Pakistonomy
Ep 204 - Assessing Biden's Policy Towards Israel and Palestine
This episode is about assessing Joe Biden’s foreign policy as it relates to the ongoing conflict in Gaza. While not a whole lot has changed in terms of the substance of US policy towards Palestine and Israel, a lot has indeed changed in terms of the political discourse in Washington.
Uzair talked to Matt Duss about these developments and the long-term implications of Biden’s foreign policy choices. We also talked about the prospects for a broad agreement with Saudi Arabia, and the ways in which communities can engage at the grassroots levels to influence foreign policy.
Matt Duss is Executive Vice-President at the Center for International Policy. The Center for International Policy is a woman-led, progressive, independent nonprofit center for research, education, and advocacy working to advance a more peaceful, just, and sustainable U.S. approach to foreign policy.
Before joining CIP, Duss was a visiting scholar in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 2017-22, Duss was foreign policy advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt). Duss’s work has been widely published, including in The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, The Nation, The American Prospect, and Foreign Policy.
Chapters: 0:00 Introduction 2:20 What has changed in Washington? 5:20 Role of AIPAC 8:40 America’s leverage over Israel 12:20 Impact of the presidential debate 18:35 Long-term implications of US choices 22:10 Saudi-Israel normalization 27:10 Key risks on the horizon 30:30 What can we do to change policy? 32:45 Reading recommendations
Reading recommendations
- The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy, and the Life of John Maynard Keynes by Zachary D. Carter
- Miles: The Autobiography by Miles Davis and Quincy Troupe
- Duration:
- 35m
- Broadcast on:
- 03 Jul 2024
- Audio Format:
- mp3
(upbeat music) - Hello and welcome to another episode of "Pagasonomy." My name is Uzair Yunus, and today we're going to be talking less about Pakistan, although it's adjacent to Pakistan in terms of the conversation, but more about what's going on here in Washington and the Biden administration's foreign policy and assessing what is working and what's not working since the war in Gaza began. And joining me for this conversation today is Matt Duss. Matt is executive vice president at the Center for International Policy. For those of you who don't know, the Center for International Policies of Woman-led, Progressive, Independent, Nonprofit Center for Research, Education, and Advocacy, working to advance a more peaceful, just and sustainable U.S. approach to foreign policy. Matt is somebody who's been a leading voice in the foreign policy ecosystem here in Washington, somebody whose work I deeply admire and respect. He was a visiting scholar before joining CIP in the American State Craft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And from 2017 to '22, Duss was foreign policy advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders. His work has been widely published in a variety of publications, including the New York Times and Foreign Affairs. And if you follow him on Twitter, you will notice that he has very strong views on criticizing Biden's foreign policy in particular with regards to Israel and Gaza. And this is where we are going to start our conversation today. But before I do that, Matt, welcome to Pakistani me. And thank you so much for your time today. - No, thank you for inviting me. It's great to be here, looking forward to the conversation. - I wanted to start with your recent interview to the New Yorker, where you said that the Israel-Palestine issue is now being viewed, quote, "in a much more critical way," end quote, and that this is a quote reflection of the change in politics, end quote. But to many on the outside, including people I talked to in sort of DC and outside DC, in India, Pakistan, other parts of the world, they don't see that change. They don't agree that much has changed since October 7th and then sort of following the terror attacks by Hamas and everything else that has happened in Gaza and Palestine since then. Help us understand why you think and how do you think things have changed during Washington? - Right. I mean, I think that's a great question. You know, I can understand people looking from the outside. I mean, the bottom line is President Biden's position has been essentially just complete unconditional support for Israel and what Israel is doing in Gaza and what Israel has been doing before October 7th. And I think that is the most important thing. We have to acknowledge that. But I also think if we look at some of the criticisms, some of the rhetoric and some of the differing positions that are coming from members of Congress, mainly I think exclusively from Democratic members of Congress, the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, the squad, so-called, but not just the squad. It's a wider, it's a broader swath of Democrats who are now speaking much, much more critically of Israeli policy, certainly of Israel's war, but who are also lifting up the issue of Palestinian rights and justice for the Palestinians at ending the occupation than ever have before. I mean, I came to DC in 2007 and the conversation we are having around these issues is so different from the conversation we were having then when I first came in. That's a tribute to the work of so many people of activists, of Palestinian-American and Arab-American activists, but not only. It's a tribute to the work I think of young Jewish activists like the people and if not now, many of whom I know of Jewish voice for peace. And also a tribute to the work of I think many brave members of Congress who are talking about these issues in a different way that acknowledges the needs, not the security and dignity of not just Israelis, but of Palestinians. So I think that is how the conversation has shifted. But ultimately, as you said, it is the president who really determines the direction of US foreign policy. And right now we have a president, Joe Biden, who has made clear repeatedly that his commitment is to one side and that is to the state of Israel. But I would just say, you know, I think and others have said this as well. And Joe Biden, I think, is probably going to be the last Democratic president who approaches these issues in this way. I think a president who is going to be more reflective of his or her party is going to take a much different approach in the future. - I wanna come back to the president in just a moment. But before I do that, you mentioned the squad. And so what we've also seen, right, is this ongoing campaign by APAC and other mega donors to sort of put a lot of money behind races where they think that people like Jamal Bowen who lost his primary in New York and others have been targeted. How is sort of the Democrat party from your point of view viewing its relationship with APAC? I've seen and I've been struck by sort of like progressive outlets and publications and even MSNBC talk a bit more openly about APAC being funded by Republican mega donors, et cetera. Help us understand where that relationship stands because that again has been a powerful way of influencing policy in Congress. - Right. There's a few things to say about this. One is the focus on APAC, the criticisms of APAC, I think are a reflection of all the work that's been done that I mentioned of shifting this debate, of talking substantively about the policy positions that APAC pushes for and advocates and enforces. But there's a second piece of this as well is that APAC now, this over the past two election cycles, has overtly and explicitly been investing money in certain primaries. This is new. For the longest time, APAC did not itself engage in funding. There was an understanding certainly that APAC would kind of direct funding, which is what they did, like it give the nod to certain donors to support certain candidates over others. That was well understood. But the fact that APAC itself is now funding to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, I think the amount that was plowed into Jamal Bowman's race was well over $20 million, but I think some 15 million around that amount was just from APAC and affiliated APAC donors. - It was the most expensive primary in American history. - That's right. It was the most expensive primary in American history. And I think the fact that APAC is now after years of avoiding this kind of overt funding of campaigns, the fact that it is now doing this is a self a reflection of how the debate has changed. APAC recognizes that in order to enforce and sustain a kind of Israel can do no wrong approach in Congress, it really needs to spend lots and lots and lots of money. And I think that is instructive to everyone. - Coming related to that now, right, is this issue that we saw again, the change. For me, sort of if I were to look at sort of inflection point, so to speak, in sort of this change that has happened in Washington was Senator Schumer and his speech, sort of seeking or not demanding, but almost doing that BB step down and be replaced because this could no longer go on. But then since then we've seen Senator Schumer, Democrats and Republicans extend an olive branch to Netanyahu who's supposed to come this month to Washington to address Congress. We've seen President Biden through Axias and other media outlets, the White House and the NSC saying, "We're not happy with him undermining things." He sort of BB came out about the weapons, shipments, delays and there was anger, quote unquote, in the White House about that. But despite that, we're seeing that Netanyahu is coming to Washington. I think the president may or I don't know if he's going to confirm meet the president himself, but Congress has joined addresses happening. We have talked a lot about sort of in Washington and in the press that the United States and the president has a lot of leverage here, but neither Congress nor the White House seems to be open to using that leverage. Why is this the case despite all this pressure despite the fact that the Democrats and many significant parts of the Democratic Party are up in arms about this? - Right, I mean, just as you said, I think Senator Schumer's speech on the floor a few months ago was a huge moment for a lot of reasons. One is just Schumer himself, obviously, as the leader of the Senate Democrats, a longtime pro-Israel voice, a very mainstream Democrat for him to be saying those criticisms and the way he did was a huge moment. And I think marks the shift in the conversation the Democratic Party is having. But as I said in the interview with Isaac Chodner and the New Yorker, I think what's going on here is that you had the Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson and probably or not probably almost certainly with the connivance of Benjamin Netanyahu of kind of putting this invitation out there and essentially daring the Democratic leadership, Hakeem Jeffries and Chuck Schumer to kind of say no to it, which I think they should have done. But unfortunately, I think some of the old tendencies still dominate here in my certain, what I said in the interview and I still think now is that Jeffries and Schumer saw the kind of path of least resistance or the least bad consequences was to kind of just go along with it. And I disagree with that for all kinds of reasons, political, moral and strategic, but here we are. So yeah, I mean, well, it remains to be seen whether Biden will give Netanyahu a White House meeting, which I think would be just yet another staggering cave, but that's basically what we've seen, unfortunately, from this administration and dealing with Netanyahu is they kind of indicate some red or maybe pink lines and then Netanyahu just plows right over them and they just kind of don't do anything about it. That's what we just saw in Rafa a few weeks ago where President Biden and his team were very clear that they did not want to see a major operation in Rafa. And after some hesitation, the Israeli military went forward with it and Biden just kind of folded. - I want to look at sort of the implications of all this now, right? That you've explained what's going on here in D.C. And I have a point of view on what comes next and it's linked to two events that have happened in the last few weeks. One, obviously, is the debate and let's start there. And the fallout of that debate, lots of conversations about whether the price president should stick on or sort of depart and say, you know, the delegates are free to choose as they want, et cetera. We don't know where that will go. But my read of this from a foreign policy point of view and I would love your thoughts on this where is that if you're Netanyahu, if you're the Iranians, if you are Hezbollah, if you're Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, any sort of revisionist actor let's call it that in the region or around the globe, basically now looks at that performance on the debate and says, well, this is almost a lame duck president. He has no leverage. And if Donald Trump is going to come to power in November and when the elections, he does not care for the international order or remotely any rules-based order. So we can keep pushing whatever it is that we want right now because Joe Biden isn't going to be able to do anything of substance and it doesn't matter what he does. How do you read sort of the foreign policy implications of the debate performance last week? - Right, I think it's, as you said, I mean, I think a lot of the actors that you mentioned, we're already kind of playing a waiting game. We're already betting, essentially betting on a Trump return. It's hard to imagine they've been discouraged from that after watching Thursday's performance. I mean, you know, I'll just go a little bit further and say, I mean, should they want to take, you know, precipitous action on a whole range of things in the interim, even before Donald Trump, you know, wins reelection if they think he's going to do that. You know, the Joe Biden that both our country and the world saw on Thursday, I can't imagine that gives them, you know, much, much pause or caution in doing things the United States wouldn't like. - Yeah, and I think like what one of the things that I think Axios reported this was that his aides want to make sure the president, you know, is at his peak from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. And then he starts to fade or is fatigued after that point. And I'm like, well, if I'm Putin, then perhaps 11 p.m. Or 1 a.m. is the right time for me to make a move because it'll take some time for the president to warm up, essentially. - Yeah, you know, I'm laughing, but I'm also crying inside 'cause, I mean, that's exactly right. I'm sorry, this is, you know, people get old, some people get old faster than others, but I think there is just no denying what everyone saw in front of their eyes on Thursday night. And I think it's also a reflection on the fact that, you know, some in the White House and others have been denying this for so long. So we really are confronted about what to do about this now. - Do you also see parallels here, Matt? - Like from, again, my point of view, this foreign policy issue as it relates to Gaza and Israel. Obviously, the White House and the president has a lot of power, but we've seen from public reporting as well that it's sort of been a very narrow group of people that has influenced policy in that space. And now we hear reporting come out that even on the debate prep and the choices that are being made in the White House, he's sort of being protected by a very dominant inner circle that has groups saying this was political reporting just this morning on this issue. Do you see parallels here in terms of domestic implications on politics and how foreign policy is also being run under this White House? - Well, there's a couple things. One is, you know, Joe Biden is not the first president to have a very tight circle of advisors, you know, with whom, you know, who he trusts and who have real access and who have the real ability to convince him of things and who, you know, kind of protect him, let's say, from certain things. But I think, you know, I saw the political piece you referenced, it does seem like this is a bit different given that we're talking about real mental capacity here. I read that political piece and some of the things they were saying, you know, they tried not to let information in that could outrage the president or whatever word they used. And I hate saying this, but like this reminded me of reading pieces about Trump, whose, you know, temperament and, you know, refusal to kind of contend or confront like, you know, you know, information he didn't like or think that's disappointed him. It kind of just creates, you know, a tendency on the part of your close staff to avoid, you know, to avoid confronting you with that stuff. I don't wanna pretend these two things are the same, they are not, but they are close enough to really, really concern me, especially when we are, you know, it's bad enough to deal with the president who's just cranky and who doesn't like hearing things he doesn't like. But again, going back to what I said earlier, it's clear that we are now dealing with a basic capacity to perform the functions of the presidency. - Yeah, and to me, like you talk about Trump, when I read that part, it just reminded me of my grandfather and passed over a few years ago, but towards the tail end, lived to be 90. So like in his 80s, basically, the rule of thumb was that if something that is going to upset him as happened, well, try not to tell him about it and just, you know, pretend that nothing happened because otherwise he would have to deal with his temper. And that's just how it is over time with age. And it's just unfortunate that it's so late now when the game that we're in July, and we have to deal with this whole crisis. - Yeah, I agree. As you said, I mean, people get old and, you know, we love them and we take care of them. But they shouldn't be the president. - Yeah. I want to switch to the more structural implications of all this. I think this is sort of like, you know, would love your insights looking ahead in terms of what happens in the near term with the elections coming up. But more importantly, America standing in the world, right? Like, this was a conversation when the war in Ukraine broke out. I remember having conversations with my friends and colleagues and peers and let's hit Pakistan about why Pakistan should have been more on the side of the Ukrainian, smaller power being invaded by large power, all those reasons. And the United States, obviously, Secretary Blinken and the White House and others were arguing for a more rules-based order and how this was a threat to that and the Chinese were a threat to the rules-based international order. And many in the global south would just automatically say, well, these are just words, Americans don't really believe any of this. And a lot of us at least myself would argue, you know, this actually matters. And this is an important part of the foreign policy agenda of this White House. Well, since October, it turns out that not much matters related to that. And we are in this phase on the back of sort of the US invasion of Iraq and the war on terror, the use of torture and all those things have built up, right? And led us to this moment and there's even deeper history, but let's stick to the 21st century when it comes to this topic. What do you think are the long-term ramifications of all of these things related to the US sort of having one set of standards for Putin and his war crimes and another set of standards for Israel and Vivian Netanyahu and his war crimes? - Yeah. No, I think the implications and consequences of this are very serious because exactly as you said, I mean, you know, I've written it and I've said, I think, you know, the administration's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine or its full-scale invasion of February 2022, both before and subsequent was very admirable. You know, laying out a case for the rural space international order, making it argument for why this was a violation of it, I think was really valuable. I just, I want our country to actually mean it. And, you know, and as you said, I'll just repeat essentially what you said is like, since October, but even before October, their approach to the Palestinian issue will already show that, well, it applies to some people, but it doesn't apply to all. And their response, you know, since October 7 has just laid that completely bare. You know, we have, you know, we can point to examples of, you know, the Israeli military using literally the exact same tactics on Palestinian civilians, that the Russian military is using on. Ukrainian civilians, you know, besieging cities, cutting off electricity, you know, food and water, Israeli government officials explicitly saying that this was their strategy, this is what they were going to do. And the Biden administration, you know, not acknowledging that at all, even to this day, they won't acknowledge that there's any similarity. And, you know, I don't want to, you know, I think it's misleading to pretend, you know, let me back up, I'll just say this. I mean, you mentioned Pakistan's response. I mean, you saw different, differing responses from countries in other parts of the world, the developing world, the global South, whatever term we want to use here, different in response to Ukraine and Palestine. And, you know, I don't want, so there is a hypocrisy that exists there as well. You know, countries act based on their interests and these double standards exist in all kinds of countries, whether in the global North or the global South. But I do think that the Biden administration's response to October 7 and the subsequent war has really upheld a double standard rather than trying to, you know, create a single standard, rather than trying to create a genuinely rules-based order, which is what I would like to see. I would love to see the United States, you know, you know, approach a rules-based order, not just as a rhetorical kind of tool, not just as a cudgel to beat up on our adversaries, but actually as something that we try to work to build and sustain and strengthen and enforce. And, unfortunately, we have just done the opposite since October 7. You also follow the Middle East closely. And over the last few weeks and months, we've had this recurring conversation in Washington about how the Biden administration has this plan related to eyeing Saudi Arabia under a security umbrella with the UAE, with Israel, almost to sort of cut out Iran, and at least in my view, by extension, China from the region. How do you see that strategy playing out and the receptivity to, let's say, a treaty-style agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia related to what has been talked about in the press? - Yeah. I mean, just to be straight up, I mean, I don't think this agreement is going to happen. At least not the kind of, you know, security guarantee part of it, which would require the approval of the United States Senate. I just don't think they have the votes. I didn't think they had the votes before October 7. But especially now, as a number of senators have made clear, I mean, first of all, they're skeptical of the value of a deepening US-Saudi relationship. But they're also skeptical of the possibility that this Israeli government, or even an alternative Israeli government, would make any real or tangible, credible commitments on a Palestinian state. But as you said, I think what's important to note about this proposed agreement, it is guided by this kind of, you know, prioritization, I would say, obsession with strategic competition with China. That is the lens through which, you know, much of Washington and including this administration sees US foreign policy now, is how do we put ourselves in the best position to compete with China into the future? And I don't dismiss that completely. I obviously, I mean, there are things that the Chinese government is doing, the Chinese Communist Party that I disagree with, both internally and externally. I think, you know, they have a vision of China's role in the world that I think conflicts with, you know, some of the values that are very important to me. But I think, you know, ultimately China is not going anywhere. I mean, this Chinese government is not going to fall. It faces challenges of its own, as our government does. But I, you know, I am concerned that as with the war on terror of the last 20 years, this obsession with, you know, China as the new ultimate security threat, now that it's overtaken terrorism as the new ultimate security threat, is going to crowd out actual good intelligent debate. We're kind of in this, you know, bidding war about who can be stronger against China. And, you know, as we saw, you know, over the previous 20 years that we were in a bidding war of who's tougher on terrorism and why do you, why aren't you fighting terrorism harder in this? And that doesn't lead to a good policy discussion. That leads to a very, very stupid policy discussion. - Yeah, and I think on the terrorism point as well, right? Like one thing at the time, 'cause I was just in Pakistan a few weeks ago and the concern there at least is sort of already was a second wave of terrorism following the fall of Kabul. And there's a lot to critique there about the Pakistani role in sort of helping the Afghan Taliban come to power in a way. But the agreements were made and now that we see ISIS Khorasan there, terror attacks in Russia and Dagestan happening. But more importantly, since October 7th, we've had reports of terrorist activity that has spiked on the Houthi route through Hezbollah and other things. And at least to me, I would love your thoughts on this. Washington doesn't seem to fully grasp the long-term repercussions on the radicalization front in West Asia and the greater Middle East as a result of this ongoing conflict in Gaza. - No, I mean, I totally agree. I mean, it's not just East Asia. I mean, I think it is in much of the global South, much in the developing world, which has the Gaza war has given them just exhibit A for how all the rhetoric, all the high-flowing rhetoric about liberalization and rules in international law that they've heard preached from the global North or, you know, particularly the global Northwest is essentially just a front. It is, it's a sham. And I think that's tragic. And I think that the repair work that's going to be required if we're ever going to repair this is, you know, it's gonna be very, very hard and it's going to take a very long time. - Given what's going on, Matt, in the region, obviously over almost 100,000 Israelis displaced in Northern Israel has been in Lebanon similar, like basically an unlivable zone. If I remember the press reports directly in Lebanon, talks of war that the Israeli army is prepared for conflict as Hezbollah is also saying that it is also prepared, threatening Cyprus. For example, what are some risks that are top of your mind that you are watching for? Whether in the Middle East or other parts of the world that concern you the most given the politics in DC and the fact that America is now entering an election cycle that is going to be much more volatile than perhaps we anticipated 10 days ago. - Yeah, no, I think the possibility of war at Israel's Northern border, the border of Lebanon is very real. I've been hearing about this for weeks. I'm sure you have as well. There are some who say, well, you know, Hezbollah doesn't really want a war. Iran doesn't really want a war. And that may be true, but that has not stopped wars from happening in the past. You know, countries get drawn into these cycles of escalation, you know, even when they really don't want to, they feel they need to for reasons of credibility, et cetera, et cetera, domestic politics matters in all of these countries. As I mentioned, the bidding war that takes place in the United States around China or other issues, these same dynamics exist in other countries and within the organizations in other countries, just as they do in the United States. I think that's something we don't appreciate enough is that other countries have their own domestic politics. - Including non-democratic countries. - That's right, that's right. You know, but this really does all come back. And again, I'm not gonna pretend that the issues with Hezbollah and Israel are all about Gaza. These are, this is a much deeper history, but I think we can say, you know, pretty clearly that this current potential escalation is about Gaza. That is when these rockets from Northern, from Southern Lebanon started to get launched into Israel, was after October 7. And ultimately, if we really wanted to fuse the possibility of greater war in the region right now, which has been a priority of the Biden administration, I will just acknowledge that. I mean, this has kind of been their approach. I don't agree with it, but I want to acknowledge it, is that what they're, you know, their real red line is they don't want regional escalation. They are essentially going to support Israel doing what Israel wants to do in Gaza. I think that's tragic. I think it's immoral. I think it's unstrategic, but that is their approach. They have, but they have been hard at work both through military and diplomatic means to try and stop it from spreading beyond Gaza. I think that will fail soon if the Gaza war does not cease. And I wish, and I've continued to write this for months, is I wish this administration would use some of the pretty enormous leverage that it has over the Israeli government and the Israeli military in terms of suspending weapons. They just haven't really done that, apart from one small pause in 2000 pound bomb, some of the very worst and indiscriminate weapons. But there's a whole range of weapons and other things the United States provides to Israel that we could and should be suspending to bring this war to an end. - Yeah, and I think that's the unfortunate part, right? That on the one hand, the administration continues to argue that it wants to cease fire, but it's unwilling to stop the flow of weapons that would result in that cease fire and that's the tragedy here in and of itself. Last question for you, Matt, again, as you said, you've been in Washington for a long time 'cause you started this conversation, right? The conversation we're having today would not be possible in 2007, but many young people that I speak to see very little hope when it comes to changing America's foreign policy and that policy reflecting, not just in Israel and Gaza, but across the board, their own values and their own moral position on the issues. This is the sentiment in particular among Muslim Americans and I wanna hear from you, like, given the energy and the desire and the appetite for change, how can these communities engage to shape a more progressive foreign policy? Because, again, I think anger and energy is good, but if it's not channeled in the right way, it's useless in my view and would love your thoughts on what can be done to take things to the next level here. - Well, there's a few answers to that. It's a great question and I understand what people are frustrated. But again, as I said, I mean, looking at the way the discussion around these issues, not just Israel, Palestine, but foreign policy in general, has shifted over the past 10 to 15 years, even though we're in a moment of great frustration and danger and pain. When I step back and I look at how this debate has shifted and the champions we have in Congress and the issues we're talking about and the way we're talking about now, I am encouraged. That may sound strange given the chaos and destruction we are witnessing all around. But I do think this conversation has shifted and we need to keep shifting it. We need to keep pushing better ideas. We need to keep supporting members of Congress and electing new members of Congress who can champion these ideas, who share these values. We have more voices in Congress right now talking about a foreign policy based on progressive values than we have in my lifetime. And that's a tribute to really hard work that's been done at the grassroots level, at the local level. So I would just encourage anyone who is listening to get engaged at the local level and talk to your member of Congress. And if that member of Congress or that senator is not representing the values that are yours, that you should look for other options. - Yeah, and I think ultimately, that's what matters, grassroots organization is what it's all about. This has been a wonderful conversation. Again, thank you for your time. And before I let you go, I always ask my guests this question. What are two or three books you would recommend to the audience? - I love this question. I'll just mention to one is my friend, Zach Carter, it's a few years old now, but I highly recommend his book on John Maynard Keynes. It's called The Price of Peace. On John Maynard Keynes is a famous philosopher and economist who was doing work in the early 20th and mid 20th century. It's really fascinating. So many of the ideas that he was talking about, his criticism of the treaty that ended World War I and his predictions of how austerity and inflicting these concessions on societies would create worse outcomes than how vindicated he was tragically. But it's just a great book, it's very well written. And not being an economics person, I mean, it's a great way to learn about some of these ideas in a really, really well-written narrative way. And to turn to something that is not politics, I would recommend Miles Davis's autobiography. It's called Miles, written with the writer Quincy Troop. It's one of my favorite memoirs. I'm a huge music fan, a big jazz fan, and anyone who likes jazz music or music in general, I would recommend reading them. - Thank you for that recommendation. We often don't get biographies or autobiographies on this podcast, so I appreciate that recommendation. And I see a guitar, I think, in the background as well. - Yeah, there's actually two back there. It was one in the case, but so yeah, you got me. - There you go. So yeah, appreciate those recommendations. Appreciate your time and your insights. Always learn a lot from your commentary. So thank you for joining me on the podcast today. Have a great four July weekend and we'll be in touch. Thank you so much. - Thank you, YouTube, glad to be here and have a great four. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) [MUSIC PLAYING]