[music] Welcome to GAS, the true story of a toxic-trained derailment. I'm Ron Scholl. Last time, I'm GAS, untrusting of official reassurances for long-term health and for the safety of the Albertan area, an angry with attempts to shut down public questions and meetings, some residents banded together to form ACE. The Albertan community evacuees. We now continue with part one, chapter 26. Halfway Home. Wednesday, April 24. Ellen Leahy reported to incident command, "The white dust, our samplers cannot find any." Bill Silverman, the public will just think you're lying. Leahy, most housewives I've talked to say, "You know, that's just dust, don't you?" Dust that samplers couldn't find. Meanwhile, preliminary data-indicated chlorinated compounds did not migrate off-site. Yet, Jim Carlson acknowledged, "Compounds are aromatic and they smell off-site. A pesticide smell, but it is not a health concern." But residents reported a pesticide-like smell that caused symptoms, which health officials discounted. Considering the anticipated opening of I-90 and river access, Fireman Paul Lazy suggested, "Posting a sign by the Clark Fork River. Do not bleach your boat here." At the 2 p.m. evacuee meeting, Leahy updated residents on the four criteria. For chlorinated phenols, with 75% of the results in, no migration. Excavation of the soil was 50% completed. The white dust criterion was declared 100% met. "We have ruled out anything that could be a health threat," Leahy said. The health department said in a memo to evacuees, after extensive testing of 12 different samples, health officials are now 100% satisfied that the white dust does not pose any health risks. The dust does not contain any chlorine or chloride contaminants. The EPA later wrote that 18 surfaces were tested, including inside residents' homes. Leahy claimed in general, "We have tested 2,000 samples. All data shows no detect outside the spill zone for any spill chemicals." In the Missoulian, Leahy claimed almost 2,000 analyses. During the meeting's limited Q&A, Chris Weiss explained that chlorine was a strong oxidizer, at least at very high concentration. Weiss recalled, "There were a lot of brass doorknobs that turned green in Alberton. We saw them." Many residents reported such oxidation. By Weiss's explanation, initial concentrations had been, quote, "very high," though officials had yet to present promise modeling for the day of the spill. Today, officials said aerial photographs taken April 22 could help show the path of the most concentrated gas by vegetation damage, but such photos were never publicized. When someone asked when the soil would be removed, Dan Watts assured the soil would be contained until a permit is issued. It was no threat. Weiss acknowledged that smells from the soil were, quote, "very odorous," but assured no pesticide compounds leaving that area, not moving. Leahy added, "No justification to continue to exclude people from their homes." MRL noted, "Residents living in the hot zone may not return home as early as the other residents of Alberton. However, they will re-enter before all the contaminated soil is excavated and removed from site." This mainly referred to plateau road residents. "In their public memo, the health department claimed the soil will be covered on site to eliminate the smell," they wrote. "Most of the reason to move the bulk of the soil is to prevent complaints of the odor or to prevent the odor from causing headaches for people. All of this contaminated soil will be removed. This process will most likely continue even after residents return to their homes. However, before re-entry is allowed, the contaminated soils must be safely contained to reduce the release of odors and contaminants," they wrote. The health department also gave advice on cleaning and health issues after re-entry, writing, "During household cleaning, there should be no threat from cleanup. Homeowners may want to avoid using strong cleaning chemicals, particularly bleach, since they may have developed a sensitivity to chlorine. Re-exposure is similar to someone with a bad sunburn who shouldn't go back out into the hot sun until healed. A person with chlorine exposure should avoid chlorine until healed from the initial exposure." This updated warning on sensitivity did not mention triggers other than chlorine or mentioned specific symptoms. It implied sensitivity would be temporary, like a sunburn. Officially, the white dust issue was deemed resolve. The Olympus told officials that no white dust was actually found for sampling. A fact omitted at today's evacuee meeting and in the mazullian. For the many residents who saw the white dust, it seemed an unsolved mystery. And suspicious. Geron Smith would write, "There was still no identification for the white powder. Olympus personnel had diligently looked for it, a conducted surface testing throughout Alberton and had no positive results for chlorides, lime, or chlorinated organics. We agreed that it did not seem traceable to logical products from the chemicals involved in the rail accident. Thus, the white powder criteria for re-entry had been satisfied," he wrote. While they he claimed publicly the white dust was safe. In truth, no white dust was tested. White's recalled, "We looked all over. We heard about white dust from several people. And so, it was of concern to us. Had there been chlorinated phenolics in white dust in people's houses, we would have brought in the remedial team to clean up houses. Since residents were allowed to visit anyway, why had health officials simply not asked residents to show them some white dust? "We believed they saw it," he said. Sampling was done at random places, but there was also follow-up done to some of the same homes where people said they saw it. "We couldn't even find any white powder." "The public will just make your line," Silverman had told her. Lehi didn't tell residents that sampers had been unable to find the white dust, instead saying officials were 100 percent satisfied that the white dust does not pose any health risks. A lie by omission. Years later, Garren Smith speculated on what might have created a white dust far from the site. "If you had a lot of chloride floating around from hydrochloric acid, you could get some ammonium chloride when that HCl mixed with the ammonia from the soil organisms," he said. "This would happen on indoor surfaces as well." "It's a gas phase reaction," Smith said. Smith demonstrated in his lab by showing how the vapor from HCl mixed with the vapor from ammonia to create a white gas in the air, which then formed a white precipitate. The white pottery ammonium chloride could coat table tops in any other place that wasn't disturbed or accessible to rain," Smith said. "It's very soluble in water, so if it formed outside, it would just dissolve and go into the ground." In houses that had been closed up, ammonia from microorganisms, which are ubiquitous, would mix in the air with HCl and make a white powder, he said. Ammonium chloride seemed a reasonable explanation, though it wasn't postulated by Smith or anyone at the time. "They would have been looking for anonymously high levels of chloride, because chloride is found everywhere," Smith said. "I found a little bit of chloride, but not anything that was unusual." When Smith looked at a picture of white dust on a VCR, taken by a family that had complained about it, he said, "I bet it's ammonium chloride." But no one sampled such dust or tested for ammonium chloride. Smith also expected ammonium chloride production wherever there was foliage damage. Evidence of vegetation damage outside an ammonium chloride inside homes might have corroborated the path of the worst gas effects. But vegetation damage maps would not become public for years. The weekly Missoula Independent wrote of the white dust reported by evacuees on lawns and household surfaces, its existence has been yet to be verified by officials. Some evacuees expressed skepticism about it. "It's our own black helicopter," one anonymous resident bemoaned, referring to paranoia of the time concerning supposed UN helicopters. This comment shifted the issue to questioning the very existence of the white dust and the credibility of those who reported it. For residents who had seen the dust, the real mystery was how samplers failed to collect any. No one simply asked a visiting resident, "Show me the dust." Lieutenant McMegan joked at the evening's IC shift briefing, "The white dust chemical has been tested and the results are available by our weatherman, Marty. It's from the white powdered sugar from the donuts." In early June, long after re-entry, Aaron Model, an independent carpenter, told Montana DEQ he was hired to re-carpet a trailer MRL used at forward ops. Model "wanted to know if the white dust was harmful." DEQ's Tom Ellerhoff told Model that the dust in homes in town had been analyzed and found non-detectable for chlorinated phenols and creasols. In fact, no such white dust was ever tested, yet he was some of the infamous white dust in a motorhome rented by MRL. Model had noticed a fine white residue all over the place he said. He couldn't recall any smell. It was like a white powder, just like a dusting. Model decided not to clean the trailer. Life's too short, he reasoned. Thursday, April 25. Leggy updated at the noon IC meeting 100% no migration of chlorinated compounds, deeming half the criteria wholly resolved. As for the troublesome chlorine, there was still no answer. Watts said he had no idea when re-entry would begin. At the 2PM evacuee meeting, Leggy announced chlorinated compounds stayed at the rail site, do not find any migration. MRL reported samples taken 100 yards to one mile from the spill were non-detectable. One mile reached halfway to Alberton. During the limited Q&A, someone asked, "Have you determined which molecule was airborne and causing the odor?" The health department's Peter Nielsen explained, "Cressellate the recaptin causing pesticide-like odor." In fact, the phenols produced a pesticide-like odor, recaptins had a sulfur odor and the creosols a medicinal odor. Nielsen, not a strong odor now. If you have been sensitized, you might notice it more. Here, sensitization was the benign you might notice it more. Someone else asked about the long-promised air modeling for the morning of the spill. "The weather issue is holding you up," they asked. Watts answered. "The model of the chlorine dispersing at the time of the accident is still not complete. We do not have the accurate weather at the time of the spill, but MRL assured the model of the initial chlorine release from the rail car is in progress." MRL had bitter-root restorations give a preliminary report on vegetation damage, which publicized the first evidence beyond the immediate site. They noted, "Douglas furs and ponderosa pines near the site were heavily damaged and would probably die." Damage to vegetation decreased rapidly further from the site, though in Alberton, residents will see injuries to Douglas fir and probably the death of a few exposed larger trees and many smaller ones. Yard plants and spring wildflowers around the accident site show extensive leaf damage. The tips of most lawn grasses are injured, like they have been subjected to a hard freeze, they noted. From this broad account, a level of chlorine high enough to damage vegetation had bathed the town of Alberton. Larry Huff of MRL then showed a video he taped around Alberton of pets and livestock left behind. "Some in the audience cried," as Huff narrated. Huff. "Contrary to some of the rumors that were going around this morning, the livestock is not dead," he said, referring to a radio talk show report. Huff's video showcased hungry horses, fat Albert, a town cat, a goat, a dog, and a pond of geese. Huff reassured the crowd of seeing elk, deer, and birds in the evenings he had spent out there. "Thank you, thank you," a woman shouted amid applause. "That was home, and you'll get there if you can get this damn patch to stick," Dick C. D.'s promised. Anticipating re-entry, a feature in April 25, Missoulian caught the mood of several evacuees who voiced boredom and frustration at their motel routine, anxious to return. Some, like Don Gonzales, praised MRL for its support. Without elaborating, she also expressed disappointment in some evacuees. "This has really changed my view of people," she said. "I think some people are really taking advantage of this." Gonzales also briefly recounted her wake-up call on the morning of the spill in Alberton. "I could smell it," she said. "I thought it was fertilizer in my house." Though not pursued by the reporter, Gonzales' incidental fertilizer description on day 15 was the first media account of a non-clurring smell by a specific evacuee other than Christopher Lee's reference to Sulphur on the highway. Though not published, many residents had noted pesticide-like smells during the evacuation and later. By now, officials had publicly linked residence reports of pesticide smells with a site, and the complaints had driven the investigation into chemical migration. The Missoulian did no investigation of residence reports about non-clurring smells and associated symptoms. From Leahy's notes, a clear picture emerged of the ongoing sampling and testing for migration of chlorinated compounds. She noted, semi-volatiles, 11 sites, 21 samples, soils, and water, 64 analyses each. There had also been wipesamples for SVOCs. At the derailment site, she noted, 246 chlorofenol had been found in the range of 0.92 to 11 parts per million. Over 600 tests for pH had also been done. MRL said, "These samples were taken from every single home in Alberton with multiple samples taken at each home." Leahy noted, pH within normal range and no evidence that chlorofenols moved away from the derailment site, criterion-satisfied. Leahy had earlier told residents, "We have tested 2,000 samples in presenting evidence towards no migration. In the newspaper, she said, almost 2,000 analyses, but only 21 SVOC samples at only 11 sites with 64 analyses each and the 600 pH samples which only measured for acidity alone accounted for nearly 2,000 analyses." Or from Leahy's own notes, 64 compounds times 18 samples equals 1,152 semi-volatile organic compound tests, and 48 compounds times 19 samples equals 912 tests, which accounted for 2,000 analyses from 37 samples, many coming from close to the site. Leahy later acknowledged the obvious difference between samples and tests. "You can run a zillion tests off of one specimen or sample," she said. She admitted, "You know, I don't think we had 2,000 samples. No, I know that we split the ones we did have, which would already double how many tests you would have run. I shouldn't have said it that way, but one thing to point out is that the plan of the concentric circles was to test in the closest circle first, and only if you found a detect and anything you were looking for would you move out and move out. In sum, the scope of testing for migration was very limited in number of samples, especially away from the site. Leahy confirmed that soil and wipe testing was all done by Olympus. As for oversight, Weiss emphasized that the EPA also collected some soil and wipe samples, both for pH and chlorinated phenolics, and wipe samples for the white precipitate. Furthermore, the EPA start contractor had oversight of Olympus's sampling, observing some sample collection by Olympus, and receiving limited split samples from them. While the public message on sampling was misleading, the effect was reassuring, 2,000 tests, supposedly, and no migration, but only from 37 samples, many from near the site. MRL would later claim there ran 11,000 tests for chlorinated organics, though Torgerson of Olympus elaborated that they tested 75 samples for chlorinated organics. That is, they tested 75 samples for 150 compounds each, which equals 11,250 tests, and these figures likely included splits with the EPA duplicate samples. Based on the start report and Olympus report, the actual number of samples for crest-late-related contamination was quite limited. Eventually, 12 SVOC soil samples were taken at the site and nearby area, including from the stained soil. Doing little original sampling, EPA start independently collected a few area samples as oversight. Off-site, Olympus tested a total of 24 soil samples for organics, including VOCs and SVOCs. Of these, only 17 samples were outside of the broad hot zone. Additionally, 18 off-site wipe samples were tested for SVOCs. Independently off-site, EPA start team collected a few soil and wipe samples in Alberton and beyond. The start team concluded that wipe-and-cell samples determined that no chlorinated phenols deposited beyond 250 feet. Officials had said testing for migration would be in a spoke-like pattern within concentric rings, like wedges of an orb spider web. But with early results showing no migration, no systematic spoke-like pattern was used, and the little off-site testing appeared random, or related to specific resident requests. A logical option could have plotted the areas of greatest vegetation damage, reflecting the behavior of the patchy gas cloud, which impacted certain areas more than others. The SVOC soil samples helped determine lack of migration of chlorinated compounds, but outside of the hot zone, only 17 such samples were taken, spread out over two miles. WICE. It's not a lot of samples, but by this time we probably had several hundred pH samples, and the pH profile was immediately available. And there wasn't a strong indication that there was acidic fallout fanning out from the site. WICE said the pH profile was an associated indicator for more than chlorine, because the assumption was if acid from chlorine was not present, other chemicals from the spill would not be either. However, everyone knew the Alberton area was dosed with chlorine, so lack of low pH likely reflected buffering from rain and dew since the initial release. A neutral pH by itself did not prove other chemicals hadn't been there, which could also be diluted by rain. In some, in relation to "11,000 tests, only 17 soil samples and 18 wipe samples outside of the broad hot zone were tested for chlorinated compounds, mainly collected by Olympus, whose samplers were unable to locate the widely reported white dust." The EPA held back on testing for dioxin, which Garrett Smith had recommended. "So," he said, "when you make phenol and creesal, the likelihood is that you've probably made some dibenzo dioxins too. Once you have them, chlorinated them would lead to chlorinated dibenzo dioxin," Smith said. "The chemistry would have been as inevitable as chlorinated phenols." I did think it would be appropriate to test a cresselae tanker to see if there were any dioxins, he said. The accent testing was a lot more expensive than for most organics. If found, MRL would have been obligated to use the accent as the standard for cleanup. Considered the most immunotoxic and carcinogenic organochlorine known, the accent remains in the environment practically indefinitely. But Smith didn't think dioxins would have traveled far, being fairly heavy molecules, he said. The rationale for not testing for dioxins or their precursors was made by the EPA. Weiss, you know, we probably would have found them, and there was some concern about if we find them what method are we going to use to attribute them to the trained derailment. But testing the tank's sludge seemed obvious. Steve Wayopine that chlorinated dioxins likely didn't form, and if they did, would not migrate offsite, and all-site contamination was to be removed anyway. The rationale for not testing for dioxin was similar to that used for not doing offsite air sampling. Low expectations of positive results, coupled with plans to remove the contaminated soil. The result? No data. How did the cresselae chemicals get chlorinated? An exothermic reaction between chemicals produced heat, and that reaction could generate production of other chemicals and their transport by air. The MSDS for potassium cresselae warned against contact with acids. "If you put acid with potassium hydroxide, that would give you explosive heat generation," Garren Smith explained. "For instance, if we mixed in some hydrochloric acid, it would make water plus potassium chloride. The water would explosively boil, which is what popcorn does, so it would pop and jet stuff out in all directions. It would throw the organics around with it. My guess is that heat would probably throw them out before they had a chance to react too much." In this case, potassium cresselae mixed with liquid and gas chlorine. Smith, I'm presuming that the chlorine was mostly mixing in the vapor phase. I don't think there was a pool of chlorine sitting on the ground and the cresselae draining into the pool of chlorine. Not having been there, I really don't know if that's possible or not. Smith thought the initial chlorine flash probably happened so fast, it didn't have a chance to react with the material. It was after stuff started oozing out of the potassium cresselae tanker and then venting of chlorine gas out in the vicinity. So, I would expect the chlorination products to have taken place in the surface of the pool of cresselae that was in the ditch next to the track. The reaction is exothermic, so it does release a little bit of heat. I don't think it's enough to boil it, but it's probably hot enough that some of the chlorinated compounds can escape in the vapor phase and get transported by wind. I'm guessing that it transported as an aerosol. I just think the vigor in the reaction was generating some small liquid particulates and that those drifted some distance from the site. Whereas VOCs were likely to travel further and dissipate, heavier SVOCs such as chlorinated compounds were more persistent and likely to be deposited. Testing showed nothing deposited beyond 250 feet northeast from the tanks. Smith's relatively gentle scenario did not assume liquid chlorine mixed directly with the spill cresselae. I'm not sure that you can have a pool of liquid chlorine outside the tanker, Smith said. But the chlorine institute said it could happen and later observations have revealed that a large rupture low in a tank can allow liquid chlorine to pool. Chris Weiss thought a photo from April 11 showed evidence of liquid chlorine on the ground between the chlorine and cresselae tanks, boiling at its edges. More tellingly, as chlorine spilled and boiled after the flash, some liquid chlorine went into the ditch and pooled under car 4 where it iced. The adjacent cresselae dumped into the ditch at the same time. The reddish orange color on top of the ruptured tanks likely reflected a mix of the two chemicals, the splattering implying a liquid falling down on top of the tanks. This could have resulted from a jetting exothermic reaction between the two chemicals in the ditch, which threw back a spray of mixed chemicals. Smith. So if you get the two of them together, getting pure liquid chlorine in the potassium cresselae, that would be a pretty vigorous reaction. I think it would probably be characterized by small events where you have sort of explosive boiling taking place. So it would be coming into contact and making enough heat and it would spit things out and blow it apart for a little bit and then it would come back in contact. There would be periodic jetting. But Smith still did not expect a mixed vapor cloud. Potassium cresselae is a pretty heavy dense liquid, he said. I don't think it would aerosolize very easily. I think he would have had to have had a lot more turbulence and heat at the site to pick it up for it to go any distance. And without an intense heat source that's really got convection turbulence going, I don't see long-term transport possible. You can have vapor phase stuff, but it's going to be at very, very, very small levels and it's going to fall off with the square of the distance. So it can't amount too much in the way of a significant mass traveling very far. But Weiss had thought a mixture of liquid chlorine and potassium cresselae certainly could have been a very, very aggressive exothermic reaction, he said, including flames and volatization of chemicals there. They're lucky that didn't happen. A big plume of chemicals would have been released, he said. No one accounted for the blue-gray color of the gas cloud that hovered by Alberton for most of April 11. Tech liaison Chris Hallhol reported in the Missoulian on April 13, the mixture of the two chemicals made the cloud look worse, much worse than it actually was. But Smith also pointed to test results. If that material were transporting very far, it would have left a very distinct footprint that would have been picked up, he said, by the limited sampling. Smith was critical of MRL having directly linked four chlorine tanks to the potassium cresselae tank, which he only found out years later. That should be something that DOT should not allow, he said. I mean, talk about an accident waiting to happen. It's like putting a gasoline tank car next to a liquid oxygen tank car. Come on. I don't think we can prove or disprove what actually happened at that time in terms of what left the site on the day of the spill, like he recalled. So I could see for individuals that that's a real concern. Were they exposed to something else? The testing did not eliminate all DOTs, he said, because he don't have samples from the time people were actually exposed. Even so, she said, there was still belief on a lot of people's part that if it actually transported during the exothermic reaction that it would have deposited and you would have found it in the testing for migration. But the negative test results did not account for the reports of pesticide smells and reactive symptoms on the day of the spill and ever since. With the complaints of a pesticide smell and Leahy and Weiss' belief that reported odors could be associated with the spill site, an obvious investigation would include air sampling, but very little took place other than for chlorine. EPA's Way wrote, "Air monitoring for these chlorinated compounds is not considered necessary due to low vapor pressure of chlorinated phenols and empirical evidence," the cell sampling, "that these compounds did not migrate far from the vicinity of the wreckage. The logs did reflect that any air sampling for SVOCs took place off site, and the start report listed no independent air samples for SVOCs and VOCs. But some site air sampling was done." Jim Carlson told Leahy today that one air test had detected, quote, "13 parts per million trichlorofenol in the air near the tracks." Though this was not documented elsewhere, Carlson had acknowledged the pesticide smell could be smelled, quote, "off site." There was no systematic air monitoring for SVOCs, which wasn't a criterion for reentry, though it would have addressed ongoing reports of a pesticide smell. Smith then made the recommendation to test two air samples near the site. We actually sent a couple of pumps out, he said, and had them pump samples for us. But the test never made his report after Smith discovered his equipment had been damaged by the sludge test. We didn't analyze those until about two months later, Smith said. A sample 50 meters from the site and 1-200 meters from the site. And what they demonstrated, he said, was that the semi-volatiles had not transported significantly to the 200-meter position. They were essentially sort of threshold levels seen at the 50-meter site. The pumps measured ambient air over time. They pulled air through at about six liters per hour, Smith said, so it's just a slow, steady sniffing of the air. Probably an eight-hour sample. They gave an average, smoothing any spikes. The test was also dependent on weather conditions, such as wind speed and direction, especially since a single pump was placed at each distance. On a perfectly calm day, or if there was a wind blowing and you were up wind from the site, the chances are you would get no reading, Smith said. Smith admitted that two spot samples were not particularly significant for testing. He thought the EPA and Olympus had split samples tested, and the 13 parts per million trichlorofenol likely reflected the sample taken 50 meters from the site. Smith wasn't aware of the air samples, had also looked for macaptons, creasol, or phenol. The main older sources from the unchlorinated crecelate. The EPA start report made no mention at all of air tests for other than chlorine. Olympus's report merely summarized, quote, "a Foxboro brand organic vapor monitor, OVA, was used to field screen for the presence of organic vapors. No organic vapors were detected by the OVA on the Dremen site or beyond the Dremen site." Olympus published no analytical data on these field screening tests. OVA were handheld monitors that gave real-time snapshots. The two samples Smith split with Olympus were not field screens. Olympus and the EPA omitted in their reports that at least one lab test had shown 13 parts per million a trichlorofenol. Regardless, Olympus's summary was meaningless. Naturally, the spilled crecelate off-gas. This was a predictable behavior. Any proper air test on nearby and downwind would detect a range of chemicals, including mercaptons, creosols, phenols, and chlorinated compounds. Unknown to most, MRL's contractor marine environmental did some non-chlorine air sampling on site, but marine's data and report were not forthcoming by MRL. Only in 2003 did the EPA report that marine did limited sampling as a worker precaution. April 22 through April 29, marine conducted air sampling in the hot zone for chlorofenolic compounds and aromatic compounds, while MRL's contractors prepared for and started excavating soil. Field scans showed no hydrocarbons. In addition, air samples were collected at the excavation site for laboratory analysis marine reported. Although low levels of hydrocarbons and chlorofenol compounds were documented in the immediate digging area, none of these compounds were detected 100 feet immediately downwind from active digging operations. Chemicals found included total hydrocarbons, creosol compounds, chlorinated phenols, benzene, xylene, and toluene. The individual levels were safe for workers, though there were no standards for the combination of the chemicals. Marine noted it is important to note that these levels were detected within a few feet of where the contaminated cells were being removed. Samples taken 70 feet downwind and a quarter-mile downwind were below the limit of detection. However, no measurements were taken from the captains, arguably the most powerful smell associated with the potassium crestlight. This monitoring by marine was in concern for the workers during excavation and was not meant to investigate resident's reports of a pesticide smell away from the site. Why set a fixed air monitor for organic compounds could have been set up as with the chlorine monitors, collecting samples to test with the GCMS, but it would have been costly. Why? My recommendation to people was that if you could smell it, you should take steps to move away from it. If you can smell it and it irritates you, get away. And so none of the criteria for re-entry would account for residents' complaints of odors and reactions during visits, not considered a health concern by officials, anyway. Next time on gas, the true story of a toxic trainer element, while the tech still struggle with the leaking chlorine tank car, officials move forward with plans to reopen Alberton. Until then, this is Ron Scholl. Thanks for listening. This podcast is adapted from the book Gas, the true story of a toxic train derailment. Visit amazon.com to see the two-book series. To access support material in the book, such as maps, photos, illustrations, and video links, visit my Facebook page Gas, the true story. Or watch my gas playlist on my YouTube channel at R.L. Scholl.
