The Duran Podcast
End of US Hegemony - Jack Matlock (Ambassador to the USSR), Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen
Welcome to today's discussion. My name is Glenn Deason. I'm joined by Alexander Mercuris and Jack Matlock, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who had a very important role in contributing to negotiating an end to the Cold War in 1989. Welcome, sir. Hello. A good day. So, well, the topic we really wanted to discuss today was the rise and potential fall of American hegemony in the world. And as after the Cold War, the U.S. obviously had a choice between embracing more a multipolar system or pursuing security based on the hegemony. And I would say the choice of hegemony was chosen and justified based on what I would consider to be a genuine objective of advancing a more liberal world order, more or less according to Francis Fukuyama's ideas. And now 30 plus years later, one gets the impression that neither hegemony or the mission of advancing liberal democratic values are doing particularly well. The U.S. is experiencing more domestic problems while global primacy is contested more and more by other states. So, one can see also argued that the hegemonic international system perhaps is less capable of adjusting to shifts in the international distribution of power. So, with this topic in mind, I thought we could start with NATO as hegemony largely translated into NATO expansion. But Mr Matlock, you and your colleagues, such as George Kennan or William Perry, you were all, well, I would say fiercely opposed to NATO expansion. In your words, at the time, I think you said it would go down in history as the most profound strategic blunder. So, I guess I want to start off with two questions. First, why did you see NATO expansion as being a strategic blunder? And also second, what do you make of them as you were there at the time? To what extent was there made a promise to go by show that this would not happen? Yes, I did argue strongly along with a number of my colleagues. In fact, many of us who were in senior positions when we negotiated into the Cold War, we argued that NATO should not expand. NATO was formed to prevent the Soviet Union from invading and occupying Western Europe. When the Soviet Union first negotiated an end to the Cold War, it was not a defeat for the Soviet Union. We negotiated an end, which was in everybody's interest. And as Gorbachev started democratizing, the internal tensions within the Soviet Union caused a breakup. The United States, although it had advocated and supported the independence of the three Baltic countries, actually did not want the Soviet Union to break up at that time. Under the first Bush administration, we had hoped that Gorbachev would be able to negotiate a more democratic, say, confederation of the 12 non-baltic republics. That didn't happen. Now, many people later looked at that as if it was the result of Western pressure. It was not. It was a defeat for Western policy, which wanted the Soviet Union to become more democratic, but did not want to see it break up the way it did. So the idea that many people had later, both in the West and Russia and the East, that the Soviet Union and then Russia was defeated, got it all wrong. That was a negotiated end. Now, why was it wrong to begin expanding NATO? Well, first of all, NATO had served its purpose. And though some thought, and I'm sure this was true of Secretary of State Baker and President Bush, some thought that it was necessary to retain NATO to keep Germany from dominating all of Europe, as it had done before, and to legitimate some American military presence in Europe. When this was discussed with Gorbachev, he accepted it and approved it. Now, later and also, as we were negotiating the unification of Germany, we definitely, we Americans, along with the German Foreign Minister and the British Prime Minister, gave assurances, verbal assurances, that NATO would not expand to the East. Now, by the late 90s, when the question arose, we said this, first of all, it isn't necessary. And second, if it is continued, it could bring about a very dangerous situation. Now, by then, by the 90s, the Soviet Union had broken up. Russia had slightly less than half the population of the Soviet Union. The other republics were given their independence under the leadership of Russia. Now, when people say today Russia is always imperialist, Russia has always suppressed these people. Yes, the Russian Empire was an empire like other empires, but actually in the Soviet Union, they did a lot to preserve the languages and the cultures of the non-Russian nationalities, much more than happened under the Russian Empire. Each of these nationalities were able to teach in their languages. They all had publications in the native languages. Even some of the smallest nationalities were able to keep their languages at least in second and primary school and so on. Now, it is true that to be successful in the Soviet Union in a profession, you did need to eventually learn Russian, but as long as the nationalities, the non-Russianalities, followed the line politically, this was the essential thing, that they were able to cultivate and preserve their languages and cultures. Finally, what broke up the Soviet Union, as I said before, was not Western pressure, but internal pressures. It was clear to many of us watching it that if there was a sudden change in the republics other than the three Baltic states, which had been brought into the Soviet Union very late, and actually as a result of the Nazi-Soviet pact, they had a history with much in common with Western Europe, so that it was clear that they had a road to what we would call a more democratic system, that some of the others probably didn't. So that the idea was why should we expand NATO, when after the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was not a threat to Eastern Europe. Actually, Gorbachev had encouraged the reforms in Eastern Europe, had accepted without calm the results of democratic elections, and was trying to democratize his own country. So the idea that somehow Russia was a threat, because it may have been in the past, I think, was totally mistaken. Now, what we should have understood is that if you start expanding a military alliance into areas which it once were controlled by another, you are going eventually to be seen as threatening the sovereignty and independence of those other states. Just as the United States, for example, went to war in Europe in the First World War, when we learned that the Germans were trying to recruit the Mexicans into an anti-American alliance, that was simply intolerable when we went to war against Germany, in part because of that, and for a country which has not, for two centuries, tolerated any foreign power to colonize or control countries in the Western Hemisphere, the United States, first of all, should have understood that this is not a good idea. Now, having said that, and many people say, well, after all, NATO is not a threat to anybody because it is simply a guarantee against external attack. Well, as Russian diplomats explained to us in the 90s, it was not so much the Title V guarantee that worried them as far as NATO expansion. They had no intention of attacking any of these countries at that time or even in the future. What worried them was bases? And he said, well, if you start putting bases in Eastern Europe, that will be a threat. And is that unreasonable? Would not the United States react very negatively foreign power? Even one that was not that hostile started putting bases, say, in the Caribbean or so on. So this, and certainly, we have opposed any French claims over French Canada, even though France was a friend. So why this couldn't be understood is difficult for me to understand. And I would also say now the first round of NATO expansion was accepted by Russian reluctantly, perhaps. But they said, well, as long as you don't put bases there, we're certainly not going to attack them. But all along, they said, first of all, the Balkans had not, when they saw no reason for NATO expansion into the Balkans. I was in New York when President Putin visited, and this was in, I think, the late 1990s, and he was asked then about the expansion to the three Baltic countries. And he said, well, I don't know why that is necessary. But if it happens, it will not strain our relationship. Of course, they could be members, but no bases. And then later, when there was talk of expansion to Ukraine, and anybody who's in them with Russian and Ukrainian history would understand that that would be totally unacceptable to Russian. And as a matter of fact, when the question was erased in 2008, at that time, two thirds of the Ukrainians were against NATO expansion. It was not something that the country in the whole was asking for. But NATO made that declaration in 2008 that eventually Ukraine, and I think also Georgia, would be members. Now, I think that that could only be seen as an offensive thing, particularly when NATO began, first of all, to establish bases in Eastern Europe. The establishment in the second decade of this century of ABM systems in Eastern Europe was considered a particular threat. And well, why one would say, these ABM systems are simply defensive. That was the argument we made. Now, defense against what was not clear. We said it was defense against potentially Iranian attacks on Western Europe. Well, if that time Iran didn't have as a ballistic missile and had no reason to aim them at Eastern Europe. And another little detail that needs to be understood is that these systems could easily be converted to offensive. They had been designed for use originally on our Navy and depending on the software they could be used either defensively or offensively. Now, obviously, this was something that Russia had drawn the line out for a long time. But the US has simply continued. Now, I think these were extremely dangerous. I hate to go on with a long lecture, but let me say now that MIMHA within Ukraine, their internal developments were making it more and more hostile to Russian interests. And I'll simply conclude this with one more observation. At the end of the Second World War, the United States had the, I would say, the wisdom to insist that Germany and France make it up and ensure that their rivalry would not bring us to another world war. And they did with American help and so on. And that's when we had the development of what became the EU, the European Union. At the end of the Cold War, particularly, once the Soviet Union broke up and was no longer communist, the communist ideology was an offensive and threatening ideology. And once that was dropped, and Russia was less than half the population of the Soviet Union, the task in Europe was to make Russia also a part of Europe and not try to wall it off and threaten it because that combined with NATO expansion was bound to create a reaction in Russia. Can I just, just a few things. Firstly, I was, of course, a complete observer of the events in the late 1980s, but I can absolutely remember the public statements that were made at the time by Western officials, including Western officials, including Secretary Baker and President Bush, and it was absolutely clear to me, and before that, President Reagan. And it was absolutely clear to me that this was not a victory in the Cold War. Those officials were saying as much. This was something that had been agreed and negotiated by the two sides. And it's a tragedy that this was lost and an opportunity to work out a long-term relationship with the Russians, which existed then, was thrown away because I've spoken to a few Russians, not people in the diplomatic or foreign policy world. But the one thing I have gained the impression of is that they do not want, in fact, or did not want to see the United States leave Europe. They did not want to see even NATO dismantled as it had existed in 1989, because they did not want to have a situation where Germany might be cut loose and might decide to acquire nuclear weapons itself. Now, you know, that might not have been a realistic possibility in 1989, but that is what Russians have actually told me. People like a filmmaker. I know people like that. They wanted a relationship with the United States, a stable relationship in Europe, which would leave them secure and the rest of Europe secure as well. Well, we are now so far away from that. Now, this has been a disturbing day. We've had the British and French ambassadors called into the Russian Foreign Ministry today. We've had the Russians complaining about statements made by President Macron and Foreign Minister Cameron. The Russians have made threats to launch attacks on Britain, or at least on British interests, outside Ukraine, if British missiles land on their territory. We have nuclear drills being carried out by Russia, or very concerning and worrying things. And it does puzzle me why there isn't a wider discussion about how we have got to this extremely dangerous point, and people don't look back and ask themselves, what did we do between 1989 and 2002, which is perhaps the turn 2003, and which is perhaps the turning point, to secure the peace that was there, and to avoid bringing us to exactly the position that we're in now. It's not a question. Well, I'm not sure what the question was. Well, I'm not asking the question. I'm just making an observation, sir, because you've explained things very well. I think the question is not great. But I'll just make one more extended analysis, and that is that I think in its reaction, the United States has begun to make the same mistake that the Soviet Union had made earlier. My cat is here. He's very curious. When the Soviet Union was in the post-war War II period was following a policy, which we call the Brezhnef Doctrine, that was based upon the philosophy that the Soviet Union represented the socialism, which was the first stage to communism, and they result of a proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie. In effect, this ideology was a threat to all of the Western countries, the capitalist countries, so that it was rightly seen as an offensive and a threatening ideology. Part of the Brezhnef Doctrine was if one country had achieved socialism, it was the beauty of the others to protect it from any opposition, whether external or internal. This was the rationale for the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakian in 1968, and also its various interventions in Poland, and of course, the justification for the continual communist control of East Germany. We seem to, the United States seems to have replaced what had been before, simply a defense of countries against an aggressive ideology like communism, with an aggressive ideology of its own. We are now saying we must protect human rights, what we define them. We change the definition at times of which ones are important, and that it is our duty and destiny to spread democracy in the world. Now, there are two things to be said about that. First of all, on traditional international law, sovereign countries are sovereign in terms of their internal politics, and external interference, particularly by coercion, whether military or economics is not permissible. A second, the idea that one country can spread its system, we call it democracy, now whether it is or not, we can debate. But the point is that if democracy is ruled by for with the people, then an external country can't create it, it can only be created by people in that country. Furthermore, if an external country begins to favor and support certain factions in another country, which is seen as a threat to the power that is there, it is going to be a damage to that. Something Americans should understand, because we have also been incredibly sensitive to what we consider interference in our own elections. So, in effect, we were trying to extend our jurisdiction over certain things, and we can see that particularly in our sanctions program, where we sanction other countries over all sorts of things, and a way of compelling them to do certain things that are politically important. I might say, in terms of trade, sometimes sanctions are necessary to get fairness in trade, but to use economic sanctions to bring political results, particularly those that are viewed as assaults on sovereignty. I think not only fail, they simply make the situation worse. So, I think that the American policy of applying either military force are not quite as bad, but also bad economic sanctions to achieve political ends, particularly to change the nature of internal governments, is going to fail, just as President's doctrine failed during the Soviet Union. I think it's an interesting parallel you're drawing, because much like the Soviet Union, which had an idealist internationalism as its ideology, one can obviously also apply the same to the United States, which sovereignty has to take back stage for this larger, ideological project. But it's an interesting argument that the American have well-effectively their own British doctrine. But I was wondering if the problem or the similarities might be even greater, because as you mentioned, when the Soviet Union collapsed on its own, and this was largely a lot of these internal contradictions, or one, if you have an ideology based on advancing human freedoms, and this is pursued through empire, this would be a huge contradiction, and it feels as if this is one of the contradictions these days of the United States as well. And I would like to emphasize, I do believe that the initial objectives were genuine to advance liberal democratic orders. But when this is done through Hegemon and Empire, it feels too many internal contradictions are building up, and especially looking towards conducting Gaza, as well as how the war in Ukraine has been conducted, also with escalations, as Alexander referred to. Do you see these internal contradictions as being sustained? There are many contradictions there. I see overall a lot, in my view, the danger, and I view this as an American, this is becoming increasingly dangerous. Obviously, what is happening in Gaza has all the characteristics of genocide, and the fact that we have condemned many of the things, but at the same time, keeps applying to Israel. The actual weapons to do this seems to me both hypocrisy and though we're told over, we're trying to contain the Israelis at the same time the Israelis simply are the current Israeli leadership are simply refuting everything the United States and the rest of the world is trying to say, so that I think the fact that we today are witnessing another genocide at the time of what we call the Holocaust. It was the middle of the war. Most people didn't know what was going on. Now, we do see what was going on, and it is not pretty, and I think it is increasingly the military involvement of the United States and the behavior of Israel, which has acted illegally outside its recognized borders, now for several decades creating instability there. And so I think that this is very dangerous. I would also say there are two other things I want to say is that the increasing hostility in the United States political leadership to China and the talk or the possibility of another war, I think is reaching almost what I would call the level of insanity. We, my whole lifetime in my professional career was devoted to trying to prevent and minimize the chances of a nuclear war. Now, we seem to be following policies which risk it more and more, and if not nuclear, there are still other very, I would say, lethal and maybe uncontrollable things that could happen, such as cyber warfare, the impact of artificial intelligence and the weapons that we currently have. I think mankind is really now facing, are we going to exterminate ourselves through these things, or are we going to try to find a policy that settles disputes peacefully rather than fueling violent changes? One more, I'm sorry for the long lecture, but in doing this, let us not forget that the United States is financing its military buildup and its contribution to these wars with borrowed funds. We are now dangerously indebted to the world. We have a national debt of now over 33 trillion dollars and it's rising by a couple of trillion every year, and Congress has shown no inflation to bring the budget into balance, much less, but to begin to pay off some of that debt. Every war we have fought in this century has been fought on borrowed funds, and yet our economic sanctions against Russia and other countries are beginning to stress the entire trading system, and I think at some point, this is going to turn out to be catastrophic for the United States itself, so I worry about this as an American. Ambassador, this is a question. I think you're absolutely correct. I cannot remember a time when things have been as precarious as they are now. If we had a situation when I think you were ambassador and the Russians were announcing that they were doing nuclear weapons drills and calling in the Western ambassadors and giving them warnings, I think that would have certainly created severe alarm bells when we see things in the South China Sea, wherever that would cause alarm bells as well. Do people in government, in Washington, in the political system, in Congress, have a genuine understanding of the extraordinary risks that they're taking? Or is it that they think that the United States has always got through everything successfully in the past, and we'll do so again this time? Because from where I stand, it looks so reckless, so dangerous, so for the awful consequences if things go wrong, that I can't understand why people are acting like they are. It makes no sense to me. Well, again, my hearing is such I have trouble understanding everything there. Let me add this. I know I give very long answers and comments to things, but I would just say that I think that the war in Ukraine is a tragedy for everybody. It was unnecessary because I think if the United States had given firm assurances that NATO would not expand to any part of Ukraine, that Russia would not have, first of all, taken Crimea, and then supported the separation of the Donbas. Also, I think that if Ukraine had been willing to carry out the Minsk agreements that they could have preserved all of their territory except Crimea, and they're the great majority of people are Russian speaking, and almost certainly if given the choice would prefer to be in Russia. Given the full choice, they would probably want to be independent, but they've never been given that choice, and they never had a vote as to whether when the Soviet Union broke up, they would be in Ukraine or Russia. Actually, the transfer from Russia to Ukraine by the Crimea was done simply by a stroke of the Ken by Nikhira Khrushchev, and in that case, he didn't even transfer all of the Crimea to Ukraine because they reserve Moscow's control overstoppable and the naval base. So the idea that somehow Ukraine has a moral and right to occupy all these areas that in fact were defined if a Hitler and Stalin before World War II plus Khrushchev later simply has no basis. To fight and kill and destroy people over that idea, I think, is a moral outrage, and that goes for both sides. So yes, we are faced with a real tragedy there, but to keep fueling this war rather than encouraging the Ukrainians to settle, even if it means giving up some of this territory, I think has been a huge mistake on the part of the United States and Europe. And right now, I think that the outcome is going to be to the detriment of all of us. This will be my last question. Do you see any optimistic path forward or any possible path to peace? Because as you mentioned yourself, I think all empires tend to weaken over time as resources are diverted from the core to the periphery. But as you mentioned, all this war is being fought on borrowed money. Obviously, there's limited resources, not just in the United States, but in the rest of the political West. And at the same time, it doesn't seem to be any possible path to victory. We certainly would end up in a nuclear war before we would be able to defeat Russia. And even now that the Russians are winning, NATO seems to have gone actually attacked Russia with this longer-range missiles and sending troops. So I'm just wondering, given that there is no possible good scenario of continuing fighting, do you see any political will in Washington or any path to peace, a negotiated peace, that is? It's very hard to protect the future. And it is very hard to know what possibilities might be there for peace without knowing all the communication that may be going on that we don't know about it. And I recall that we were able in the Reagan administration to take us from one of the high points in the Cold War to an end of the Cold War in a mere three to four years. But we had a strategy to do that. And at the time, actually, a few people were predicting that it could happen, but it did. We really, really can't see the future because there are more aspects of this that are unknown, that are known, and some of the crucial things. You know, one of the sayings that I like the most in terms of today is it's not what you don't know that gets you in trouble. It's what you know that ain't so. I think that was attributed to one of our humorists in the 20th century. But that's true. There is so much propaganda out there that simply is not true. And on both sides, on all sides, I would say as far as Ukraine and Russia's concern, they have inherited all of the ability that the Soviet Union has to propagandize things. That doesn't mean that everything they say is wrong. And at the same time, we see what I consider propaganda on the western side. And so I think that current policies are not sustainable over the long run. In the case of the United States and its economy, our own Federal Reserve Chairman has said that the current course is not sustainable. And yet we seem to intensifying the problems of that course rather than bringing them under control. So at some point, at some point, some things are going to happen. We can't predict what they are. There couldn't be a change in the Ukrainian leaderships that decides it's better to make a deal the best they can and end this and so on. But the idea that simply a few more arms or more economic sanctions are going to preserve the borders of Ukraine that were donated by Hitler Stalin and Khrushchev I think is a fantasy. And it is a tragedy in humankind that people are dying over this. Ambassador, I have nothing further to ask just to say thank you for coming and joining us today. And don't apologize for your long statements there. They're very, very informative and fascinating. Thank you. Thank you so much as well. It seems to be dark times ahead. So I wish we still had people leaders like yourself and George Kennan who could navigate through this difficult times. I don't see anyone but we should still be optimistic. So thanks again, Ambassador. [Music]