The Duran Podcast
Iran and Israel at war? - Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen
Hi everyone, my name is Glenn Diesen and I'm joined today by Alexander Merkurs, as well as Professor Sayyad Mohamed Marandi, an advisor to the Iranian nuclear negotiations team, which is an excellent guest for today. As our topic is this conflict between Israel and Iran, which will threaten to unleash massive regional war, if not even larger conflict. So welcome to the both of you. Thank you. Thank you. I thank both of you. So yeah, Professor Merandi, we're just saying, we're really exposed to Iran's perspective in this part of the world. So we really appreciate you taking the time. This is, of course, a very dangerous situation we're in. So I just wanted to ask first, if I get the situation right, or if you wanted to add something, which is that, well, after decades of tension between Israel and Iran, we see now that Israel bombed the consulates of Iran, which, well, obviously, is not just a breach of international law in accordance with the United Nations, as this is an attack on sovereign territory of Iran, but it was also breached obviously of the Vienna Convention that offers additional protection to diplomatic staff and premises. And with then so, Iran retaliated. If I'm not mistaken, with a bit more than 300 drones and missiles in what was seen as an effort to restore its deterrence. And afterwards, Iran said it considered the matter to be concluded. And I guess an effort to prevent escalation, but at least interpret it as such, by constraining Israel, who saw the United States effective the cold Iranian attack of failure, and thus claimed it to be an Israel victory. In Biden, worse is said, you've got to win. Take the win. This was his message to Israel. And on this premise, the US urged Israel not to respond, which ends the de-escalation effort, but what we now saw is Israel did respond. But again, for my interpretation, this was a minor attack, some even referred to it as symbolic in order not to lose face. Am I reading this correctly, or would you add something else? And what would we also, what could expect from Iran? What do you think Iran will do? Or will it let this go? Or what do you think will happen from Iran? Well, I think if it's okay, I'll go back a bit and remind our audience who, I know they're very politically aware, so I hope I don't bore them. But in the past, the Israelis have carried out attacks on Iran. The first cyber attack in the world apparently was carried out on Iran's nuclear program. The Israelis and Americans carried it out. Then a number of nuclear scientists were also murdered. And at that time, the Iranians did not respond to the Israelis. For a host of reasons, but my personal interpretation with hindsight is that the Iranians I think wanted to focus on their project for the Axis of Resistance. And they didn't want to get distracted by some sideshow or some exchange between Iran and Israel. And what I mean by the Axis of Resistance is that strengthening Hezbollah, strengthening Hamas, strengthening their other allies in Yemen and Saudi law, and so on. And the complex defense capabilities that, for example, right now, we see in Gaza, these, for my understanding, took roughly 20 years to create. So it's been a long time that they've been working on these defense capabilities for whether it's Gaza or Lebanon or elsewhere. And then came the Dirty War in Syria where NATO, regional countries, the Israelis were supporting ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Iranians came in to help stop the fall of Syria in 2013, basically. The Russians later came in in 2015 and then they all worked together to push these groups back. But in 2013, when they came, the Iranians were fighting ISIS and al-Qaeda and others. And some of them were alongside the Israeli border. And the Israelis would strike Iranian positions, Syrian government positions to support ISIS and al-Qaeda. So back then, again, the Iranians didn't respond. Because Iran didn't want to spread the fight, they wanted to focus on Syria to solve the problems in Syria and to prevent the extremists from getting the Quran. And this is my personal interpretation. It's not based on any information, solid information. They were continuing to build their long-term defense capabilities or the defense capabilities of their allies across the region. Then more recently, when the genocide in Gaza began, the Israelis again started targeting Iranians in Syria. And again, the Iranians didn't respond. But this time, my understanding is that they wanted the focus to be on Gaza. They didn't want the narrative to shift away from the genocide and what was going on. But when the Israelis bombed the embassy, that for Iran was too much. Because they said to themselves that if they bombed embassy, we don't do anything about it. Tomorrow, they'll bomb the embassy in Beirut or they'll bomb the other buildings in Damascus and no one will be safe anymore. So Iran decided to strike back. Now, this is an important point that I want to make because the Western media basically says the Iranian strike was a failure. But it's basically propaganda. What the Iranians did was that they needed intelligence from the Israelis and they didn't want to give intelligence. Because the Iranians have, as our friends in Russia or people say about the Russians, the Iranians and the Russians know a lot about Iran, one another's defense capabilities. Iran has very good missiles and very good drones, so they say. And so the Iranians didn't use those. They went and fired after 10 days of mind games with the Israelis, a bit more than 10 days. And then, and now I'm seeing basically that they're going to carry out the attack and then launching the drones in public, those drones took like three to five hours to get to Israel. So the Iranians did this intentionally because they wanted the Israelis and Americans to all mobilize what they have. This is, I think Alexander knows what I'm talking about because he's been covering another conflict and I think that this strategy has been used often before. The Americans and the Israelis went after these drones. Simultaneously, when the drones reached Israel, the Iranians fired two sets of missiles. One, older missiles that were again, like the drones, decoys for intelligence gathering and very cheap like the drones for maybe $10,000 each. So in all, maybe Iran spent a few million dollars on this operation. The engaged Americans, the Israelis spent 1.35 billion dollars on their own, by firing their own missiles. And the Americans, it's an unknown sound, but it's probably more or less the same. The Iranians spent maybe $10, $15 million, I don't know, but the Israelis a lot more. The Iranians gained a lot of intelligence. As a result of the operation, the Israelis gained almost nothing. And then those handful of missiles between 10 to 20 that were the real missiles that were going to strike two targets, the air base in the South and intelligence gathering center on the Golan Heights, they hit their targets. So they went right through the defense layer, the layers of defense. And even though these are two of the most heavily guarded bases in the world, they say. So for Iran, it was a success because the Americans and the Israelis depleted their reserves. They spent a lot of money. The Iranians gained a lot of intelligence, and they sent a message by hitting those two bases. After that, the Israelis wanted to retaliate. This is where the messaging began between Iran and the United States. I mean, there are always messages going back and forth, but on this issue, the Americans do not want an escalation as well, but the Iranians said, if the Israelis hit us, we're going to hit them very hard, much harder than what we saw before. And they're not going to be using old drones and giving it three days, heads up and that sort of thing. They're going to hit them hard with a much larger number of drones and missiles and they'll cause devastation. Ultimately, and I don't know all, I don't have the details, but ultimately, my understanding is that the Americans forced the Israelis because the Americans are very worried about an escalation to do almost basically nothing. Because I still don't know, no one knows. Like there was no damage. There's no place, the Americans said missiles were fired, but there's no place, there's nowhere in the country that we've heard explosions. There's no place where people have said that they've seen a fire or damage. The BBC is trying to pretend, I think, that some things happen, but I think it's a face-saving project. So since it was a, since nothing really happened, I'm just guessing I haven't spoken to anyone, but I think that probably the Iranians don't feel retaliated. - Can I just make my points, which I think can't limit yours. And I'm saying this because I should say I've already done a program on this subject earlier today. And I think it's important that you know what I've said, which is I think that the Iranians have come up ahead on points in this confrontation. And there's a few things to notice. Firstly, the Israeli, the Iranian strike on Israel was public, it's announced at the time, commented about disgust by Iranian officials whilst it was happening and after it was happening. And we know that some missiles got through. I mean, this is not actually disputed. I mean, BBC might not want to admit it, but there is satellite and other thirdographic evidence of this. The thing that is most interesting about this Israeli strike, which I'm sure it is an Israeli strike area, we can always see that it was an Israeli strike, is that it is entirely furtive. The Israelis are not saying anything about it. They've clearly been told to keep it as minimal as possible and also to say as little about it as possible. They're not even taking ownership of it. Now, given that this is a situation where each side is seeking to demonstrate deterrence and given that deterrence is ultimately about resolve, Iran has demonstrated resolve because it has launched a strike at Israel. It has shown it's got the capability to attack Israel. It's shown that it has the capability to cause damage to Israel. It's done publicly, it's done it, and it's owned it. Whereas the fact that the Israelis have done this in a very minimalist way, but have not been prepared to come out and say they own it, that shows less resolve. I mean, that seems to me obvious. You know, if it's a game of poker, then that's clearly what this is. And given the deterrence, as I said, is about resolve, the Iranians have established resolve over the Israelis and have to a great extent called the Israeli and American Bluff. The Americans do not want to ball in the Middle East. They do not want to wide a conflict in the Middle East. The Israelis cannot risk a conflict in the Middle East with Iran without the Americans. So the Iranians have shown that they are not seeking a conflict but are not going to run away from one. Whereas the Israelis and the Americans, and it's important to say it was the Israelis, Israelis who initiated this process by attacking the embassy building in Damascus, have in effect pulled back and have their Bluff called. Now, I say all of this 'cause, you know, we're going to discuss more, but I think it's worth you knowing what my own take on this matter has been. - I agree completely. I think you're spot on. The Israeli attack, the three drones, I'm not even sure, we'll find out, I guess, in the coming days, but I'm not even sure they came from outside the country. It's possible that these small drones were from inside the country, but you're correct. I agree with your assessment completely. - Well, the issue of deterrence though, I think it's interesting both of you pointed this out or focused on it because I think there's a wider problem in the region 'cause we see that if the United States bumps any countries in this wider region, which it does from time to time, be it Syria, Libya, or a bit more bombing of Iraq, which also happens every now and then over the decades. Actually, there's simply, yeah, no consequences. No one's fighting back. There's no uproar at the United Nations. So this is a very dangerous president if you can begin to bomb a country like Iran without having any pushback, then it sets the prison. This format can be also applied to the Iranians, and that's why I was wondering if Iran has achieved something that other countries in the region have not, and this is not even my words. As you were speaking, I was thinking about Chas Freeman, the former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He also held a lot of other top position in the US government all the way from kissing her stays until setting up a security architecture in Europe after the Cold War. Anyways, Freeman, he argues that given that Saudi Arabia and UAE refused to let the US and Israel use their territories for any hostile actions against Iran, that this is immensely significant. As also Iran threatened states who allowed their territory to be used as they wouldn't become targets. And essentially, the argument of Ambassador Freeman was that this represents nothing less than diminishing to a huge extent, US power in the region. And I guess this is the power of deterrence. There is, in the era of hegemony at least over the past 30 years, there hasn't really been any deterrence in this region. And so I, what do you see, therefore, Israel, Nasar here certainly, Iran's calculations being this efforts of deterring without unleashing a wider war? - I agree, I would add a footnote at the end, but the Iranians, when they warned the neighboring countries not to allow the Americans to use their bases. I think basically they were sending a message to these countries that look, these American bases are not doing you any good. If the United States attacks us, we're going to see you as a partner in crime. Not only are we going to destroy those bases, but more importantly, we're going to destroy your infrastructure because you'll be a partner in this war. So all those gas installations and oil installations in the Persian Gulf region, and in the Caucasus and elsewhere, all of these are vulnerable. And all of these will be destroyed if there is a conflict between Iran and the United States. And that's how Iran has sort of established a balance of terror with the United States. Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons like the former Soviet Union, but Iran knows that it's the vulnerability of the US and the Persian Gulf and the global economy is immense. So these countries basically saw that, look, we have these American bases here, but they're dangerous, and they're dangerous for us. So that diminishes the power of the United States on the one hand. On the other hand, I think that it is pretty clear to the Americans that if, for example, a conflict between Iran and the United States occurs, that the Iraqi resistance still over one American bases in Iraq and Syria would fall automatically. If it gets to that point, God forbid, then it will be catastrophic for the world. But with regards to this particular strike of Iran's, I think this again is my personal view. I think that Iran intentionally wanted these drones to go over Jordan. And the reason is that I believe, the Iranians knew that all the drones would be down. As I said, they were, they're dirt cheap and they were there basically to force the Israelis to engage and use their missile defense and to expose their capabilities in the Americans as well. But I think that the Iranians use Jordan so that the Jordanian government would be put in a very difficult position. Because if the Jordanians allow the Americans and the Israelis to use their space, which they did, it would put them under greater public, pressure public scrutiny. And that has implications. It has angered people in Jordan. It has angered people in Palestine. And that, I think, and that's just my personal view. I think that was intentional. - Can I? - Right. - I want to talk as well. - No, no, no. - Sorry. - Sorry. - Now, briefly, I mean, can I just sort of see it? Sorry, the original attack on the embassy in Damascus, which was an extreme provocation. How was that seen in Iran? Did people see this as an attempt by Israel to enlarge the wall? That they're getting into major problems in Gaza? There's articles in Haaretz that says much. There's an article in the Wall Street Journal, which says the same thing, that the Israelis are having major difficulties and that they were looking, perhaps, to enlarge the wall. I mean, is that what people think it was in Iran, that it was an attempt to create a trap for Iran? Or, I know that there's another view, which I've seen in the British media, which is that the Israelis have now become so accustomed to launching attacks against Iranian targets, that this was just a careless, another careless attack. They didn't fully understand what they were doing. What is the feeling about this in Iran? I mean, was it a trap? Or was it just the Israelis blundering and not understanding what they were doing? Because I think that might help to understand this whole event better, if we know how the Iranians themselves perceive this thing. - In Iran, they're both views existed when the attack was carried out. I've been actually to that building many times because during the dirty war in Syria, I would regularly go to Syria. Maybe every year, three or four times, I'd go and visit universities. I didn't fight or anything. I'm an old man, but I would go to the University of Damascus and other universities to speak with students. And there weren't the international professors, and they're all gone. So they were just a handful of us who would go as volunteers and come back and forth. And I would often go to them, I would often go to the consulate building. So for me, it was very shocking when this happened. I really never thought the Israelis would go that far. But there was both schools of thought, let's call it that, did exist. I personally think that it would be, I personally believe that if the Israelis thought that Iran wouldn't respond, which may be true, that shows that the Israelis really have very little understanding about Iran. Because the moment that I heard the news, I was certain that Iran would respond. And I have no inside information. It's just, you recognize certain things. It's just like the three of us base upon, I think what I hope is an objective analysis. From the very beginning, we were saying that, look, this war in Ukraine is not going to go the way you're saying it's going to go for many, many different reasons. And the Russian people are not going to turn against the government. And because we, I think we had a better understanding than that these people who were giving these very strange analyses about the future of Russia and so on. So as soon as the strike took place, I was sure that Iran would strike back. I don't know what is the case. I would imagine that the Israelis knew or thought that the Iranians would strike back. That's a personal, just not based on information. I would imagine that's the case because if it's not, then they really don't know what they're doing. They really don't know what they're doing. But the Iranians were careful about how to strike back at the Israelis to make sure that they don't fall into any potential trap. The Americans, as you know, and as I said earlier, they do not want this war to expand. And I think that the one difference between the Americans and the Israelis is that the Israelis are much more emotional and they are not thinking, regardless of my belief about their lack of morality, but I think that they are very emotional and that is what is hurting them. From the very beginning, from day one, when the war began and the Israelis started attacking, this started this genocidal onslaught on Gaza, I told media and friends and colleagues that Gaza will not fall. And it was based upon the information of people in Iran who knew no more about these things than me. They were saying, because many of my friends, Palestinian friends, everyone was concerned, but these people were saying, no, it will not fall. And this will be a very long war. It will take at least six months to a year and that they have all that they need, they have hospitals, they have all sorts of different tunnels. I didn't have any of this information, but these people were always correct when it came to Syria, so I trusted their judgment. The Israelis, when they attacked Gaza, either they knew that they would fail or they didn't. I think that when it comes to Iran, they should have understood that Iran was right back. But in the case of Gaza, I really think that the Israelis did not know the extent of the defense capabilities underground. And their lack of intelligence, I think, is much greater than we think. So the Israelis are in a very difficult situation in Gaza. It will get worse. If they go into Rafa, Rafa is much worse than Gaza City because it's much more wide. By now, Alexander is a specialist in the military, so I won't argue with him on anything, but Rafa is much more wide. The Israelis can only come in from the East, whereas Gaza City, they could come in from the North and the East. So Rafa will be, I mean, regardless of the fact that the genocide will get much worse, that aside, but the battlefield will be much more difficult for the Israelis. And right now, as we speak, Hamas and its allies are building more tunnels. They have new people are joining, new ammunition and equipment is going into Gaza. The Israelis can't win. So they're stuck in Gaza. I think they know that now, probably. They're stuck in Lebanon. They cannot defeat Hezbollah. So the only way forward, in my opinion, is for Netanyahu to expand the war against Iran. That's how I see it, but not Israel and Iran, because Iran would have the upper hand, to somehow get Iran and the United States into some sort of conflict with one another so that he can save his own skin and his government, and to be able to escape what I believe to be a colossal defeat for the Israelis. - Well, it's interesting you use this term, well, miss miscalculation in terms of action towards both Iran as well as Gaza, because, well, there was this article coming out in the New York Times when it used this word as well. It said the Israeli had committed a miscalculation. And the text was quite absurd. It's literally said that the Israelis did not think that targeting high-ranking officials at the diplomatic facilities in Syria would be seen as a provocation by Iran. So essentially bombing its diplomatic facilities would not be seen as a provocation now. And this was apparently the miscalculation now. If there's also miscalculation, it shows, well, it was an extreme absence of any recognition of deterrence that the belief that Iran would just take it. But of course, the New York Times, of course, doesn't necessarily speak the truth. It can twist it around. But an alternative explanation as both of you said was has been the effort to drag the United States into a wider war. But on the other hand, while it sounds absurd is miscalculation argument, it nonetheless seems to also apply to Gaza, because, well, me and Alexander spoke to people like Alistair Crook, whose extensive background from British intelligence. And he, almost from day one, got an outline of exactly why Israel couldn't win in Gaza, why they couldn't defeat Hamas. And it begs the question, well, this can't be explained as anything else than a miscalculation, I guess, because this will be devastating for the Israelis as well, as we see more and more in Israeli media, especially Ahardot pointing out that this is a defeat, that they're not winning. So, but then this begs the question, Israel is supposed to have a great amount of intelligence, it has all these connections with the Americans, the British, it's supposed to have access to all information. How is it possible to have this huge miscalculation? If it is indeed miscalculation. Well, there are a few things that I could mention. One is to make a distinction between Syria and Gaza. I just want to point out that it is understandable to a degree for them to think that maybe Iran would not strike back because they were striking Iranians before. And that was causing a lot of anger here in Iran over the last few years, whenever someone would be murdered in Syria, people would say, "Why isn't Iran responding?" I was also surprised, as I said, with hindsight about the capabilities and what's happening, I began to better understand why they were showing patience. But I can understand why the Israelis might think that Iran would not strike back. But the embassy is just too much. I mean, hitting an embassy building basically means nothing is safe anymore. That is like the last, you know, the last red line. So, I think Iran striking back was inevitable and that was a major miscalculation. In the sake of, in the case of Gaza, I think there are a number of things. One is hubris, one I think is the arrogance of the Israelis, their reliance on the new technologies, on AI, and also this orientalist worldview, the other being less competent, less intelligent, ignorant, stupid, and that sort of thing. And that arrogance was a part of it. And, you know, one thing that is very important in politics, that we don't often take into account, is emotions. And I think that the Israelis have not been thinking rationally, and a lot of their analysis has been based on emotion. And those emotions, when they get in the way, they prevent you from seeing what's really happening. In fact, when I was younger, and Al-Ester is an old friend of mine, and when I would go to his conferences in Beirut, he knows this story, I told him a few times, once we were sitting together and having coffee many years ago, like 14, 15 years ago. And he said something, and I said, well, Al-Ester, why are they doing this, this is irrational, this is not in the interests of the West. And he told me, Muhammad, you don't understand, you think that in the West, we think rationally and everything is based upon rational thinking and analysis, and much of its emotion. And then a few months later, we had another discussion at another conference in Beirut, and he has a good memory. And he's-- it was something else. And I said, well, Al-Ester, why are they doing this? He said, Muhammad, remember what I told you a few months ago. And I think that this is a major reason why the United States is in the situation that it is, let alone Israel. I think that then the arrogance of power, exceptionalism, all of this has contributed to the rapid decline of the United States, taking, why could they not see what was obvious to me that Russia would not collapse? Because I think they saw, looked at the world from that exceptionalist worldview, that ultimately, Russia has to collapse because they are backward, they are lesser people, we are Americans. And you can see that in the way in which-- I remember-- I think it was the Wall Street Journal, if I'm not mistaken. It had a picture of President Putin, and they said he's gone to his Asian past, or his Asian heritage, like he's one of the hordes invading Europe. That sort of mindset, in my opinion, is very important in the way in which the Israelis view the Palestinians, the way in which the Americans view the Russians, the way in which the Americans and the Israelis view in Iran. And I think that that is a big-- it's a major reason why they get things wrong. I am sure you're right. I just make just two observations about that the Israelis should be underestimating their adversaries. Seems astonishing, given that their records, since perhaps the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, has not been particularly successful. And I think that's being rather generous, actually, to them. I would have thought that by now it would have sunk in that things are not actually-- they don't have the enormous superiority that they did. The second-- and I think this is not just me. I've had a lot of people say this, that I think a lot of people have noticed this extraordinary self-discipline and self-control that Iran has exercised. And in our previous program, we talked about the fact that Iran has started to gain major benefits from this. It's broken out of whatever attempt was isolated. It's now got regional friends, got powerful friends, China and Russia and all sorts of places. It's established a strong position in them, at least. But you've achieved all of that. You've got your economy strongly growing again. You've demonstrated your technological capabilities. The balance is shifting in your favor. Does Iran have a plan or an idea about how to advance the situation in the Middle East from this point on? Because given that things are starting to turn, if you like, in your favor, does is Iran preparing its next move? I asked that question because, of course, you could say that the best thing for Iran to do is just to continue to be reactive. But we have a crisis in Gaza. We have a potentially very dangerous crisis with Israel. What is Iran thinking about this? Now, I appreciate that it's a huge question. And you're not a member of the Iranian government. And I suspect that people in Iran with different views about this. But any thoughts about this yourself? I would, before I respond to that, I would-- I agree completely about, as you said, underestimating the adversities. But in this regard, I think Israel and the United States are strikingly similar. When the United States and Russia basically started the war and against one another, since the beginning of the proxy war in Ukraine, the Americans, if you-- I'm sure you will call-- the Americans, during the first few months, they courted China. And they were trying to persuade China to distance themselves from Russia. But at the same time, they were threatening China. And then the speaker of the house flew to Taiwan, a Nancy Pelosi. And I was always wondering to myself, well, why would you do this when you need China to distance itself from Russia? And I think that that arrogance of power, that sense of exceptionalism and superiority prevents them from seeing the reality on the ground. In fact, what you said said that Iran has been able to escape this isolation that they've imposed. A lot of it is because of US policy. To a large degree, the Americans were successful in isolating for Iran economically for a few years under Obama, the maximum pressure sanctions, and then revived under Trump. But then the Americans, effectively, we pushed Russia towards Iran, pushed China closer to Iran. They're the ones who are, to a significant degree, helping to break Iran's isolation. But that's the United States. I find Israel in the United States in so many different ways to be very similar to one another in the way in which the political elite calculate and think. In my opinion, the Iranians want a ceasefire immediately in Gaza. And I think the Iranians feel that the resistance has achieved what it needs to achieve. But-- and this is somewhat-- I don't want your viewers to misunderstand what I'm saying here. The Iranians do want a ceasefire immediately. But the side that really needs a ceasefire is Israel. The Israelis need a ceasefire more than anyone else. Let's-- just for a minute, put aside the Gazaan people who are being massacred and slaughtered. That's why we need a ceasefire immediately. But if you put that aside, and I personally believe that the biggest defeat for Israel is the genocide, I believe that their defeat on the battlefield in Gaza or on the border with Lebanon or in any exchange with Iran is important. But I believe that-- and I think it's-- the evidence is becoming overwhelming-- that Israel has demolished its image across the world and in the West and in parts of the United States because of the genocide, not because of Hamas beating them back or Hezbollah, keeping them at bay. But in any case, if we leave the people aside, Israel, when it goes into Rafah, because the Israelis have effectively forced themselves into a position where they have to attack. Why? Because they lied to their public. They said, look, we've wiped out Hamas, and there are just a few more units left in Rafah. And once we go in, it's finished. And we all know that that's not the case. Hamas is in the north just as much as it is in the south. Its network of tunnels throughout the Gaza are largely left untouched. They have what they need. When the Israelis go in, it's going to get worse for them. And it's going to be very bloody. But more importantly, the genocide will get worse, and there will be another wave of global outrage. And I believe that this outrage is having a permanent effect on the legitimacy of the Israeli regime in the eyes of the global public. We are seeing things in the United States that I would have never imagined that would happen in my lifetime. Never. It's just not for me-- I could not have believed that such things would happen. You have young people across the country-- Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus, people from all walks of life turning against Israel in a big way. And in my opinion, very heroic young people, especially the young Jews, because I think it's particularly difficult for them. I'm sure they are under a lot of pressure from within the community. But things have changed. So they would lose on the ground, and they would lose-- the hostility of the global south and world public opinion would only be further cemented by such a genocide. So in my opinion, Israel needs a ceasefire. But the Israelis have put themselves in a position where, right now, Netanyahu says, no, if he accepts a ceasefire, he'll be a traitor. Because everyone will say, look, we're just about-- it's almost finished. We're about to defeat Hamas, and there's just a few more units left in Rafah, and now you're pulling back. So I think Iran wants-- I'm sure Iran wants a ceasefire, but I think Iran is preparing for a longer war. And the longer the war lasts, I think that predicting the future of the region is going to be more difficult. Because wars have a way of becoming increasingly unpredictable and dangerous, because you strike something that you didn't expect to strike. You kill someone who wasn't supposed to be killed. You-- an outrage happens that wasn't supposed to happen. Some school is bombed, and things can change dramatically. And also, one thing that I think a lot of people in the West are not thinking about is the public in across the region. During the Arab Spring, or what many in Iran called the Islamic Awakening, or the Awakening, or whatever, how did it start? Everything was quiet, but some young men burned himself alive because of a local injustice in Tunisia. And he started an earthquake across the region. Right now, the sentiments on the streets across the region are changing. People are very angry. They are very disappointed and very angry about their own government, even-- so we can't be sure. It's like the ocean. You look out at the sea, and everything looks calm, but there are powerful currents underneath that we have no idea exists. So I think that it's a very dangerous situation. And the longer that this conflict lasts, the weaker Israel becomes, and the more unstable the region becomes. But Iran's policy has been, and it will continue to be, strengthening its allies, whether in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen. It will continue to do that. But I think at the same time, Iran's rapprochement with countries like Saudi Arabia will continue, especially Saudi Arabia, especially Saudi Arabia. And I think that the fact that the two countries have been able to rebuild their relationship will have an impact. And even though we have very different policies on Palestine, but I think that it will be able to-- if the time comes, it could be-- the relationship could be a pillar upon which could help prevent things from getting out of hand in some respects. I wanted to ask a little building on that. Maybe it's a strange time to ask this question, but the possibilities of a peace between Israel and Iran, because as you said, when China negotiated this resetting of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, this seemingly began to dismantle some of the alliance system in the region, the US-led alliance system, which has a tendency to perpetuate conflict, because you need this to weaken Iran, but it also makes Saudi Arabia and this neighboring states dependent on the US. So again, dividing region between the dependent allies versus weak and adversary. But as we saw, as you pointed out as well, Saudi Arabia and UAE, they didn't want to allow the US to use their territories or attacks on Iran. But you even saw them not wanting to join all the strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, given that they didn't want to break this path of peace. However, when this agreement with which Chinese help to negotiate came through, there was a very interesting article by the former chief of Mossad, Ephraim Hailevi. He wrote that, you know, given that Arabs and Iranians were making peace, this puts Israel in very awkward position. It can't be the only country left in an anti-Iranian alliance. So he suggested, again, the chief of Mossad, former chiefs, sorry, that Israel could actually also make a peace with Iran, after a while, that the differences weren't unresolvable. Obviously, this is not official position of Israel. I just want to add. But it is interesting that if the alliance systems can be dismantled, that there is some opportunity to shift to a security system where security competition could be mitigated and walk a little bit away from this there is some rivalry. But obviously, this is-- well, even further away now, as a possibility, it would seem. But if it would come to this one day, if there would be an interest from Israel to improve ties with Iran, what would be the main demands or conditions of Iran? Would it be ending apartheid over the Palestinians state? What-- did you see any pathway? Again, maybe a bit to our idealistic area, but the pathway for our peace between-- mutual beneficial peace between the Iranians and the Israelis. Actually, I think that there are two issues. If you want to understand-- and I'm sure you do, but I mean, I'm speaking to your audience. If you want to understand Iranian foreign policy, I think there are two things that we have to keep in mind. When the revolution took place, the revolutionaries, and before the revolution, they were very critical of the West, but they also wanted to stay away from the East, and that meaning the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Bloc. Some now say, does Iran have close relations with Russia and China? That's not the East. This is not an ideological Bloc, like it was during the Soviet Union. So Iran wanted to remain independent of the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. The second was that the revolutionaries, both before and during and after the revolution, they had two foreign policy issues that were always repeated among themselves. They were very serious about. One was apartheid South Africa, and the other was Palestine. These were two very key issues. In fact, my first job, first job, I was 15, and I became a translator. I never became a good translator. I was always lazy, and I can never find the right words. It's pretty horrible. But I was translating as an activist for a journal that was about South Africa and Palestine, basically, the resistance movements. For the Iranians, the only way-- and here, Iran is actually the idealist, sort of what you're just saying, but in their own way, in that for them, Israel, as it exists today, is not acceptable. They could never deal with that. They have said-- and I think this is foreign policy-- their policy position-- that if somehow the Palestinians, including those who are in refugee camps and outside of Israel, come to a deal with Israel, we won't interfere. But we won't accept the legitimacy of Israel because of the ethnosuppremacist nature of the regime. So for the Iranians, the acceptable path is for, as you mentioned, the dismantling of the apartheid system, where all people are equal, and the Palestinians have their rights returned to them, and that Jews, Christians, and Muslims live as equal human beings, sort of like what happened in South Africa, although South Africa-- I'm not saying it's an ideal society. We're talking about the collapse of apartheid. Otherwise, right now, the ANC is in a lot of trouble, and it probably will ultimately, at some point, lose power because of a host of different reasons. But the idealism behind their support for the resistance is the same idealism that they had 42 years ago. In some ways, Iran has changed a great deal, I think, when it comes to economics, when it comes to social issues. But when it comes to Palestine, I think that they are very firm in the position they take. It seems to me, and I don't know whether this is an Iranian perspective, that if you're going to get peace in the Middle East-- and this isn't just a piece between Israelis and Palestinians, but work towards the resolution of the many problems that exist in the Middle East. What has to happen is you, first of all, have to deal with this issue at the heart of all the other problems, which is the one between the Israelis and the Palestinians. I think any attempts to work around it are never in the end going to be successful. That's the first thing. And the other thing is that Israeli leadership or the Israeli people have to make a choice, which is a choice to seek peace. Because what they have been doing, ever since the state was founded and before, is that they've been seeking something else, which is a victory defined in the most extreme maximalist terms, which they will never achieve. It is impossible to achieve it. So what they're doing is that they're locking themselves and the region in which they now are into a situation of permanent war as they seek a victory, which is beyond them. And looking to a confrontation with Iran as the way to somehow solve this riddle is not the way to solve the riddle. It may have making it worse. Iran might, on the contrary, because of its history and its familiarity with the region of which it is, of course, forever been a part, might on the contrary be a partner if that decision to seek a genuine lasting just peace is ever made. But that decision has to be made ultimately by the people of Israel. I think, again, this is a point many people ask me, but I think this is really where it all comes down to. Now, I don't know where you are. But you know, one thing that I'd like to have, is that who else is like that, who has this maximalist position all or nothing? And that's the United States. So I always find, for me at least, maybe I'm wrong, but I find these two countries so strikingly, or the Israeli regime in the US as a country, I find these two countries so, or these two entities, so similar to one another. It's very striking for me at least. I may be exaggerating, but that has been the Achilles heel for the United States since, I think, 9/11. Personally, what I have always been saying to my students is that I think the United States have, they've been cursed by two things. One is the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the second is their victory over Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. Because the collapse of the Soviet Union gave them this, it reinforced this sense of invincibility, this sense of superiority. And of course, this end of history mentality that's very Hegelian was strengthened even further. And the defeat of Saddam Hussein and the stupidity of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait sort of washed away or dealt with the ghosts of Vietnam. And the Americans, they were now the hyper power, as someone once called it, and they were at the top of the world. And you could understand why they thought that it's all or nothing, and if they get into a fight, they will get everything they want. But time after, just like you were mentioning, the Israelis since 1982, they haven't had good experiences, the United States haven't had any good experiences for the past few decades, but especially since 9/11. But they continue to push down the same-- I mean, you would think, I mean, I think if the decision maker was yourselves, you would think that the Americans would cut and run right now in Ukraine. They would say, OK, let's cut a deal. Let's try to find a solution for DESA, so that everything all is not lost. We'll give concessions. Maybe a DESA will be governed in a particular way where the Russians-- but no, they can't do that. They have to keep pushing and pushing, even though it's like you see the tsunami coming your way, but you don't want to believe it. I just want to add, I think this is rather spot-on in terms of comparing the price in the Middle East with the conflict with Russia as well, because I think after the Cold War, you have two ways of ensuring security, because we're all living under this international anarchy. So either you seek to manage the security competition by also acknowledging the security interest of your adversaries. Or alternatively, you try to end the international anarchy by pursuing dominance. And I think that the prospect of establishing a new Pax Romana, a new dominant system, global primacy, as the US put in their security strategies after the Cold War, that this has been a key of their curse, because as I mentioned, the main prospect, and the main problem is you have to dominate your adversary. This is how the foundation of peace. This is also what we did in Europe when we began to expand NATO, respectively, the largest country in Europe shouldn't have, be a part of Europe, it shouldn't have a voice, it shouldn't be represented. We kept making that point. You don't have a veto power here, even though you're the largest country. You don't even have a seat at the table. So this is, yeah, I think this is really, well, what has broken security in both places, because it is possible to accommodate the security adversaries. For example, the Russian security concerns, we can say what we want about their actions in Ukraine, but the security concern of not having NATO roll into Ukraine, the Americans trying to push them out of Crimea and take over. This is hardly something that can't be accommodated, the same with the Palestinians. Surely, not living under apartheid or given the state which was promised to them long ago. These are quite reasonable demands to be met, which can be accommodated. However, if the security architecture is based on the foundation of hegemony or dominance, then we can't accommodate this. We can't, even the basic reasonable security demands can't really be met. So I think that this has definitely been a key problem. And of course, with hegemony, you also get as you said that this, or you uncorkly discussed this hubris, as the Bible says, pride goes before the fall. This is really a huge problem, because you mentioned before the discussions you had, but we have the same in Europe when we talk about Russia, we can try to make the arguments, we'll look at the numbers. Obviously, the Russians will win, but we stick to these identities. Well, America's this huge juggernaut. If they stand up, nothing can, you know, no one can push it back against them. So we get stuck in these ideas and these emotions, as we said, rather than actually dealing with the facts on the grounds. - I think that both in Ukraine and Palestine, it's the same thing. In Ukraine, the Americans just couldn't let it go. Ukraine could have been had a unique spot in Europe. They could have had a sort of the best of both worlds. But the Americans, again, this maximalist approach just doesn't let that happen. And the Israelis too, even though from the Iranian perspective, apartheid across Palestine has to be dismantled. But if the Israelis wanted to preserve apartheid, and they wanted to preserve their own system, with the least amount of pushback and resistance, the smart thing for them to have done would be to give the West Bank and the Gaza Strip independence. They would have allowed for a two-state solution. And then 80%, 70% of the problem would have gone away. I mean, there would have still been resistance, but it would have been a lot less. And now they've colonized the West Bank so much that a two-state solution is impossible. If they speak about the two-state solution, they're being completely dishonest. Because anyone that looks at the map with all the settlements can see that there is no way that a Palestinian state can be created in the West Bank anymore. So that maximalist approach that the Israelis pursued when things were more in their favor, just like the Americans, that led to the situation which they are in to a large degree now, and the same true as in Ukraine. - I'm gonna make one very last comment. Just briefly this, if the Israelis had done what you've just said, Mohammed, given up the West Bank, given up our Gaza accepted to Palestinian state there, they would not have been seeking victory, which is what they've been doing all along. This is their fundamental problem. And of course, if you play all or nothing, always the risk you run is that you're going to end up with nothing. It always amazes me that people never understand that. But it's something that really, however strong you are, you should always take into account. Now, the second point I want to make is that I think eventually we are going to have some kind of a piece in the Middle East. I'm always an optimist and I insist on remaining one. And I think it will be a just piece, and I think every party will find a place in it. And one thing, however, I think is absolutely clear, and the events of this last two weeks, three weeks have demonstrated that conclusively, at least for me, is that there can be no peace in the Middle East without it wrong. And what you were talking about, that the Palestinians come to some kind of a deal with the Israelis, which allows the Israeli structures to remain essentially as they are. I don't believe that is conceivable. I don't think that is sustainable. I think if it were to be negotiated, it would run into enormous resistance, both from the majority of the Palestinians, but also from some Israelis who would say, "Why are we settling for less than all?" Because that's what happens when you see it. - It would lead to a civil war. - It would indeed, exactly. So I don't think that's going to happen. So given that that isn't really, to my mind, a viable option, there has to be an actual real sustainable peace. Given the importance of Iran as a integral part of the Middle East, which Heavens knows as a Greek very well, how long the history of Iran is, how much the part of the Middle East Iran is. I mean, it's not something that as a Greek, you have to persuade me all. Given that that is so, just like Russia is a part of Europe, but Iran has been a part of the Middle East and much longer than Russia has been a part of Europe, I can say that. - That's right. - Given that that is so, there cannot be a just, sustainable peace in the Middle East without Iran. I think one day it will come. I think the sooner people understand that, the better for everybody it will be. - I agree. I'm optimistic about the future. I don't think I'm naive. I think we're going to see very many dark days ahead. And not just in our region, but in Europe and elsewhere. But I'm ultimately optimistic because I think that during this era of great change, many things happen that are completely unexpected and sea changes take place in societies and in thinking. And I think that ultimately that there will have to be a peace in our region, which is just. And I think ultimately that we are going to have peace in Europe. It may not be today or tomorrow, and many lives will be lost on the way. And many other difficulties will be ahead, but we have to be optimistic in any case. But I think I am by nature optimistic and hopefully we'll see those days before too long. - Yeah, well, I'd just like to say this. Glenn, does it sound too optimistic? - No, I'm a little more optimistic, but I do hope we can go. I think there's some optimism if there's a change in the way people think because again, I think this era of hegemony has skewed or corrupted our entire way of thinking about security because I never opened a newspaper or see the news on TV ever where they actually discuss what are the legitimate security interests of our competitors? And to what extent can this, can we harmonize our interests? To what extent can they be met instead of always fighting it out? Instead, under this idea of hegemony, the main focus is always, I mean, always in the media. How can we defeat the adversary? If we don't agree with them, can we have regime change, should we defeat on the battleground? But there's always this winner takes all. And this is when the international system is at its most dangerous, when there is a winner take all. This is when states are willing to risk everything, to navigate through all these very dangerous waters. And again, this whole idea that we can't discuss what are the legitimate security concerns of our adversaries, this whole idea that we're legitimizing as if this would be something, it is quite absurd. And I don't know, I think at least this is the legacy of hegemony and the hubris. But I think if this can be overcome, there might be a return to some of the foundations of diplomacy. But again, maybe I'll optimist as well then. So. - Go ahead. - Anyways, Professor Marandi, thank you so much. Alexander, excellent, yeah, to have you both back here. - Thank you both very much for having me. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (bright music) [MUSIC PLAYING]