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The Duran Podcast

Iran tragedy and political stability

Iran tragedy and political stability

Duration:
22m
Broadcast on:
20 May 2024
Audio Format:
mp3

- All right, Alexander, let's talk about the helicopter crash in the northwest of Iran with President Raisi, the foreign minister, and other government officials who were on that helicopter, and this morning it was announced that there were no survivors in that helicopter crash. So what are your first thoughts on this tragedy? - Well, first of all, it is a tragedy, and one has to think of the families of these people. I mean, they're all got families, and this is any deaths like this, is a tragedy for those involved, and obviously for their families as well. Now, having said that, we have to move on. These are political people, and there's a number of things about this particular incident that I do not understand. This is apparently an old helicopter. Some say that he dates back to the 1970s. You know, Bell helicopter bought at the time when Iran was, you know, allied with the United States under the Shah of Iran. You place your president and your foreign minister in a helicopter, which then flies across the border from Azerbaijan across rugged mountainous territory at a time when there's mist, fog, and bad rain, and bad weather conditions. Something, some major act of negligence, I mean, it clearly was negligence, but some major act of negligence took place here. And one wonders how such a thing was possible or how it was allowed to happen. I would have thought that at the very least, they would wait a little to try to get, you know, try to wait for the weather to clear. And if we're talking about helicopters, they're much more powerful, far more modern helicopters, that Iran could have bought from Russia or China, and which could have been available to Iran for many years, actually, even before the sanctions were lifted and all that, which they could have used. So, I mean, you know, there is, there is some kind of a story here that, you know, one doesn't really understand, but let's look at the political situation in Iran. Now, it's important to say that the Raisi is the elected president of Iran. He is not his leader. The leader of Iran is Ayatollah Khamenei. He directs Iran's foreign and security policies. He is the person who is in overall control. He is still there, or the other institutions of the Iranian government continue to function. There's no reason to think that this affair itself is going to provoke a crisis. However, in the relatively short time that Raisi was president, it seems to me, looking at this from a distance, that he was a very effective and ultimately rather successful president. He piloted Iran into its membership with the break states. He presided over the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. He completed negotiations. He sealed the negotiations with the Russians on a major arms deal. He completed negotiations with China on a major economic deal. And he has presided over a rapidly recovering and indeed one could almost say booming economy. So he has been a president who has led Iran or who has been involved in leading Iran through a successful time. Now, I say all of that. I appreciate that many people, very critical of Iran, very critical of the kind of people that the character rise as conservatives, which is undoubtedly what Raisi was on social issues. He had the views that you would expect from an Iranian cleric, which is what he is, and a conservative cleric. But if you look at this from a position of most Iranians and of Iran as a whole, he has been a president through a successful time. And in my opinion, he has significantly materially contributed to that success. He's been a steady pair of hands. He's been, he's worked with harmony very well during the time when he's been president. The government of Iran seems to have been much more joined up, working together much more harmoniously. There hasn't been that sense of dysfunction and tension that you often get in Iranian politics and in Iranian decision making. And I think that that overall success has been played an important role in making the machine work better and in enabling Iran to achieve all of the recent successes that I've described. And on top of that, in international terms, he has been a very successful and effective diplomat. He's established good relations with the Russians, good relations with the Chinese. He's been able to work with the Saudis. He's been a strong spokesman and a clear and consistent spokesman for Iran. So even though he is not the key decision maker, he's going to be a difficult man to replace. - Yeah, I agree with that. He has done an excellent job for Iran over the past couple of years. I also agree with your statements with regards to the weather and the helicopter. When you saw the images, the videos coming out from the area where the rescue team was dispatched, the fog was unbelievable. The amount of fog that was in the area, very mountainous terrain, but the weather looked absolutely horrible. Why would they decide to fly out in that type of weather? - That's the one big question, Mark, that I have. But I imagine an investigation will sort this out or hopefully an investigation will sort this out. - Yes, I mean, it looks like negligence. I mean, I would say that I don't think it was an assassination attempt. At least there's no evidence that it was, at least not so far, because clearly whoever was flying that helicopter, the pilots, what to some extent, responsible for the presidents, safety, and it's clear that they failed, and failed catastrophically. Now, I don't know what the chain of decision-making was, but it's an incredible thing that they did, that they flew over a mountain, basically into the kind of weather conditions that you absolutely accurately had described. I mean, it's an astonishing thing to have done, and it's ended in disaster. And I'm not saying it's a complete disaster for Iran, given, as I said, the Khamenei is still there, and there is still that continuity in leadership, which is there. But it is certainly a blow for Iran, and there is a further factor to consider too, which is the Khamenei himself is now well into his 80s. He's not going to be supreme leader of Iran for very much longer. It's unclear who he's successor is going to be. There is a very complex process in Iran for selecting the supreme leader. And I have understood that there were people who were looking at Raizi, and were saying that he might be the person, because he's been successful in so many other respects, and the foreign powers that he has dealt with, like him, and the various power brokers within Iran, like him, and they work well with him, that he did look like he might be a potential supreme leader for Iran. Now, I'm not saying that that was a done or a green thing, and I understand that within the clerical hierarchy, he was far from being at the top level, which you would need to be presumably to become supreme leader because it's also a theological post, as much as it is a political one. But having said that, he was somebody who we're talking about in that sort of general category. And if that really was the plan, then of course this is going to be even more disruptive, because whilst they could probably replace Raizi with, well, they will replace Raizi with a new president who might not, of course, have his particular skill set. If Raizi was also being groomed to become supreme leader, then another gap has opened up within the power structure in Iran, and they're going to have to rethink that all over again, and that might not be straightforward at all. - Yeah, I believe he was 63 years old at IC. So relatively young in the grand scheme of things when it comes to the president and leadership of a country. - Yes. - Iran also lost an excellent foreign minister as well. - Well, how do BRICS view this? How do you think the US is going to view this? - Well, I think the BRICS will be deeply dismayed, that they've lost someone, that they liked and worked well with, and that applies both to Raizi and to the foreign minister. Now, Iran has a very, very strong diplomatic call. They have many excellent diplomats. They will probably be able to replace the foreign minister, even though obviously, you know, a diplomas diplomats are really good diplomats who are hard to come by in any country. But I think Iran can do that. They will be very concerned about the fact that they've lost Raizi, who is a person they've got to know and got to like, and it will cause some concern. And of course, the BRICS will be nervous about the uncertainty, because Raizi is now going to be replaced by his vice president, the vice president, however, will then stand down. Within apparently 50 days, there's going to be a new election in Iran, which seems a remarkably short time frame, by the way, in which to hold an election. Elections in Iran can often be fraud affairs. The BRICS are going to be worried about the stability of the country going forward, and about the stability of its policies. Because of course, Iran is a key piece now in the BRICS. We see India has been completing an important energy agreement with Iran, China, good relations with Iran, Russia, good relations with Iran, Turkey, which is not, of course, a member of BRICS, but which is in some way aligning with the BRICS increasingly closely. Also, by the way, had good relations with Raizi personally. So all of these countries are going to be concerned. They're going to be asking themselves, who's going to be the person who's going to take over? Will the situation in Iran remain stable? There have been protests in the past in Iran. There are protests in Iran very often, by the way. So will the situation remain stable with Raizi gone? And how stable is the Iranian leadership all together, given that Khamenei himself is now old and won't be around for very long? So this is a blow. It's not a catastrophe if it's managed skillfully, but there's no question that a government, which over the last few years has looked stable and functional, has now lost a pivotal person, who made it that. And that will worry all the other powers, given that in the past, Iran has not looked particularly stable or particularly functional. - Yeah, well, the big question is, you're going to have elections in 50 days. Will the US pounce on this opportunity? Will Israel look to take advantage of this opportunity? - Yes, absolutely. And of course, this is all happening at a time of heightened tension in the Middle East, with the crisis in Gaza and with Iran and Israel recently in confrontation with each other. So yes, they will try to take, and they will try to use this to destabilize the internal situation in Iran further. They've attempted that many times. They've not so far been successful, but the international situation, the immediate situation in the Middle East has never been more fraught. And of course, there's going to be all that doubt and uncertainty in Iran about how they move forward. And it's not clear to me that they have anybody really lined up at the moment to take his place as the kind of president that the Supreme Leader Ayyad-Tunah Khamenei would want and would want to work with. So yes, they will try and take advantage of it. The only thing I would say is 50 days, even for the United States, is in very short time to organize something. And perhaps that's one of the reasons why it's happening in just 50 days. Though of course, that will open up criticism from the other side, the opposition, and there is opposition in Iran. We'll say, well, you know, how are we supposed to get ourselves organized in 50 days? It would make it easier going forward to criticize the legitimacy of these elections. But I think the Iranian government wants to resolve this matter fast, to have an elected successor to Raisi in place as soon as possible. And I think there will be discussions going on within the Iranian leadership about whom to propose to the Iranian people for this election. And I think they will also want to capitalize on the very, very strong outpouring of grief and sense of tragedy that exists at the moment in Iran following the death of their president. - Yeah, I agree with you. I think they have to resolve this quickly because if this drags on, then you do leave the door very much wide open for. - Yes, yes. - For the usual regime change, color revolution stuff to take hold and game momentum, which is going to, it's gonna be tried. - Absolutely. - Everyone watching this video in the next two, three, four weeks as we get closer to the elections, get ready for the typical news stories and articles and reporting about Iran and overthrowing the government and stuff like that. I mean, it's gonna happen. - Absolutely. - You're absolutely right. It's programmed in. - Yeah. - Even if they don't have the time that you were talking about, they'll try something. - Oh, absolutely. - And of course they're gonna try something, yeah. - Absolutely. And of course, you know, there's also terrorist groups that are present in Iran, which will also try and capitalize on this as well. And of course, some of them, according to rumor, which is probably more than rude, have their contacts with the other outside players that we've just been talking about. And they will try something to. - One final question, how does this affect the conflict of the war in Gaza, in Israel, Hezbollah? How does this affect the dynamics there or does it? - It doesn't, it won't affect it immediately or directly because the person who runs Iranian foreign policies, Iranian-toler Hamineh, who is the supreme leader. So he will continue undoubtedly on the course that he's been conducting at the moment. But the supreme leader, the system in Iran only really works well when the supreme leader, Hamineh, and the president, up to Na'alezi, and the various other key office holders, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the parliament, all of that, when they're all working together as a team. Now, if the president, if the system throws up a president who isn't able to slot in to this team well, and that has happened in the past, then you start to getting all kinds of dysfunction and all sorts of problems and all kinds of tension starting to build up in the country. And that might, over time, start to have an impact on Iranian foreign policy decision-making. But again, for the moment, I am confident that Hamineh has it under control. And of course, over the next few days, the Iranians will be contacting all their friends and allies in the Middle East, and we'll be telling them, look, it's a tragedy that we've lost Raizi. He was absolutely one of the best. But don't worry. Policy remains the same. Continuity continues. Hamineh is still in control. We have it all under control. So they'll be reassuring all their friends. Hezbollah in Iran, sorry, in Lebanon, the various militias in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen. They'll be telling them, look, we may have lost Raizi. But don't worry. We're still here. Our policies unchanged. We're still as strong as ever. - At Saudi Arabia? - And Saudi Arabia. - We're crushing the Saudi Arabia. - Exactly, that's going to be... That's a particularly delicate thing, because of course, the Saudis are now coming under constant, pressure from the US. I mean, Blinken is in Riyadh almost every other day. I mean, he seems. I mean, they're trying to move forward with this negotiation with the Saudis. And of course, the Saudis, again, they'd come to like and work with Raizi. NBS seems to have been able to find some common ground with Raizi. So the Saudis are going to be unsettled. And again, they're going to be looking at Iran, and they're going to want to make sure that whoever takes over from Raizi is also going to be a steady pair of hands. If it's some more socially liberal, more divisive figure, then of course, the Saudis will say, well, maybe Iran isn't quite the steady place that we expected it to be, and we don't really like disruption and all of that. Conversely, if it's some fire-eating, radical figure, maybe from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Saudis might say, well, actually, it's a mistake getting so close to Iran after all, because this is a disruptive and chaotic state, which again, we shouldn't get too close to. So the Saudis are going to be watching this very carefully. Is everybody else's? And the Iranians undoubtedly know that, and they'll again be trying to reassure the Saudis that they have the situation under control. All right, we will end it there, the doran.local.com. We are on Rumba Ladisi, Bitchee Telegram, RockFit, and Twitter X, and go to the Doran Shop, 15% off. Most merch use the code, get ready, 15. Take care. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) [MUSIC PLAYING]