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The Duran Podcast

Big change in Russia's nuclear doctrine

Big change in Russia's nuclear doctrine

Broadcast on:
29 Sep 2024
Audio Format:
other

All right, Alexander, we are here in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. And we are going to talk about the big news that was announced the other day, Putin at a security council meeting. That's right, security council meeting in Moscow. In Moscow, OK. And I guess you would say he lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons used by Russia. OK, so this is huge news. And obviously, a lot of people are worried about this announcement. It worries me when you hear stuff like this, that you're lowering the threshold. It's worrying because you think we're heading closer to a nuclear war. But Putin has given the message. He timed it right before Zelensky was going to meet with Biden and Harris. And this is his second, I don't want to say warning, but he gave the warning last week. And now he's taken one step closer to codifying. I mean, he has codified that warning. Say what your thoughts about this big announcement. Well, I think this is a very big announcement. I think that there's a lot of misunderstandings about it. And I think that on the one hand attempts to downplay in significance, to say that he doesn't really change anything significant. And others, of course, go to the other extreme and say that nuclear war is around the corner or that he's making up more threats about nuclear weapons and all that. In fact, I think this is a very big announcement. And it does exactly what you say. It lowers the thresholds. Now, I think that there's a few things we need to understand and explain about the framework of this decision. And it goes to the way in which the Russian system works. Now, the Russians have three types of rules. There's laws which are passed by the parliament and the constitution. There are decrees which are passed by the president and other senior officials. And decrees originate from powers. The president is given through laws and through the constitution, but decrees themselves have the force of law. And then there are orders that the president and ministers make through which they implement the laws and the decrees. Now, this is a decree. What we are working towards is an announcement of policy. Exactly what you said, a codification of the rules of how nuclear weapons are going to be used. And it would be done through a decree. It's not yet been signed, but it's coming to that point very soon. And because it would be, it would carry the force of law, it will restrict Putin himself. Putin can't just get up in the morning and announce tomorrow, I want to drop a nuclear bomb on Kiev. He's got, he can only give orders for use of nuclear weapons if it is compatible with the nuclear weapons policy that is set out in the decree. If he gives an illegal order of that nature, then the military, and by the military we mean defense minister, Bello Usoff, and get us him as the chief of the general staff, who also by the way have nuclear briefcases, would be entitled to ignore it. So this is, I think, this is what, this is the framework. And I think it's important to understand that framework now. Because the media runs with the articles of Putin's going to laws and officials. Exactly, you clear this up. Exactly, it doesn't work like that. But there's been a debate and a discussion within Russia. Apparently, it's been going on for about a year, but clearly it's been developing over time. And now they have made significant changes to their nuclear doctrine, which means that the range, the bandwidth, if you like, of Russian decision-making, on use of nuclear weapons, has been significantly expanded. Now, up to now, up to very recently, the Russians basically had a policy that they would only use nuclear weapons if they were facing threats of nuclear weapons being used against them, so that their entire state was in danger. Now they're saying that we would be entitled to nuclear weapons if we were attacked by a country that is an ally of a nuclear weapons state. And if that attack was such that it placed in jeopardy Russia's security, territorial integrity, and future. And of course, the nuclear power is the United States. Many people assume that the non-nuclear power that they're referring to that would be allied with the United States in carrying out that attack would be Ukraine. And of course, Ukraine obviously features. But it could, in theory, be others. It could be the Baltic states, the Scandinavian countries, Poland. Because it also incorporates-- Absolutely. --you're leading into it, it incorporates Belarus. I think that's another key component. It incorporates Belarus, and it covers Kaliningrad. And there have been discussions in the media about attacks on Kaliningrad. A lot of discussion. A lot of discussion. And of course, it extends. That's the other key point to understand about this change. It treats Belarus from now on as Russian territory. So an attack on Belarus is an attack on Russia. And if this kind-- the same sort of attack were carried out against Belarus, then the Russians, the Russian president, would have the right to order nuclear weapons use to protect Belarus in exactly the same way as he would if there was an attack on Russia. So it extends the Russian nuclear umbrella to cover Belarus as well. So this is a major change. It's a much bigger change than some people understand. But it doesn't mean that the Russians are thinking of using nuclear weapons tomorrow. But does it mean-- or does it have a connection to the long-range missile strikes, the push for storm shadows and scalps to hit Russian territory? Because I believe Peskov said the other day that this change was directed towards the US, UK, and France. I mean, he said it. So I mean, obviously there is a connection-- There is a connection to the long-range missile strikes. There absolutely is a connection. Because what Putin said about 10 days ago, when the British in particular were promoting this idea of carrying out long-range missile strikes against Russia, he said these are missile strikes in which Western personnel would be involved. And that the Russians would construe that as an act of war. And that if that were done, Russia would be at war with the countries that participated in the launch of these missiles. And if you look at Putin's words, as he announces these prospective changes in the policy, because they haven't yet been fully codified. We don't yet have a legal document, but that is coming. He actually talks about missile strikes and drone attacks and the kind of things that we have been seeing being carried out at the moment. So if they're done on a big enough scale, then Russia would consider itself entitled to response, to retaliate, to attacks using long-range missiles with nuclear weapons. Now, the final decision on whether to do that would rest with Putin himself. I mean, they wouldn't do it automatically. There would have to be a decision. They'd have to quantify the extent of the attack, decide how dangerous it was to themselves. But they would be authorizing themselves, empowering themselves to do something, use nuclear weapons in the event that deep strikes with missiles were carried out against their territory. It's not only missiles, is it? Oh, no, I mean, there's drones as well. And anybody who thinks that this is unconnected with the recent debates that are happening in the West, and, you know, the drone and missile attacks that are already taking place, I think anybody who thinks that this is unconnected, is, I mean, being delusional. I mean, clearly it's connected. And we can see how all of these discussions about doing all of these things, what they are already achieving, is that they are causing the Russians to lower their nuclear thresholds in order to re-establish deterrence. - Did we not say it, that all of this escalation, instead of pushing Putin to capitulate, all they've done is they've moved Putin more towards Medvedev, if he's taking a more harder line, where Putin was a moderate. - Yes. - I wish people would just understand this in the West, in the collective West, the mainstream media, all these leaders in Europe, in the US, that Putin is a moderate. - Yes. - He is a moderate, but now he's being moved towards a harder line, because of all of the escalation. But just so I understand the process, it is Putin, but Yeraseimov and the Defense Minister, they also act as a backstop, correct? - Exactly. - It's like a three person. - It's a three person seat. - Okay. - So I mean, if the decision is made, if Putin gets up in the morning and says, let's carry out a nuclear attack tomorrow, and there's no reason for it. - Okay, let's take drone strikes, 150 drones are launched into Russia. - There would need to be a discussion. - Okay. - Putin would speak with Yeraseimov, with bellows, probably with the rest of the Security Council, and then there would be a decision, but the final decision would be his. - Okay, okay, so he has the final call. - Yes. - Okay, the reaction from the EU and the United States, the EU, they said they reject this. They rejected, they said, like, as if anyone cares, but the United States seemed shocked. Shocked, I mean, Blinken, Blinken was shocked, I think. - Yes. - For one of those rare times where you see Blinken is just kind of worried about this. He kind of had that, oh crap, I messed up moment. I think he had it when this was announced. What do you think of the reaction? - I think that's exactly what. First of all, the EU doesn't understand this, because frankly, they're not involved in nuclear weapons, but honestly, the EU doesn't have its own nuclear weapons. So, I mean, this isn't something they understand. They are taking an extremely anti-strong anti-Russian line. As far as they're concerned, this is just Putin, and they're not gonna pay any attention. The Americans are in a completely different position, because of course, they have a very, very long history of being in a kind of nuclear standoff with the Russians, going all the way back to the 1940s. So they have long, much deeper understanding and experience of what this means. And from an American point of view, they now have to recalibrate their own decision-making on the basis of the fact that the Russians have just lowered their nuclear thresholds. And there will be a lot of recrimination behind the scenes about this within the US government, people from the Pentagon, the intelligences, all of those people will be coming back in the National Security Council. They'll be coming back on, they say, our decision-making now has just become more complicated. - Yeah, really messed up at the Biden White House. Really, really messed up. Can this be rolled back by Russia? If a new administration comes in into power in the US, can something like this be rolled back to what it was? - Well, in theory, it could be. I mean, you have a decree, but a decree can be replaced by a different decree. The mechanisms to do that exist. Well, I have to be honest. I mean, given how bad relations between the US and Russia have become, given the enormous deficits of trust that exists now, it's going to be very, very hard to persuade the Russians to roll this back. And it's all very well-stained that a new administration can come in, try and sort out the problems in Ukraine, try and sort of cool and calm things down. But the Russians will say, well, that's you, that's the US telling us this. What are you going to do about all your non-nuclear allies? The Baltic states, the Poles, the Scandinavians, the Germans, sometimes some people in Germany have talked about Kaliningrad, the British. Are you going to reign them in? Because unless you do, unless we get a situation where they are restricted in what they can do, unless you impose block discipline on them, how do we know that we won't find ourselves in exactly the same situation again? Maybe they will again stop threats against Belarus and Kaliningrad and whatever. So I don't think this is going to change any time soon. That's my own view. - The European Union messed up by saying the Biden White House messed up boy did the European Union really messed up. Anyway, that is the video, the tarrant.rogance.com. We are on Rumboladys with Bixby Telegram, RockFit and Twitter, @xoutofthedarrant shop. Picked up some merch, like the Australia flag t-shirt that I'm wearing today. And that looks like I'm just wearing the preek flag polo shirt. There is a link in the description box down below. Take care. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music)