senses exasperation on the Russian side, growing exasperation on the Russian side, and growing exasperation on the Chinese side. Now, how is that translated in Iran, because you're now finding yourself again in a potential confrontation with the United States, because the United States, we discussed earlier in the program, is going to back Israel to the hill over these events, even as I read every day articles appearing about how angry President Biden is with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the stormy conversation that they had, and there's even another article today in the Washington Post about how furious the Americans are with the Israelis, but they're still going to back them to the hill. So the point I'm making is Iran isn't isolated anymore, at least not in the way that it was. Does that have an effect? Does that increase the sense of confidence, and can you also tell us a little about this meeting that's taking place, I believe it's today, of the Organization of Islamic States, which I think is an important meeting for Iran, and again, it would not have been a given a few years ago that the Organization of Islamic States would be coming out fully in support of Iran before your countries like Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf monarchies with difficult relations with Iran, more likely, perhaps, to tilt towards the Americans then to show solidarity with the Islamic Republic. How do people in Iran feel about this? I mean, you know, both the political class, the political leadership, but perhaps is this something that people sense, you know, in the streets, in the cafes, when people talk about these things. I'm sure they do talk about these things. What do people feel? Well, Iran is a very political society, and so if you're in the taxi, if you're in the bus, if you're in the metro, you will hear people saying all sorts of things, some of them very strange, some of them very profound, but you'll hear everything. There are two, three things here that I should pursue, but first I also want to point out that if there is war in this region, if there is a broader war, those in Europe and in the United States who are against all these refugees, then they should join the anti-war movement because the reason why there are so many refugees in Europe is because so many countries have been destroyed, just like Latin America. I was in Venezuela, I was invited to Venezuela as a monitor for the elections, and many Venezuelans told me that relatives of theirs had left, and they'd gone to the United States, the numbers are huge, and it's because of the sanctions, so the Americans have imposed sanctions on Venezuela, and I think a least significant portion of all those people who are entering the United States from the South are from Venezuela, of course they're from all across Latin America and even beyond from what I've been hearing, but the point is that when you cause suffering in Latin America, these are the consequences, and now whether the elites in Washington want this or not and they're opening, that's a different debate, but in any case, the fact that the people feel they need to leave their homes, that's another issue altogether, so that is blowback, and in our region, if people in England and in Europe, if they're concerned about the huge influx of refugees, which I think is understandable, then they should be at the forefront of anti-war protests, but Iranian, I can't really comment on all the things that I've been seeing online as you have as well about all these claims coming and going, I don't know how true that is, I really don't know, but what I can say is that Iranian-Russian relations have evolved a great deal, and Iran has been supporting the Russians extensively, a lot of Iranian technology has been transferred to Russia, or Iranian products have gone to Russia, I think we know that, and vice versa, the Russian technology has been a Russian weapon system, and weapons systems, and other goods, of course, they've been coming to Iran. The relationship has evolved a lot, especially since the war in Ukraine. First of all, the Iranians don't see the West as the good guys in this war, they, and I don't want to go over this because your audience, I know they know this very well, but the Iranian, this is what the Iranians have, the Iranians perceive it. The Iranians have history with Russia, and so ordinary Iranians always do have suspicions because of a very long history, the occupation of Iran by Russia, alongside the West, so it's not as if the Russians, Iranians have more suspicions towards Russia than they do of the British or the French or the Americans, but that historical feeling does exist, and there are a huge number of Persian-language media steaming in from the West, television, online media, that are very hostile towards Russia, because they're hostile towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, but they're hostile towards all of Iran's friends, so they're hostile towards China, they're hostile towards Russia, they're hostile towards Iran's allies in Yemen and Lebanon, so they're constantly promoting anti-Russian propaganda within this context, but the relationship with between Iran and Russia has evolved tremendously, and despite all that, and Iran sees the West as the main culprit in Ukraine, Iran sees the expansion of NATO to be a threat to Iran, because of course, if with Ukraine comes, Georgia, and then with Georgia, who knows, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and so this is a threat to Iran as well, and of course, the Iranians saw how the West dealt with the Minskot course, just like they dealt with the JCPOA, and the Western media as usual, they never blame their governments, they only blame the Russians or the Iranians or whoever is non-Western, so the exchange, the business exchanges, the military exchanges between the two countries has changed rapidly, so I don't know if there have been a lot of planes coming and going over the past few days in particular, but I'm very, I'm quite sure that a lot has happened over the last few years, and especially over the last two, two and a half years, and Russian sentiments have, and Russian and Chinese sentiments have changed since the war, but also since Gaza, because the social media, I've been to China a couple of times since the war, since since the genocide in Gaza, and to Russia a couple of times too, social media in Russia and in China are showing things that social media in the West, and of course the mainstream media in the West, are censoring, so the Chinese are seeing children being slaughtered every day on social media, and so too are the Russians, so it's not as if the whole, it's not like 20, 30, 40 years ago, when we are all reliant to a very large degree on what Reuters said, or what the New York Times said, or what CNN was showing us, or what the BBC was showing us, the no, the now, different countries that are on the rise, they have their own means of gathering information, people online have their own means of exchanging information, it's a different world, so Russian, China, their mood towards Israel has evolved a lot, and it has to do a lot with Ukraine and a lot to do with the last 10 months in Palestine, and Iran has benefited from that, and also have, so have they, so the Iranian-Chinese relationship has evolved, the Chinese are buying large amounts of Iranian oil, completely ignoring the Americans, and of course within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and more importantly BRICS and other regional organizations, they are moving towards trade and business and investment that has nothing to do with Western financial institutions, and the dollar and the incentive has grown because back in the past it was Iran that was sanctioned, now Russia, Iran, Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba, the list goes on, and China is fearful that the Americans are trying to cut them off from all of their partners and allies and friends, and then that the Americans will gradually push their own, let's say, allies or their own client regimes away from China, so China has a very strong incentive, especially within the context of BRICS, to move towards building financial institutions and means of trade where the Americans and the Europeans will have no say, all of this is important for Iran, but I think in particular the Iranian-Russian relationship has evolved, it has evolved a great deal, and Israel has suffered for a number of reasons, one is because of its actions, which I think is clear as day, but also Israel used to be seen by many as the road to Washington, it was seen as the person you had to go to to get influence inside the United States, and although the Americans and the Europeans will do almost anything for Israel, they have put pressure on Israel to keep a distance from China and to keep a distance from Russia, and the Israelis have, the role that they've played in Ukraine, for example, I think has made the Russians unhappy, and in general, but in general though, Israel not only for Russians and the Chinese, but also for the Emiratis and countries in our region, it can come clear that they can't really get much from Washington through Israel, anyway. In other words, the situation between the United States and China is not going to evolve because of Israel's support in Washington. The situation in Ukraine is not going to evolve because of Israel's influence in Washington, and I think that it's increasingly becoming clear for countries in the Persian Gulf region that Israel really can't do all that much for them. So Israel is losing its influence in that respect as well. So it's Ukraine, it's Gaza and Palestine, but it's also the divorce that we're seeing taking place, and the fracture that we're seeing across the globe taking place, and which, of course, breaks and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In other regional organizations, their rise is also influenced by this reality. I think if you were going back 20 years, probably when Russia was obsessing about integrating into a greater Europe, it was more willing or prepared to trade away relations with Iran in order to buy its way into Europe. But since that came to an end, and this new strategic vision is greater in Eurasia, I think now effectively Iran has been elevated to an indispensable strategic partner, which changes that whole dynamic, of course. But also, I think you're correct at the same time now, especially the past two years, the relations with Israel has collapsed a bit. I remember I spoke very briefly to the Israeli former prime minister, Ed Oldmert back in 2018 in Kazakhstan, and he was kind of making this big thing about Russians and Israelis having this historical connection. But a lot of this has suffered greatly over the past two years, due to Israel's involvement in the Ukraine war. Anyways, I just had a very quick two-fold question. I just want to ask one example. You know, blood has been spilled in Ukraine, a lot of blood, Russian blood, Ukraine in blood, and this is not going to be... So even, let's say, if Trump becomes president, he's... I don't... I'm not sure he's going to be president, and I don't know what his policies are, because he shifts and changes all the time, and he's very much influenced by the last person who meets him. But he will demand things of Russia that the Russians cannot give, because the Russians have made too many sacrifices, and the Russians will be demanding things that the Westernist arrogance cannot easily give, because of that exceptionalism. So I don't think that the change in presidency, whether it's Paris or Trump, can change things that easily, if at all. And the example that I want to give was the Iran-Iraq war. When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, lots of Iranians and Iraqis died, hundreds of thousands. Over 200,000 Iranians died, and probably more Iraqis. So after Saddam was overthrown by the Americans, ironically, and they... the Americans actually undermined their own position in the region by these invasions. They invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, surrounded Iran, then gradually through their own decline in Iran, supporting resistance groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Americans had to back off, and now we see Iranian allies and the Iranians basically spreading across West Asia. Now the Iranians have surrounded Israel with their allies in Yemen and Lebanon and Iraq and Syria, but that's another story. So, but the point is that Iranians and Iraqis, because of the bloodshed, even though the new government in Iraq was friendly to Iran, many of them were exiled in Iran, but the Iranian people in Iraqi people didn't like each other very much. They had... they lost family members. The only thing that brought about change, a real change among Iran... and I went to Iraq at that time. I could see even... I was at the airport, there was tension between the Iranian pilgrims and the Iraqis at working at the airport, but what fundamentally changed the relationship was ISIS. When ISIS attacked Iran, the Iranians went and fought alongside the Iraqis, and their blood was spilled together, and that was the... that created a new environment between the two countries. So, even after the Iranian-Iraq war and after the fall of Saddam Hussein, relations between the two countries were still very problematic. And so, I don't... and this is what... the reason why I'm saying is that this is that I agree with you completely. The situation has changed. The North-South corridor, the trade relations between Russia and China, the evolving, the growth of the strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and other organizations. These will bring about a permanent change, and the West, it is stupidity by pushing Russia away and humiliating Russia and discounting the importance of Russia. They've helped bring about this change, and it is not going to go back to where it was for the reasons that I think... for the reasons that I stated, if not for many other reasons as well. I should act that there's a massive levels of mistrust now between Russians on the part of Russians towards the West, and I'm talking about ordinary Russians. I mean, Russians I meet in London. I meet a few. I don't know many Russians in London, but I do know enough, and many of them were fervently anti-poutine, by the way, and they've changed precisely for this... these reasons, because they've seen this extraordinary change. The experience of the West, and of the way the West has acted, has changed their feelings. And you know, Alexander, the same is true with Gaza. Two years ago, some of my own students participated in the protests and the riots, and they were influenced by these Persian media media outlets based in the West, and say how evil Iran is, and the West wants to solve the problem, and the Iranian government is insisting on conflict with the West, and now they're seeing what's going on in Gaza, day and night, and how the West supports this. And they, when I say, when we have discussions, they see the world in a very different perspective. I'm not saying they've all suddenly shifted in their pro-government or pro-Islamic Republic, although that has happened, but they have their views of the West have evolved dramatically. Trump nothing. Can I just quickly, I'll ask a question for me, about the Arab world, and Iran's relationships with the Arab states, because I saw the king of Saudi Arabia, one of the people who sent a letter of congratulations to President Bezesh Ghan. He seems to want to continue the relations. We've had statements from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, I believe, all of them say that they're not going to allow their airspace to be used, in a military way, by any party. But, of course, one gets the sense that ultimately they're really talking about an attack by Israel against Iran, because they're not going to be able to fly over Saudi airspace, for example, to do. What is the relationship now between Iran and the Arab states? What is going to happen specifically at this meeting of the OIS? Are we going to see a coming together of the Iranians, the Arabs, all of the Muslim world, not just the Muslim world, but of course, we're talking about specifically the Muslim world. Are they all going to come together, are they all going to speak out with one voice about this conflict, or is it going to be riddled with tensions and disagreements and worries and splinters? I've been reading articles again in the media here that say, well, even if they do all come out and say how they support Iran, ultimately the Arab states, their alignment will continue to be with the United States and with the West. How do Iranians think about this? What is your own feeling about it? One more question. I don't think there's going to be any arguments. It would be very difficult for anyone to defend the Israeli regime now. One of the things that in the West they constantly talked about is an alliance between Arab countries and Israel, but the problem is that they are erasing public opinion from the equation. These family dictatorships, they may want to have good relations with the Israeli regime, but the population doesn't. The longer this genocide continues, the more atrocities we see, the more discontent there's going to be. We all remember what happened in Tunisia a little over a decade ago when one young man burnt himself alive and we saw the consequences across the region. The waters may seem calm today. The sea, the ocean may seem calm, but there's a lot of things happening underneath. The more the Americans push and help, and the more the Europeans push and help the Israelis continue with what it's doing, I think the more tensions will there will be underneath this calm surface, and ultimately something is going to have to give. Now, I don't think that for these reasons anyone in this meeting is going to side with Israel, but I do think that many of these countries will still be under American pressure and they will not move against the Israeli regime. I don't think that the Saudis or the Qataris or the Turks, that they will actively help Israel, but the American facilities in their countries will be used just as they were used in April. The Angelic Air Base in Turkey was used against Iranian drones and missiles, and so were facilities in Bahrain and Qatar and across the Persian Gulf, and these countries continue to allow the Americans to do that. Jordan, of course, allowed the Americans to use air space to, but they, when the Israelis would want to, when the Israelis would bomb Syria, so then the Jordanians would help block Iranian drones and missiles, but when the Israelis planes would fly over Jordan to bomb Syria, the Jordanians have no problem with that. I think that will continue. That's my personal opinion. However, the tensions that are building up in Jordan among ordinary people, the tensions that are building up across the region, I think these are things that the West is ignoring. The revolution in Iran was a very, very good example. We had tens of thousands of military advisors from the United States in Iran during the late 1970s, and they were each taking a lot of money and doing really nothing in the country, and the Iranians were not allowed to even talk to their own F-14s. So the Americans were making a lot of money in Iran, selling a lot of useless weapons to the country, and the Iranians weren't allowed to touch. All this was creating anger in Iran, and they were imposing themselves on the country, making decisions, trying to change the Iranian culture, all that sort of thing. But the Americans never saw it coming. They never saw the revolution coming. In fact, Jimmy Carter, just before the revolution began to explode, he came to Iran and said Iran under the Shah as an island of stability. So it's very foolish for the Americans to allow the Israelis and the Europeans to continue down this road, because all of these regimes in the region that are silent in the face of the atrocities in Gaza, they are becoming increasingly vulnerable. So I don't think that they're going to oppose Iran, and I think it's going to be a platform for Iran to hammer the Israeli regime and the Americans and the Europeans politically. And it gives Iran space to speak to global public opinion, but more importantly, regional public opinion. But I don't think that in reality, these countries are going to do much. Although, everyone does see the decline of the West. Everyone sees it. The Saudis see it, the Emiratis, and that is why they are trying to improve relations with Iran. That is why they're trying to improve relations with China, with Russia. For example, the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the help of the Chinese. All of this is a result of the fact that people in this region recognize even those who are very close to the West. And they are very close. Their children are brought up there. Their investments are there. Their bank accounts are in western banks. They go to the West for vacation. They don't usually travel to Russia or Iran or to China for this sort of thing. So they are bound to the West. But they do recognize that the world is changing fast, and they are looking for ways to hedge their bets. And I did it, by the way, in interrupt Glenn. And I don't think he asked me his question, although I think Alexander may have to be soon. So I apologize. Well, I was going to say, I'm a bit over time. So I'll keep it brief. And actually, I want to, I like to understand, I think, stolen a question of it. I was curious about how Iran would, to one extent, is speaking now with our neighborhood in anticipation of this. But let me instead ask them, because often we discuss whether or not Iran will retaliate or not retaliate. But the Israel alternative to the large, like a similar strike with drones or missiles is somewhere in between, like as an assassination, or attack through proxy, or is there something else to do to restore the turns? Or do you see it now most likely to be something similar, but more advanced missiles, more advanced drones? If the previous time was a warning shot, now it's going to be more severe, but along the same lines, or is there no go-between answer, I guess? Well, I'll try to be very brief. First of all, the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf are very scared, because Americans have bases in their countries. And if the Americans strike Iran for any reason, they will be seen as hostile. And they are key infrastructure, including their oil and gas infrastructure, ships, but also other infrastructure. They are water purification systems, they're electrical, powerful plants. All of these are very vulnerable. Iran can take out anything it wants within a couple of days. They can just destroy everything. So these regimes know that they will not last if there is war. They will be gone very shortly. In fact, some people sometimes joke, they say that the Emirates will become a non-Arab country, because 80 to 90% of the people in the Emirates are not even from the region. They're from the Indian subcontinent, they're from South East Asia, so be a non-Arabic-speaking country. Hopefully, we'll never get there. But if the Americans attack Iran, the Americans will lose everything in Iraq. Iraqi resistance will expel the Americans and probably the Europeans, and the same is true, of course, in Syria. So it would be a catastrophic. It would be catastrophic for the world. So these countries in the Persian Gulf are very fearful of an expansion of war for it to become a regional war. With regards to the Iranian response, I think that it will be much more significant than it was in April. I think the response in April was not really a show. It was important. The Iranians use their very old drones, hundreds of 300 drones and mostly older missiles to gather intelligence, but also to draw fire from everyone. As I said, the Americans and Israelis together, I think, spent roughly $4 billion, where for Iran it was almost nothing. But also the Iranians sent a handful of missiles, over 10 missiles that went more advanced missiles that went right through the shield and hit their targets to send a message. But the Iranian -- it was basically an intelligence gathering operation, but also it was the first time that Iran carried out a direct strike against Israel. Israel gave Iran that opportunity. Because until now, the Iranians were not able to strike Israel because the Israel never struck Iran. They did kill Iranians in Syria, but not -- they did never target the Iranian-owned targets, Iranian territory, like the embassy or Tehran. So the Iranians did that to both punish the Israelis and the Americans. It was costly for the West. It was a great intelligence gathering operation as well. But they also wanted to show that, look, we're not seeking a regional war. And that's also sending a message to the Russians, the Chinese and neighbors, and, look, we're not the ones. You have to yank on the leash. It's not us. Since that didn't work, Iran will have to hit harder. I have no doubt about them. It will hit harder. The Israelis will suffer more. It's not just Iran. Hezbollah will hit them because they have their own grievances. The Israelis cross the Red Nine. They bombed Beirut, and they hit a civilian building. Get to one person. They bombed the capital. In Yemen, they bombed Al-Hudaydah. They didn't strike Ansarullah. They didn't strike the Houthi, they struck a civilian target. And so I think they're going to have a -- it's going to be a punishing response. And then it will be up to the West to make sure that we don't get a regional war. Because they're the ones that they hold the leash. If they don't want to pull on the leash, it's up to them. But after April, after April, Israel could have been -- everything could have been contained. But after what they did in Tehran, Iran knows that if they don't hit back, it will happen again and again and again. So they really have no option. Well, these are terrifying times. So, yes, so say the moment, Barandi. Thank you so much, Alexander. Thank you as well. Yeah, this has been very interesting. So, yeah, thank you for both for your time. Thank you both for having me. Thank you, Mark. Thank you, Mohamed. Thank you. [Music]