Radio Miraya
2858: Exclusive with Hon. Pagan Amum ahead of the re-opening of Tumaini peace talks in Nairobi
(upbeat music) - Nationwide, we bring you latest current issues, discussions and information. Nationwide, I'm Radio Miraya. - Good evening, dear listeners, and welcome to Nationwide discussion. Our name is Mike Dulan Josef, and I'm delighted to have you with us today. Please note that our today's program is pre-recorded, so we won't be able to take your calls or text messages. And as we continue to receive updates on the Tomaini talks in Arobi, South Sudan's main opposition groups and the South Sudan opposition movements alliance, Soma, have expressed their commitment to concluding the Tomaini Peace Initiative discussion within the two weeks' time frame, set by the mediators and the heads of state. And my colleagues, Annie Martin, who is Nairobi Kachap, who is Pagana Muam, the leader of the opposition and chairperson of the Real Espalem. In the interview, Mr. Amum impossies the importance of addressing the unresolved issues of governance and responsibility sharing during these talks. Let's listen to the interview. - Hello, and welcome to Radio Miraya. My name is Annie Martin, and today our guests will be honorable Pagana Muam, the leader of the Real Espalem, and chairperson of the South Sudan main opposition alliance, the Soma, and he's taking part in the Tomaini Peace Initiative in Nairobi, Kenya. You are most welcome for the Real Enorable Pagana Muam. - Thank you, thank you very much for hosting me, and I start by greeting your listeners, all over South Sudan, and also in the worldwide world. - Okay, right away, let's begin the chief mediator, announced the 11th of this man has the official resumption of the talks between your group and the government delegation. Why are we right now with the peace negotiation in the absence of the government delegation? - Well, we are here on the table. We received the invitation for the resumption on the 11th of November. We went to the mediation and the meeting hall to show up with the mediation, and we told them that we are ready to resume the talks and proceed with the signing of the Tomaini as was agreed by the parties and the stakeholders. Unfortunately, the government did not show up on the 11th, and again on the 18th, we were also invited to resume on the 18th, Monday, the 18th of November. Unfortunately, again, the government did not show up. So we are here on the table waiting for the government, and definitely this is a very bad sign because when President William Ruto on the 6th of November visited Juba, the two governments, the government of South Sudan and the government of Kenya, the two leaders, agreed to resume within two weeks from the six, and finalized within resume and finalized within two weeks. Unfortunately, the government of South Sudan violated this and reenact on this commitment. Two weeks have gone, the third week also has gone, and the government did not come to the table. - You have co-position taking part in these talks. Are you frustrated with the absence of the government delegation in AARP? - Two weeks after the official date was announced for the assumption of the talks between your group and the government delegation. - We are not frustrated, but I'm sure our people are disappointed. This to my initiative is an initiative of the president of the Republic of South Sudan, who requested his Excellency President William Ruto to mediate between the government and the opposition, or particularly the non-signatories of the RSS. So this is their initiative. Unfortunately, the government is divided between those who want to achieve a comprehensive and sustainable peace in the country, and those who want to maintain their status quo, and who are against achieving peace in the country. I'm sure those who are against peace for their own selfish interest are the one who are either advising the president wrongly or posing the president to renest on his commitment and to go through his initiative. He has agreed with President Ruto to start this mediation. He has agreed with President Ruto after we finalised the negotiations and agreed on the Tomaini Consensus that the parties and the stakeholders will sign the Tomaini Consensus on the 16th of September. Yet, the government did not show up, probably because the president care position has been changed by those anti-Tomaini groups. And indeed, this is what led to the dismissal and dishonoring the government team that negotiated the Tomaini Consensus, whom were congratulated by President Keir when he came to Nairobi in August. - For how long can the opposition and the other stakeholders wait for the government delegation to arrive? - We have demonstrated that we are patient and we do not want this opportunity to be wasted, to achieve a comprehensive and sustainable peace in our country. Large parts of the country are submerged in floods, unprecedented floods and there's a lot of violence and insecurity all over the country. And that is why all the stakeholders from our church and our religious leaders, all our civil society leaders and women leaders, the opposition are determined to rescue the country. We cannot be frustrated by the absence of the government and we are patiently waiting for them to come. - It's not because we are desperate. - You are the chairman of the Soma Group and we understand there were some protocols that were initial in July, this year. Can you take us through what are some of these protocols and how many protocols are left and when the talks begins, which protocols will be discussed? - Thank you very much. This is very important. First and foremost, we agreed, negotiated and agreed on eight protocols. We have finalized them, we signed five protocols and we left three protocols, having agreed on them to be initial with the last protocol which is responsibility sharing, which we have negotiated and the government side requested to return to Juba for consultations and decision by their leadership. This is the only protocol that was left and when the government came back, they said they were still consulting on the responsibility sharing protocol. Then they brought back concerns and observations and reservations from the government, both the SPLMAIO and others, whom were having reservations on the eight protocols. We have negotiated and discussed to accommodate those concerns and therefore, we have now finally agreed on the eight protocol. And also, when president here came to Nairobi, we met with him as the opposition and he met with his delegation. He congratulated them and we had a joint meeting with president here, where he instructed his team to go back to Juba and make all the preparations for the signing of the Tomaini Consensus as he had agreed with president William Roto and he has expressed his satisfaction of what has been negotiated. That the parties would come on the 16th Monday, the 16th of September to sign the Tomaini Consensus when the responsibility sharing is agreed to, which was the only thing that was left, the only protocol left out. And both president William Roto and president Salfakir agreed to mobilize the East Africa community. They got countries, the African Union, to support the Tomaini Consensus. And agreed to that when they are meeting in the Africa-China summit in Beijing, they would use that opportunity to engage the leaders we got and African Union and the East African community as well as also to engage the international community and the UN during the United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York in September. That was what was agreed for us to come back by the 16th to-- And signed the agreement. And signed the agreement. Unfortunately, the government of Saas Sudan did not show up. The government of Saas Sudan re-neged from its commitment to come and sign. Just before we continue clarity for our listeners who are not familiar with these protocols without putting them in order, could you maybe outline some of these protocols for the sake of our listeners? The Tomaini Consensus is composed of the following first statement of purpose of the Tomaini and secondly, articulation of principles, guiding principle for the Tomaini Consensus. Then the first protocol is a protocol on trust and confidence building measures. The second protocol is a protocol on resolution of communal conflict and land-related conflict in Saas Sudan. The third protocol is a protocol on humanitarian assistance to address the disastrous humanitarian crisis that we have in the country. The first protocol is a protocol on economic recovery, given the economic crisis that we have. The fifth protocol is a protocol on transitional justice and transitional reconciliation. The sixth protocol is a protocol on security arrangement and security sector transformation. The seventh protocol is a protocol on a protocol on permanent constitution making process and then grantors for the implementation plus of course the statement of purpose and principles, I believe. And most of the protocols you have mentioned almost 90% apart from the protocol on resolution of conflict and issues to do with the land, almost all what you have mentioned are within the 2018 revitalized peace agreement. Is that not a copy and the past protocols from the current revitalized peace agreement which is being implemented in Saas Sudan? There are two protocols which are new. One is trust and confidence building. It is not there in the arachid revitalized peace agreement plus the protocol on communal conflicts and land related conflicts. The others are, there are aspects which are new. It is very important to note that the Tomaini consensus is an agreement that is composed of two components. One is all the provisions of RRCS that are not implemented are included in the Tomaini consensus for the purpose of implementing them. What is new with these protocols that have not been implemented with RRCS are mechanisms to ensure implementation. What we have done is work, we have asked ourselves as negotiators representing both the artigono formed by the parties who signed the RRCS and the parties in the opposition who did not sign the RRCS plus other stakeholders from our civil society, religious leaders and women groups. We ask ourselves the cardinal question. Why the parties of RRCS fail to implement these protocols? We learn lessons from this failure. We found out that the mechanisms for implementing that agreement the RRCS were weak and we provided a strengthened mechanism and new mechanisms to address the failure in the RRCS. You know very well the RRCS over the last six years the parties and the RRCGono have failed to implement it and even the principal parties have different and contradictory positions on the RRCS and why it has failed to be implemented. One of them is that some parties believe that the RRCS was not designed to be implemented. Others say that the RRCS is not implemented because of lack of political will and we have found out that there is a problem with mechanisms to implement the RRCS. Some of these mechanisms have diverted resources and misuse these resources to implement the RRCS and is funded these resources and making the RRTGono to fail to bring sustainable peace in the country to create a conducive environment for a transition to a democratic governance in Saasudan. One of the weaknesses of the RRCS also is lack of grantors, both internal grantors and external grantors that would have brought a prejudice to bear on the parties that for example, lack the necessary political will to implement and then address this problem or lack of grantors, both internally and externally to check on the mechanisms that were misusing resources for example. In addition to the fact that the RRCS has not been introduced to the people of Saasudan to own it. If you remember, the parties to RRCS never conducted public rallies and outreach to the people and appear together to announce the RRCS as come to bring peace. But the president of the Republic Self-akir toward the region of Baragazar, he drove from Juba up to Wau and on up to Awil in the name of peace dissemination. He was not disseminating peace, they did not appear together, and as parties who made peace and the way they have gone about it, they went about it separately and not appearing in public at all, as parties who have made peace. This is a major flaw in the, and this is a sign of not only lack of political will, even continuation of hostilities. And how do you believe has a soma group that the Tumayani consensus or peace initiative will make the leaders appear together and disseminate the outcome of whatever is agreed here to get the RRCS in Saasudan? We have addressed that. The other aspects of the Tumayani are new provisions, as you have mentioned, addressing some of the problems and the crisis that have not been addressed by RRCS like community conflicts, like land related conflicts were mentioned, but not sufficiently addressed. This is what is new. Now, the Arthigono who signed the RRCS and formed the Arthigono on the basis of RRCS agreed with the opposition and the other stakeholders to include all the provisions of RRCS into the Tumayani. Agreed with the opposition and the other stakeholders to devise new mechanisms, new mechanisms to implement the Tumayani, having learned lessons from the failure of all the transitional government to bring peace, particularly the failure of Arthigono to implement the RRCS. This is by agreement by all of us. There seems to be a big concern among Arthigono members when you talk about the National Leadership Council. Some people within the government believe that it's taking away the power of the presidency and also you are trying to replace some of the mechanisms that are already existing within the revitalized peace agreement of 2018. Could you try to shed more light about this NLC or the National Leadership Council? What would it be doing? What is its role? Is it replacing the existing mechanism within the agreement? The National Leadership Council is a new body that is created as an internal grantor. And it is a grantor to ensure full implementation of the Tumayani, which includes the RRCS. This has been missing with the RRCS. There's no internal grantor, there is no mechanism where the top leadership signatories to the agreement where they can sit, resolve problems, and ensure full implementation of the agreement. But the agreement talks about presidency. This has been which agreement? The 2018 report, LSP's agreement says the presidency can sit and resolve any outstanding issues impeding the implementation of the agreement. They have not been sitting to resolve these issues, and actually they have not been providing a full oversight to the implementation of the agreement. And because of that, the agreement has not been implemented. The presidency has also not provided hands-on oversight in the implementation and also to check the mechanism in implementing. And because of that, a lot of resources have been mismanaged. The presidency has not been providing strategic leadership to build sustainable peace in South Sudan. And because of that, the agreement is not implemented. The presidency has not been providing strategic leadership and oversight of the implementation, say, of security arrangement. And because of that, you can see that the task which were meant to be implemented in the pre-transitional period have not been implemented, not even 10% of it have been implemented. You can see with the unification of the forces, where is the presidency, with all these delays and with all these problems? You've seen, just recently, the SPLMIO commanders who are in the mechanisms of security sector arrangement and literally worked out because complaining that this has not been working. Why are there some groups so excited that the too many will put to an end some of this extension and it was a rescue plan? We are not excited. We have provided solutions to the problem. We have analyzed where the weaknesses are and we said the strategic oversight is lacking and is missing, therefore you create a body, a grid, not at home, a grid in the body of the agreement, the NLC to provide that strategic leadership. Now, the NLC is not taking the powers of the presidency or anything. It is actually included that the presidency itself is the one providing the leadership of the NLC. But here in the role of overseeing and ensuring strategic leadership to implement at the leadership level, this has been missing. We have provided a solution to that. The leadership council will be meeting periodically, in schedule and a grid and they will address all the problems. If there is lack of political will, it will be immediately confronted and challenged. Also, other mechanisms have been created to ensure that the mistakes made by the mechanisms in the RRCs are also corrected. So this is where our optimism is based because we are learning lessons from all our failures as South Sudanese in bringing peace and transition to democracy in our country. And some of these other mechanisms we have read that were initial includes the national oversight implementation of committee which, according to what we had, will be replacing the national transition of committee. And will this NLC be replacing the presidency? Will this NIC be replacing the NTC? And some of the mechanisms you have already initiated because that is one of the biggest concerns that literally the Hermione will be replacing the RRCs. - The NLC will not be replacing the presidency. The presidency will be there. The NLC is a body of the agreement creating an internal grant hope for implementation. - What would be its composition? - Its composition is the president will be the share of this body. The first vice president will be deputy share of this body. The other four vice presidents will be members and four from the position leaders will be members and there will be other members. The function of this body is not to run the government. The function of this body is to implement the agreement and ensure that it is the last resort to address and resolve problems in the implementation which the presidency in the case of RRCs has not been providing. This is the difference. So the running of the government will be done by the presidency and the Council of Ministers. But this NLC is to ensure full implementation of the Tomionic consensus, to bring peace this time and avoid the failures that lead to extension of failed transitions. That is its main function. So there's difference between the presidency and the NLC as an implementation body. Providing a strategic oversight and ensuring implementation resolve all the problems that may arise from the implementation. And this will make us exit the country from the crisis it is in, from the fragility, from failed transitions and ensure transition to peace, good governance and democratic governance in the country. - And how can that be achieved when we still have some whole that group, the likes of General Thomas Cyril who's not part of these two main peace initiatives. We also have Simon Gattuit who has a large followings and they are not yet included in the two main peace initiative. Does that concern you as some other group? - It definitely concerns us. They are not here. The others are like those of Thomas are not here because they chose not to be here. They were invited. We were all invited together. So in their absence, we met with the government and other stakeholders and this is the outcome. If they can join the process, they will definitely be welcome. And efforts have been made even during the negotiations. The mediators met with them. The government also met with them. Of course, earlier we had discussed with them and advised that we should positively respond to the initiative and invitation by President William Rotome. We definitely want them to be included and that has been our position. It is our position. We want an inclusive peace in our country. Now the call for them to join the process is our position that we have been making earlier. General Gattuit actually, position is different. He is in a place and he told the mediation that he is not in a position to come because he is not able to. He is in Sudan and there's war in Sudan. So he has difficulty of coming. Logistic wise. Yeah, logistics and security. And to my consensus also talks about a release of political prisoners or detainees. Do you believe that we still have political prisoners being held in different parts of the country? We believe so. And this is something that needs to be addressed. Not only that, we need the political space to be totally free for our people and to engage, to meet and in freedom. We need also the space for the media and freedoms of press to be insured and not to be censored and regulated the way it is now. What about the issue of the permanent constitution-making process? What is being discussed about it because we have already a body set up in Cuba and the chairperson have already set December as the day of civic education throughout the country. We have agreed on a whole protocol on the constitution-making process. That includes very important aspects. One is that we shall organize a conservative, a permanent constitution, consultative conference for the diaspora and for the opposition and the diaspora representative of our people in the region here and in the diaspora. To be organized here in Nairobi, buy it to Miami first. And we expect that to bring in the participation and voices of all South Sudanese for one reason or another could not be in the country, including the opposition. Given the limited political space that is suppressing our people and political freedoms in our country, this is a very important aspect and the National Constitutional Review Commission will be participating in that. This is agreed by the government already. And this actually takes the place of what we propose as the round table. And this will bring the views and opinion and solutions from all South Sudanese who could not engage freely in the country. Then we'll move with the resolutions of this, including a possible constitutional draft into the country to join the rest of the process. And the proposal we are making in this is based on how to address these failures and take the country out of these repeated failures. - Okay, and right now there are a lot of talks among the people of South Sudan that most politicians who are out of the country and out of the government are just angry because they lost their jobs in one way or the other. They're only fighting hard to come back into the government and the noise you people are making out there just to ensure that you secure your job and begin earning once you go back to Juba and you are given your posture. You keep quiet, you'll not be advocating for most of the things you are saying when you are out of the government right now. What is your response to that? - That's totally wrong view altogether. Check, for example, my case. I did not lose my job. I was the Secretary General of the SPLM and remained the Secretary General of the SPLM for many years, but I decided to be opposed to that government. When there was still calling on me to return to the country to take back my position. So I did not lose my job to be in the opposition. How can they say that? This is absolutely wrong. I am in the opposition because first, in 2015, when we discussed with the leadership of SPLM at that time, and I was the Secretary General, we agreed that the most important things for us as SPLM are too. One is to achieve peace and end the war in the country. Secondly is to unite the SPLM and return it to its vision that it has lost, return it to its program that it has dishonored and betrayed. These were the two things. Now, President Care asked me to go to Addis Ababa, in August 2015, to go and engage the SPLM I/O, to sign the agreement, and he agreed that he was ready to sign himself, President Care. Now, when we went to Addis, we agreed, Victoria and herself in the FDS, that it is time to end the war and sign peace agreement. And we began to oppose the government because of the resistance to peace in the country and also the resistance to return the party to its vision. These are the reasons. It's not about positions. I had already my position. Do you believe that to many consensus, if signed, by all the parties can ensure that people of South Sudan gets back their power and elect their desired leaders? If you look at the protocol on constitution-making process, the main trust is to ensure that we hand over power back to our people to elect their government in free and fair elections, peaceful elections, and established a system of governance that is based on our people having the power to elect their government and leaders periodically in free, fair and peaceful elections periodically. That is the whole trust. That's one aspect. The other aspects of the too many is to ensure stability and sustainable peace in our country. The third aspect is to ensure that in an environment of peace and democracy, we release the creative energies of our people to focus on wealth creation and improvement of their life. And take the path or put the country back to the path of a state and nation building. That's all what it is. And that is why we call it a rescue plan. This is not about power. This is not about position. As I shared with you earlier, the too many consensus, the eight protocols we have signed are about addressing the crisis in the country. The last protocol which we have discussed, the last protocol is responsibility sharing. Why did we put it last? It's because the most important is solving the problem we are in. The crisis, the national crisis that is gripping our country and society. The crisis, economic crisis, the constitutional crisis, crisis of governance or misgovernance, actually. And crisis of violence and insecurity, crisis of land disputes among our communities, humanitarian crisis, and also climate change crisis that our country has already become a victim of. These are our main focus. - From why you stopped? Do you expect the parties to resume from why you stopped in the last July with negotiation? And what are some of the issues to be discussed as we age towards the final discussion of the too many peace consensus? - We have been ready to resume since Monday, the 11th. And again, when the government did not turn up, we expected them to turn up on the 18th, 18th of November, as per the agreement between president here and president Ruto. But anyway, we are ready and waiting. We are ready to resume with them whenever that they come and we will be meeting with them for two weeks and two weeks only. - So what are some of the protocols which are yet to be discussed when you resume? - We have already discussed and agreed on the protocols and we should be coming with the last position on responsibility sharing for us to agree and proceed to sign within two weeks. The resumption is based on the communique of the six. Please refer to the communique of the six. The same finalize, address all the understanding issues within two weeks. - And if the talks drags on beyond the two weeks, what-- - We are only going for two weeks. This is what we have been asked and we see no reason to drag the talks beyond two weeks. - And what if the other side open up some of the initial protocols-- - They will be violating the spirit of the communique and the letter and spirit of the communique. If they come to reopen what they have agreed to, then this is a clear proof that this government does not want sustainable peace in South Sudan, does not want a transition to democracy in South Sudan. If they just, after that would reopen, then this is a proof to our people. - How does the too many consensus contribute to nation building and state building in South Sudan? - The too many consensus will contribute to state and nation building in South Sudan by first taking South Sudan out of this crisis. Changing the direction of the country. And as we address the humanitarian crisis, the communal crisis, land related conflicts in the country as we reconcile our people and achieve transition of justice, and as we reform our security sector and establish non-partition national defense forces and non-politicize internal law and order system and establish a proper rule of law, we will be able then direct all our energies to focus on building a state that is capable to deliver on all the promises made to our people during our struggle. Bill state, a developmental state that is capable to use public resources to provide security, protection of life and properties of our people, create an environment where our people can create wells and turn South Sudan into an attractive investment destination by creating an environment that will reduce the cost of doing business and will facilitate easy environment of doing business in the country to encourage investment both national and foreign. And create a state that is capable to provide public goods, to provide social services from education to all our children, school going children to all our citizens because at this age you cannot develop faster unless you develop the potential of the people and carry out literacy and numeracy, campaign and revolution and transform the economy into a knowledge-based economy that is also integrated to undigitalize. All this requires a state that is capable to develop the potential of our citizens and the capacities of our citizens. A state that is capable to invite a legal framework that provides certainty, a state that is capable to build infrastructure and connectivity. A state that is capable to really exercise sovereignty over the country and particularly a state that is capable to stem out as much as possible abuse, misappropriation of public resources or corruption. This is key to build a nation. Then you proceed to build a nation where all South Sudanese can transform and turn South Sudan into a homeland where they can live in peace and harmony, united in peace and harmony, singing songs of freedom, this joy, as we sing in our national anthem. This is a dream that we must realize. That is how the Tumayini, as a rescue plan, will lay the basis for returning South Sudan to the path of state and nation building. Remember, we, the present generations of South Sudanese, alive today, our most important historical responsibility. As the founding generation of South Sudan, this is a very unique responsibility. The present generation, we are the founding generation of South Sudan. We are the founding mothers and fathers of this new nation and this new state. This only falls on the shoulders of very few and unique generations that are placed by history to assume Sahaja Raul in the history of all nations. That is what is on our shoulder. That is our historical task. Laying the foundation of the new state and the new nation. - Thank you so much, Honorable Paganamum, and the Chairperson of the Soma Group, and also the leader of the Relay Spalam. - Yes. - Thank you so much for talking to the de Meravi. Appreciate your time, so much. - My pleasure, thank you very much. - Thank you so much. And with that, we have come to the end of our discussion from Ms. Anematin and the team here. Thank you so much, and stay tuned.