Pakistonomy
Episode 215 - Pakistan enters another IMF programme
In this episode, Uzair talks Khurram Husain about the recent agreement between Pakistan and the IMF, which has secured a 3-year $7 billion programme. We talked about what comes next for the economy and why the hard work is only just beginning.
In addition, we focused on Pakistan’s debt sustainability, with Khurram sharing his perspective on why restructuring debt is perhaps not the right path for the country at this point in time.
The articles we referred to in our conversation are linked below:
- https://www.dawn.com/news/1859741/shaky-stability
- https://www.dawn.com/news/1861209/and-audits-for-all
- https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2024/08/28/break-the-taboos-propping-up-unsustainable-debt-pleads-a-former-central-banker
- https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pakistan-needs-public-debt-restructuring-by-sanjay-kathuria-1-2024-09
Chapters:
0:00 Introduction 0:45 Debt restructuring for Pakistan 13:16 IMF agreement and its implications 22:55 Petrol prices and relief 29:10 Politics and the current status quo 36:25 Conclusion
- Broadcast on:
- 26 Sep 2024
- Audio Format:
- other
(upbeat music) - Hello and welcome to another episode of Pakistani. My name is Uzair Yunus. And joining me once again today is for a Musan, which is a very timely episode yet, but meaning to get together and discuss a few things over the last couple of weeks. And then there was a confirmation that Pakistan's IMF program would be approved this week, which happened yesterday, just a few hours ago. So we'll talk about the program, the $7 billion, three-year program that has now been approved and what it means for Pakistan to come to the next. But we'll start this conversation with a sort of on and off discussion that has been happening in economics in Pakistan related to Pakistan's debt and that restructuring, you know, the former deputy governor of the central bank has written about this extensively, has tweeted about this extensively as well. And others, including Sanjay Kathuria, as of yesterday, wrote a piece in projects indicate, if I remember correctly, about this as well. So I'll link those pieces for those who want to go and read that part of the argument, but welcome to Pakistani. And let's begin our conversation with your point of view on this debt restructuring conversation that keeps coming back up in Pakistan with some arguing, including the deputy governor of the central bank, that Pakistan should go for an orderly default and restructure its debt because it's currently unsustainable. - The interesting thing about that conversation, Josel, is that all those who are participating in it so far, at least. And yeah, you mentioned the former deputy governor of the central bank, who also then served as acting governor of the Pakistan central bank, Murtaza Sayyid, who's actually leading that conversation in a string of articles that he has published, starting as far back, I think it's February 2003. - 2023, you mean 2023. - Yeah. - Yeah. Now, the interesting thing about that conversation is that everyone who has made in on it so far stops short of actually saying what kind of a restructuring are they talking about? Given that Pakistan's external debt, well, first of all, there's a big breakdown between external and domestic debt. Second, even within the external debt, the majority of it, I think it's close to 40% or so, is owed to multi-natural creditors. That is not really up for rescheduling, nor is there any sense in even trying to rescheduling that because it doesn't weigh as much in terms of its interest costs. Then you've got a very large bilateral debt component that has grown over the 2010s. In 2008, it was relatively smaller, but it's probably been one of the fastest growing components in external debt over the course of the last decade. And that's owed in various forms. You've got reserve extension facilities in the form of these deposits. From Saudi Arabia, UAE, China, you've got a whole slew of other bilateral predator lines coming whether or there's money moving to the form of returns and equity or dividend payments to Chinese project sponsors as loans taken on Chinese conversion banks. Are they talking about that? Are they talking about rescheduling when you have that, for example? But if they're only talking about rescheduling private predators, your bonds, if I'm not mistaken, that's a very small proportion of whatever maturing loans that are over the next two, three years in Pakistan. There are some bonds maturing over the next three years, I think, but the amount is so small that rescheduling isn't going to make much of a difference in the overall deterioration of Pakistan's debt indicators. So what exactly are they talking about these people? Are they saying the structure with domestic banks are they saying go to Chinese and ask for a restructuring because that's already taking place. That process is already underway. Are they saying we structure the Euro bonds? In which case, would they care to tell us what sort of, what cost benefit there is in doing so? The disruption that we'll have on Pakistan's credit profile versus the benefit it will bring you in terms of lightning, your debt, the service burden, how would that be worth it? These are important questions. And in all the people that have weighed in on this conversation so far, no one's touched upon it. They're just sort of looking at the overall liquidity levels and for, of Pakistan's economy and saying, well, it's no longer sustainable and no longer, and it can no longer be carried. I think overall the debt, the fact that the debt burden is increasing and has increased since about the middle of the 2010s in particular, Pakistan borrowed heavily in order to pull itself out of the great financial crisis or at least not pull itself out, but whether the impact of the great, to survive the impact of the great financial crisis. But then they borrowed heavily again in the middle of the 2010s in order to pump, grow in the country. And that's what actually has led to this very sharp spike in, in Pakistan's debt, debt burden of today. There's no doubt that it's, that it has increased at a pace that the economy cannot really sustain. But I'm not sure to what extent debt restructuring has been talked about by these guys, helps address that problem. Or at least debt restructuring in the absence of any reform. I think that conversation comes first, because even if you do get open up space on the external front, with everything else being constant, they're just gonna run it right back up again. Because, you know, you and I both know the policy makers in this country sort of view all of this as the, like a credit card, you know, just go ahead and like buy whatever you need, whatever you want. And down the road, whoever has to pay the bill, you know, they'll worry about it when the bill arrives. And so if they do that again, you know, there'll be little to no sense in undertaking a debt restructuring. That's what they did in the aftermath of 9/11. - They got a very struggling from sharing that, that mascara. - Yeah, yeah. They got a very nice restructuring deal back then. And just ran that whole debt all the way back up again, you know, just used the resulting space to engineer one big growth boom, with which to buy off the political elites of this country. And legitimize what was otherwise in the legitimate government of a baseball serve. You know, given that call, given everything else, where it stands to me right now, but debt restructuring is not making sense. Not on the basis of just, you know, an analysis of the liquidity indicators of that. - Yeah, and I'm glad you went there, right? But I'm because I was before this conversation, looking up the latest economic survey and the budget that was passed earlier this summer. And so the things you were alluding to right, I'll just put some numbers out there for people and you can check it on the economic survey yourselves. You don't believe what I'm saying. Pakistan's total external public debt of FY 24 in March, according to the economic survey was about $86 billion, out of which government external debt, that is long-term, is $78.6 billion, off which as you were alluding to, $38 billion is multilateral. So that's outside the domain of new negotiations. Other bilateral is about 18.9 and Europond is 7.8 billion. So that's basically the makeup, right? So if you're going to negotiate 18 plus 7.8, so 19 plus eight, let's say 20 something billion dollars, I don't see as you were arguing, right? I agree with you that net impact at what cost? Number one, number two, then everyone goes back to this liquidity argument from a budgetary standpoint and yes, out of the current expenditure of 17,200 billion rupees in the current budget, 9.75 trillion is basically interest payments, but then it's interesting to go a bit deeper, right? And I think out of those 9.75 trillion rupees, about 10% if I remember my math correctly is external interest payments. So again, if you go towards debt restructuring externally, the bang is not really there. So okay, you go to domestic. And I think that's the other interesting point that I find in these articles that have been written, nobody goes into even a sentence or two about the implications of a domestic debt restructuring on the financial stability of the Pakistani economy. And they just say there could be some risks, but they just paper over that's back. And I'm like, well, let's play that out. What happens to your financial system? And I wonder if you have a point of view on what would happen to domestic banks in Pakistan if you go for domestic debt restructuring? - Well, I mean, I can't think of a compatible moment, you know, when domestic debt restructuring of this sort was actually undertaken. We've had a restructuring by other means in a sense. I mean, I think a prolonged period of forced low interest rates is, in a sense, a kind of a restructuring, right? And it's, it has sort of the same impact in any case. But, you know, the sort of these guys are talking about, for example, I think banks need what they call there's some kind of a price level for zero risk paper. They need to know that this is the price of a zero risk asset in order to be able to price risk afterwards, you know, and build on that. And zero risk pricing right now is government bonds. So now if you, if you, under daily restructuring, they don't have such a, such a floor anymore. They don't know what's a zero risk asset. How do you price risk after that? I think it will, you know, I'm trying to be careful here because I don't want to mount a defense of the banks and their excess profits because, you know, I'm a socialist at heart and I don't like banks and bankers, some of my best friends or bankers, you know, I love them, but I don't like bankers as a profession and whatnot. But it will devastate their balance sheets and it will, you know, it's negative effects will cascade through the financial system in ways that may not be, you know, fully, that we may not be able to fully understand. So I think before anybody starts advocating such a thing, especially in a declining interest rate environment, which we didn't clear. - Which is domestic and global, by the way, because the Fed is now-- - Which is domestic and global, exactly. So I mean, if we are in a declining interest rate environment, some of that is already happening in that environment, you know, if you want one to take domestic debt restructuring, you know, I would like to know more about what sort of risks are being taken before such an enterprise, before such a thing is launched. And right now, I don't think we have a clear picture of that. It probably wouldn't be a bad idea to stress test some of this out for the central bank. And maybe make it public that, look, we've stress tested two, three different scenarios. They do this regularly as part of their financials, financial sectors, stability survey or something like that, they call it, they do this sort of thing regularly, maybe include an exercise with two, three restructurings and see, although I don't know what the impact of that would be on the perceptions, you know, in the financial sector watching the central bank stress testing, domestic debt restructuring scenarios. But maybe if they make it clear enough that this is purely hypothetical or something, I don't know, maybe that's not bad. - I mean, I would even say the central bank itself does. And I have to do it, right? I mean, the world over central banks work with, collaborate with research institutions. So I would say arguably someplace like Pied or SDPI could do that analysis as part of their own external research agenda and show everyone exactly what that outcome would look like if we were to go down this path of restructuring domestic debt in particular as well. - All right, let's talk, so that's debt restructuring. Now let's move on to the IMF piece, right? Good news overall that, you know, the staff level agreement had been reached. Weeks had gone by with no approval from the board, but as of yesterday, the approval came through the first tranche to do this month. So in the next few days, $1.1 billion will flow into the central bank's reserves and we'll have that data soon thereafter from the state bank. How do you see this playing out now? I put it on that inflation is coming down, interest rates are coming down. The IMF is in for three years. And by and large, I would say like, given the volatility we've seen with IMF negotiations, this process at least went through without a lot of noise which created uncertainty. And that's also showing, and I know the stock market is not an indicator of the economy, but the boom in the stock market and the run we've seen is reflective of that process that at least Minister Aurangsev and his team have been able to shepherd through without a lot of noise. How do you see this playing out now? - Well, you write in terms of the absence of noise around it, but I think right now they've got a really fractious consensus behind this program. And I think the finance minister's challenge is actually about to begin. The fact that getting executive board approval is appearing to us as some sort of a major hurdle that has been crossed itself suggests that the process is more fraught today than it has been in the past. I think beyond I think await the release of the staff report, important to point out that this conversation is taking place before the staff, this is after the executive board has approved the program, but before the staff report has been uploaded. So we haven't really seen the details yet, but those will tell us more about what kind of steps are to be taken now. But we do know, for example, that they are going to have to bring in some kind of legislation to ramp up agriculture income taxes and get the provinces to start collecting more and more under that head. But we'd find out more details when the report is uploaded. But for now, I think it's enough to just point out that the real job actually begins now. Keeping the fiscal equation in check ensuring that the primary surpluses that have been committed are actually produced at the end of the fiscal year that the net international reserve targets that have been committed to by the end of the fiscal year. Apparently, from what I hear, significant amount of debate took place around that in the run-up to the approval of this program around what kind of NIR targets the fund and the government were willing to agree on for end of the fiscal year. What kind of current account projections that they were working with. And I think the pressure on the government to try and ramp up growth to try and provide some sort of relief to the people in terms of energy pricing, in particular, is going to decline. Some rancor from the business community is going to increase as well. Although, exporters are screaming bloody murder about the cost of borrowing, about the cost of energy. But exports are climbing pretty fast. In the first quarter, they've registered fairly decent increases year on year. And corporate profitability, you mentioned that, yes, the stock market is not an indicator, but corporate profitability of listed companies is that a record high yet again. I don't know to what extent that's just driven by inflation or energy price and just moves because some of those companies are at the head banks and energy companies in terms of driving. Companies are seeing this, these windfall profits come. But companies, other than these, are also there, registering very high levels of profitability. But nevertheless, there will be rancor from the business community. And the government in our own history tells us at some point or the other is usually then compelled to give some attention to them, whether or not it's justified in our view. And, you know, these kinds of pressures are going to work. So I think the finance minister is going to have, going to have to be looking over his shoulder because his own party is factionalized. He's got people like his art art breathing down his neck. And he's got to shepherd the federal government and its various sort of, you know, departments. He's got to shepherd the coalition government. He's got to shepherd the provinces and the federal government together. And keep this whole thing on an even keel. It's a big job, it's a big, you know, but it's going to be a big, big thing to pull off. And frankly, I think the executive board of Google just means that we're at the starting line. You just literally, you know, this is when it's all just begun. Even though it's feeling like something is just, you know, like a really big task is just ended. But no, it did this at the beginning. So let's see. - Yeah, and I think part of the reason why people feel right that this is a much bigger milestone versus just the start of a program. I think it's also because Pakistan was in a standby arrangement for a year. So one year, I would say assuming of a four year program has gone by and the crunch for the next three years has been approved. Perhaps that's one way to look at it. But I would love your thoughts on this 'cause you wrote about this last week as well. And I'll link to that piece in the description for those who want to read that full piece. That it's a, we are dynamic right now where broadly speaking, the economy stabilizing again, and the external space is opening up, which is also interesting, right? Cheating in OPEC plus means all prices are down. That helps the government cut petroleum prices. For example, although I have a point of view on that, which we'll get to in just a moment, interest rates being cut globally domestically, inflation coming down now under 10% rapid decline there. And at least for the time being seems that that will sustain. So in that environment, why do you, you wrote about this that politics is beginning to be more unstable when the economy is becoming stable? Help us understand why that concerns you and why is it that duality is different this time around? It concerns me because economics and politics are joined together and really important in critical ways. And whatever happens in the political domain does spin over and does have very important consequences for the economy and for economic management in particular. So the extent to which the government is embattled, the extent to which it is struggling to command its own mandate, the extent to which it is perceived by its own constituents as illegitimate, the extent to which it is disempowered versus the bigger partner on whose shoulders it has entered into power, which is the military in this case. To the extent that all of these things are in play, its ability to execute the kind of commitments that has given to the IMF in this program is helped. And we've seen this already. We've seen them, for example, searching for frantically, searching for ways to bring power tariffs down and because, I mean rightfully so in the sense that yes, you know, electricity has become frightfully expensive and for ordinary people in this country, it's becoming extremely difficult to be able to afford their monthly energy bills. At any elected government is going to feel the heat and we'll try and look for ways to take some of that burden off their citizens. But look at the way in which they're going about it. Right, the provincial government unilaterally just announcing a subsidy program out of its own pocket to pay a part of people's energy bills. For example, saying that, okay, well, we'll try and keep it fiscally neutral in the sense that we'll reduce the development budget by the same amount. So we'll just diverting money from one head to another in order to help deviate some of the pain that people are feeling all their energy bills. And then it turns out it's actually not fiscally neutral. The own finance minister comes out and says, well, you know, we've managed to locate half the resources required to pay for this subsidy. The other half is gonna have to come from the federal government. Well, that made no sense. - And then we'll ask-- - If I may pause you, if I may pause you there because that was something I wanted to get to and you've gone down that rabbit hole. So let me interrupt you. This is a question I had was, okay, if you are facing an environment where global oil prices are coming down and we know that, yes, if you cut prices at the pump, they offer some relief, but that relief is aggressive meeting the land cruiser and we discuss this at length, right under the M brand concept city. The land cruiser owner benefits a lot more than the Honda 70 CC owner or the Rickshawala. So it's regressive in that nature. And of course, that decline in prices is not passed down to the consumer and other goods. The increase is always passed up in the formulation, but prices are downwards sticky. So they don't come down in that same sense when you cut energy prices, particularly petroleum prices. So what did it have made more sense to, you know, bank that increase or that cut in the form of an increased tax collection from the fiscal federal fiscal side and use that to then use that same excess resource to give energy relief, quote unquote, in the form of reduced electricity prices. The stimulus would be higher. The progressivity of that cut would have been higher because you would have first started with your lifeline consumers, et cetera. And it would have been much more popular, but I was confused that for some reason the Sharif government has decided to go about with the old playbook of saying, we will cut petroleum prices instead of we will bank this excess, keep prices stable and pass you some level of better stimulus in the form of lower electricity bills, for example, which for example, is what Narendra Modi across the border has been doing and Raoul Gandhi's been complaining about saying look at the petroleum prices now versus where oil is now in the past, but it makes sense from New Delhi's point of view that we will bank that resource and then use it for infrastructure spend and other direct benefits transfers because it's a much better use of resources. Why do you think the Sharif government doesn't seem to understand this logic? - Well, I mean, look, what you are describing is a situation, I mean, that's the sort of thing that would happen if decision-making or functioning normally or the way it should function in a policy space. Yes, I mean, it does sort of make sense that you retain some of the benefit from falling oil prices in the form of taxes and use those taxes to provide a targeted relief to those who need it, rather than a blanket relief by just reducing prices across the board for everybody. But you see, this is what I was getting at is that what happens when you have all of these things weighing upon a particular government is that it impairs decision-making. And in an environment of impaired decision-making, then you get, well, I mean, you get some standard policy outcomes. An example being the blanket or the power subsidy that they announced without really having fully looked at the costs and how much it's going to cost. And that evidence is there because the finance minister, their own finance minister had different things as compared to what their chief minister was saying or the chief minister's office was saying. You've got another example of impaired decision-making on the energy side with this effort to try and reschedule or renegotiate IPP tariffs, the tariffs at which the government purchases from private power generating companies. I mean, we can talk about that, but I mean, it's clearly, you know, less, we're talking very little bang for the buck there. We're talking a very large, a very large negative signal going to domestic investors who are going to basically price in this kind of risk in all their future decisions, which means even more rent-seeking behavior in the future because they're going to say that, like, you know, in part, sir, you can get mugged, you know, at that point because somebody one day decides that, look, we're under a lot of pressure. These are kind of decisions that happen, you know, when a government is feeling like it has to deliver very quick and very visible results in a very rapid way, you know, in a short period of time and it has to be seen to be doing things. We have, it's not examples of this kind of decision-making taking place. I've written about one of those in my article today, for example, where they're saying that they're going to have audit-driven recoveries on the revenue side. You know, having failed to really expand the tax and they're having really failed to bring in the, or net any significant amount of the services sector through their revenue measures in the previous budget. Now that they're responding to this, speaking of old playbooks, this is one of the oldest playbooks out there. - Which again, like ignores the fact that there's a big trading lobby, which is your key constituency that you don't want to antagonize even more. So let's go for those that we can quote unquote, audit more and extract a bit more flesh. - These exercises have never worked, you know, they're at least not work to deter evasion tax evasion and not work to raise recoveries, which are the true outcomes you're looking for when you launch this kind of an audit-driven, sort of a tax effort. So these kind of decisions being made all over the place just shows that decision-making itself is in bed. And, you know, I trace that impairment back to the myriad ways in which this government is hobbled by. It's the circumstances under which it came into power, the circumstances under which it is being made to perform. - So let me ask you the last question related to this, right? Because when I talk to some folks who are more focused on the political dynamics that play in Islam about and Mindy and Adiala, essentially the three key sort of places where power politics is playing out right now in Pakistan, they say, look, is there, like, there are essentially five men who are guarantors of the status quo, General Munir, still around. General Anjum, now replaced by General Malik, will see how he, you know, changes the ISI, but I think he'll probably stick with his chief as most have done in the past. Justice Issa in the Supreme Court, President Zardari in the presidency, and Shabbat Sharif in the prime minister's office. And these five men writ large, or these five officers writ large are underpinning, or guaranteeing the entire status quo. And there is clearly no evidence at this point in time that even one of them is changing their position right now, which leads me to ask about Justice Issa, which is the answer to that as well. Look, that's what they're trying to solve for, because they know the next guy might be not aligned with the rest of the four. So they're trying to push through this constitutional amendment, which is currently playing out. How do you assess this play then, right? That if these five offices are basically, you know, in the Imran Khan era, I used to write a boy was a crime buried. It was General Faz, General Bajwan, Imran Khan, and a falling out removal of Faz, and then the falling out between Bajwan and Imran meant the end of the crime but it, and then the system went away. How do you see the fact that now there are five men, or five officers underpinning the status quo, and there is still no evidence that at least the most dominant of them have soured on the junior partners in this relationship? - Yeah, I mean, I've rarely seen things as all over the place as they are today. You know, you've got way too many, they've got way too many sort of people writing this book right now. And, you know, in our last podcast, I'd used the metaphor of a game to try and illustrate how I was seeing the play of political forces. And I'd, if you recall, I'd talked about a four player game in which, you know, at that time, it was Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif, Asimovir, and Aussie Faisiesa, and each one of them had their objectives, you know, and they were, and how the game had turned, you know, it used to be three, one, in favor of Imran Khan way back when Imran Khan began his ascent into power, but now it's become three, one against him. And in a four player game, you don't let it go three, one against him. So, you know, what's happened now is that at least one of those players has sort of, you know, diminished and has not really been able to keep up with the requirements of the fight that they are in. When that's the worst Sharif. The other player, Aussie Faisiesa, has found that his own team, that the hierarchy of top, which he sits and from where he derives his power and his strength, itself is not entirely behind him. And he's having a hard time pulling his own judges behind him and sustaining this fight. There's at least eight of them now are saying, we don't want anything to do with this because it's calling on us to make far too many compromises. - Which is why the executive helped him out last week with that order and it's giving him control of the roster once. - Yeah, basically, they have to now sort of start centralizing more power in his hand so he can exercise tighter control over the reins. So that leaves the army chief, really, you know, who's now leading that camp, the three versus one and versus Imran Khan. I gotta admit, I've never seen a civilian politician put up as a vigorous of fight as Imran Khan is doing right now. Never seen this before. Just consider how he's actually now caused the judiciary to rupture how the military sort of holding up on its side, but all the combined political forces of the country are not up to the task of really taking him on. And what is really Imran Khan's source of power? What is the source of the strength? It's literally, I think, I mean, maybe I might be overstating the case here, but I'll say it anyways, but it is literally the force of his personality. It's just who he is. The party apparatus that he sits atop, there's no sort of a legacy that he's riding, you know, like Baylessy rules in 2008, the legacy of struggling against a military dictator. It's literally just the force of his personality, the man that people see when he speaks. Notice, I'm not saying the man that he is, but the man that people see when he speaks. And the kind of rhetoric that he has employed, especially since his outster from power, that has resonated so deeply with so many people, that I think it's astonishing to see the combined powers of the political universe of Pakistan and of the permanent establishment of Pakistan, the military and the judiciary. All of that common cause against it. And then all struggle to overcome it and to try and break his will. And how it ends, I don't know. I fear, I fear sometimes now, when I try and visualize the ending. But in that same podcast last time, I told you what animates this game, this popular game, is the fact that each one has vendettas, scores to settle. One of those scores was with Fazamid, and we had talked about that at that time. Nawaz had a much longer list of scores to settle. I think his scores to settle include Satyb Nasar and the judges who gave adverse judgments against him, who disqualified him, who gave judgments, throwing him in jail. They included Fazamid for sure. So, you know, then they're going down that list, they're settling those scores, but the ultimate score to be settled was with Imran Khan for all three of them. And, you know, game remains in play. And how it ends is still uncertain and up in the end. And the quality of economic management the country will receive in the course of all this is going to be compromised as a result. I think that's a good place to end this because I agree with you that the game is in play. And again, I think a government and a status quo that broadly people in Pakistan view as illegitimate, if not questionable, if I were to be more diplomatic and questionable, but I view it as, you know, broadly people think it's illegitimate. If it is unable to get over this hurdle of, you know, delivering on certain economic outcomes, then it's going to face even more uncertainty. I agree with you there. And I think that's where the challenge still remains as we talked initially in our conversation that, you know, you have had three years of IMF approval, but the hard work begins now. I think we touched on the first part of this conversation. It's terrible advice to go down a restructuring path in this political dynamic because I will destroy even more whatever little legitimacy if you believe that that you have. So terrible idea, don't go there. And then finally, in one way or the other, you know, the executive has to start pulling its weight by making common sense choices that it relates to data to economic management, which again, we're not seeing yet for now. And I think underpinning all of this is the vendetta, right? For now, the three versus one situation remains in place where the three main characters still have sports to settle against one man in jail, who's not going away, who is not willing to bow down or leave or go abroad. So we'll see where this goes. But at least for now, this week, the government can say milestone achieved. We're checking off the economic boxes now. - Yeah. (laughs) - Thank you. Thank you for your time. Always wonderful talking with you. And again, learn a lot from your articles and these discussions. So we'll have you back on as this game materializes. But for now, the three players think that some money is coming in the bank and that will give them more space. Let's see how it goes. - No, some space and some relief for them is coming. - Thank you, bye. - Okay, all the best. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music)