Squaring the Circle

Discussion on the Nature of the Russian Army and How They Fight with Mr. Sullivan and Dr. Hall, TRADOC G2

For more information, I recommend reading the TRADOC G-2's recently published The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations at

https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/2024/07/31/the-operational-environment-2024-2034-large-scale-combat-operations/

Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Broadcast on:: 07 Sep 2024
Audio Format:: other

Hello and welcome to Square in a Circle on this episode and joined by Mr. Ian Sullivan who serves as the Director of Intelligence Deputy Chief of Staff G2 for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine and Command. Mr. Sullivan is a career civilian intelligence officer who has served with the Office of Naval Intelligence Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army Deputy Chief of Staff G2 as an Office of the Director of National Intelligence cadre member at the National Counterterrorism Center and as a senior advisor at the Trade Act G2. He has held multiple senior executive senior level positions and has published extensively over the years to Small Wars Journal. Army Mad Scientist Laboratory and the U.S. Army work college quarterly on the threats, national security and changes to the character of war. And Dr. Michael Hall who serves as the Assistant Director of Analysis and Production in the Analytic Control Element at Trade Act G2. She previously served as the Devil's Advocate Red Team for G2 Trade Act, the Army and other organizations. Prior to joining Trade Act, Dr. Hall served over two decades at Defense Language Institute as an Russian instructor and course writer in a number of leadership positions. The view is also opinion expressed in this podcast are of my own and my guests. They do not reflect the views and positions of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Army or any other organization. This is contents for education and information purposes only. All right, Mr. Sullivan, Dr. Hall. Hey, welcome to the podcast. It's a pleasure to both have you all. I'm here. I'm looking forward to discussion and learning from you both on this, but I think it's a fascinating topic. We're going to talk about the RUSU Korean War and how Russia fights and being a force manager. I think it's really important that we have an understanding of the threat of our adversaries and how they fight. I don't know how we can build the force without having a foundational understanding of having familiarity with that and understanding of our threats. That being said, thanks again for coming on to the podcast. I really, really appreciate it and I can't thank you enough for your time. I'll turn it over to you for opening comments. I'll start off with you, sir, Mr. Sullivan, and then I'll turn it over to Dr. Hall. All right, thanks, Matt, and again, thanks. It's a pleasure to be doing this. I enjoyed our last chat about China, so that should be fun and interesting. I think we're talking about a really critical topic today, and I was heartened to hear the words that you said to start it all out. The notion that we can't do force design without understanding the operational environment and without understanding our adversaries. Here in the trade act, G2, I tell the team, our mission is we know the enemy and we make sure our customers do too, and so that's the start point of everything. Hopefully, the discussion we have today will get at that and give the folks who listen at least a starting point to understand the adversary. Absolutely. Thanks again, Reginald for inviting us. I think one of the hardest things to understand is when you look at this current conflict that's going on, look at this invasion and you say, "How can President Putin have thought this was a good idea?" And it seems like there's some concept of rational, objective logic, and in his mind, he has his own logic. We can all agree that there are facts, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, and we think, "How can he think that this is logical?" But he has a narrative in his mind that connects the same facts that we all agree to, but in his mind, he connects them with a different narrative, right? So it's important for us to try to understand what that narrative is, because in his mind, there is a logic to it, right? So it's really important for us to try to understand where he's going with it. Okay, awesome. I really appreciate that. I'll kick it off. Mr. Sullivan, first question for you, sir. Just to get a foundational understanding of how Russia fights set the stage here. And so I was wondering if you can give us a brief overview of how Russia fights and the character of the Russian army. Yeah, sure. So the Russian army is, as we often refer to it here in the trade act, G2, we often call it an artillery army with tanks, right? And so that sort of sets out the mindset or at least the baseline of what the Russian army is. And this is obviously before the Russia Ukraine conflict began, right? That's what we called it. And that's really what their doctrine is about, right? Their fire is based force. Maneuver is used to set up fires, and fires is what kills. And so this has been their mindset for many, many, many years, right? Going back to the Soviet era, you know, when they talked about things like building fire sacks and things like that, right? Maneuvering to force the adversary into a position where you can kill with fires. And that didn't really change. In 2014, the Russian military did essentially publish new doctrine. And that's the doctrine that exists today. So the force that went into combat in Ukraine in February of '22 was in theory reflecting that doctrine. And in many ways, they tried to carry it out, I think, as the fighting began. And, you know, we could have a really long discussion sort of about what happened and why, right? The conflict sort of took the character that we see. But, you know, in essence, they did indeed try to carry out the doctrine that they published and followed. Now, one of the interesting things about that doctrine is when you look through it and you think about it, and although it covers sort of lesser included cases, in many ways, the thought process that went behind it really was about a conflict with NATO, right? And furthermore, in many ways, from the Russian perspective, it's a defensive doctrine, right? So when the Russians think about conflict, they often think about NATO on the offensive and themselves defending against a NATO offensive, which is kind of interesting, right? Because the shoe is certainly on the other foot when they're moving into Ukraine, right? They are on the offensive. And so it's interesting to sort of see what happens when sort of many of the thoughts and the ideas that you have about warfare that you incorporate into your doctrine are sort of flipped on their head. And that's not saying that their doctrine doesn't include ideas about the offensive and the like, it does, but it's more of a mindset kind of issue. All right, so the character of the Russian army. So that's an interesting thing to think about, right? Because that character, I think, has changed a lot since the conflict began. But prior to the conflict, and, you know, again, talking about the doctrine from the 2014 era, the Russian army was modernizing. And as we watched that modernization, it was sort of an interesting approach. And so they definitely had a belief in getting more professional soldiers into the forest, right? The contract soldiers versus the conscript soldiers, the numbers were approaching 5050, right, at the start of the conflict. So that was, I think, very interesting. They were training. They have combat training center clones, although those combat training centers are a lot smaller than the ones that you would see in the United States or even in China. You know, they're not, they're not brigade level. They're generally below, like at the battalion level. Again, sort of interesting, right, which means if that's what you're training. And as we see now, sort of the battalion tactical group being the main unit of action, that puts a completely different characteristic on the fight. It sort of reduces it in some ways. So, so again, sort of an interesting, an interesting piece of their character as you, as you think about how, how the fight unfolded. I think in many ways, the training that they were doing, you know, was roped. And it certainly didn't prepare them for, I think, a dynamic battlespace. And so I think that played into, into some of what we, some of what we saw early on in the conflict. But, you know, for the, for the most part, they were in the middle of a modernization effort. You know, right before 2022 began, it wasn't just doctrinally, it was organizationally, they were bringing divisions back, right? And I think this is one of the more interesting aspects of the fight. You know, they took a lot, they, they basically transitioned in the earlier, you know, the late 90s, early 2000s through brigade, sort of centric force, and they were starting in 2014 to go back to this idea of bringing back divisions. And then they go to war in Ukraine, and they broke apart divisions that they were forming into constituent parts, and just moved them. Pelmel into these operational groups that were assigned missions within the assault on Ukraine. So they took the team, the teams that they were forming, the bonds that they were making, completely smashed them apart on the, you know, eve of battle, and then said go, right? And so that's, you know, clearly in some ways, I think one of the most overlooked aspects of, of what happened particularly early, right? It would be, you know, the equivalent would be of taking a, you know, you think of a US division that would work together, you know, through thick and thin over years and CTC rotations and everything that they would do. And then right before battle, say, okay, yeah, that's great. Then we're going to break you up and bring in all these other pieces and go, go have at it, right? Now, our training is better. We probably muddled through on some of it, but you know, there would definitely, it would definitely not be as good as that solid team that was formed, right? So, so I think that was, that's sort of where we are. Bring this up to sort of the start of the conflict. I hope that got to what you were looking for. It does. Yeah, I appreciate it, sir. And then, you know, just the, just the follow up to get after, you know, to go to 2022, let's talk about the actual Russo Ukrainian conflict. If you could give me for, you know, a question for both of you, if you can give me your assessment of the conflict, how do you see it? What's your, you know, I want to see your, like, your perspective on it. You know, there's a commentary out there because we're, you know, maneuver centric force commentary out there that, you know, maneuver is dead, you know, this is a war of attrition, a war of, you know, positional. Do you see it that way or, or how do you, how do you see the fight? So you're asking two separate questions here, Matt. The first one is, you know, to give you an assessment of the war and the second one is maneuver dead, right? And I can see why the question is asked that way, right, because a lot of people ask it. Because they're looking at the, at the war, right, in Russia, Ukraine, and they're the Russia, Ukraine, Warren, they're saying, okay, God, maneuver is dead. Well, no, not necessarily, right? Russia, Ukraine is a, is definitely an example of large scale combat operations, but it's an example with unique circumstances on unique terrain and unique time and space, right? So no maneuvers not dead, and we could, you know, that would be a whole nother podcast, right? What's happened in this conflict, I think, and, you know, my assessment is that this conflict has sort of come in waves and stages, right? The Russians had, and this discussion would be a lot more fun, incidentally, if we were doing it in a skip. And so I'll just throw that out there. But big picture, right? The Russians had a plan. They tried to enact the plan. The plan was based on their doctrine, but the plan probably got bigger than they anticipated. And they tried to do too much too soon, right, with, with on a number of broad fronts, right, that were not necessarily mutually supportive, that did not necessarily under, well, I don't want to say understand, but did not take advantage of the terrain that they had, right? And did not, and certainly underestimated their adversary's ability to sort of mobilize reserves and sort of stop them along the way. So, so what happened is the Russians begin the conflict and, you know, right off the bat, it was much slower than they anticipated. They were unable to fight a war of maneuver for various reasons, like weather, right, being a bad, I mean, brilliant, brilliant thought to begin a conflict in February and Ukraine, right? Well done, guys. You know, dealing with rain and mud and then you're stuck on roads and everybody remembered the, what was it, the 40 mile convoy, right, that got stuck and, you know, eight, ten pilots were chomping at the bit saying, God, if, you know, but, but, you know, for the opportunity, right? So, the conflict bogged down for various reasons, right? And so the early war of maneuver failed, right? And frankly, the Russians never really trained for the war of maneuver, right, that this is not something that they were truly ready for. I think there was a, maybe a belief from some of the senior leaders that, you know, this would be sort of just this quick thing and they wouldn't face much opposition and they'll go down the road and that's it. And, you know, the one thing I'll say about the operational environment and I'll, you know, use the plug of our new OE assessment, which was published yesterday, right? I mean, check it out and see what we say about LISCO, right? Modern warfare is incredibly lethal, right? Small, small elements with sophisticated ATGMs, right? We all saw what UAVs did, right? It made maneuver difficult. And so what happened is the initial assault culminates. So then we go to a number of different phases of the conflict, right? And I won't bore everybody with the details, but what we've seen are fits and starts of offensive from both sides since 2022, but neither side is able to truly gain the momentum that they need to do something with the breakthroughs that they would, you know, like to achieve, right? Look, the Ukrainian had some significant success for a while, right? But again, it sort of stopped and culminated. So, you know, what we have in many ways in this conflict is sort of a high-tech version of what we saw on the Western Front, you know, after the initial German assault through the, you know, the Schlieffen hook through the, you know, through Belgium, essentially, right? And so it's the notion of how do you get back to the essentially maneuver war that will give you the breakthrough that you need to do something. Now, that's sort of the way I see the conflict, right? Does this mean maneuver is dead? No, absolutely not. Right. I mean, I think maneuver is difficult because of the operational environment and because of what we see, and again, read our document because it will list the 12 conditions that we see, you know, with large-scale combat operations based on observing contemporary conflicts, including this one, right? But I think if you're committed to maneuver early on, if you plan for maneuver, if you think about maneuver, if you're able to effectively integrate maneuver, fires, and protection, which I think is really becomes the Holy Trinity of contemporary warfare. And if you can understand how they all play together, I think maneuver becomes even more important, right? But you might have to do it differently. You might have to think about it in different ways. You might have to accept different realities, right? You might take losses in different ways. But the key is to not let yourself bog down, right? To try to do everything you can to not culminate. And I think you can do that, but I think it will require a really deft understanding of sort of that Holy Trinity of protection, right, fires and maneuver, because they play off on each other, and they become kind of this symbiotic triad, if that makes any sense to you. Sorry. Yeah, no well stated. I was going to mention that I listened to a lot of free Russian press political analysis of the war, and a lot of breakdown of events as they happen. And right at the very beginning, I just want to say that there was a lot of shock from day one, there was shock on the Russian side. I'm talking about Russian free press. Just complete shock that this would occur, and saying, you know, this isn't our president. This isn't, you know, we, Ukraine, we stand with you. We are completely shocked that this happened. You know, this isn't our war. We're not attacking you. So there was a lot of solidarity of, at least from Russian journalists, and they would do, you know, man on the street, interviews with Russians, you know, Russian people on the scene, we have no idea what this stuff very first days of the invasion. We have no idea what's going on. You know, people have relatives, people have family. It was just like crazy, and so that the same thing that I heard the very same thing that that Mr Sullivan's talking about in the in the press that this analysis of, it was supposed to be that the Russian idea of the invasion was that it was going to be a very quick, you know, entry capture, and kind of this idea that, you know, the Ukrainians were willing to, you know, just sort of kneeled down and it was going to be okay. I happen to hear Putin give a speech to the Ukrainian army in his not so great Ukrainian. And he said, in Ukrainian, that it's in the first hours of the invasion. You did not sign up. It's not your fault. You did not sign up for this Nazi, he's the word. And I'm just sitting here in beautiful verdant Newport News, Virginia, with my chin, my jaw on the floor, like what I can't believe you're saying this to the Ukrainian army. And Zelensky, whose Russian is beautiful, speaks to the Russian people, and he says to the Russian people, we know this isn't you. We know that your president does not act on your behalf. We know he's acting by himself. We understand, stand with us. So it was a, a crazy. I think the, I think what the Russian military didn't anticipate at the beginning was, which doesn't make any sense whatsoever. They didn't under, they didn't anticipate the Ukrainian resourcefulness. They didn't anticipate, you know, will to fight is one thing, when it's an existential fight, and you have the entire world to turn to and say, clearly, you know, invasion of a sovereign country like this with no provocation whatsoever. But Ukraine had the entire world to turn to and say, we know you're not going to send boots. You have to help us materially. They had the entire world to turn to for help. I also wanted to mention exactly the same thing that Mr Sullivan was talking about with the war being long doesn't necessarily mean that it's going to be stuck in attrition. Everyone's trying to get back to maneuver. It's fun to hear the same analysis being played out just in Russian political analysis, just talking about it in open source, trying to figure out as they are looking at the battles, trying to figure out what Ukraine is going to do. So it's really surprising how the Russian army was unprepared, considering that they are right there. Ukraine used to be part of the Soviet Union. They should know the territory and the calendar well. So, I think that kind of part of it was surprising considering how familiar they should be. I did, I did want to circle back to something that Mr Sullivan was talking about earlier with the doctrine being a defensive doctrine. I think that really plays into the Russian cultural mindset, which I think is surprising sometimes to people considering what a massive country it is. It's so big and people would think that it's so big and they would lead by leaning forward, but they would sort of be proactive, but that's not their mindset. Their mindset is chip on their shoulder. Their mindset is people are trying to attack us, people are trying to keep us down. They had a huge, huge empire. You don't have an empire without going out and building it, taking it, right? That's how you get in empires, you go out and you take it. And yet their mindset has always been, people are trying to get us. We're under attack. And they have always felt that culturally, and that's why they've been able to be led by strong leaders, you know, leading with an iron fist because there's this mentality of like, okay, he can save us, he can protect us. And so even though they might, there might be, they might go on the offensive just as a move. There's still this, the narrative of NATO is trying to get us. That doesn't mean that they really think that necessarily they're in danger from NATO. And that's know your enemy. Right. If they say, NATO, you're trying to get us, we feel like, oh, they might think that they're in danger from NATO. I mean, that plays well with us. Right. And it plays well at home plays well in the domestic front. So that's a pretty good pretext, and it has been for many, many years, right? That's been a very good pretext for them to say NATO's trying to get us needles encroaching on our territory. They're getting their expanding when they said that they wouldn't. It's that has been a very good narrative for them to build on for a long time. Just because they say it and they've been saying it over and over and over doesn't mean that they really feel like NATO is a threat. It means it's a really good pretext for them to do a lot of next steps. Yeah. Fascinating. Dr. Hall, I want to stay with you on this next question. I'm kind of jumping ahead a little bit, but, you know, on the narrative. And so, how does Russia portray the conflict with Ukraine to their people today? So, like, I remember seeing in the beginning of the war, you know, we saw some protests. And, you know, Wagner had their little coup, you know, they're 20 miles out from Moscow. But you don't really see anything, you know, see people out on the streets, mass protesting. It seems like it's the war is acceptable. Do I have this right or how do you see it? Well, it's, I mean, there are really a lot of different pictures of the war in Ukraine, right? And it really depends on who's consuming what kind of media. And they're different populations. Remember, it's a huge country, right? So there are regional differences. There are generational differences. It depends on where you're getting your information from. I just heard this yesterday from a, I wish I could remember who said it. It was a government official, but they were talking about YouTube and how they are choking YouTube. They're slowing it down YouTube in Russia. It was surprising that they hadn't turned it off earlier, but they've been choking it recently. And, and they're, they're trying to guide people to go to YouTube, which has been around for a long time. They're trying to get content providers to put things on YouTube and get people to watch YouTube instead of YouTube. And they said something like, Oh, you think it's a pain to be moving your stuff over to root to. Well, it's been a pain for you to be getting on VPN. So this is just, you know, the same equivalent pain. So they're basically openly saying, we know you're getting on VPN people. Like, it's, so why don't you just do this different pain and do this? I like that the zero argument was that doesn't the logic. It seems like it doesn't make sense. Right. So there are people who there are people who get their, their news in just a straight TV way. And if you go look at the TV channels, you know how on American news, there's an idea that the White House would have talking points. And then on the Sunday morning news, the Sunday morning talk shows they would send their, their emissaries out and everyone would stay on the talking points and put out the talking points right that what used to be an idea right. Well, that is nothing compared to the Russian propaganda machine because you could turn on any channel, any like time of day, which you can watch a lot of them on YouTube. It's great for me. It's great. You can watch, like, end of it, I see it, not just, not just channel one, but you can watch a lot of different channels that are not sponsored by the government, they just don't want to run a file the government. And they will be on point 24 seven. You know, what they could be talking about and they know what will get sort of the close to jingoistic kind of headlines. And they run that whatever is the, the drawer, you know, headline about the war. They told the party line. Not because they're told to, but because this is the bigger picture of things made regular this is the bigger picture of things. The Soviet Union was not that long ago. You don't have to tell people how to answer a survey. You know, that's why I don't trust those surveys that are taken these days, when they say, Oh, do you support the war. When you get an answer like, I support President Putin and his successor. Like, those are the kind of answers you get back. Why? People don't want to die. Because when the terror works, it works for generations. Right, people that those memories are not that long ago. So that if you want to watch TV and you want to watch them like entertainment show. And this stuff just gets like pulsed through the regular everyday media. I don't think that people necessarily believe it. I think they just can't get away from it. And so you learn to keep your thoughts to yourself. You learn to speak in what's pretty close to Orwellian double speak. It's just that in our lifetimes, we, we had a period, pitist orca was real. Blossom was real. People really did start to speak their mind. People really did start to have freedoms. People really did start to not go to jail. Like, that was real. And we started to feel like, Oh, like, we got used to it. And so when Putin started, he was in period of time from like 2000 to maybe 2012. Before he started to get, you know, started to move more in a more conservative populist iron face kind of way. So, and people started to realize, Oh, journalists are starting to be killed and starting to go sideways. So I think really those, the narrative to get back to your real question, the narrative is that really there is a kind of a Nazi idea, this Nazi, you know, the original idea that he came out with. That there's this theme of Naziism in Ukraine that we have to put down the other main theme that Ukraine isn't a real country. Ukraine is part of a greater Slavic nation together with Belarus and Russia were one Slavic nation, like they were never a separate nation that we're all one. That comes from Alexander Dogen, who used to be considered a conspiratologist, a mere few years ago, 2018, 2019, even Kremlin officials would call him a conspiratologist like right wing nut job. Next thing you know, you get a little time in isolation with COVID. And he's whispering and President Putin's ear and boom. Next thing you know, President Putin starts writing his own quote unquote white papers. I want to add points to this just this discussion is kind of interesting. There's, um, Mike Mike I'm very rightly laid out the notion of, you know, the fear of the outsider right like NATO in particular. And that's been driving sort of at least Russian foreign and security policy really since the end of the Cold War right, particularly as NATO started its expansion into Eastern Europe in the 90s right. But so that that attitude is very real and it exists, particularly within sort of the Russian national security decision making elements right. Interestingly enough, I think one of the fascinating developments in this conflict that sort of expands on this is is as the conflict has expanded deeper into Russia. Right Russia is now taking conventional strikes periodically right from from Moscow down down across, you know, much of much of European Russia right and it. It's interesting as we think of what happens in these broader conflicts right protracted conflict right the battle of annihilation right versus the battle of attrition. What matters becomes the perception in the homeland right because you can, you could clearly see cases moving forward even with the United States where we may have to face some of these very same realities right particularly if you're in a conflict with a peer, a peer competitor who can reach out and touch you. And so again, all of this leads into that narrative right so narratives become important both internal and external so I think it's a real important issue that that you got to. I asked my appreciate it, Dr. Hall was just all of them really appreciate perspective on that. The next question I that I want to get after and I want both your perspectives on this one as well on adaptation and so one of my all time favorite books is adaptation under fire by by Barno and Benson hell. I got those authors names rights. And so you see Ukraine and Russia and the conflict you see them they're both learning organizations they're both adapting to the changes and the character or war. And so it's wondering you know your perspective. How do you see it what is impressed you from their changes from the initial invasion and what February 2022 2022 till to now those changes over over time. Yeah, that's a great question and in fact if if you look at our new or new or new or we assessment rapid adaptation is actually one of the implications right for everything that we see. And it's kind of interesting right so so when does this when does this truly matter so as a as a US force we haven't had to think about rapid adaptation for some time. Right early on you think of desert storm right short chart conflict. Then suddenly we're into or into coin right and then adaptation mattered right we we had things like the rapid equipping force that was. You know out there designed to bring rapid new capabilities as the adversaries changed and I think we encountered some of that in the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan right particularly in the IED fight. It shouldn't be surprising to us that in this fight that adaptation matters, and that will see adaptation right but I think the thing that has been most surprising is sort of the pace and the scale of the adaptations. Right, both sides have had to adapt on the fly multiple times, you know sort of advantage, you know disadvantage reaction counter reaction overcoming it solving it. And then across the board right. Some of the, the, the most I think you know public examples or at least the most, you know the examples that get the most attention or the UAVs. Right, and you know you look early on in the conflict the Ukrainians had some significant success with things like the, you know, the Turkish TV twos and the, the relatively sophisticated, you know kinds of kinds of unmanned systems. And the most part that that we've all we've all been accustomed to right like we've had predator right we had Reaper. You know we saw what what the TV twos and others did in Nagorno-Karabakh right, and they were successful early on well the Russians adapted right they figured out some some approaches in terms of electronic warfare and other kinds of things. These systems are less useful. So then what happens I mean we've gone into this massive to and fro on UAVs down to the to the point of of small you know UAVs dropping grenades or RPG rounds or something like that right. First person view systems one way attack system all all of this and and I think that's that's really important. The fascinating thing though sometimes is how fleeting the advantages are right like sometimes there might be an advantage that one of the sides comes up with and I just mentioned UAVs that's one of hundreds of different kinds of adaptations that we've seen on the fight but sometimes the at sometimes the advantage is very fleeting right like it's it's days or maybe a week and and I think that's an important lesson for us to understand as well, particularly when you take a step back and you think about our approach to warfare under multi domain operations right and JAD C2 when you go joint the notion that we're looking for windows of opportunity right in order to converge multi domain effects. So sometimes these opportunities sort of reveal themselves through these rapid adaptations right but you have to be deft enough as a force to be able to take advantage of it. And so that's one of the reasons I think we were bogged down in what we have today neither side is is truly able to rapidly exploit the conditions of the advantage. So, so I think the question goes takes us in a moment in several different different directions right. First, the first is, for the most part the US forces pretty good at this right our kids are brilliant in terms of adaptation. Let them do it right because it might be the it might be what gets us the window of opportunity, but if that opportunity pops up, we have to be deft enough as a as a force to be able to rapidly exploit it. So I think that's sort of the thing that that's interested me most about adaptation on the battles face, how much we've seen, how fast it and furious it's calm, how fleeting some of the advantages have been as the, you know, the other side rapidly figures out a countermeasure. And then if it's truly going to matter, can you take advantage of it quickly enough to truly get the bang for the buck out of it so so that's kind of how I see that. Yeah, and I would add to that by saying, I've seen a lot of adaptation in the information space as well. In the information space on the battlefield and on the side of people who are in the whole of nation space right so we always talk about whole of nation that we are going to need that we need a whole of nation approach. We're going to need a whole of nation approach if you know God forbid that we should ever have to, you know, go be in a conflict. And here you are seeing Ukraine in the conflict, 100% whole of nation engaged, right. And so not only are they engaged in the information space but you know one of the things that they already had a Ministry of Digital Transformation before the conflict. And one of the very first things that they did as soon as the war started was, here you have a Ministry of Digital Transformation already in place. They thought, what can we do to help, right. They started tagging immediately remember Butchia was very early on in the war. They started tagging immediately they told they set up a site and they told people immediately. Everyone has a cell phone. You are all able to contribute to this war by tagging anything that you think is a war crime. Here's the website, use your cell phone, take a picture, geo tag it, upload it to this website. I mean, how does it, I think this is the first time ever, right, that we are able to log war crimes as they're happening in the middle of battle, right, and upload them and we already have people coming lawyers, you know, volunteering their time. Gathering the evidence while it's still there, right, I mean that's like unheard of. So that's an innovation that is, you know, turns your stomach. At the same time it makes you happy in a terrible way. I mean, it's horrible and it just makes you think, thank goodness that they have it. It's a terrible thing to have to have, right. It's part and parcel of our line of work. Right. On a, on a happy note about an information innovation. I just want to share this little story that I heard recently on, on Russian news. Again, free Russian press. So there was a drone video about a soldier who had been wounded by a Ukrainian drone. So everyone agreed. Remember, I was saying about the facts that we agree on on the ground one, two, five, ten, twenty, right, and then we tell a narrative about it. The Russian media had played this video. They said this is a video from a Ukrainian drone. We all agreed to that. And that the guy on the ground was, you couldn't tell by his uniform who he was. And another guy runs up and I'm sorry, this is terrible. And he shoots him in the head. Okay, you can't tell by their uniforms. They don't have markings on them. From the video, it's not that great quality. You can't tell. And so the Russian media plays it like these Ukrainian soldiers are so base. They're like insects. They have no feelings. They just shoot each other. Right. As it turns out, journalists did some digging. They found who these Ukrainian drone operators were. They got the actual original video, which was clear. And beautiful, had great clarity, found out who they were. They had shot this Russian soldier and they showed the video. They were able to identify who he was by the underwear he was wearing because when he fell down, they could see the underwear brand, which isn't sold in Ukraine. It's only sold in Russia. So they identified that he was a Russian soldier and they identified the weapon of the other guy who ran up as a soul as a weapon that's only in the Russian army. That it was a Russian soldier. They did all this geolocation. They did all this stuff. So they identified that was actually a Russian soldier that they had shot down with the drone. And this other Russian soldier that we bake to put him out of his misery because their battlefield med medical is so bad that he didn't expect to be able to live. So they actually, the free Russian press actually revealed what the real story was behind it. It's a little information innovation because they could get a hold of the real drone operators and get the real story behind it. Yeah, as a force manager, I'll chime in on this one because I just I find adaptation and adapting to the changes the character ward is just absolutely fascinating. But one of the things that I think is interesting that I think for the US armed forces, we have to take a hard look at because we've really, we haven't really had to do this in a very, very long time. But that's reconstitution of your forces, and you see on the Russian side where acceptable losses is 30,000 a month, which is, which is mind boggling. I mean, looking at the two divisions, a whole core just, you know, just lost from, you know, every month. And they're replenishing them, you know, with 30,000 from wherever, whether the foreign volunteers or their conscripts or Russian volunteers or prisoners, whatever, with very minimal training just replenishing replenishing those losses and putting them on the front lines. And I'm not saying that's the approach that we have to do, you know, but it's just interesting on how they're reconstitution their losses. That being said, you know, one final question, since we're running out of time, and for this is for both of you, Mr Sullivan, Dr Hall, the rooster training conflict. Is this the future of war, is this what we're seeing now what war is going to look like in 2030, 2040, or do you see it changing again. All right, so, so actually I want to answer before I do that I want to talk about reconstitution because that's, that's one of the things that's really interesting to me as well and this is something that we've been really talking about since the early days of conflict. And again, it, it shows you what happens when, when we need to consider a protracted conflict. And so I'm glad that you as a force manager are thinking about that, because look, modern warfare is lethal. Right, losses are going to happen and when you're going to fight, when you're going to fight appear, right, it's, it's going to be, it's going to be lethal and reconstitution is going to matter. You know, the Russian, say what you will about the Russian army, right, and they've made a lot of mistakes over the course of this conflict. The fact that they could replace armies on the fly is pretty impressive to me. Right, and that's, that's something that we probably need to think about because even though we're exquisite, just the sheer lethality of modern warfare is going to mean that we're going to have to figure out ways to replenish as well. So, so, you know, the force that's there today, it's certainly not well trained. It certainly isn't, isn't necessarily as capable, even as the force that they went into the fight with, but it's still in the field and it's still fighting. And, you know, there's, there's something to that. So, so I'm glad that I'm glad that you're thinking about this. We sure are as well. We did a, we did a thing for, for a previous, you know, CG when we talked about this and we told them, you got to know the story of the old contemptibles from the First World War, right? And the British Army went to war in 1914, best trained, best equipped on the planet, most combat experience. They went to war in 1914 and most of them were gone by 1915. They recruited another army in 1916 for the Somme. That army goes away by the Passchendale. They recruit a third army for the final push, right? They didn't have a fourth army in them. Right. I mean, these are, these are real important questions. So I'm glad you're thinking about it. In terms of is this the, is this the future of warfare? I think this is, this is where we get, this is, I think, where we, we tend to focus on what we see, right? And, and Russia Ukraine has been going on now for two years. It's large scale combat operations. And so everybody looks at it and says, Oh, my God, this is the, this is the future of warfare. What I'll say is this is an example of the future of warfare, but it's not necessarily what future warfare is going to look like. There are elements of this conflict that that I think will, will see in, in LISCO, you know, over the next, if it occurs over the next 10 years, potentially in the next 20 years, right? Or, or beyond, but, but this is not what, this is not LISCO. This is an example of LISCO. If, if you think about what LISCO could look like saying in the Indo-Pacific region, we're talking about a lot of what we see here. And I think a lot of the conditions that we talked about in our OE assessment, all of them will exist, but they will exist in a different format. Sometimes, sometimes more acute, sometimes over greater distances, right? But, but, you know, we, we need to be, we need to be mindful that this is not LISCO. This is an example of LISCO. So when you ask me the question is maneuver debt, and I don't think maneuvers that at all, right? This is showing you in this particular case why it's hard. So, so I, I guess we just need to, we need to keep that in, in mind. But there are elements of this conflict that we'll see, right? Unmanned systems are going to be ubiquitous across the, across the battle space. There's going to be a transparent battle space, right? It's going to be hard to hide. I mean, seriously, look at our, look at our OE assessment. We have the 12 conditions. Every one of these sort of stats of trajectory for you, that shows you what LISCO will look like, at least over the next 10 years. And then as technology increases, as we think about warfare more, as we try to put it all together, you know, I think that, that trajectory will probably, probably expand a bit. What we're seeing on the battlefields of Russian Ukraine should be eye-opening to us, right? We should say, okay, this is, this is different than we had to contend with, right? In, in coin, you know, the sheer, the sheer scale of it is mind-boggling to some. And here, here's the best example I'll give you, right? Fires. I mean, you're paying attention to this. There are days where the Russians have fired 30 or 40,000 rounds of artillery a day, right? In coin, an artillery battalion might have fired 10 in a month. Okay. Now, here's the kicker for why I say it's different. The Chinese are studying this conflict, right? And we're paying attention to what they're saying about it. You know what their, one of their key conclusions is, they wonder why the Russians aren't using enough fires. For 40,000 rounds a day, the Chinese are like, why are they firing so little? Okay. So, so again, Lisco will be different depending where it happens in time and space, who the adversary is, but a lot of what we've seen in this conflict will appear, but it might be in a different form. Does that make sense? It does appreciate that. Thank you, sir. Yeah, I fully agree. Mr Sullivan, definitely the proliferation of unmanned and manned unmanned teaming 100%. I think there's a reason why our own national strategies list deterrence first, right? Because no one wants to get into a conflict. Right. I mean, we don't, our adversaries don't, we just don't. Best possible case scenarios that we don't get into a conflict. I think what's really challenging for us and this is why you to trade off and until in general is so important is. You know, there are some existential questions or matters for our adversaries that I don't think the US as a nation has fully wrapped its mind around. And so when you ask what the future of warfare is going to be, I mean, for the US, it's really, for all of us, we don't want to get into a conflict. And yet our other big competitors adversaries in the world, they have some goals that are existential for them that we, as a nation, we don't have a goal like that, like reunification for PRC. We don't have a goal like that in the US. It's just that Americans cannot wrap their minds around something like that. The curse of the status quo power. Right. Right. And it's so frustrating for us to think about how do we prepare. I mean, we want to carry the big sticks. Right. How do we prepare for that? And when it's really, really hard to imagine it ourselves. Right. Anyway, that's, that's why I'm just going to pay the big bucks. Yeah. All right. No, I appreciate that. And, you know, we've covered a lot of ground and honestly, you probably can take this conversation for like three to four hours. And I, and I really appreciate it. You know, we, we talked about how, you know, Russia fights the character of their army. We talked about UAVs talk about reconstitution information operations. A lot here. That being said, I want to get after at least one fun question for, for both you before, you know, we sign off. And so, Mr. Sullivan, I know already asked, you know, some of these questions, you know, prior to, but I'll get after and change it a little bit and ask you, you know, what is your all-time favorite movie or podcast? Yeah. It's like when you asked me what my favorite book was, right? Because, you know, again, there's, there's different genres and things that I do, but it's funny. I did a podcast earlier this week for our army mad scientists and they asked me the same question. So, so I better keep the same, the same answer or people will accuse me of, of waffling. But, you know, the movie that, you know, for me personally is, I just always go back to you over and over and over again. And part of it could be just my, you know, maybe it explains a lot about me. I don't know. I, as a kid, I saw the 1979 movie Zulu Dawn. I don't know if you've ever seen it. It's about the battle of this sandalana, right? And I saw that as a kid and it just captured my imagination. So, 1879, the British army and made Zulu land. And the story is in many ways very similar to the Russia-Ukraine war. They, you know, they just knew they believed they were fighting an inferior enemy, you know, armed with spears. They marched in, just figured it was going to go their way and they were outmaneuvered completely and annihilated, right? And that movie always just sort of captured my imagination. And it fascinated me in Victorian military campaigns. So, I collect toy soldiers. I have the battle of work strips set up in my living room right next to a Martini Henry rifle. So that, that movie has always fascinated me. But, but I'll say the same thing, because, you know, I don't want people to think I'm too serious. And I shouldn't say this as an army senior leader, but I do love the movie stripes as well. All right. All right. Dr. Hall, we can go with movie, but, you know, what is your all time favorite book and it's not book, we can go movie or podcast. Well, I can give you, I can give you a two for because one of my, I can't, I can't say what my one favorite book is, but I can say you made me do it last time. I can say one of my favorite books is the unbearable likeness of being, and there was also a great movie made from that. You know, and, and you know, and we're forming was the director of that. So, you get a two for because it was a great book and a great movie made from it. But I also on the professional side if you haven't read thinking fast and slow by Danny and he just right before he passed this year. He came out with another book. I think she came out with it last year called noise. The social behavioral economist really gets into how we make decisions and how we just need to sort of take a moment. I always say there's always time to think and that kind of that he provides the data to back up, you know, why we just need to take a deep breath before we move forward and. These are all my favorite books. Awesome. I really appreciate it. You know, this has been a phenomenal episode and I can't think enough for your for your time. That being said, I'll turn it over to you for any final comment. Again, thanks, Matt. This was this was a fun hour. So, so I'm glad we got to, glad we got to do this. You know, look, I'll tell everybody, you know, we've been observing this conflict. You know, from the start. You know, there's there's things we're learning about list go by by observing it. Again, I think the last question you asked me was the most telling is this the future. It represents what what list go is and what it could be. I'm just caution people to go talk about what they've learned from a conflict that's not yet over. The key lesson might not yet have been, you know, even contemplated yet. So there's a lot we can observe. There's a lot we can take from this. But it's really hard to truly learn lessons until we know the beginning, the middle and the end, right? And so, you know, like I said, the final, most important lesson may not yet, even if it could yet. So, so I'd ask everybody to keep that in mind as they as they think about this conflict. And lastly, I'll again, I'll give a plug. Read our read our read assessment and find it at oe.tray.gov. Absolutely. Again, thank you very much for your time. I really appreciate it. It's been a phenomenal episode and thanks again. All right. Thanks for listening. Stay tuned for future episodes on Russia, the defense industrial base, some drone warfare in MDU. [MUSIC PLAYING] (gentle music) You