[music] Welcome to GAS, the true story of a toxic train derailment. I'm Ron Scholl. Last time on GAS, health officials considered the criteria for allowing re-entry for residents, and decided that hypersensitivity was not a concern. We now continue with part one, chapters 23 and 24. Chapter 23, "The Patch." Epigraph. One of the Vietnam vets that was part of the response crew came up to me and he said, "I did two tours of duty in Vietnam, and have never been so scared." Chris Weiss. Monday, April 22. Vapor transfer from car three was underway late yesterday, the tank holding up to 60,000 pounds of liquid chlorine. At 1 a.m., the crew applied steam heat to the tank head where the chlorine pooled to increase the vapor flow. MRL noted seems to be off-gassing from the steam application to the tank and jacketed insulation that is saturated with chlorine as well as the surrounding soil. A green cloud rose above the car every so often. At 2 a.m., Scott McLay of the boiler crew was removed from the site and examined. Scott has been coughing for approximately 15 minutes after inhaling some chlorine that penetrated his respirator, MRL noted. By 2.30 a.m., readings near the boiler exceeded 20 parts per million. Paramedics were called to examine McLay. He was given albuterol and oxygen. Weezing, McLay was ambulance to the ER at 4.15 a.m. As a result, the boiler crew was pulled back, allowed in every 15 minutes to check equipment. But at 4.30 a.m., the crew simply abandoned the site and did not report to anyone that they were leaving, MRL noted. Gas transfer continued without steam. At the morning briefing, Dan Watts updated. The patch did not work. There were strong chlorine readings at the site during the night. No one mentioned McLay's exposure. Watts Waldron and other locals met with the EPA's Weissen Way about opening I-90. The DOT's George Swartz complained, "I am under a terrific amount of pressure. We're going to kill someone on the detour." But unpredictable spikes still threatened I-90, especially at night. Way noted a recent 15-minute average on the highway of 10 parts per million. The level immediately dangerous to life and health. Paul Asie of the fire department said, "Almost all vehicles take fresh air into the cab of the car, whether the vent is off or the window is closed." Waldron recalled a huge amount of pressure from the Federal Highway Administration and Montana DOT to open up I-90, which closure was the longest in history. Hundreds of wide truck loads were simply stuck. Chris Weiss recalled, "Truck traffic was backed up all the way to Cincinnati and the grocery stores in Seattle were running out of vegetables. And I was getting daily calls from the Department of Transportation in Washington about when that highway was going to open. And my daily response was, we're still recording high concentrations of chlorine on the highway unpredictably." Yet on the detour, Weiss acknowledged, "One of my fears was that there would be an incident between a logging truck and a school bus." Early the next evening, a tractor trailer overturned, causing a 12-hour delay. The semi and its lumber load caught fire, but no one was reported injured. Traffic on the narrow road was described as "heavy and treacherous" since the spill. After 10 a.m., steam was again applied to car three. A marine air monitor tech observed M-tech employees steaming the car and using an air chisel to unzip more of the tank jacket. Readings five feet to the west of car three were IDL-H, at least 10 parts per million. The marine reader noted that U.S. Coast Guard and industry observers standing within 20 feet of the car west side, no PPE, no protection. Claring safety laps has continued, even among the expert brass. This marine worker wrote a list of other safety violations after his new entry, including one, use of air purifying respirators in IDL-H atmosphere. Two, observers using mouthpieces without nose clips and for observation rather than escape. Three, no emergency decon shower. Four, no formal maintain zones. Five, level ABCD, all-in-hot or contaminated reduction zone. U.S. Coast Guard, EPA, railroad, chlorine experts. Six, no airlines for job. That is supplied air. Chlorine is obviously going to require level A, he wrote. Mr. Marine would have more to say. The techs reported today, when the ice was cleared from car three, a large dent was observed on the end of the car. This car should not be moved until it is finished. Vaporization increased pressure, and the FRA noted, the tank could not be heated too fast because the patch would start leaking, causing very high chlorine readings in the area. Occasional low positive readings continued to be measured far from the site. That afternoon, Envirocon began excavating the accessible contaminated soil, piling dirt on poly sheeting on the south access road. Most of the soil was expected to be dug up today, except for around car three. The soil removal would be done in stages. First, removing the cressellate stained soil in the ditch, then the potentially contaminated soil beneath, and lastly, the mixed cressellate chlorine stained soil around and under the tanks, after they had been emptied and moved. As Envirocon worked, Marine began the first air sampling for other chemicals to see what was stirred up, such as chlorinated phenols. Mr. Marine monitored for chlorine during track cooperation. West of car three, peaks were greater than 20 parts per million. The short term exposure limit, 10 parts per million. Mr. Marine wrote, "chlorine appears to be coming from under the tank car rather than soils." At the same time, Mr. Marine noted, a representative from American Association of Railroad was on the site, West of car, no respirator, informed to use respirator or leave the area. Worst offenders on respirator use are chlorine association experts. Overconfidence, not ignorance. At 3.30 p.m., the site's short term exposure limit was 15 parts per million, with peaks still over 20 parts per million, the monitor limit. At 3.45 p.m., the still was 15.7 parts per million and the three and a half hour time-weighted average was 2.2 parts per million, with peaks still over 20 parts per million. A very hot zone with lukewarm safety. Then the wind shifted. Now, Marine noted direct readings of 10 to 20 parts per million at the East barrier at 4.15 p.m. Even the deconstation East of the site received hits of 1 to 2 p.m. We reported that chlorine concentrations of 80 to 100 p.m. were recorded in the hot zone this day. Anyone taking an unprotected breath would suffer greatly. At the night shift briefing, what's updated? There is chlorine frozen beneath the tank. As the steam melts the chlorine, it sends up spikes. Plus, the damn patch leaked. Lieutenant Mike Bighman warned, "Keep your SCBA with you at all times." Within 30 minutes, the second worker at the site in 18 hours was exposed to chlorine during the steaming process. The contract employee was not wearing any breathing apparatus. Marine reported a halter worker was exposed and EMT personnel said he was in pretty rough shape. He was transported to community hospital. Bighman said the unprotected worker walked into a pocket of gas. Mr. Marine was likely not surprised. Mr. Marine's criticisms ultimately made it into the Marine Environmental Report, which MRL withheld from the public record until it surfaced in 2000 litigation. The immediate hot zone, as defined by the red and yellow tape barriers close to the site, changed repeatedly due to shifting winds. Marine made some critical comments. He wrote, "Several times decontamination stations which were established outside the hot zone experienced chlorine concentrations above the IDLH of 10 parts per million. And concentrations more than twice the IDLH were recorded several times. Access into the overall site was controlled. However, entry into the hot zone was not controlled, nor was the hot zone clearly defined. The changing hot zone, he wrote, often caught workers unprotected and were exposed to chlorine concentrations above the protection limit of the respirators. On respiratory protection, he noted, air purifying respirators are not appropriate for emergency response to chlorine spills. Full-phase air purifying respirators were used by the decontamination station personnel, boiler personnel, chlorine consultants, regulators, and chlorine gas pumping personnel in locations with chlorine concentrations above IDLH levels. The mouthpiece respirators, which were used, should not be allowed on site. They provide only limited protection and are to be used for escape only. Some personnel use them to observe operations in the hot zone. According to Mr. Marine, this included federal personnel and industry experts. He noted, chlorine measurement on top of the damaged cars identified chlorine exposures over 100 parts per million and still exposures greater than 50 parts per million. However, the workers in the area were protected only with full-phase air purifying respirators. SCBA was required. He continued, airline respirators, which were rented after arrival at the site, failed on two different occasions while workers were in the hot zone directly in a chlorine cloud. One worker had to be cut out of his level A suit after the airline respirator failed. Mr. Marine concluded, it is also important to note that two workers who were not wearing appropriate respiratory protection near the hot zone received chlorine exposures that resulted in their being transported to the hospital by EMTs. Fortunately, their injuries were minor. Other workers also received exposures above the OSHA permissible exposure limit and in some cases above the IDLH but did not require emergency treatment. Marine reported that several more workers than documented in the logs suffered significant exposures, mainly because of unsafe practices. All of this occurred after the EPA was allowed on site. No worker exposure injuries were reported publicly. Tuesday, April 23. More rain was coming with high winds. Transfer from car three continued overnight under a new bank of lights. The techs maintained a slight pressure of two PSI but even this strain, the leaky patch. MRL reported, readings in the pit on the west side are 37 to 40 parts per million. At 2.40 a.m., the tech shut down the boiler due to readings in excess of 80 parts per million at the north hot zone area. But chlorine had already drifted to the edge of the broader hot zone. Smell of chlorine at the forward command post very strong at 2.45 a.m., the techs noted. 2.2 parts per million was detected at the security point at the natural peer bridge and 1.6 parts per million at Holcher's trailer. The gas threatened forward apps almost 3/4 of a mile away with no warning. Chlorine also drifted north. At 3 a.m., MRL noted readings in excess of 10 parts per million at mile marker 73 on the highway. The fixed monitor at the natural peer bridge peaked around 2.5 parts per million then readings drifted between zero to 0.2 parts per million for about an hour. On I-90, spikes peaked over 14 parts per million and stayed high about an hour. Unreared in lane, the peak hit 86 parts per million. Chlorine gas infiltrated all directions. At 3.30 a.m., the steam was still off but pressure in car three rose to four PSI. Marine recorded just after 4 a.m., site vacant. Abandoned, the site was too hot to handle. By 5.15 a.m., readings dropped with tank pressure down to one PSI. The techs resumed steaming at 6 a.m., though reared in lane still peaked at 80 parts per million and I-90 at six parts per million. Following the pattern of recent days, readings quieted by 8 a.m. Leahy noted Chlorine readings were 2.5 at the natural peer bridge. Can smell it and Albertan, she wrote. A reading of 2.5 parts per million should have triggered a pullback at the forward command post or, as Weiss put it, moved the circus but there was no record of any this night. Weiss, 2.5 parts per million of Chlorine in the air would have been intolerable, so anybody exposed to that either would have had a respirator on or they would have had to withdraw. That's a huge warning. Basically, that screams, get out of the way or put your mask on, go inside and shelter in place. Scott Waldron recalled vaguely, you know, it seems like there were a couple of times that based on their monitoring that people pulled back, I think it occurred more than once. I think they just pulled back into Albertan. But the idea was not to have forward ops overrun by gas. This hadn't even been a major release. Weiss didn't recall hearing about this incident. No EPA report, including Wade's daily reports, mentioned the evacuation. But Chlorine put crews on the run this night. At the morning IC briefing, there was more concern about information leaks than leaks of Chlorine. The information officer complained, information is being put out by someone connected to the incident. All information must be released by the IO. No information is to be put out by you. There was information that the site was evacuated last night. Mick Meekin later confirmed the pullback, which included the site and forward ops. Everybody in the area, he said. My recollection is that that was immediate. Everybody out of the area. While the news was withheld from the public, based on the IO's complaint, someone had tried to break through the suppression. Physical security was leaky, too. An officer reported having many breaches of the exclusion zone. A person ran row block number four last night, he said. That person is now in the mineral county jail. Officers found a few people in Alberton. We have tightened security. The next day, deputies arrested someone at Dave Stenberg's ranch in the hot zone across from the site. We had people constantly trying to violate the parameters Mick Meekin recalled. A batch of bad signs. Chlorine spikes from steam and rain. Two chlorine injuries in 18 hours. A boiler crew abandonment. A forward ops evacuation. Uncertainty of how much chlorine had been successfully transferred. A transfer process that could drag on for unknown days. And worker fatigue and frustration in a dangerous situation. Throw in interlopers that didn't give a damn. In today's IC briefings, Waldron discussed the slow progress. Since start of vaporization, he said, approximately 100 pounds of chlorine is being neutralized an hour. After 36 hours, the projected timeline is 20 days. May 13. Watts. This is the largest hole ever tried to be patched in history. This is the first time for many of the problems occurring here. The tax estimated 26 tons remained. To speed up the transfer, they would change pipe size from one inch to two inches. The technical specialists are considering all options available, Waldron said. High risk options could be to roll the car and attempt to take the chlorine out in liquid form. It could become very risky if other options are used. The tax warned, everyone is reminded they need to be in full face respirator in the red tape area. The readings have been averaging in a 30 to 40 parts per million range. An EMT was on site with oxygen. The tax wanted a two man level eight hazmat team staged at Ford Ops as a backup rescue team for the work site. The crews at the work site are fatigued, they said. There's a lot of frustration among the specialists attempting to stabilize the chlorine. The tax explained, the patch is leaking between the rubber backing and the metal plate. It appears to chlorinate the contact cement and is coming through the cracks. Reportedly, the chlorine ate everything. An aggressively corroded equipment involved in cleanup, including vehicles, tires, and air compressors. Sometimes parts had to be replaced after 12 hours. What said the texts were unsure how much chlorine under the tank might be causing spikes? The specialists are having a difficult time explaining that, he said. A company called Team Industrial Services, Inc. or Team Leak was responding to repair the patch. An earlier personnel reduction had been premature and Waldron now wanted more emergency manpower. With the riskier options, he said, there's a possibility of re-evacuating residents that had already come home. Deputy Howard Reed asked, "Do we need to remove livestock from the hot zone and/or the exclusion zone?" This would eliminate the hazmat teams going into the hot zone. He made a good point. Responders continuously faced added risk by officials leaving animals behind in the broad hot zone. The animals faced greater risk as well. If an emergency caused re-evacuation of residents, hot zone and exclusion zone animals would likely be left behind again, just as they had been during last night's pullback. Waldron assured we have time to plan in the event of a major release. Deputy Reed, some of my people have concern about entering the exclusion zone. I don't want to take my troops in there. High readings. McBeek had said no one went past Petty Creek Road or Seer Bridge unless equipped with breathing apparatus. Waldron, just keep them out, absent a definite need. The pressure of dealing with the tank ramped up anxiety. The chlorine that ate everything. The techs brought up risky options again such as rolling the tank. Steve Wei had earlier nixed such ideas. Wei wrote this morning more aggressive measures such as attempting to mix caustic and chlorine in an open containment area is not being considered. Wei recalled, "There are a couple of concepts. One was to introduce sodium hydroxide into the car itself, and the other was to potentially create some type of a chamber or pit outside the vessel to co-mingle the caustic and the chlorine." I essentially told them neither of which we were going to do. We ultimately went for the most conservative, stable and predictable operation that we could run as quickly as we could. But even that conservative approach resulted in dangerous leaks and exposures. Waldron recalled many extreme measures were discussed. We looked at everything from blowing that car up with explosives to dragging that car into the river, he said. A frustrated MRL was losing money by the hour and would have loved to drag that car with a dozer into the river and let whatever happened happen, he said, and opened up the train, but it wasn't that easy. And the best minds in the world were here trying to solve that problem. The techs said, "We have a 19 page report from the chlorine spill in Florida. The report lists everything that was done wrong. We are not making the same mistakes." But mistakes were being made, original or not. In the lethal 1978 Florida spill, the rupture in the 45 tonne chlorine car was much smaller, but complicated by the car being under a pileup that included a liquid propane tank that had flipped upside down and leaked from the top dome. If ignited, the propane could have destroyed a half mile area, igniting other cars, including four caustic soda cars, sodium hydroxide, turpentine and ammonia nitrate. Rather than patch the one foot square leak, the NTSB agreed to a plan to gingerly neutralize the deadly chlorine tank car by pulling it into a pit of caustic soda. After making a ditch running to two bulldoze pits, chemical experts had the chlorine tank dragged 80 feet from the wreck and pumped the liquid chlorine into the pits over two days, mixing it in the open with caustic soda from another train tank, where it was transformed into harmless crystals. However, during the process of neutralizing the chlorine gas, officials said a significant cloud of gas was released, though dampened by rain. One worker was exposed and injured. From spill to neutralization took under five days. Toward the end, with 2,000 residue gallons left in the tank, the EPA on-scene coordinator suggested that the recipe dumped and the chlorine cloud endured. Chlorine experts rejected the idea, but early the next day, the OSC witnessed a huge chlorine cloud rising from his vantage two and a half miles away. A railroad official told him that the chlorine car had been dumped because no progress was being made. Problem solved. Finally, the caustic buffer ponds weren't filled in before a heavy rain flushed contamination into a nearby stream. The Florida response, while grossly effective, was unsettling. It crossed the minds of some that it might have been best if all 90 tons had vaporized on April 11th in Alberton. If you ignored human exposures. When I see met with Weiss at noon, a main topic was fatigue. The EPA decided to request a national emergency strike team to assist in hazmat operations. Weiss said, "This is a small hot shot crew. We will still need your local support." "Weldren, the work crews are very fatigued and this level will increase." Off-site Weiss said, "We need to monitor the air movement up and down the canyon more closely. The safety officer warned everyone that they would need a real purpose to be in the area. You will be in no part of the exclusion zone without a monitor," he said. Yet, resident visits had continued. Livestock feeding needs to be revisited, icy noted. If animals need to be moved, address this. "Waldren wanted it settled." Livestock, he said, "Do we need to move them?" Without a decision, Watts next announced that the techs were still looking at a process to take the chlorine off in liquid form. "We are going to speed the process up," he said. They are considering tapping the tank, rolling the tank, a risky process earlier rejected. McPeekin said Wei asked that at the 2 p.m. evacuee meeting avoid any projection of a re-entry date. On day 13, nothing seemed lucky. Watts recalled wanting the EPA's environmental response team out of Edison, New Jersey. When these spikes of chlorine occurred, it's clear that the chlorine specialist didn't know what to do. We couldn't fix it. The patch didn't work. We couldn't pressurize the car. It continued to evaporate unpredictably. So at this point in time, Steve and I are going, okay, we've been here for almost two weeks. If this goes on for another month or two months, what are we going to do? Steve and I at this time have been sleep deprived for a week. And we were on the threshold of calling the emergency response team guys that we know and work with and trust and start a rolling watch crew. So you have at least two federal guys on scene all the time. Wei recalled, "Most of our days there were probably "anywhere from 12 to 16 hours, if not more at times." This was a perilous time in the incident. A seemingly endless struggle to transfer the leaky car three amid frustration and fatigue felt by everyone. Evacuis included. Wei, we definitely were getting stretched. The nature and the intensity of the incident and the interaction with the community and the public and other officials at the site, it takes its toll. You're always on demand and your attention is key to what's going on. Weiss, it was a war zone. Honestly, I had one of the Vietnam vets that was part of the response crew came up to me after about seven or eight days into the incident and he said, "I was never so scared. "I did two tours of duty in Vietnam "and have never been so scared." The enemy was chlorine. Originally a weapon of warfare. It was dangerous, weiss said. It was unpredictable. Every time the chlorine gas would warm up and vaporize, there would be a bubble release or airborne release of gas that sometimes was high enough to cause a green hue in the air. And for days and days and days, those bubbles contained lethal concentrations of chlorine. Meanwhile, he said, "It was difficult to tell "how much fluid was left in the tank. "Even on day 15, we had no idea "when the incident was going to end." Besides the steam heating and leaky patch, disturbance of soil or simply rain could create instant vaporization. So everybody was running around with a respirator, weiss said. It's difficult to do, and nine times out of 10, you didn't really need the respirator. But if you didn't have it within an instant of your face, you were gonna get dosed. And so there was just this constant trepidation. Just day after day, night after night after night, that you had to be totally on guard to prevent yourself from being injured by chlorine gas. Lack of vigilance meant chlorine gas roulette. Yet many people at the site had spun the wheel. Just one stink and tan car, Watts bemoaned at the afternoon of Acu E meeting. At a transfer rate of about 100 pounds per hour and a guess of 26 tons left, this would take a long time, he said. The unspoken reentry target date? Unknown, 1996. "We have had significant spikes on I-90 "and at the forward command post," he said. A reading of 15 was monitored on I-90. Waldron explained to the weary audience, "We decided this was like fighting a fire. "We've been trying to downsize, but this fire had flared. "We are up sizing at this time," he said. The workforce would ratchet up tomorrow to 140. Leahy added, "We are getting tired. "Safety is the main issue. "When someone comes up and thanks us, we appreciate that." Albert and Mayor Gene Curtis told the panel, "MRL recognized their responsibility. "They have brought knowledgeable people in to help. "We respect your judgment. "MRL, the volunteer fire department, "law enforcement and health department, "we are grateful for your splendid cooperation "for the way you have handled this." That afternoon, M-Tech transferred the remaining sodium chlorate, which had taken six days to complete. After the change out the two inch lines, the tech resumes steaming, eliminating the step of moving vapors to an empty tank, instead transferring the chlorine gas directly to a caustic car to save time. An estimated 5,206 pounds have been transferred. The pressure had risen to one and a half PSI. However, the techs noted, the leak is increasing around the patch, so it looks like we'll proceed with steaming one hour and shutting it off one hour. Team Leak would arrive this evening and try a special sealant called Pookiee to seal the patch, supposedly inedible the chlorine. They would know within 24 hours if a liquid tap could be used based on the patch effort. Rain moved in. While a metaphorical cloud dogged the incident, at 1110 p.m., a large cloud was noticed hanging over Albertin, the techs noted. Marine Environmental advised at 1230 a.m. Wednesday, the cloud had dissipated over Albertin. No detects were found in the area. Marine's direct readings at the site were being quiet as well as heavy rain fell. The rain had possibly generated a chlorine vapor cloud and then likely suppressed it. Chapter 24, questions. Epigraph, I think we're being railroaded a little bit. I'd like to have a chance for myself and others to speak. Paris Young. Enough of these damn questions, Lucinda Hodges. Monday, April 22. Today's evacuee meeting offered more drama. The moderator again was Dixie D's. We had a lot of comments about yesterday's meeting. Some good, some bad, some in between. Some didn't care, D's began. Referring to the no public questions format from yesterday. D's, so we're going to try the same format again today and then see how it works. And we'll see if we're going to do anything different again tomorrow. A woman shouted, could you allow questions after? There are some questions people want to have heard and we can't follow everybody around the room. Man and audience, why don't we put it up to a vote? Which format people would like to see? Several people, yeah, D's, okay, same man. So it's a decision of the residents which format we use. D's, okay, should we do like a hand raised thing? Yeah, okay, so there's two ways to do the format. One is the way we did yesterday and then the other would be to allow questions. Different man, what did you do yesterday? D's, what we did was have all the people up here speak and then after they got done, the meeting was over. The experts stayed around and the people could come up and talk to them. Our concern and our audience that we're trying to get to is the people from Alberton. Those were the people that we were getting phone calls from that said they felt like they couldn't get their questions in. So that's what we're trying to do and that's why we changed that. We also had several calls about the length of the meeting and there was so much information coming out. Some people had quit coming because of that and we don't want that to happen either. So it's, you know, D's balanced or palms like a scale gum snapping. Kind of a way thing. D's didn't present the other side argument for people who wanted more public discourse and more information. In effect, D's was saying that the solution to residents supposedly not getting to ask questions allegedly because of outsiders taking up time was to stop public questions and somehow with shorter meetings, less information was better. D's, so I guess we'll do a show of hands. What we also don't want to get into is two or three hours of questions after the meeting. So no such Q&A marathon had yet happened. During Will Snograss' documentation of six recent meetings, only one went past an hour at an hour 28 minutes. In the meeting Snograss taped in which open questions were allowed, Q&A sessions average 28 minutes. Some questions were asked during certain presentations as well. D's, all right. So who wants to go with the way we did it yesterday? Hands go up. Someone says, count 'em. D's, can the panel over here get an overview of this? They're trying, okay. No count was announced. D's, plan B will be that we will limit the questions to a two minute question. You have one opportunity and then somebody else has to speak that hasn't spoken yet. A time limit had never been offered before. D's and the panel were making rules up on the fly. Woman and audience, and then also the experts at the end? D's paused. Sure, we'll throw the experts in at the end as long as they can stay. Okay, how about that? A bit like, let's make a deal on Robert's rules. Same woman pumping up response. All right, yeah. Hands went up. Again, no one reported account. D's, all right. I think the other way has it. There were neither audible complaints or sounds of agreement. D's moved on. We've had some calls about some of the other meetings that are going on in town. Those are not sponsored by this incident or by Montana Rail. We do not know what they are. We don't have any involvement in it because we've had some questions about why we weren't announcing those meetings. That's because they're not ours. These were the early meetings of disaffected residents, apparently banned from announcement. After an update on car three by Watts, Dave Torgerson of Olympus showed slides about sampling near the site. Once the chlorine was stabilized, he said, Olympus would make sure all the potassium crestplate material that was spilled is cleaned up and dug up, along with any chlorinated compounds. This was an obvious opportunity to disclose the change in the criterion of removing the bulk of the soil, but Torgerson didn't reveal the revised plan of leaving the soil on site after re-entry. A man in the audience asked Torgerson whether Olympus was doing any investigation to track the original gas cloud. Torgerson, well, we use some information, looking at vegetation to try and get a feel of the extent, and then we went beyond that to make sure our sampling activities extended beyond what might be seen in the vegetation. No official had yet acknowledged the extent and pattern of vegetation damage. But when the resident tried to ask something more, Dave jumped in. Any questions will be held afterward, like everybody agreed on. Thank you. Yeah, someone shouted from the audience. Many people burst into applause. As Lucinda Hodges paraphrased the attitude at evacuee meetings, enough of these damn questions. In addition to stifling open sharing of information, this restriction cut off the immediacy and context of a question. But now, this was censorship by the assumed majority, enabled and encouraged by officials. With presentations over, the meeting ended, and once again, no open questions allowed. There was no mention of the fire last evening in a car three, the night's chlorine spikes, or the inhalation injury on the boiler crew. As the meeting broke up, Paris young told Snograss, I think we're being railroaded. Robbie Flynn, we just got railroaded. I noticed on the first vote, there were three, three of those MRL people with name tags and everything raising their hand. They aren't any of the residents. Young went up to the unused microphone set up and back and asked, will there be a chance for a community forum here, for community discussion before the meeting's over? Will there be a chance for community questions and answers here? Someone said, no, they're not doing that. Some of the scattered crowd had already left. Young, I think we're being railroaded a little bit. I like to have a chance for myself and others to speak. Young was ignored, left to stand at a live mic in a dead room. These decisions to take a vote on having public questions at a public meeting was impromptu, amateurish, yet no one on the panel spoke up about it. The panel got exactly what they wanted, no open questions. Vote or not, Snograss recalled. If you have health department officials there and it is a public meeting, it was on the fringe of being a government meeting requiring public input. The meetings were not conducted fairly, in my opinion. In my opinion, public comment was not sought. It was stifled. Snograss claimed, I was told not to distribute any more information, even though it came from given sources. So, my overall impression was that these meetings were not conducted to help the general population, but they were to minimize what had happened and keep the lid on. For many evacuees, the official meetings were becoming irrelevant as they felt pushed to organize their own meetings as obliquely referenced by these. The official logs did not reflect that anything unusual transpired at this evacuee meeting. The media paid no attention. But officials' effort to control questions was viewed with deep suspicion, outright incredulity by many residents. What were officials hiding, they wondered? University of Montana graduate student Hope Seek recalled an evacuee meeting without the time for questions and answers, she said. It was incredible. I was sitting in the back next to this woman who was pregnant, who was very concerned. And this woman stood up and said, "This is ridiculous that there is no time for us to have questions. We are the ones who are the victims of this accident. We are the ones standing here who are not knowing what's going on. We need time to talk to each other and we need time to talk to you. You owe us an explanation. You need to tell us what's going on." Throughout the crowd, Seek said, people muttered in agreement. You could tell that the people up front were getting a little bit nervous, right after that woman stood up because she started crying. Right after she sat down, Paris Young stood up and said, "Why don't we all meet? We're having a meeting after this. Anyone who's interested come to the meeting." And that right there was how the community group forum, Seek said. Overt attempts to limit questions coincided with health and exposure complaints and it perceived withholding of information and distrust only grew in many residents. A stew of dissent was rising to a boil. With Garance Smith's test array down, Energy Labs stepped up their turnaround. The April 23, Missoulian, reported that early soil and wipe tests from homes within a third of a mile of the drill element bore negative results for migration of chlorinated compounds. Samples from Alberton had not been analyzed yet. Olympus did find evidence of trichlorofenol and chloroform within 200 feet of the 10 cars. Peter Nielsen of the health department told the paper, "We want that cleanup pretty much done "and the contaminated soil contained in some way "before re-entry. "The chemicals are real odorous," he said. "They could cause discomfort for some of the people "who already had the chlorine exposure "and may be sensitive right now." This was the first publicized suggestion that residents might have become sensitized to chemicals other than chlorine. Reported for the first time was information that the ruptured chlorine tank and the potassium-crestylate tank were adjoining cars. The white dust reported by evacuees had yet to be tested because, "Health officers "have not been able to find any of the white dust or powder." Tuesday, April 23. At today's evacuee meeting, Lehi told residents the soil would be treated and contained covered with tarps before re-entry. She acknowledged the soil odor caused headaches without mentioning other symptoms. Lehi said samplers were unable to find as described the white dust. If residents smelled anything or felt sensitized, they should clean surfaces with baking soda, she said. Snodgrass taped no more evacuee meetings, but this day's meeting minutes included handwritten attached questions submitted. Question, medicinal smell while feeding animal yesterday. There was no law response to this resident's comment, which went to the heart of the complaints. If tests showed no migration, why were people smelling something other than chlorine? And why were people, especially those sensitized, being constantly re-exposed upon these unnecessary visits? Question, why not possible to remove contaminated soil from site? Waldron answered that the EPA had rules and regulations, but they were conducting neutralization with soda ash and the soil would be confined with tarps and there would be no risk? Question, possibility of airborne contaminants? Answer, not a threat for EPA. The site was deemed safe even for people living nearby. Question, why do you not know what the white dust is? Lady replied that they had tested surfaces looking for any compounds. Apparently, none had been found. Emerald's handout elaborated. Olympus environmental technicians did not find the dust on any surfaces. They wiped sample many surfaces. Results of the scanning tests are no detects for volatile compounds and semi-volatile compounds and pH results are within normal ranges. In other words, surfaces without the white dust were normal. The next question was for MRL. Two really sick kids told, don't go home for doctor. Are you going to take care of us? Dan Watts, stay out until kids better. Here, a resident was effectively told by her doctor that the Albertan environment was triggering or worsening symptoms and Watts reply acknowledges much. The leap of faith was that the children would get better and later have no symptoms upon returning home. The implied issue was re-exposure and sensitization. The next question came from someone living 7.5 miles west of the spill near Fish Creek. They wanted to know if it was safe to go home because three days after the spill, they self-evacuated because their eyes burned, they felt fatigued and they smelled pesticides. We left because we don't feel it's safe to be home, the person said. Watts assured that chlorine monitoring away from the site was negative, though he acknowledged occasional smell to the west, he said. Walton then informed that officials were now in the process of moving all animals out. Logistically, too many problems to staff, he said. Someone with small children who lived in the re-entry zone east of Petty Creek and had stayed out said, others who had waited were going back today. Should we, Watts, yes. Re-entry zone okay. Waldron will not hesitate to re-evacuate if necessary. Question, why are they moving animals out if it's safe for us to go back in? Waldron, higher levels of chlorine, meaning wherever these animals were. This meant animal removal was more than four logistics as just stated, but also due to levels of chlorine. Question, area now being evacuated of animals? Waldron, being assessed, natural peer area, west. This likely meant at least plateau road. Emerald's handout elaborated. Preventative safety measures are underway to vacate animals of livestock remaining in the hot zone to a different location due to the elevated chlorine levels in the air. The pet and livestock feed will not proceed tomorrow. Ultimately, however, no animals were removed and visits continued. Finally, the audience was again promised that an air model from the first day would be available quote soon. Officials were still trying to obtain weather information. While the tech struggled with CAR-3, progress was made on two of the criteria for re-entry and a third was clarified. Testing for migration of chlorinated compounds was trendy negative. No white dust had yet been found and residents now knew the soil would not be removed prior to re-entry. A mallodorous question remained. What's that smell? Next time on gas, the true story of a toxic train derailment, untrusting of official reassurances for long-term health and for the safety of the Albertan area and angry with attempts to shut down public questions at meetings, some residents band together to form ACE, the Albertan community evacuees. Until then, this is Ron Scholl. Thanks for listening. This podcast is adapted from the book Gas, the true story of a toxic train derailment. Visit amazon.com to see the two-book series. To access support material in the book, such as maps, photos, illustrations, and video links, visit my Facebook page, Gas, the true story. Or watch my gas playlist on my YouTube channel at R.L. Scholl. [MUSIC PLAYING] [MUSIC PLAYING]
