The Duran Podcast
Neocons, narratives and Netanyahu
All right, Alexander, let's talk about the drone strikes into Iran. I believe that we can now say with certainty that drones were launched into Iran or towards various Iranian cities. I've heard conflicting reports saying that the drones were launched from Iraq, from Azerbaijan. I've even heard reports saying that the drones were launched from inside of Iran. But these were not missile strikes, these were drone attacks, and everyone is asking what exactly happened yesterday, late evening, early morning. What do you think is going on here? Well, it's not entirely clear what has exactly happened, because we're still getting conflicting reports of either where there's even confusion about the targets. It's clear that one target was an airfield near Isfahan, which is an important city in the south of Iran. It's a very historic city, by the way, former capital of Iran, and a treasure house of Iranian architecture, you know, capital at the time of the Safavid dynasty. The other place that seems to have been attacked was either Tehran, according to some reports, a place, a location near Tehran, or more plausibly near the town of Tabriz, which is a big city in Iran, also in the north of Iran. Part of Iranian Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is a region. It's divided into two parts. One was former Soviet Azerbaijan, which is now the Republic of Azerbaijan. The other is a territory in the north of Iran, which is obviously under Iranian control. So, if the target was Tabriz, then it is plausible that the drones were launched from Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has a close military and defense connections with Iran. With Israel, Israel supplied military technology and weapon systems to the Azerbaijanian military, which the Azerbaijanian military used in the war that took place in 2020 against Armenia. So, it's logical that Azerbaijan would be providing facilities for a drone strike. I'm not saying that was what happened, but it's plausible that that did happen. And it does seem that only drones have been used. Now, the Iranians are claiming that they've shot down all the drones, that the no damage at all has been done, that all the explosions that people have heard have been explosions caused by Iran's air defense system, in other words, in air defense missiles. That I can neither confirm nor refute. I don't think anybody will ever be able to. The important thing is that nobody is actually so far saying that it was they who did it. So, the Israelis are not coming forward and saying that they carried out the attack. The Americans are briefing people that it was the Israelis. The Americans are also briefing people saying that this was a very scaled down, small demonstrative strike, not intended to do a huge amount of damage, or indeed any significant damage, that its purpose was merely to demonstrate to Iran Israel's reach, its ability to strike deep inside Iran. And that, in effect, this is a performative attack by Israel on Iran, just like the Iranian attack on Israel was, it must be said, a rather bigger and more powerful, but also ultimately performative attack, and that this should be the point where the line is drawn under the whole affair. And comments from Israeli, Iranian officials at the moment are suggesting that that is likely to be the case and that they are prepared to just absorb this attack, which they say was completely unsuccessful and also draw a line under this affair. So, if this is all that we're going to see from Israel, probably this is the point where it all ends. Unfortunately, we can't be sure. It could be that this is, you know, the first act of a bigger drama, that they're going to be bigger attacks over the next few days. I think on balance that what the Americans are telling us that this is, as far as it goes, is probably true. I think in that case, what the Iranians are telling us that they don't feel under pressure to respond to a minor attack of this guy is probably also true, in which case we're out of this crisis. So, that is the big question then, is what is Israel doing? Does Israel go along with this narrative from the, if this is indeed the case, that what's going on here, do they go along with the narrative from the Biden White House? Or really, if this is what's going on, then it really does display how important narrative control is to the Biden White House. And perhaps their selling point to Israel is that the narrative is good for you guys, Netanyahu, to end this. I mean, we got the word out that this was a successful strike, this was a big strike. Some people know that this wasn't a big strike and this successful strike, who cares, the majority of people that are going to read the Washington Post and the New York Times and the BBC, they'll believe that the retaliation was sufficient and we could end this. I mean, will they go for this? Well, who knows? It's narrative-first reality, I guess. Yeah, I know. I mean, there's a number of things we need to say about this strike and comparing it with the Iranian strike. Now, the Iranian strike was negotiated and performative. We know that the Financial Times briefed us that that was what it would be before it took place. We've had lots of comments in the media from all sorts of well-informed people who told us that would be the case. So it was a performative strike intended to inflict a minimal level of damage, but an actual level of damage and the Iranians saying that will be the line we draw under the affair of the Israelis don't respond. There's an important difference, though, between the Iranian strike and the one that we've just seen by Israel, which is that the Iranian strike was conducted in a massively public way, hundreds of drones, cruise missiles, and many of them taking off whilst it's still daytime. Lots of lights above Jerusalem itself. I mean, lots of comments by Iranian officials before, during and after the strike. In other words, massive publicity around it, a public demonstration of Iran's power and briefings since then sort of hypersonic missiles were used against two of the bases that seven hypersonic missiles were launched by Iran against Israel and the two penetrated the Israeli defenses. So that's the Iranian strike. Now this strike by Israel, by contrast, appears to have been much smaller and lighter and also ultimately furtive. Israel is not actually coming forward and saying this is us. We did it. We are the people who are responsible for this strike. There's been no official confirmation or acknowledgement by Israel that they carried out this strike at all. And it was done secretly or at least secretly as far as we were concerned whether the Iranians were told anything in advance. Who knows? But anyway, minimal publicity, minimal reporting, anonymous briefing from U.S. officials. The contrast in that respect between the Iranian strike and the Israeli strike could not be greater. And that, I think, is going to leave an unsatisfactory sense about this with some people in Israel because you're absolutely correct. The Americans are trying to spin their narrative. This was a successful strike against Iran. But since the Israelis themselves are not even admitting that they carried out the strike, the Israelis are not saying that. And the Iranians, of course, are now getting their narrative out, which is that the strike was entirely unsuccessful. And the Israelis are not contradicting it. So I think that some people in Israel will feel let down and frustrated if this is as far as it goes. And already you can see one of the ultra-hardliners, one of the uber-hardliners in Israel, Ben-Gvir. He's obviously deeply frustrated and he's come out and he's made public comments, in effect confirming that it was Israel that carried out this strike. Apparently, in doing that, he breached the agreement that was reached by the Israeli war cabinet and the Israeli government that there would be no such confirmation provided by anybody within Israel. And there's already criticism of Ben-Gvir over this. And I suspect that he did that because he's not happy with the way which this strike was carried out and feels that the result of conducting it in this way is that Israel has not provided a real response to the Iranian strike of last weekend. And the result is that it is the Iranians who are coming out ahead in the narrative war, not the one that's been fought out in the United States, which neither the Israelis nor I suspect the Iranians care much about, but the one that is being fought out in Israel and Iran and across the Middle East. So that's what I would say if this is indeed as far as it goes. It suits the White House, it suits the Biden administration. It probably suits the Iranians to stop at this point. I can imagine that some people in Israel and Ben-Gvir's actions strongly suggest that are going to be very disappointed and frustrated. And they're going to say, you know, this isn't what we were led to expect. We were told that there would be a hard response. And what we see instead is something very light and very slight. And the Iranians are already bragging that they managed to knock all our drones out of the sky, which might even be true, by the way. I mean, I don't know one way or the other. Yeah, but Israel also said that they knocked down all of the Iranian missiles and drones. 99%. So 99% of them. But you know, they couldn't conceal, however, that actual damage was done to two bases. And you know, so I mean, they can say that. But with Israel, it's known at least that some strikes got through. So and, you know, in the wider Middle East, that is also acknowledged. As I said, what people say in Washington, in the United States and in Britain and in Europe, is one thing. What plays out in Israel itself, where people are much better informed, and what plays out in the Middle East and in Iran is a completely different matter. So the Biden administration can spin whatever narratives there's chooses, but closer to home, it's somewhat different. What if the opposite is what's going on? What if this was the first wave, first attack towards Iran? Well, we are heading towards the weekend. We are heading towards the weekend. And usually, this is when when attacks happen, you know, we got this Thursday, Friday, initial probing attack or whatever you want to call it, a few drones that that enter into Iran, because the big attack is going to happen. Saturday, early morning, Sunday, early morning, evening time. I mean, the timing does line up for something to take place. Absolutely. Now, I mean, if that happens, if we are about to see something much bigger, which is as you absolutely rightly say, entirely possible. First thing to say is it would contradict American briefing, even the comments of some Americans like Marco Rubio, which have been public, which all but suggests, you know, it's going to stop here. But if we're looking at something very big, then of course, the Iranians will respond and then the whole situation will start to escalate. So, you know, it's possible that this is not the end on the country. It is the beginning. And in that case, one can definitely say that the Americans have lost control of the situation, because the Israelis would in that case be acting against the wishes of the administration and if it's and even if people like Marco Rubio in Congress. I wonder if if the Biden White House is is approaching this this entire crisis with Israel in a way where where they say, okay, you got your your military strike. Don't don't put too much emphasis on on on that part of the retaliation. We got the the word out through the media that this was a successful strike. It managed to to hit targets, whether that's true or not. Don't don't don't harp on it too much. We've put sanctions on on Iran. The UK's put sanction on on Iran. Don't worry the the EU, all the G7, they're going to put sanctions on Iran. And at the same time, we vetoed the UN Security Council resolution for Palestine to become a member of the UN. So I wonder if they're approaching this with in a type of hybrid way, saying, you know, don't focus so much on the military part, but also take a look at sanctions, take a look at what's happening at the UN, and we can we can end this entire affair. That's exactly what they're doing. I mean, they they can tell I mean, they've already said they already said to the Israelis after the Iranian missile strike, they said to them, take the win. You know, this is based on the narrative, but you know, only 1% of the Iranian missiles got through and minimal damage was done and all of that. Now, it doesn't you can believe that or not as you choose, but that's the version of events that the United States and Israel are promoting. So the Americans say take the win, take the win and launch a minimal strike also. And you know, it's the Iranians who've lost because we've had a successful strike on Iran. Again, don't worry too much whether that's true or not. We're all say that it was what we say is what people in Washington and, you know, in America and in Europe will believe because it's not going to be contradicted. So take the win, leave it there. And of course, we've got to put more sanctions on Iran. The sanctions, of course, are not going to change anything. They're not going to make any difference whatsoever to the real realities, the economic realities within Iran itself. But, you know, we're not worried about realities. We're again, we're worried about narratives. We're going to have more sanctions on Iran. We've demonstrated our unity, our support for you. Our aircraft participated in shooting down all those drones and missiles that the Iranians launched against you. So that shows how much support you have. And of course, we also blocked the vote in the United Nations Security Council to make Palestine a full member state recognise as such in the UN voting rights in the General Assembly. So, you know, we're giving you all of that. So you can walk away. You could say that you've come out ahead on points in this matter. You might be some people like Ben Veer who are disappointed and frustrated, but you can spin this to your people that you've taken the win. You've got your head on points. And this is the point you're going to stop. And, you know, I think there are also some people in the Israeli cabinet who do understand that. I mean, they do understand that at this particular moment in time, Israel does not need a conflict with Iran, that it is a much more powerful adversary than any adversary that Israel has fought before. And, you know, they didn't, as Larry Johnson said in that live stream that we talked about, we had with him the other day. If the United States can't defeat the Houthis in Yemen, then it's inconceivable that Israel can defeat Iran. And, you know, the Iranians almost certainly can close the Straits of Hormuz. They've again demonstrated their ability to do that. They've seized an Israeli ownership in the Persian Gulf. So, you know, just let's not do something reckless and overambitious and stupid, get ourselves involved in a massive war with Iran, which ultimately will not turn out for us whatever some people say. So I think that's, I think that's, you know, there will be those voices in Israel. But, you know, one can never predict whether those voices in the end will prevail. The instinct in Israel, not just with this government, not just with the Netanyahu government, but with any Israeli government, and this has been true throughout my lifetime, and it goes all the way back to when the state of Israel was founded, is not to, you know, pull your punches. It is to punch extremely hard as hard as you can. So, expecting the Israelis to exercise restraint in this situation is to ask them to do something which is radically different from what they have done before. So, anyway, we'll see how it all balances out, but you're absolutely right. That is what the Americans will be telling. The Israelis, there will be some people in Israel who I think understand that this actually makes sense for them. It may be they will pull their punches as of today, as of making this video. I think that is the most likely outcome, but one can never be sure. Yeah, I mean, you know, you're saying, you follow the news. We know what's really going on, or at least we hope that we know what's really going on. Everyone that watches this video hopes that they know what's really going on. But if you're selling this to Netanyahu, if you're the United States, you know, you sell it to him as you guys are beating Iran for nil. You defended successfully against their attack. You launched your own attack, which was a huge success. And you got the UN win with the veto. And we're going to start piling on sanctions, thousands and thousands of sanctions, which will, you know, turn Iran's economy into a rubble, like, you know, look about with all the statements too, right? So, if you're selling it to them, that's how you're going to sell them. The question is always, you know, what does Netanyahu do? Does he defy the Biden White House? Again, which he likes to do because he's been given carte blanche. Correct. So if you're dead in Yahoo, you say, well, that's all well and good for, you know, I've got four wins. Why don't I go for five? Why don't I go for six? Because I know that you're going to support me, support me no matter what I do. So I think that's the question mark. Well, the other problem is, of course, Netanyahu understands better how qualified those wins are, and probably knows that they're not fully wins at all. But beyond that, he also knows that many people in Israel know that. And of course, people like Ben Ghir, his government know that as well. And he has to think and worry about those people. So he's got those pressures. I mean, it's important not to underestimate the effect of the last few months on Israel. Israel, you know, the mood in Israel. There was the events of the 7th of October, which were a shock, because Hamas was able to penetrate into Israel itself, fighting to place inside Israel. People died. That's already a traumatizing event. Then there's the six month war that has been fought in Gaza. It has not ended in anything that remotely approximates to a victory, or at least the kind of victory that Netanyahu and his officials promised. So already Israel is looking less successful militarily than it likes to present itself as. Then we've had the Iranian missile strike on Israel itself. As I said, Israelis have seen these Iranian missiles moving across the night sky. We've had all the lighting, the lights of them over Jerusalem. And of course, as I said, it's a sophisticated, well informed country. People know that some of the missiles did in fact get through and did strike at Israeli air bases and did call that cause actual damage. And now they are being told that they should accept as a further win, as a win, a drone strike on Iran, which whatever spin you put on it doesn't seem to have changed anything really on the ground. 60,000 Israelis are unable to return to their homes in northern Israel, because there's shooting and firing going on across the Lebanese border. So Netanyahu has all of that to contend with. So it's all very well for someone like Biden to tell him take the win. Netanyahu himself might even be tempted to do that. And of course, he knows very well how powerful narrative control can be. But the question for him is, does he actually control the narrative in Israel? Can he actually keep people like Smarthridge and Benkvere and people like that in line? That's, that's I think the calculation that Netanyahu is making. And he may very well be saying to himself and he, you know, there'll be polling and soundings and all kinds of things taking place in Israel. And he'll be looking at the political tensions within his government. He may be saying to himself, well, look, it isn't turning out quite as Biden says. People here are worried. My government is coming under more stress. So I have to launch that bigger strike against Iran, because if I don't, things could turn very bad for me politically here. I don't think he's going to do that. In fact, I think he's going to accept the American narrative. I think there are concerns and worries within Israel itself. But I think the way he's going to address them is by going ahead with this offensive against Rafa, which he went out of his way yesterday through his officials to say he's still on. And I think that is now a certain thing. Yeah, and I also think that another, another thing that the Biden White House is going to, to provide Israel his support for Rafa or cover for the Rafa operation, which the Biden White House is signaling that, okay, maybe two weeks ago, they were saying, don't enter Rafa no matter what. Now you're starting to see at the Biden White House is changing its tunes on, is changing his tune on Rafa, which probably signifies that the Biden White House is saying, okay, we can, we'll give you Rafa, Netanyahu, we won't tell you to not go into Rafa, but let's not escalate with Iran. It looks like that's, that's kind of what the trade off is going to be. But, you know, we'll find out this this week. And I do believe that if there's not a big strike this weekend, then there won't be a big strike. And it's going to go as, as you just said, I mean, it's either this weekend or, or it's not going to happen. I think that's right. I mean, the longer this takes, I mean, unless it happens now, then as I said, we can conclude that as far as the Israel is running, exactly this weekend, unless it happens this weekend, then we can conclude that as I said, a line has indeed been drawn under this affair. And I mean, you know, putting aside, you know, the narratives, I think the Iranians at that point will feel that they have come out ahead on points. They haven't scored a decisive win because that's not what they were seeking. But I think they will feel that on balance, they've come out, they've demonstrated to Terrence. The fact that the Israeli attack will have been on a relatively, would have been so low key and so furtive will, again, have demonstrated the power of his runs to Terrence. And, you know, for that reason, they'll be satisfied with that and they will draw a line. There is another problem for Israel, of course. If they go ahead with the attack on Rafa, then we pivot back to the Gaza conflict and the question of the Palestinians. Now, the one plus that the Israeli, the Israelis have had over the last two weeks since the strike on the Iranian embassy in Damascus is the people that have been talking less about Gaza, more about Iran and Israel. And the Gaza war has not gone well for Israel militarily. And it has been gone extremely badly for Israel, politically, in the sense that across the world, people have been horrified by what has happened. So, bringing the attention back to what's going on in Gaza, by resuming the offensive in Rafa, is going to be politically very damaging for Israel. It's also going to be very politically damaging for the United States as well. And this is where we come back to what happened in the UN Security Council yesterday, because the Biden administration may be saying to themselves, "Well, look, we put this veto. That gave us more leverage over Israel. Israel, as a result, scaled down its attack on Iran, which is what we wanted." I mean, of course, the price of the United States is going to be paying its twofold. Firstly, again, they've exercised a veto in the Security Council against very strong international opinion, only Britain and Switzerland supported them, well, half supported them by abstaining. Apparently, the US tried to get other countries to abstain as well, but none did, so that the US could avoid having to use the veto. But we see that there's now a strong body of feeling about this. So the US has already come under international criticism, because it exercised that veto in the Security Council and is being seen to be taking positions that are hostile to the Palestinians, which is the opposite of what the Biden administration has been trying to do. But beyond that, it's given Israel an effective veto over a Palestinian state, because the administration said that they will only recognize a Palestinian state, and they will only agree to a Palestinian state having voting rights in the UN General Assembly. If there is a negotiated resolution to the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians, which in effect means that the Israelis now have a veto over the whole process, they can simply refuse to come to a deal with the Palestinians and following the logic of what the Americans are now saying, there won't be a Palestinian state with voting rights in the General Assembly. It reminds me very much of the Minsk Agreement, by the way. If you remember, Minsk Agreement, Ukraine agreeing to do all sorts of things, but Angela Merkel saying that the sanctions on Russia would remain in place until the Minsk Agreement, in terms of a fulfilled, which meant in effect that Ukraine had no incentive to fulfill the Minsk Agreement, because it knew that if it did so, not only would that cause internal issues for the Maidan government, but that the sanctions on Russia would be lifted. So it's a diplomatic trap that the Biden administration has walked into, because it's given Israel blocking power now over any move towards getting the state of Palestine internationally recognized, and make no mistake about it, most of the world will blame the Americans for it. It's a trap, but I would also say it's more of just kicking the can, like Minsk. For me, I see it as the Biden White House is saying to the neocons, to Israel, don't worry, we are going to get that war with Iran. Just like they were saying, don't worry, we are going to get that war with Russia. But right now, the timing is just not there. We can't take on Iran right now. I've read a lot of reports saying that the US is having a hard time with their weapons inventories, with their patriot systems. I've read reports saying that the US can't supply two wars, just coming right out and saying the US can't do it. Their military production can't keep up with the demand. It just can't do it. It's not there. So a war with Iran is out of the question. They can barely handle what's going on with Israel and Gaza, as well as Ukraine. And it just feels like it's the Biden White House saying, okay, don't freak out everybody. We're still going to work towards our ultimate goal, which is a war with Iran. But for right now, let's just manage this as best we can. Let's get through this campaign. Let's get to the election. And then we'll see how it goes. That's kind of the feeling that I get from all of this. And then that was Minsk. That was Minsk. We need six, eight years to build fortifications to prepare. We're going to get our war with Russia. We're going to work at getting regime change. But let's build up the military. Let's give it eight, nine, 10 years. And we'll get to that point where we can provoke Russia into a conflict. Well, you absolutely right. But of course, the point is kicking it down the road doesn't put you in a stronger position. It actually puts you in a weaker position. First of all, and this applies to the Ukraine war, sabotaging the Minsk agreement is one of the fundamental reasons why the West has not been able to get most of the world on site over the conflict in Ukraine. Because everybody outside the West, the Western bubble knows exactly what happened. They understand who really actually was responsible for sabotaging the Minsk agreement and for provoking the war. And that has had, of course, massive bearing on the way in which the conflict in Ukraine has played out. And that has been a major defeat for the West. It's the same going to be exactly the same over the ultimate conflict with Iran. But beyond that, yes, the United States can prepare. But so can the other side. That's the problem that I think Americans, your near cons, never fully understand. You can delay. You can defer a war. You can work towards a war with Iran. You can say to yourself, and you probably are planning to, and you probably will eventually do it. You can say to yourself, you know, we, you know, time and place of our choosing, we will start the war with Iran. But just as Russia got a lot stronger as a result of the delay, and it's important to stress us, Russia became, Russia in 2022 was much stronger than it had been in 2014. If the sanctions that were imposed in 2022 had been imposed in 2014, that would have created a massive crisis in the Russian economy. It needed all those years of proofing to do that. The Russian military was also built up to a great extent over the eight years, more so than the Ukrainian military was. The same applies with Iran. Iran has now got its economy moving forward again. It's built up. It's a alliance network with China and Russia. It's got good relations with India and Brazil. It's a member of the BRIC states. It sorted things out with Saudi Arabia. It can capitalize on that. It can make itself stronger. So yes, you're kicking the can down the road. Yes, you're saying to yourself, we play for time. Yes, you could say to yourself, this isn't really the moment to start a war. We're overextended. But things don't stand still. Time is working against you. And I think that the Biden administration taking the steps that it did in the Security Council yesterday, well, on the one hand, it's to fuse the immediate crisis. It's postponed the war to a moment when it feels Israel and the US will be stronger. But they've lost goodwill in the process, more goodwill on top of the goodwill they've already lost. And that will have a play role eventually. And beyond that, the other side will use the time given as well. And he's likely to prepare even more. Just saying. Just a final thought. You got to imagine that Netanyahu also understands that the US is overextended militarily. And that may play a factor in his decision as well. I mean, even if he wants to strike at Iran, he needs the US with him. There's no doubt about that. He needs the US support. He needs the US's weapons. It's money. He needs the US in back of him if he does launch a very big strike against Iran. So you would have to imagine that he also has the EV information, which shows that that the US will not be able to properly support and fund a large war with Iran. So that's the reason we want about that too. That's great with Iran. If I have to say, what I think is the single factor that is perhaps restraining Netanyahu is that he understands that. And Netanyahu is not Zalinski. He is an extremely clever man. A person who has been at the top of Israeli politics for decades. He's been an extremely skilled diplomat. Maybe you can argue about the strategic wisdom of his diplomacy, but there's no doubt that he's conducted diplomacy well. So I mean, he's not Zalinski. He's not somebody who lives in a fantasy world. He understands very well the limits of American power, the fact that the Americans are overextended, that they have these problems in Ukraine especially, that the Americans are not in a position at the moment to provide full support for a conflict with Iran. When it's explained to him by the Americans, he understands that. He also understands that for Israel to attack Iran and to wage a long-term war of attrition against Iran would be a massive challenge, probably on, you know, beyond Israel's strength to sustain for any particular length of time. So yes, Netanyahu is a much more sophisticated political operator. And if he's gone along with what the Americans want him to do over this strike, it will be for that reason. And that will be the reason that he's giving to his various officials within the Israeli cabinet. You'll say, look, we can't go forward without the Americans, and the Americans are not in a position to go forward with us in a way that we would like. So we have to go along for the moment with what the Americans say and work to put ourselves in a stronger position later. I'm sure that he's saying all of that. So if he is exercising restraint, that's the real reason he's doing it. He's not doing it out of love of Biden. He can't stand Biden. He's not doing it because he necessarily wants Biden to win in November probably. He still feels on balance that he'd rather have Trump. He got on very well with Trump, much better than he ever got on with Obama or with Biden or with the Democrats at the moment. So, but saying all of that, Netanyahu remains under extreme political pressure within Israel itself. He has to argue these points with people like Ben get beer and smart rich, who are his indispensable allies. And given the kind of people they are, they might not be very interested in hearing these kind of arguments. They might be saying to Netanyahu, you know, what you're talking about is appeasement. It's a, you know, acts of moderation. Precisely, because as you say, we main fact, we weaker. It's even more important that we strike hard so that we show that we are strong. Yep. And the argument is, you know, yes, we should net it. Yeah, who can tell them? Absolutely. I agree. But the U.S. is in no position to back us. It's not that the U.S. doesn't want to back us. They want to back us. They want to go to war with Iran. The Biden White House absolutely wants to go to work around Biden is a neo-con. They just don't have the capabilities at this moment in time to do it. Oh, absolutely. No, that's that I think is it goes back real quick. It goes back to Russia and Ukraine as well. It's not that that the West and the U.S. and NATO doesn't want to defeat Russia. It's not that they don't want to balkanize Russia. It's that they can't, they can't do it. They've given everything they've had and they can't do it. Absolutely. They would. Absolutely. And you can imagine the, you know, the very heated debates that are going on within the Israeli war cabinet and within the Israeli government, the wider Israeli government, all of the debates that we're talking about have been taking place there. They've been going backwards and forwards. You can be sure that they're happy. And you've got all of these, you know, leaks that come out of, you know, from the government, the Israeli government giving contradictory signals, which is clear evidence that precisely this argument that you're setting out has been taking place. Now, I think that a majority of Israeli officials, top ministers, understand the points that Netanyahu will be making, which are essentially your points. I mean, and that's why on balance, I think what we've seen over the last 24 hours is as far as Israel will go. But, you know, don't count on it. I mean, you know, it's, it's, as I said, some, in some ways, country to Israeli instincts to pull their punches. And there will be some people within the Israeli government and within Israeli society who will be angry that things are not going much further than they currently are. By the way, it's not just in Israel. I mean, I was reading some of the articles and the British and the American media from the very hard line near cons. I've been listening to people like John Bolton. And they are furious. They are furious that the United States isn't backing Israel at this moment in time to go all out for a war against Iran. And of course, their argument, by the way, is, you know, that Iran is weak. It's fragile. It's a paper tiger. What we need to do is attack now. And this horrible regime will crumble and the Iranian people will rise up. And there'll be regime change, you know, the broken record that we've had so many times before. But, you know, they are there too. You know, they're, they're, they're also an influential force within the US government as well. But I think on balance, ultimately, for exactly the reasons that you said that the capabilities do not exist to conduct two big wars at the same time on top of the Gaza wall. I think that what we've seen for the moment will hold. But as I said, don't, don't, I mean, you know, let me be like this. If I was a gambling man, which I'm not, I still wouldn't put money on it. Yeah, we don't know. It could happen this weekend. It could. Timing does line up. But yeah, if it doesn't happen, if it doesn't happen, I agree, then let's not call them realists because they're not really realists. But the people who are slightly more connected to reality will have won. And in terms of Israel, Iran, the worst of the crisis will be behind us. The worst of this immediate crisis will be behind us. This immediate crisis. I mean, the bigger crisis, of course, is there is festering. It's going to get greater, so. And as you said, we go back to, to a terrible crisis in Gaza. So it shifts back to the Gaza. Exactly. So yeah, okay. That's where we are. All right. The derad dot locals dot the derad dot locals dot com, we are on the line to see but you telegram rock fin and Twitter X and go to the derad shop look for limited edition merchandise. The link is in the description box down below. Take care. 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