[MUSIC PLAYING] Hello. You're listening to the next page, the podcast, the librarian archives at UN Geneva, dedicated to advancing the conversation on multilateralism. I'm Amy Smith, and today's episode is all about what we now call communications, and we'll be delving into the history of what became known as the information section of the League of Nations. I'm delighted to have here with me Emile Seidenfaden, who knows a great deal about this topic. Emile is a postdoctoral researcher at the Saxo Institute at the University of Copenhagen. He specializes in 20th century European history, the history of international organizations and intellectual history. His work explores the intersections of journalism and diplomacy by combining international history and media history. Today, he's joining us to talk about his recent book, Informing into War Internationalism, which is published by Bloomsery Academic. I mean, Seidenfaden, welcome to the next page. - Thank you very much. It's great to be here. - It is a very interesting approach that you've taken to this topic, combining intellectual history and international history and the history of communications. What prompted you to write the book? - Yes, I mean, it's a book with a composite nature, right? Because it combines intellectual history, as you say. So I delve into what these people in the League of Nations actually communicated. The ideas and visions that they tried to communicate with an attempt to simply map who they were and what they did and how it developed. But to start from the beginning, it's no secret that the original work behind this book was a part of my PhD project, which was one element of a collective research project at Ohus University here in Denmark, which was actually called Inventing International Bureaucracy. So it was about the history of bureaucracy. It was headed by the excellent Karen Gamskjalea, who is now a professor at Ohus. And the whole collective project was about telling the story of the League of Nations Secretariat, which was the first, you might say, international secretariat of the kind. So all of us were working in different ways on mapping the internal dynamics of the League of Nations Secretariat in different ways. And I fairly quickly sooned in on the League's information section for, well, for several different reasons. First, you could say that propaganda in the interwar period, you know, what could be more fascinating than that. And we can talk more about propaganda, I'm sure, but this was propaganda, no matter if it's for a good cause or a bad cause or something in between, you call it propaganda when it's a strategic attempt at persuading and promoting a cause or several causes, right? And also it was about journalism. And I've always been fascinated with the history of journalism since I was a student. I've taken an interest in journalists and in editors because journalism's emergence as this autonomous institution which has this very strong self-image of guarding and protecting democracy is fascinating to me when at the same time journalists, the same people, are so often hired into state service, for example, hired into public diplomacy or to do propaganda in wartime or even to do intelligence work. And the story of the league's information section is exactly such a story because the league hired journalists to promote its cause. Obviously, this was before the rise of modern communications professionals, right? You didn't have communicators in the same sense. So you hired journalists to do your communication. So my point of departure was almost a very small and friendly rebellion against this overall bureaucratic focus of the project that I was in because my project became about journalism and propaganda and ideology, basically. - I can see the attraction of this. I wanted to ask you about open diplomacy. The constituting document, the League of Nations, the Covenant, aimed to provide the means to avoid wars and it provided procedures to settle international disputes and to foster international cooperation and also for disarmament. And in your book, you highlight the principle of open diplomacy on which the league was somehow built. The term doesn't actually appear in the Covenant, but it was considered key for preventing future wars. Could you tell us a bit more about the principle of open diplomacy and how did it originate? - Yes, I mean, to talk systematically about open diplomacy is probably, well, not an anachronism because it would be said like that back then, but it's mostly something we say today, I think, about what they were discussing back then. As you say, it doesn't appear directly in the League of Nations Covenant, which of course was the equivalent to the UN Charter of today, the constituting document of the League. But it is certainly hinted at in article, it's called Article 18 of the Covenant, which says, I have it down here. Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any member of the League of Nations shall be forth with registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until it is so registered. So there was this ideal that everything should be open, should be transparent. But I guess you could say that its absence in the Covenant in that phrasing is a little bit telling in itself because it forebodes the absence of the United States in the final League of Nations. Obviously, you know how the United States was among the initiators with their President Woodrow Wilson for the League of Nations, but were unable to join the League because he was unable to convince the US Congress to ratify the Treaty of Harsai. But the idea of ending secret treaties and backdoor deals seems to have emerged, I think, during the end of the 19th century and the early 20th. But in this phrasing, it was the result of the competing socialist and liberal internationalisms of Vladimir Lenin and of US President Woodrow Wilson. They both Lenin and Wilson envisioned and acted upon an idea that there ought to be public insight or even public control or supervision with the treaties made between states. But of course, I guess you could say that Lenin saw this as an element in a Soviet strategy of bringing about world revolution, but Wilson instrumentalized the idea as the salvation of a liberal world, the preservation of the existing world, and a new way of bringing about lasting peace between nations. So the concept of an open diplomacy is probably slightly older, but it makes sense to say that it stems from the first point of Wilson's 14-point address in 1918, in which he outlined the war aims of the United States, and of course, in which he spoke about open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always, frankly, and in the public view. So it really was a rupture with the past. I think you can say that it was a rupture with the past, or at least an escalation of some ideas that had been brewing in the past. And so what was the role of the Lee in support of open diplomacy? The short answer is that everything the League of Nations did was about publicity and therefore about bringing diplomacy before the eyes of the world. I mean, they did many other things, obviously, then publicity, but nothing that they did would matter that much if it didn't resonate with the public, at least according to the League's officials themselves. That's how they thought. And I wanted to get back at also something that I begin the book with. I begin the book with a correspondence between two men, Raymond Fostake, who was an American lawyer who was intended to be the first deputy secretary general of the League, so the second in command to the secretary general. But of course, he never was because the US withdrew from the League. Anyway, he wrote letters with Walter Lippmann, whom many will know as a media theoretician, a big man in media analysis later on. But at that time, he was a top advisor to Woodrow Wilson. And he was one of the people behind Woodrow Wilson's thoughts about open covenants and so on. Anyway, Raymond Fostake asked Walter Lippmann, do you have any advice for me now that I take on a big role in this League of Nations? And Walter Lippmann answered him that he should try to make it all about publicity, because he didn't see any real muscle, any hard, deliberative power in the League besides that of publicity. So in light of that, it's interesting to note that Lippmann was a bridge between these thoughts and what actually emerged as the League of Nations. Yeah, it was a fascinating quote. I highlighted that one in your book. Very interesting way to start. Yes. You've shown that the concept of diplomacy was shifting at the time with this idea of open diplomacy, but ideas around governance were also changing. Would you tell us a bit more about that change and what it meant for the development of the information section? Sure, it's a complicated question, because governance can mean different things, right? It can mean global governance, as we would think about it today, what an international organization tries to do, or it can mean governance in a national context. But I guess the rise of mass society made for more complex governance in general. More and more groups during the early part of the 20th century were being included into the citizenry. In so many countries, women were getting enfranchised, other groups were getting the vote, and state power was growing more ambitious and to a higher degree building large civil services populated by experts in economics or health or what have you. And these trends could also be projected into the first intergovernmental experiment. There were problems that arose at the time, especially immediately following the First World War, that seemed especially designed for something like the League to tackle. Obviously, it was the other way around. The League was instituted to tackle these problems. But these were problems that had risen specifically out of the First World War. The war had caused the collapse of three or four great empires. This had left a high number of small, vulnerable, new states, a high number of refugees swarming around and needing the help of some kind of international agency. A number of epidemics were hitting Europe in the aftermath of the war. And there were these ongoing debates about whether to do population exchanges, something that did materialize after some of the later post-war treaties, such as the one between Greece and the New Turkish state. And of course, there was what was then called white slave trade. Today, we would call it human trafficking, following the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire. So the point is that there were all these big border crossing crisis, and the League was intended to try to solve them. And it was, of course, doomed because it's really difficult to solve them. So yeah, global governance, but also just an increased complexity of how to govern countries, which the League was asked to supplement. These were interesting times. So moving on from the principle of open diplomacy and the changes in governance, ideas around governance and so on, let's talk a little bit about the key actor of your book, the information section. Today, it's very normal that international organizations have information services. But in 1919, that was something extremely new. How is the information section formed? Yes, I mean, you're exactly right, that it is considered normal today to have information departments or communication departments or whatever we call them. This is a key tension of my book, obviously, which it is for any historian that I have to filter the normal from the not normal and focus on how this was thought of or configured as a new and revolutionary thing at the time. As you indicate, press services or publicity departments existed in the big countries at the time. And they were being established in the foreign ministries, two of smaller states also. And journalists everywhere in the Western world, at least, had recently started to learn about the opportunity of going into diplomatic work and working in press departments and at foreign ministries as press attachees at embassies and so on. But the idea that an intergovernmental institution needed such a thing was not a given, obviously, because an intergovernmental institution was new in itself. But it was not a given that it would have a press department. But it became a natural consequence of the way that the first secretary general, Sir Eric Drummond, who was British, conceived the secretariat, namely as a genuinely international secretariat. So, originally, there were these plans that the secretariat should be simply divided into national offices. And there would be representatives of each member state or great member state. But Eric Drummond insisted and was granted the autonomy to insist that the officials in the secretariat would be genuinely international and loyal only to the international institution. Whether they were loyal only to the international institution is a big open question and a separate discussion. But this ideal meant that it was natural to also have an information department that served as a press department to the League of Nations in a traditional sense, facilitated the work of the journalists that covered the organization, but also promoted and informed about the organization. And I guess I didn't answer your question earlier that precisely about how did the League support this open diplomacy. But the short answer is that it supported it, in one sense, by publishing treaties between states, right? I mean, in the Covenant, it said that it was obliged to publish treaties. But in another sense, also, by informing, by publishing news and material information, materials, pamphlets, books, films, broadcasting, these latter things were predominantly the job of the information section. Yes, very interesting. And so it was also very international, this information section. It was, of course, international but also hierarchical. The strong states were expected to take up the strong roles. And you can see in the earliest planning documents for the section, which were written and drafted and so on, different memos that were drafted during the spring and summer of 1919, which of course is before the League of Nations comes into existence, because it wasn't officially in existence until the early 1920s. But during this time, Eric Drummond hired his first officials. And he basically hired a French man and a Brit and an American, because he thought that these three nations would be the strongest nations of the new league. These men were Pierre Comer from France, George Mer from Great Britain, and Arthur Sweetzer from the US. And then, of course, history happened. The United States was not admitted into the league or didn't join the league. And therefore, Arthur Sweetzer became this sidelined official, but also paradoxically a strong official, because he had no government watching over his shoulder. And in that sense, he actually became more important than the others in the sense that he became an unofficial diplomat and liaison officer and connection to the US government and to other US elites between them and the League of Nations. But that's another story I'm getting ahead of myself, I guess. No, but you bring that very well in your book. Perhaps you could also tell us what the main challenges were for this new information section. Yes. If you consider the information section, the press service of the League of Nations, meaning the whole League of Nations, so the press service of the Secretariat, the Council, or the Continental Assembly, its main challenge was simple, but also demanding. It needed to create a smooth, well-functioning press service for the steadily growing international Geneva press call, all the journalists traveling from afar to Geneva, whether to recite there or to simply come for the annual assembly. And these people needed admittance cards, reserved seats in the press galleries, telegraph, shorthand writers, telephones, and so on and so forth. And the section also hosted press conferences and social events and dinners for all these journalists. So this is what you think of as the basic task of a press section. But apart from that, on a more abstract level, the section's main challenge was to promote the League of Nations and inform about its work. And the main inherent problem in doing so was that the great dark ghosts or trauma of the post-First World War world, namely, propaganda, was ever-present. So the section was constantly afraid, and it had reason to be afraid, that if it did anything more than inform about what had been said at a meeting or in a committee or at the assembly, it would be criticized for being a propaganda department, either a propaganda department for the League's own liberal internationalism, which was bad, but even worse, to be a propaganda department for one side of a given dispute, such as, for example, France, if France was having some dispute with another great state. And it was often France because the director of the information section was a French man, so there was constant suspicion towards him and whether he actually just promoted the viewpoints of the French government. The information section was, indeed, supposed to be neutral. And you've just talked a little bit about that. And it was also supposed to play this crucial role in promoting the League, so you really see this tension here. And these new officials are constantly pulled between three concepts that you talk about in your book, the internationalism and public opinion and propaganda. As they tried to promote the organization, and bolster its moral claim, would you explain a bit more about how the officials sought to legitimize the League and tell us a bit more about these tensions? Absolutely. This is the key argument or the key analytical framework of my book, and to take it as two questions. First, how did the information section actually try to legitimize the League? It did so first by being an efficient and well-respected press service, so keeping a good relationship to journalists from all over the world, also by publishing news and information about the League's work. And third, and this is something that's close to my heart because it's something that permeates everything that you read about this section, but it can also be very difficult establishing how efficient it actually was, but it was definitely something that they really cared about by attempting to establish a transnational network of collaborators working to the advantage of the League. So because they were so afraid of being accused of making propaganda, they tried to delegate propaganda to their friends, to people who were in what they would call private associations. Today, we would call them interest groups or NGOs. So for example, League of Nations unions in the various member states or their umbrella organization, the International Federation for League of Nations Societies or to veterans groups or to women's rights groups, student unions, and so on and so forth. This was something that did a lot. And in this work, and especially perhaps in this last work, they were confronted, is my argument, with these three tensions. I think what I try to say is that throughout its existence and this probably still applies to IO communications officials today. I don't think it will ever go away as a problem. The League information officials were confronted with three problems. Problem one, what is the League actually? Is it something like a world government? What is its mandate? How strong can we be? So that's internationalism, right? I mean, to what extent are we an international agency that can act against nation states? Problem two, who is the League's audience? Who is the public? Are they good? Are they bad or both? Do they support the League or is it our job to make them support us? So that's public opinion. And problem three, how is it legitimate for the League to speak to this public? And that of course is the problem of propaganda, which is closely intertwined with the two other problems. So these three challenges, which of course is in fact one challenge, but it's easier to say if you divide it into three, permeated everything that the information section did, I would say. - Fascinating, yeah. So let's talk more now about how the information section evolved over time during the years. And especially the later part of the 1930s, which were very challenging years for the League and for the information section. There was the crisis in Abyssinia, Manchuria, the withdrawal of Japan, Nazi Germany and Italy from the League. And the League was also progressively politically marginalized. How did the League's information strategies evolve in response to these rising tensions and challenges of the 1930s? - That is a big part of the book too. And that's where I think I can contribute in particular as a historian, because the chronology, the timeline of the interwar period comes into play when you look at what happened, as you say, in the early 1930s. So in terms of the importance of studying the League's public information historically, there's always a problem in drawing this strict contrast between the before and the after the year 1933, right? The big apocalyptic, horrible year of the interwar period. It can be reductionist to draw this contrast, but there are just very good reasons for taking the early 1930s very seriously when looking at the secretariat. And this, of course, is because in 1931, we have the Manchuria crisis, which is probably the worst thing for the League specifically, because it's the first time that the League is openly challenged by a member of the council, Japan, which attacks another League member and basically ignores everything that the League tries to do about it. And then, of course, in '32 to '33, we have a number of international crisis emerging and at the same time, internal conflicts in the secretariat. Germany has been allowed into the League from 1926. And then later on, after that point, the German government started to be dominated by ultra-nationalism. And this new German government in the early '30s puts pressure on the League to sack Pierre-Cormere, the French director of the information section. And this is hard-call national politics because at this point, there has been a British secretary-general, Eric Drummond, for a long time, and Eric Drummond has voluntarily decided to resign. He doesn't want to do it anymore. And then there is an astounding deal between the great powers that the next secretary-general, after him, has to be a French man. So that's Schussef Abenol, who takes over. And when this powerful French man comes in to be the new secretary-general, the Germans cross their arms and they say, well, we can only accept such a powerful French voice in the secretariat if you sack another powerful French man in the secretariat, if you fire him. So Pierre-Cormere is forced to resign after a long time of having shaped this information section. And he is replaced by another director and then another director. I won't go too much into that, but you can see concretely how the secretariat is written by these conflicts and tensions of the interwar period. Then there's also a conflict in the assembly where there is an ongoing discussion about to what extent international civil servants represent their publics and so on and so forth. And this results in an angry minority report from some of the member states, including Germany and Italy. And this results in the information section being cut to about half its original size. So to the information section, there is a before and after 1933, because before that, it is the largest section in the secretariat. And after that, I think it's possibly still the largest in some senses, but it's much, much smaller. And it's much more like simply a basic press service. Yeah, so that's the short answer, although I know it was very long. - It's very interesting, I'm sure everybody can read more in your book if they are interested. I also wanted to ask because there's so much technological advancement during this period as well. And we see new media such as radio and news reel that started to become extremely important at that time. So how did the rise of mass media and new communication technologies in the interval period impact the league's information strategies? - Yes, as I argue in the book, the rise of new communication technologies and specifically broadcasting and films did impact the work of the information section, not in the sense that they completely changed their strategies because the information section didn't really have the funds, the money or the personnel to really put their money on films and broadcasting, especially after 1934, when, as I said, they were cut down severely. But it can be demonstrated, and I tried to demonstrate that the Dutch director who took over from '34, his name was Adriana Pelt. He acted as the section's last director. And he clearly felt more and more clearly that these new technologies represented the way forward for the league. That is what he told others who cared to listen when he was consulted by the planners of the United Nations during the Second World War, because he was one of the people who became influential in passing on the legacy and the lessons from the league into the United Nations. That's what my last chapter is about. In terms of what the league did in fact do with films and radio, its prime achievement in films consisted in a few short reels. Well, a great number of short reels, but usually just short clips, you would call it today, showing people, showing various speeches at assemblies, or people, great politicians passing in and out of buildings. And then there was one so-called infomercial, so a movie which was intended to run before the main show in movie theaters around the world. And it was called 'The League at Work', it's from '37', it was produced by the realist film, which was a British, I think, company. It can be found today in two parts, in the UN audiovisual library, at least last I checked, it was on that platform. But this was intended to run before the main show in movie theaters, it was produced in several languages, including French and English. It basically just runs through all the different work venues of the league, and then it's narrated by the directors that's responsible for these different venues at work. And then Schusseff Avano, the French Secretary-General, is a very awkward host of the show, because there was no teleprompter, so he just frantically looks up and down from his papers while he speaks. I wrote a piece about this film together with Halistan Gohyensen and Nikolay Schutzberg in 2019. And there's also a Dutch historian, Pelifand Deik, who's written a very fine article about league films. It's called 'Internationalism' on the big screen, I think, a few years back. - I'm very glad that we have these clips and excerpts of films from this time. - And would you tell us a bit more about Radio Nacional? - Yes, the Radio Nacional Radio Nations was this attempt by the League of Establishing its own broadcasting station, I think, in collaboration with the Swiss authorities. It began its operations in 1929, but it seriously began its operations with weekly broadcasts from '32. As you may know, broadcasting was met by deep skepticism from state actors and from the print media, from traditional journalists in its infant years, because it obviously held the promise of a super-fast transnational news service, which was very threatening to the livelihoods of journalists and threatening to the information monopolies of state powers and governments. So for this reason, Radio Nacional was never allowed, as far as I understand, to become a news service. It didn't broadcast news to Europe or abroad. Instead, it broadcast radio talks and public talks and discussions and debates in the main languages of the League, so in Spanish and French and English and Italian. And it did so throughout the week during the 1930s. I may be among the big experts, but I'm not really a big expert in this, because I have not found any substantial recordings or collection of talks. They pop up unsystematically here and there in the League archives, transcripts of talks or plans for the manuscripts, but I actually opted to not spend much time on Radio Nacional in the book. So there's definitely work there for future students. - I hope so. I also wanted to talk about another idea that came in the 1930s, that was brought up by the Polish delegation, I believe, but I'm a concern about a different kind of disarmament that they called moral disarmament. Would you like to talk about that for a moment? - Absolutely, moral disarmament was quite simply the idea that disarmament, which was so important, that result of the League of Nations, ought to be conceived more broadly than simply the reduction of arms and of armies. So as far as I can tell, the phrase moral disarmament existed already immediately after the First World War. But as you say, calls for moral disarmament came more and more often as the League's great and spectacularly, and also, misfortunate disarmament conference of 1932 drew closer. So in concrete terms, moral disarmament meant ensuring a cultural, spiritual, moral disarmament of the mind across the League member states. And this could be done, for example, by the various interest groups that supported the League, League of Nations unions, or people working with educating about the League in summer schools and stuff like that, pushing or lobby groups that pushed for more League friendly and less nationalist material to go into school textbooks. There was some success with that. It was also often linked to the League's efforts to coordinate cooperation between journalists' organizations and press organizations. So the idea was that peacefulness and pacifism should be instilled into these various national presses, and also to prevent false or tendentious news as they called it back then, what we would call fake news today, basically. The League of Nations hosted, well, it supported three international conferences for journalists and editors, and the first one in 1927, it even hosted itself in Geneva. This is something that I've written about and also the great media historian, Heidi Tworek has written about it. So there was this very cool precursor to the discussion that we have today of fake news and to war propaganda. There's also, I just saw this yesterday when I was preparing for this interview, a recent article out in the International History Review by Simon Potter, which shows that even broadcasting was tied to these projects because the League passed a convention on the use of broadcasting in the cause of peace in 1936, which of course was late, but still. - So your book really does contribute to the new historiography of the League of Nations and despite its political failure, the organization laid the foundations for the international system we have today and its legacy is still very, very much present. What lessons do you think we can draw from the League's efforts to inform and engage the public on complex international issues? - Well, I mean, it's a super hard question, right? Because it ties together with the question of why is this even important, which I was actually asked at my PhD defense, someone always has to ask that question, right? I mean, why do you study the League of Nations because it failed? But it is often the task of the historian, which is a rather boring task, but still the task to say that the main lesson is that none of this is new, right? We can see from the book and other new exciting publications that it has always been challenging to explain complicated international stuff to the public. And we can remind ourselves that the question of public information is closely tied to the question of legitimacy. The United Nations has no hard power. It still doesn't have today. It has no power or almost no power to interfere in national politics. If the strongest member states disagree, when you research into these things, you are simply reminded that every time we think we stumble across something entirely new, we haven't tried. I mean, the League struggled with the same things that the UN struggles with today. - But in researching this book, did you find anything, any unexpected discoveries about the League of Public Information? - I did, I mean, I found many things. And of course, when you get deeply involved in some topic, many of these will not be interesting to other people because they will be mainly interesting to the people who've also studied the League of Nations as a secretariat. So some of the things I found, which I'm most excited about, are perhaps not super exciting in this podcast, but I found some intriguing side stories to these characters from Geneva. I found side stories from their lives and it's interesting when they pop up in other contexts or outside of Geneva or outside this time period. These people that you've grown accustomed to getting to know as international civil servants. So for example, I've been looking into the afterlives of these top information officials. So for example, there are some dramatic stories of Pierre Comer, the first French director. Well, he's not so much himself. He went into exile in London during the war and he became quite disillusioned with international cooperation as far as the sources tell. But his son was arrested for being a member of the Las Eastans in France and his wife was put in a concentration camp. So there are some tragic stories there. And this is not, I hope, personal information because it's out in publications. And then there's F.P. Walter. He's not an information official, but he was the director of the political section of the league. I learned that his daughter was also a member of the Las Eastans. Even though she was British, she was parachuted into France who take part in the resistance. And then Arthur Sweetzer, my American main character from the league, he has a very interesting pre-war life because he actually published a book already in '21 or '20 or something which is called Roadside Glimpses of the Great War because he wrote his bicycle along the Western Front during the First World War. So he saw the First World War from his bicycle and he was taken a prisoner of war, both by the Germans and by the French because they couldn't understand what this ridiculous American was doing in the middle of a war zone. So there are these fascinating side stories that you stumble upon even when you study something as seemingly boring as international bureaucracy. - But we're talking about people and that's always interesting. - Absolutely, yes. - Would you have a good book recommendation for our listeners? - Well, I quite recently read a fascinating book which is not about the League of Nations, but it is about this time period and it's about journalism, which is a book that came out I think in '22, '23, maybe by Deborah Cohen, an American academic who has written a book called The Last Call at the Hotel Imperial or Last Call at the Hotel Imperial. It's about the U.S. foreign correspondents, I think the six most well-known U.S. foreign correspondents, men and women who crisscrossed Europe and interviewed all the dictators and all and many other people during the interwar period. And she has gotten access to the most fascinating material because many of these correspondents wrote very honest diaries. This is from a time when Freudianism was taking a seat and they all had, they were all being psychoanalyzed and they were very honest and she's been granted access and licensed to use all of this. So it's just a very exciting book to read about this period and about foreign correspondents in this period. - I think that one's going to have to go down on my list too. So do you have a final word that you'd like to leave our listeners with about this topic? - That's a difficult one. I mean, welcome aboard the League of Nations studies. I guess it's a highly fascinating subject even though the League of Nations has been ignored until practically a few decades ago and all the archival sources are digitized by now. That's a little advertisement for the League of Nations library in Geneva. So that would be it. Yeah, the interwar period and the League of Nations never disappoints, I think. - Thank you very much, Emil, for joining us today. - Joy being here. 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