The Duran Podcast
End of the Liberal Order & Return of War - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen
Hi everyone, my name is Glenn Diesen and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercuris and a very popular professor, John J. Mersheimer. Welcome. Joe loves to be here. I am too, Glenn. So I really want to first to bring up the topic of the future of the also called liberal international order because in the post-Cold War order, we commonly refer to it as liberal hegemony or liberal international order, principle being one central power to reduce the anarchy and the international anarchy mitigate security competition. But this hegemony was also supposed to have the role of attempting to elevate liberalism in the international system for the purpose of perpetual peace, as we know. But not only is the hegemony gone, but it also seems that the liberal system may be collapsing as well. Not just internationally, but within the West as well. So we see, for a long time, already, I guess government and corporations very much go hand in hand. We have government financed NGOs, hijacking civil society. It seems that economic liberalism is also over now with a lot of draconian tariffs on the Chinese efforts to cripple their semiconductor industries. None of this seems to be compliant with the WTO. We're also now looking for ways to legislate theft to steal the reserves of the Russian central banks. We have growing threats to transportation corridors, international boys regularly undermined. We're now largely openly supporting and excusing genocide. NATO's slogan is weapons are the path to peace. We see opposition, especially in the EU now seems to be overcome with political opposition, that is. It's overcome with threats of sanctions or simply making up new rules and laws to overrun the opposition. Political polarization. I know in the U.S. law fair is a big issue now in terms of concerns, the judicial system being used to target political oppositions. A collusion between intelligence agencies, media, political groups, censorship, well, across the board, things aren't really looking good. I don't think we need that many more examples. So I guess my question is how can we explain all of this? What is happening? Is this related to the decline of hegemony? Or how would you understand this, I guess, from the political realist view? Let me say a few words about this, Glenn, and let me start by just talking about how I think about orders, international orders in general. During the Cold War, there were two, what I call, bounded orders. One was the Western order. That is what we usually refer to as the liberal international order. But it wasn't international. It wasn't truly international. We're in the order and that we're largely created by the United States, applied almost exclusively to the West. The Soviet Union had its own order. It had a bundle of institutions that applied to what we used to call the communist world, right? And this included things like Comic-Con, Common Turn, the Warsaw Pact, and so forth and so on. So you had these two bounded orders that dominated the landscape. Then what happened is the Cold War ended and you moved into unipolarity. And you had only one great power by definition in the system. And this was an opportunity for the United States to take that liberal order that it had created in the West during the Cold War and turn it into a liberal international. And I underlined the word international order. This dovetails with NATO expansion, EU expansion. If you think about it, what the United States is doing during the unipolar moment is creating a truly liberal international order. Think about the WTO, which we create during the post-Cold War period and we bring China into. So we actually do create a liberal international order. But what happens roughly around 2017 is that we begin to morph into a multi-polar world. Putin brings Russia back from the dead, China grows towards a great power. So you have three great powers in the system, and when you have three great powers in the system, it's going to be hard to sustain a liberal, let me again underline the word international order. Especially because the Chinese are going to try to create an order of their own. They're going to create their own institutions and they're going to throw their weight around in the existing institutions to which they're members. But think about the AIIB. Think about Belt and Road. They're all sorts of institutions that the Chinese are creating, right? That represent an alternative to the liberal international order, which is beginning to wither away. So at a very broad level, it's important to understand that the rise of China and the resurrection of Russian power is going to undermine that liberal international order that the United States had fostered during the unipolar moment. So that's point number one. Point number two is, although there are powerful structural forces that I just described that are undermining that liberal international order, there's no question that the United States has behaved in ways over the past 10 years that are designed to facilitate the demise of the liberal international order. And you Glenn just described some of the policies that we have pursued that have done enormous damage to the liberal international order. And very little of it is left standing as a result. And I think the most graphic evidence of just how much damage we have done is the American reaction to the International Court of Justice's ruling in Israel. And now the National Criminal Court's attempt to lead restaurants to Israeli leaders. The United States has gone to great lengths to delegitimize these two institutions, which are part of the liberal international order. This makes no sense at all. And of course, these moves by the United States are only representative of a small sample, or only a small sample of the many moves that we've made in recent years to undermine that order. So there is very little left of the liberal international order. And in moving forward, it's not going to be international at all. The one thing I would say is that, of course, the Cold War, because we have these two very different systems facing off against each other, gave the liberal order in the West based around the United States a very great deal of coherence. You could say what it was, and you had the opposite, which is what the Soviets did, which was different, and you could compare the two. And you could say this is the liberal order, and this is the communist order. And there are these differences, there is this clear divide. When the communist system went, and there's an attempt to make the liberal order universal. And again, I want to say this, I mean, both of you probably remember this better than me, but one of the things I remember about the Cold War, at least was, you know, that the idea was that if communism is defeated, or if the communists defeat us, then whichever of the two systems prevailed, that would become the universal system. I mean, it was couched to a certain degree in those terms. So it's not surprising that there was an attempt to make it universal. The moment it became universal, it lost coherence. Because there isn't any longer that level of comparison, that the sense that there is the alternative that you must not become too identical to. And it's, I think, inevitable. So I think it's inevitable that it was this attempt to spread it around the world. And it was inevitable that really by that act, it began to develop contradictions within itself. And of course, over time, those contradictions grew because they became connected very much to the belief that in order to preserve this thing, this new liberal order, you needed at the core American power, because without it, it would regress. And of course, over time, the importance of focusing on power created more complications and more contradictions as well, because the exercise of power, almost by definition, requires some degree of transgression of whatever rules there are. So I think this was a process that, in effect, was programmed to happen from the moment the Cold War ended. And of course, the relative power of the United States has declined as we've gone from a unipolar situation to a multipolar one, which was inevitable. It's become impossible to conceal those contradictions anymore. I mean, that's what I wanted to say. I would just jump in at Alexandria and say I agree with you, of course. But I think the United States could have done a much better job managing the liberal international order if it had had a lighter touch. There's this distinction in the international relations discourse between hard power and soft power. And I think the United States used to be quite good when it came to soft power. We certainly were during the Cold War. But I think during the unipolar moment, as it wore on, we got less and less capable of exercising soft power. And we became sort of a blunderpuss, or we acted like a blunderpuss in our relations with lots of countries around the world. And we alienated them. And we did a lot, I think, to undermine the liberal international order. I think if we had been more sophisticated, we had had a lighter touch, we would have been able to preserve it for a longer period of time. And during that period, we would have gotten more out of the order than we're now getting. I think that's unequivocally true. I don't get to dispute that because I think the record speaks for itself. I mean, I think that at some point, the United States lost its ability to conduct negotiations and diplomacy and understand others. And it became impatient, aggressive in ways that it absolutely did not need to be losing sight of it ultimately, of what was its own ultimate best interests. But there we are. I would just to jump in quickly, Glenn, I would emphasize here that a lot of this has to do with the fact that the United States is a crusader state. And it's a crusader state because it's a liberal state. The United States is committed to remaking the world, where it has long been committed to remaking the world in its own image and using military force if necessary to achieve that end. And the result is that we have gone around the world and behaved in a very heavy-handed way because of this liberal ideology. It's kind of counterintuitive because liberals are usually portrayed as being against the use of military force. And it's realists like me who are described as hard-nosed proponents of using force here, there, and everywhere. But in a very important way, the exact opposite is the difference. Realists tend to have less interest in using military force than liberals do. Again, it's because of this crusader impulse that is hard-wired into liberal ideology. Well, it's interesting you refer to a crusader state because I was wondering if there's a contradiction in the idea of liberal hegemony because liberalism kind of carries with this two legacies, on one hand, or definitions, an internal contradiction because on one hand, liberalism should be based on tolerance towards different views or different regime types as well, the ability to harmonize and get along. And on the other side, you have liberalism, which is often also based on these universal ideals and values. So there's the assumption that everyone will begin to conform around these same values. And when that doesn't happen, there's less and less acceptance, if you will, towards different regime types. And the reason why I'm thinking it's perhaps inconsistent with hegemony is because if you do have a hegemony, you have dominance, you have the tools to force through this universalism. And so that aspect of liberalism and kind of ignore the aspect where they're supposed to be tolerance to different regime types in order to get along. And I remember your colleague, Stephen Walt, he was, I think he made this point that after the Cold War, the main challenge for the United States, I think he compared it to 500 pound gorilla or something, that the main problem was how to restrain itself, because others couldn't restrain the US anymore. And now we have to find a way of restraining itself. And what stains states do not constrain themselves. So this is a, yeah, a key problem. So I think this is why you might have a, you might see the United States engage in excessive use of force, and perhaps undermine a lot of these same liberal ideals in the same process. I mean, I agree with you completely. There is that tension sitting at the heart of liberalism. And I think what happened is that the lack of tolerance that is embedded in liberalism triumphed over the tolerance that is also embedded in liberalism. And we got ourselves into a lot of trouble. And by the way, it's not just the United States, it's the West more generally, because most European countries drank the Kool-Aid. And if you sort of look at what we're doing around the world, when I use the term way, there's no question the United States is in the vanguard, but the European powers are right up there with them, especially the British. Oh, yeah. I wouldn't suggest this is exclusive to the United States. I think, as you mentioned, the West is, all liberals often become more aggressive. I think this also applies to the European simply because if you have an ideology which suggests that the contemporary flawed world of secured competition can be transcended towards some perpetual peace. If we just all adopt this universal values, this end tends to legitimize a very violent means. So who wouldn't want to go on perpetual war if it brings with it the promise of perpetual peace? So I think this is something we bought into as well, very much even more so in the hubris after the Cold War in which we had this special mandate to transform the world to a better place. And once politicians believe they have this power, I think they're really willing to devote significant resources and use some very ugly means to achieve it. It's very interesting to know when exactly the United States did become a crusader state, because at some level, I mean, there's always been, at least in British liberalism, there's always been a tension between an imperialist liberalism, people like Mill, for example, and an anti-imperialist liberalism which has also existed on Hobson, who wrote this book, he's for the famous book, "Cootie Sizing Empire", for example, was an anti-imperialist liberal. When did the United States decide to become an imperial, rather not an imperial, and a crusader state that saw its mission to expand liberalism all over the world? Was this always so? Was it there? It's hardwired from the beginning, or did it develop, perhaps around Wilson and the period around the First World War, or did it come after during the Second World War? Because I should say that amongst many people in Europe, and by the way, I agree completely that the Europeans today are aggressive in promoting liberalism as the Americans are, but at one time in Europe, there was this belief that the United States was different, that it was not a crusader in the same way. My father, who was very, very much part of the old European political left, for example, was born in the 1920s. His conception of the United States was that it was liberal, which is, of course, a good thing to be, as far as he was concerned, but that it was also pacific, that he didn't have great armies, didn't interfere around the world, that it looked to itself, developed its economy, and even after the Second World War, he always retained a sort of lingering belief that this was so, and that the period of the Cold War was a kind of anomaly. Let me say a couple words, Alexander, try and answer your question, but before I do that, just to reinforce your point regarding your father, you want to remember that Roosevelt was deeply committed to putting an end to the British Empire, and the European Empire is more generally. Americans did not like the whole concept of Empire at all, and that's when we had a more restrained liberal view of international politics. Now, with regard to your question, I think there are two events that are of enormous importance for explaining when we turned into a crusader state. First is the end of the Cold War. Just think about the Frank Fukuyama argument, the Fukuyama argument, which was widely accepted in the United States, and I believe the West more generally, is that the Cold War had been an ideological conflict between communism and liberal democracy, and liberal democracy had won, and Frank made the argument in the famous piece that we had defeated fascism in the first half of the 20th century, and then we had defeated communism in the second half of the 20th century, and we had triumphed in a way that was almost unimaginable before the Cold War ended. So we were so full of ourselves when that Cold War ended. We just thought that liberalism was the future, and this is what Fukuyama says, as time goes by, eventually all the countries on the planet are going to turn into liberal democracies, because it's a wonderful thing. Once that happens, you're really off to the races, right? Now, throughout the 1990s, the Clinton administration was very hesitant about using military force to support that crusader impulse, and largely because of Vietnam, but then the Afghanistan war happens, and I think what happens in the first few months of that war is enormously important for explaining why we turn to using military force to support the crusader impulse. You remember, we get attacked on September 11th, and then we go to war in mid-October of 2001, and the war is effectively over by early December of 2001. It really goes for two months at the most, and it looks like we have won a spectacular victory. The Taliban has been decisively defeated, we believe. The Europeans come in to help run Afghanistan, and we adopt the Bush doctrine at that point, because we think we have now found the magic formula for knocking off regimes, putting in a democratic leader, and then moving on to the next target. So after we're done with Afghanistan, we think we can do Iraq. We think Iraq will be quick and easy. Didn't Afghanistan tell us that? We knocked off the Taliban in two months. We put Karzai in power, now we're off to deal with Iraq. I remember when the Israelis caught wind that we were going to do Iraq before we did Iran. This is right around January 2003, if my memory is correct. The Israelis sent a delegation over to talk to the Bush administration to ask why they were doing Iraq and not doing Iran. And the Bush administration and the neoconservatives more generally told the Israelis, "Relax, we're going to do Iraq, and when we're done with Iraq, we'll do Iran or Syria," and pretty soon all the countries in the region are going to throw up their hands, because they're going to understand that we have the magic formula for knocking off regimes and replacing them with liberal democracies. So just don't worry, we'll get to Iran and due course, or we'll deal with Iran and due course. So you see, we thought that military force coupled with the fact that the world was moving toward more and more liberal democracies, this is the Fukuyama argument, really allowed us to go on a rampage, which we have done since 9/11. And again, we were moving in that direction in the 1990s. And I think this is what allowed these two events, the end of the Cold War and the perceived victory, the false belief, false, I want to underline, false belief we had won in Afghanistan, allowed us to think that we could act on that crusader mentality that was deeply embedded in the United States. There was a major mistake in one which history, which I said, because these people started very well, perhaps would have taught them would be a mistake. I mean, somebody once said, you know, nobody loves armed missionaries. I think it's interesting, though, because this is an often when people look at the American foreign policy, they often dismiss the liberal rhetoric as simply camouflaging very crude power interest. But I do think that there is, this is quite genuine, though, and Henry Kissinger made this argument in terms of when he wrote about world order as well, he was making the argument that this liberalism is not just a cover for American dominance, it's also something very deeply embedded in the United States, this idea that they have to bring forth these ideals, now also applying to Europeans. But many would bring it further back, though, beyond the end of the Cold War, because I guess Woodrow Wilson would be the, well, often recognized as the one who made the United States initially into a crusader state, because before then, there had been the idea that at least while it stood for liberalism, liberalism would be spread by the U.S. being this great example of how to organize a proper, peaceful society based on non-intervention. And I think it was in the First World War when Woodrow Wilson really came out and said, you know, we have to make the world safe for democracies, this will be the war to end all wars, that this is really when the United States began, at least beyond the Americas, to convert itself from a role model to be emulated, to instead take on this active offensive role as a crusader state, if you will, this is a good terminology. But I know it's very disputed, because some people will go back to 1898 with the defeat of the Spanish and the U.S. getting their colonies, in which you have people like Mark Twain saying, you know, this will poison the soul of America, I think it was William James, he wrote the America puked up its soul, so a very dramatic language to suggest that, you know, the American sources weren't supposed to be like the Europeans, but they weren't supposed to become like us with this empire building. And this is when they essentially began to turn, when they made manifest destiny into more of an international colonial project, if you will. But I know it's different views on this topic, though. But you know, Glenn, given what you just said, you want to remember what you said earlier in the conversation, which is that there is this significant tension at the heart of liberalism. There's one line of thinking that emphasizes tolerance, and another one that emphasizes intolerance, and that's where the crusader mentality is embedded. But the fact is that over the course of American history, that line of liberal thinking that emphasized tolerance has had a lot of influence as well. So you can argue that the United States is a profoundly liberal country, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it should be a crusader state. And that's why I think you want to focus on what happened in the unipolar moment, because that's really when the United States became a crusader state in ways that it had not been beforehand. And just one quick point on Woodrow Wilson, there's no doubt that Wilson talked like a crusader. But the fact is you want to remember that he failed with regard to getting American membership in the League of Nations. And the Americans became, or the United States became a thoroughly isolationist country after Wilson's demise. So it wasn't that Wilson converted the United States into a crusader state. He pushed in that direction for the first time, but he ultimately lost. I think this is absolutely correct. I mean, a liberal state does not need to be a crusader state. And a liberal state can be a great power, but not a crusader state as well. I mean, that is a distinct thing. I think the United States today definitely behaves like a crusader state. And to a great extent, believes that it is. But are we coming to the end of this? I mean, are we coming to a moment when even the United States, even people within the elites in the United States, understand that this is played out, that you can't sustain it longer, because doing so is becoming increasingly dangerous. It's not only dangerous, but it's unsuccessful. And that keeping up this process of trying to expand liberalism is creating dangers for the United States itself. And for the world generally, it's leading to major geopolitical reverses. And it's also leading. And this is, of course, my beauty concern is leading to increasing risks being taken, which are extremely unwise, like the ones we've seen, which I believe have been taken over the last few weeks with the authorization to Ukraine to conduct cross-border strikes into Russia. I think there's no question that the United States is in deep trouble today. It's in deep trouble in Ukraine, which is why it's taking those risks. It's in deep trouble in Gaza, with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And it's in deep trouble on the home front. I mean, liberalism, but we don't want to lose sight of the fact that liberalism inside of western countries is in real trouble. It's not just liberal American foreign policy or liberal European foreign policies. It's also the fact that these liberal states are in real trouble. So I agree completely with that. But on the topic of Ukraine, then, what are the political calculations of the United States at the moment? Here in Europe, I feel there's nothing really. I think this knee-jerk reaction, we can't allow the Russians to win, but we're not quite sure what our victory would look like. But from the United States, how do you read the current escalation, essentially, sending weapons now to Ukraine to use NATO weapons with NATO targeting and surveillance to strike deep inside Russian territory? This is, I guess, as close as it gets to a direct war. So it's the effort to escalate to set the stage for negotiations. That's the amount of uncertainty for the Russians who would create an incentive for them to have greater desire to find a peace. Or is this an effort to try to believe the Russians a little bit more before Ukraine collapsed? Are they trying to keep Ukraine alive until the elections? Or is there any actual goals about victory over Russia? I guess if so, what exactly what the victory looked like? My sense is that the American foreign policy establishment, and in particular, the Biden administration, fully understands that we and the Ukrainians are in deep trouble, that the Russians are on the march, and that it looks like the Russians are going to win that war, exactly what that means in their minds is hard to say. But it's very hard at this point to tell a story that Ukraine is going to prevail in this war. And we're desperate to try to figure out a way to prevent the Russians from winning. I think at this point in time, Glenn, that is our principal goal, just to prevent the Russians from winning. I don't think the Biden administration has any ultimate goal. I don't think they think that they can stymie the Russians and take this to the bargaining table and get a good deal. I don't think they really believe that. I don't think they believe that we can stymie the Russians in 2024 and then take back all the territory that's been lost in 2025 or 2026. I think at this point in time, they're just desperate to stem the tide. That's the aim. And the problem that they face is that they have no way of doing that. What are they going to do? They're going to give ATACOMs to the Ukrainians and let them use them for deep strikes into the Russian homeland. I guess they can do that. It's not clear it'll work. As Alexander emphasizes all the time, the Russians are quite adept at coming up with counters to all these escalatory steps that we take, whether it's introducing new tanks, high Mars or you name it, the Russians eventually counter it. And I think they'll end up countering the ATACOMs. But even if they do, we then run the risk, even if they don't, we then run the risk of escalation, crossing a Russian red line. If these ATACOMs and scalps and assorted other missiles really begin to have an effect, isn't that going to lead to escalation? And if it looks like you're going to have escalation, aren't we going to back off? Probably. This is why we're proceeding very cautiously. It's very much an incremental approach. We don't do anything very bold and we don't do anything very bold because we're afraid of escalation. So that prevents us from really escalating. But as I said a second ago, even if we really escalate, it's just not going to make any difference. What's needed here are ground forces and aircraft and missiles that can shoot down Russian airplanes and so forth and so on. And we're not going to give that stuff to the Ukrainians. We're not, in my opinion, going to intervene militarily. So I think that we're basically doomed. Biden administration doesn't want to accept that, obviously. They don't want to cut a deal now, which is what they should do. They're just trying to prolong this in the hopes that some miracle happens and the situation stabilizes on the front and then who knows where we go from there. But I just, again, don't think they have a very clear idea what they're doing. I have to say that's certainly the expression that I'm getting from London. It's rather concerning that it seems to be an impression from someone closer to the ground in the US. And I agree, I don't see any sign of any strategy. I don't see that the administration has a political or diplomatic strategy to get out of this. And will that change? There are some people now in Congress who are coming forward and are saying that things might be different, JD Vass, people like that. I don't get the impression that they're at all influential, at least at the moment. But maybe there's voices that are going to be listened to. Is there any chance that a new administration or the current administration, if it's reelected, will change course? I mean, I just asked this. I mean, I don't know. But I mean, I just asked this because it seems to me that what is being described, keeping going, hoping that something turns out, Nick Corbirism, as we call it, in England after a character in Dickens. Well, it's not a policy. It's not a policy at all. It's something that is going to make the situation worse, because nothing is going to turn up. Well, I think, Alexander, that when you talk about changing course, sort of, what is the alternative? Negotiations. Negotiations talks. I mean, somebody I know has been talking a lot about the Korean armistice, for example, and making comparisons with how that was negotiated in the early 50s. I mean, you can argue about the details. And I think you can pick the holes in this very much. But at least negotiations of some kind, establishing communications with the Russians, finding out what the Russians are thinking, what their own desires are. It may be they haven't yet really thought through what they want. But if a dialogue of some kind begins, then maybe something can come out of it. Okay. But the question is, what does the deal look like? I mean, I think there's no question that we want to facilitate negotiations. But the question you have to ask yourself is, what's the deal that we can plausibly get here, right? That we'll put an end to this fighting and leave Ukraine in reasonably good shape relative to where it is today? And it seems to me that you have to take into account the fact that the Russians don't trust us at all anymore. So we and the Ukrainians have to come up with some sort of strategy for convincing the Russians that we're going to put an end to this conflict once and for all. And that, in my opinion, means severing relations between Ukraine and the United States completely. The Russians have to believe that you're going to get a truly, neutral Ukraine, one that is not only in NATO, but one that one that also doesn't have close relations of any sort with the United States. Because if the United States and Ukraine continue to have close relations, even though we say Ukraine won't be in NATO, the Russians are not going to believe that. They'd be fools to believe that, right? Putin has trusted the Americans on a number of occasions, and he got double crossed. He's not going to do that again. So what I'm saying here is, I think, even if you go down the negotiating road, which I'm fully in favor of, you have to think long and hard about what the end game here is, and the end game is going to have to involve a radical severing of relations, military relations, for sure, between Ukraine on one side and the West, particularly the United States on the other side. And I would say that I find it hard to imagine us accepting that. We are so deeply committed to Ukraine. The United States and the West more generally are so wedded to Ukraine. It's hard for me to see us severing the ties between Ukraine and the West in the way that I think is necessary to get a meaningful peace agreement. So the end result is, from Putin's point of view, he's going to see this as the Americans and the West more generally playing games with him, and it's going to incentivize him to continue the war, to take more territory, more Ukrainian territory, and to make sure that Ukraine is a thoroughly dysfunctional rump state. So I'm extremely pessimistic about the possibility of us getting out of this colossal mess that we're in in Ukraine. I completely agree, and I completely agree about Putin's deep mistrust of the United States, and he's actually spoken about it. He's actually said that he doesn't trust the United States anymore, and won't can understand why he says that. But I would just make one point, because we were talking about liberalism and the liberal order. It's a very strange hill to die on, which is Ukraine. If you're talking about the liberal order, given what a profoundly illiberal society, Ukraine actually is. I mean, I put aside the fact that Zelensky is still president, even though there haven't been elections, about which one can argue I'm not going to get into the constitution. But the way Ukraine is governed, and the political culture of Ukraine, including a lot of the popular political culture of Ukraine, is profoundly illiberal. It's a strange cause to fight and commit oneself to with the vehemence that has been done. And of course, it's also true, as we are seeing, that this commitment to Ukraine has turned out to be a disastrous strategic liability for the United States. It has not strengthened the United States in any way to commit to Ukraine, in the way that it has. Not a question, but just a comment. The problem, though, Alexander, as you know very well, is that when the United States and European countries go to war in behalf of any country, they portray that country in the most positive light. Even if the story that they're telling about that country bears little resemblance to reality, I mean, an even better example is the Israeli case. In my opinion, and the opinion of many others, Israel is in apartheid state. Yet we describe it as a liberal democracy that shares our values. Certainly doesn't share my values in apartheid state. But given that Israel is our ally and we're backing them to the hill, we therefore have little choice but to describe them as a paragon of liberal democracy. And you see the same thing happening in Ukraine. If people were honest about Ukraine, if they turned you, Alexander Luce, to describe in the mainstream media what Ukraine was all about, it would undermine our links or our commitment to Ukraine. So they keep people like you in the back closet and they have these spinmeisters out there telling this rosy story about how Ukraine is one of the world's leading liberal democracies. Yeah, I find it fascinating. There's a long series of articles which were written already all all the way back to 2021, where I point out this was a very corrupt society. The democracy was effectively hollowed out. A lot of the elections would take place on the streets and well, the political elites would be elected on the streets as it was rather in the ballot box. And then suddenly, after February of 2022, it transformed into a big amount of democracy, something we should all aspire to. But of course, this is political branding and marketing. I just want to one quick comment on the trust issue, which is required in any peace deal. The problem goes both ways though, because the common argument one hears from the Ukrainian side is, if there would be a peace agreement, what would prevent the Russians from attacking later? And it's actually a good point because if there would be a peace agreement now, it looks as if there's a lot of animosity within the Ukrainian population towards the political leadership. The economy probably wouldn't be able to sustain for very long unless there's a war which incentivized the West to pump in more and more money. And the Nationalists would maybe turn on Salinsky. They're also very unhappy about a lot of governance being outsourced to Western nations. So across the military, all the people who are in the military, if they're allowed to travel freely again, more than might jump the border thinking that the peace with Russia might break down. So there's a million ways which the economy can collapse the political system would fragment or the country fall apart. And this is if there would be a peace agreement. And then, of course, what would stop Russia from coming? But I also agree on the Russian side, they would be, as you said, foolish to trust the West at this point after what we did with the Minsk agreement. And obviously, it would be a Korean-style ceasefire. We already said in the West that we need at least two years to build up enough weaponry ammunition to keep Ukraine going. And so effectively, and we're also announcing that the Ukraine will become a part of NATO. So what we're effectively communicating to the Russians is, we just need much like the Minsk agreement, just buy some time to arm the Ukrainians again. And then they will fight Russia. And in victory, they will be allowed to join NATO. So it's just start the whole thing all over again. So I also don't see how it will be possible for reassuring Russia. Even if we take NATO expansion completely off the table, you also have this process of a possible de facto NATO membership, which is what you saw between 2014 and 2022. And all disagreements coming in place, the modernization of Ukrainian ports to fit American and British warships. You know, there's not either or it was already very much becoming a de facto member state. So I'm not sure how you would be able to get an agreement in place, which would you get effectively complete cuts between America and Ukraine, and also make Ukraine feel very safe that the Russians won't come for them when the whole House of Cards starts collapsing. So I would like to see some diplomacy just for trust building and mutual understanding, but it's becoming very difficult to see what an actual peace agreement might look like. Well, I think Glenn, to assure the Russians, there has to be an almost complete break between the United States and Ukraine on the security front. Otherwise, it's just not going to work. And the problem is that the Ukrainians for understandable reasons fear the Russians. I mean, both sides now hate each other much more than they did before the war started. There's a huge amount of animosity and distrust on both sides. Furthermore, the Russian military is a now quite formidable fighting force. It wasn't before the war started in February 2022. So if you're a Ukrainian looking at the Russians and you understand the level of animosity between the two sides, and you understand how powerful the Russians have become, of course, you're going to be scared. And then you hear people like us saying that you're going to have to break ties, you Ukraine are going to have to break ties, security ties with the West almost completely. This is going to leave you feeling terribly exposed. But the question you have to ask yourself is, what's the alternative? If you're Ukraine, you're choosing among bad alternatives. These are all bad alternatives. And the question is, what is the least bad alternative? And my view is that the least bad alternative today on June 4th, 2024, is to try to end the war immediately where you lose hardly any more territory and no more Ukrainians die. And you work out some sort of modus vivendi with the Russians. Is this a great outcome? Of course not. But what's the alternative to continue this war, lose more territory, have many more Ukrainians die, and have this go on forever and ever? I think that is a much worse outcome. So I'm in favor of negotiating now. But again, I just want to emphasize, I think it's going to require a radical shift in the relationship between the West and Ukraine if you have any hopes of making this work because of Putin's mistrust of the West. That's one very brief thing on this lack of trust. I forgot one important component. And that's the trust in the West now as well, because I'm very convinced that once this war is over, yes, the Ukrainians will hate the Russians probably for decades. But I don't think they will remember us necessarily as a reliable friend cedar because there is this tendency that whenever we seek to help the Ukrainians, we never have really have their support. And it always ended horribly for them. So this goes all the way from pressuring them into NATO through all those years when hardly only small minority wanted it from toppling their government on my down. And most recently now we're talking about how to help Ukraine. What are we actually saying? We're saying, well, we're pushing the Ukrainians to lower conscription age to get down 18-year-olds into the army so we can squeeze more blood. And also we're saying, how about we begin to deport some of these Ukrainian refugees, which are in Europe. Surely the people fled war if we take away all their social benefits and pressure them to go back to Ukraine, then we can have some more meat for the trenches. So I think at some point, there will be some reconsideration of to what extent we helped them or actually used them as Selensky's former advisor Alexei Arastovich. He made the analogy that the West, or pointing mostly to America, then was able to do what they couldn't do in the Cold War, which was to make effectively the Russians and the Chinese fight each other like monkeys with knives. That was his analogy, not mine. And I think once the war comes to an end, not once, but even now there's more and more or we're not necessarily too happy who wants to see us as this great allies. I think when the war is over with, maybe even before the war is over with, the Ukrainians will fully realize the extent to which the United States led them down to Primrose Path. But I would also note, Glenn and Alexander, that the Ukrainians have agency here. Zelensky has agency. Zelensky did not have to walk away from the Istanbul negotiations. He listened to the Americans. I think there's no question the Americans and the British put great pressure on him. And I'm sure that the fascist element inside Ukraine put great pressure on him to walk away because they too were convinced they could beat the Russians. But Zelensky had agency and he walked and he's going to pay a dear price for it. But this doesn't take away from your point, Glenn, that we led them down to Primrose Path. Not only Zelensky, but it's important to say that the desire to break from Russia, to resist Russia are kind of romantic belief in Ukraine, that they could do that and that it was somehow their cause to do it. I'm afraid that was very widespread within Ukrainian society. And again, as somebody who comes from the Balkans and who is familiar with romantic nationalism and how disastrous it can be, and I don't find that at all difficult to understand or surprising, but there's been a lot of that in Ukraine. Coming back to the points that you were both making, there was a very interesting article in The Guardian, short time ago, by Timothy Gartanash. I'm sure you know who he is. Very fervid supporter of Ukraine in this war, very much somebody who wants Ukraine to be in NATO and in the EU, somebody who's always wanted to defeat Russia in Ukraine. And he's just come back. He just came back from Ukraine. And he spoke about war weariness, disillusion. He said coming back to what you were saying, John, that half the population, according to some estimates, suffers from various forms of PTSD, which is terrifying, absolutely shocking. And again, the point that Glenn was making, and you've also been making, John, that there is no anger towards the West, that people in Ukraine feel that they haven't been supported in the way that they'd been expected and led to expect, and that there's a sense of a growing sense of anger there as well. Anyway, just those points, but one further point, how well do people in the United States understand the extent of the debacle that this conflict for the United States, the Ukraine conflict is turning out of the, we noted the Russians of the Chinese coming together, becoming close friends from a situation where 10 years ago, they were keeping their distance from each other, the Russians at least were. We see the Russians building up mighty armed forces on a scale that they never had at any point since the end of the Cold War, and they're far more experienced than they were then. We see a new political class emerging in Russia, which has been trained to think in terms of hostility to the United States. We see the collapse of influence, West and influence in Russia itself, and we start to see concerns amongst people in Eastern Europe about the fact that maybe their expectation that joining the EU and NATO would somehow secure their future. Maybe that wasn't quite such a wise thing to do after all. Do people in the US government, in the political leadership, in Congress, wherever, do they understand how bad this defeat could potentially be? My view on that is that the answer is no, and the reason is that the United States is the most secure great power in the history of the world, and when the United States runs around the world creating disasters, it's usually other people who suffer, not the United States. If you look at the consequences of putting sanctions on Russia, it was not the United States that suffered as a result. In fact, one could argue that the United States benefited somewhat from sanctions. It was the Europeans who were badly hurt. When you think about all the people who died during the Unipolar Moment as a result of the Forever Wars, it was a small number of Americans, and these were people who had volunteered for military service. But huge numbers of people in the greater Middle East died. It's quite remarkable how many people in the greater Middle East died during the Forever Wars. If you think about the destruction of Iraq, the destruction of Libya, and so forth and so on, it's really quite mind-boggling. But the effects on the United States were minimal, and with regard to the Ukraine war, in terms of funding the Ukraine war, the United States is an incredibly rich country. You can easily afford to keep the war going from a financial point of view. No Americans are dying. We're willing to fight to the last Ukrainian. So the cost to us are not that great. Furthermore, when you think about where the world is headed and you look at demographics, the United States is in a very good position relative to countries like China and Russia. And most other countries around the world, because of immigration, the United States is going to continue to grow in size population-wise, while countries like Russia and China shrink. And when you marry our population projections with the fact that we are, we, meaning the United States, an incredibly rich country, one can argue that the future looks quite rosings for the United States. So the sense that there's some sort of significant cost to pay for these disasters is not present in the American foreign policy establishment psyche. They just don't think in those terms. If they fail so bad, let's go do it right the next time. It's not quite the disaster here in the United States that it is in Ukraine or it is in Iraq and so forth and so on. But I think this is different though, because over the past 30 years, these were minor countries we went after. And for example, ceasing funds from the Venezuelaans or the Afghanis is one thing, but now that we see the Chinese, Russians, the Indians, the world, the BRICS grouping all promoting this idea of reducing reliance on not just American but Western technologies, their banking systems, their currency, their transportation corridors, effectively creating this parallel value chains. I think this could have a huge impact. But what you said also made me think a bit about Europe because we in Alexander spoke to Colonel Wilkerson in the United States and he was making this prediction, if you will, that NATO, despite what we're predicting now, that it will be stronger than ever due to this shared perceived threat from Russia that could actually begin to fragment. And one of the arguments he gave was the view after this war is over that Europeans might well feel like you suggested now that they're the one who carried all the costs. And for Europe, it's a bit unusual because we always thought that we were sitting at the same table as the Americans. We were the subject, the rest of the world was the object. But I think we might get the idea impression now that we were effectively also pieces on a chessboard which will move around because after this, especially the Nord Stream attack, but also these sanctions which were quite devastating, not just against the Russians now, but the coupling from the Chinese that this is weakening our economic strength. And on top of the weakening, the economic strength, the United States, especially in Germany, has been not purging but offering different subsidies. So when the Germans, when the German heavy industries don't have access to cheap energy anymore from Russia, they're not competitive. And then they learned, if you will, or offered subsidies from the United States and then, you know, good sense means you should survive, you would move across the Atlantic. But at some point, once the war is over and the group mentality and unquestionable solidarity wanes off of it, I'm wondering if there would be more opposition. Even looking at the statements coming out of Italy now that when Stoltenberg is, you know, effectively calling for a striking Russia with net weapons, the Italians are starting to sound more like the Hungarians, which are explicitly saying, we don't want any part of this. We joined a NATO which was self-defense, not one that's going to war against Russia. And I'm wondering if we overplay this hand and unity was effectively conditioned on defeating Russia victory and we all get to share the spoils. But now it seems in losses, the Europeans will carry a very large part of the cost and that there might be some frictions between the Americans and the United States thereafter. At least that was the direction that Colonel Wilkerson's was going. I was just curious how you saw this. How do you predict the future of the Euro-Atlantic partnership going after this war is all over? I'll tell you what I think the counter-argument is. And then you guys can tell me what you think. I think the counter-argument is that Europe depends on the United States for security. Europe wants the American security umbrella over its head. It's desperate to maintain NATO. And that's why the Europeans do pretty much anything that the Americans demand of them. And that means that moving forward, even though you've had all this trouble and you probably have more friction in the future, in the end it won't matter because the Europeans are overwhelming and concerned about keeping the American security umbrella over their head and therefore they'll do anything to placate the Americans. I think that's the counter-argument. What do you think of that? Well, I think, sorry, I'll accept it. No, I tend to agree with it, by the way. I mean, certainly that's the view in Europe. The British certainly are terrified of the idea that the Americans might leave. I mean, the whole point about NATO was to keep the Americans in. And I don't know about other European countries. Maybe France, but a certain culture there that might be different. But I think the same is true of Germany as well, by the way. I think the Germans, they might kick against the pricks from time to time, but basically they don't want the Americans to go. That remains for the German political class, as it is for the British, an absolute strategic nightmare. They certainly don't want to be left dealing with the Russians by themselves. We're dealing with each other by themselves. We're dealing with each other by themselves, absolutely. Recently, Lloyd Austin, he made the argument that, yes, we might have actually sounded that I was thinking about you when I heard him speak, because he was making the argument, you know, we're bogged down in Europe at the moment and the Middle East, but we shouldn't lose focus. That our main area of priority should be Asia. This is where we have to go. And they are thought, oh, this sounds awfully a lot like what Marsha and we've been saying for years. But the reason why I'm, I guess, more pessimistic about the future relationship on Europe and the United States is we always had this attempt to renegotiate, renegotiate the relationship, because the United States always provides the security and in return they get the political influence in Europe. So you take care of us and we do as we're told. But over time, you see, the Europeans are trying to push a little bit back. They want to have some strategic autonomy, or they call it European independence. And the Americans are suggesting, you know, you should carry more of the security weights, you know, pay your own bills. They do not free ride. So they're always trying to renegotiate a bit. But at the moment, I think after this is over, Europeans will be very severely weakened. And perhaps even more dependent on the United States, especially economically, which can be, well, and with the security dependence as well, they will be also converted to more political oil-ties. But more importantly, the United States will have less interest because I think Europe's significance in the world will only drop. And I think we will be one of the big losers of this war we pursued in Ukraine as well. So as the United States decides to focus on Asia where the real, not action, but the main rival race, I think it's very limited of what Europeans can necessarily get from the United States in terms of resources and priorities. So a lot of the foundation for the relationship appears to be weakening. Yeah, very interesting. Glenn, I want to go back to a point you were making and just say a few words about it. You emphasized when I said that the United States had not paid a significant cost for all its misadventures in the unipolar moment and in recent times. And you said in response to that that the world is different now because you have two other great powers, China and Russia. And you could get away with these misbegotten policies during the unipolar moment, but we're in a different world now. I think that it really doesn't matter to most Americans because they don't believe that even with China and Russia in the system and as rival great powers, the United States is going to pay a significant price. They just don't see that. And this gets back to a point that Alexander likes to make, which I often think about. He said once on this show, and I believe he said a number of other times, that what we need, and he did not say this with any enthusiasm, but what we need is a catastrophe, some sort of giant blow up to drive home the point that we're not playing checkers here. This is a really serious business. And if you make a mistake when great powers are involved, terrible things can happen. And you have the sense as you watch the crisis in Ukraine or the war in Ukraine unfold, that the Americans continue to think that they can get away with escalation and not really pay any price. And one has the sense that this might blow up in our face at some point in a really terrible way. Nuclear weapons, for example, might be used. And I think that if that were to occur, let's just say nuclear weapons were used, the Russians felt they were boxed in and had to use a nuclear weapon. I'm not saying that's going to happen, but if something of that magnitude happened, that would focus the Americans' mind like nothing else. But until we have sort of a major catastrophe, or let me put it differently, until we have some sort of catastrophic event, that really damages the United States, that really threatens the United States, I think we're going to continue to proceed as if our policies in places like Ukraine and places like the Middle East have no serious consequences for us. No, I deserve briefly. I think that's the whole purpose of incrementalism, as John mentioned earlier, that if you do huge steps, imagine after the Russians invaded, America would begin to send weapons to strike Russian cities. That would have been nuclear war. And I think that's usually why states pursue this incrementalism as well, to slowly test out the waters. So now we're going to send the missiles, but only to strike military bases in the Karakov area. Then we're going to say, well, it can go a bit deeper, go for logistics centers. And before you know it, we're going to be greenlighting attacks on St. Petersburg or something. So I think this is what you've seen over the past two and a half years. So I agree with this incrementalism. The danger of incrementalism, obviously, is people don't notice that the frog is beginning to boil. And I think that's how whenever it blows up, it might come as a surprise. And this is also why I keep warning people not to blow off Russia that they have red lines, but they're not reacting. We can step all over them, because we said this before. But in 2014, if you read Putin's Crimea speech, you said, listen, you've been pushing us backwards now for more than 20 years. We have no other places to retreat. You step the red line, and then they go hard out on this, what we thought was a small issue. So we call it unprovoked, but this was things that built up. And then in 2022, as well, they saw eight years of the West escalating Councilor sabotaging peace agreements, slowly building up this huge military force in Ukraine. And at one point, they're saying, that's it. And then they go harder with the invasion. So that's why I'm very concerned about this incrementalism now as well, because I do think we're walking into a disaster, because this isn't just a few missiles being launched towards Russian cities. At one point, they will say, this is it. Now, here comes a response, and it won't be a minor tit for a tad, but they will go come out quite heavy than they likely did in the previous instances. So again, no one should hope for this big, horrific occurrence. But I do think we're moving very quickly towards it, though. And with the alliance system, I think, well, on the issue of what you talked about before, the idea that the United States would necessarily see a big concern from the Chinese and the Russians diversifying their economy, perhaps. But I think it's much wider to present a wider shift of the international system. If you see why countries like India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, so friends of the United States and Europe, why they're not joining in on this campaign against Russia is not because they want to join a Russian Chinese bloc against the West, because, well, they don't. But they see this as the, not not the return of a Cold War between two blocks, but the multipolar system. So if you look at the Saudis or Turks, they see this as an opportunity for smaller, medium-sized countries to play the role of an independent polar power, if they can diversify their economic connectivity sufficiently. So I think this is why when the Russians and Chinese are spearheading this break away from a unipolar international economic system, it creates an opportunity for other countries, again, not to ally against the West, but to establish themselves more independently. If you want to be independent, like the Europeans will soon start to notice, you have to diversify your economies. You can't put all your eggs in one basket. So that's what I'm thinking, that this is quite different from what we've seen in the past, given that we're now challenging some of the key centers of economic and military and political power. I agree, by the way, about the danger of incrementalism. I think incrementalism can lead to complacency as well. The fact that somebody isn't reacting, because they're showing restraint or trying to, does eventually come a breaking point. When they say enough, we can't just go on having this happen. And the difficulty is that with every escalation, there's always the pressure to go from more escalation beyond. And one sense is that the United States doesn't really believe that Russia actually does have red lines, where in fact, I'm absolutely sure they do. And I think that we've seen in the past, just as Glenn says, that eventually they do enforce their red lines. That is why we have a conflict in Ukraine now. But again, people in Washington just don't seem to, or at least too many people in Washington don't seem to understand that. And I absolutely do not want to see a catastrophe happen. But I think it's true. I think we are getting closer to that point all the time. I think just quickly on the red lines, I think that the Russians have done such a good job of negating our escalatory steps, countering our escalatory steps, that they have been willing to sort of forget about the red lines. I think if we had put some weaponry into Ukraine that had really shifted the balance against the Russians in a meaningful way, they would have considered that a red line. But I think what the ATACM is, the really interesting question, even if they start to use them for deep strikes, is whether or not the Russians can counter them. If the Russians cannot down most of those ATACM's and they don't do much damage, the Russians won't treat it as a red line, especially if they're winning on the battlefield. The Russians don't want to interfere with what's going up on the front line, going on up at the front lines, because they're doing very well up there and they just want to keep going. So I think the key issue is here. The key issue here is whether we start allowing the Ukrainians to do deep strikes, deep it to Russia with the ATACM's and assorted other missiles that Ukraine has and what the consequences are. Colonel Dane Viscan, I think he made the point, which I think is a completely valid one, that Ukraine has absorbed thousands of Russian missiles and it's still standing. Is it realistic to assume that a couple of score or 100 of ATACM's much more short-range, less powerful missiles launched at Russia is really going to change the balance on the battle fronts and provided, you know, given that the Russians are winning the war, surely in a sense, that's not something they want to rob themselves of victory by escalating to the point that they bring disaster upon themselves. And I think that is a valid point. But of course, there's also a motion. There's also anger. If missiles are launched against St Petersburg or something like that, then I didn't really see how politically the Russians can stand back from doing that. And some of the rhetoric from Ukraine makes me wonder whether that's the kind of thing that some people in Kiev would quite like to do. I think, sorry. It's very quickly. I think it's very clear that the Ukrainians would like to bring us into the war. I think the Ukrainians have a deep-seated interest in getting the Russians to react in a way that increases the likelihood that Uncle Sam will come into the war because that, they believe, will rescue the situation. Sorry, Glenn. No, no. That's what I was going to say because I think a lot of the reasons exactly whether we should hope that this weapons work or if NATO should hope it because, well, if this would really be a game-changer, I think that's when the retaliation would actually come. That's when Russia would feel it would be compelled to deter. And this is also what I hear whenever I go to Russia. If someone at a conference or a discussion would say, "Why don't we have to retaliate to restore our deterrence?" And then, they don't fear even our nuclear weapons anymore. It's time to push back. It's always the same argument coming back where they're saying, "Well, the boat is coming now into shore. We're landing this one. Why start to create waves now?" Also, if our retaliation would cause a wider war with NATO, it's better to have finished off with Ukraine first, because Ukraine has placed a role as, well, the West proxy or the Western frontline. So it's better to wait. But the question is then if our escalations would actually work and begin to severely hurt the Russians, then there's less priority on simply allowing just let it go because we're winning anyways. I think then you would see a very fierce response and very quickly we could go into into a great power war, if not even nuclear war. But it's, as you said earlier, the agency of Ukraine hasn't come in ignored because our calculations is that we have this slow incrementalism and the Russians still calculate. We can believe them a bit more, but they calculate that it's not worth retaliating because they're winning anyways. But for the Ukrainians, obviously, I think they have an objective or incentive to do something reckless with these weapons to make it impossible for Russia not to retaliate against the owners of the weapons, which will be the West, of course. I want to make a statement and get a response from you guys to see what you think. I do not believe that Ukraine, using those missiles and striking deep into Russia, can hurt Russia in any meaningful way. There's just nothing they can do militarily with those attackums. If they get tourist missiles, scallops, you name it. They just can't do much damage. You know, from looking at the strategic bombing campaigns in World War II, they had remarkably little damage in terms of getting the populations to rise up against the government and put an end to the war. The strategic bombing of Japan and Germany against cities against populations, it just didn't turn the population against the war. If anything, reinforced the population's commitment to winning the war. With regard to the military consequences, the idea that these attackums are going to affect the balance of power on the battlefield that they're going to affect the outcome of the war is, I think, not a serious argument. Do you guys agree with that? Absolutely. Can I just say, this is one of the things that makes this whole thing so absurd, and my piece of so ludicrous, because we're talking about an escalation that is going to achieve nothing. If it takes place, we're going to launch missiles at Russia, the world's biggest country, huge industrial place. Attackums have a range of 300 kilometers. The Russians are able to shoot many of them down. It's going to be a pinprick. The problem is, and this is where I think the danger comes, if Russia were a completely logical, rational player, if Putin had the kind of iron control that I think people imagine, then quite plausibly they would absorb this blow, and they would say, "Look, this isn't changing anything. Let's just keep going. Let's just go keep moving westwards." And sooner or later, we're going to win, and really all this doesn't matter. The problem is, it isn't like that. Russia has its own public opinion. It has its own hardliners. Putin has his own critics. They say, "Look, the reason you got where in this war at all is because you trusted the west as you yourself admit for too long. You are showing weakness. You are allowing our Russian cities to be attacked, whereas you present yourself as big someone who protects Russians and Russian places." If Putin really wants to be tough, I think he can face that kind of pressure down, but it becomes more difficult. And as I said, there is a Russian public opinion. Every Russian leader needs to take that into account. So I think it would be risky to put it no further than that, to simply assume that however ineffective these weapons are, you can still launch them at Russian targets inside Russia with, as Putin himself says, assistance from Western technicians, and assume that nothing will happen. That's my answer. Well, I think that that depends on the targets, because when the Ukrainians use, for example, American cluster weapons against civilian populations in Belgrade, this, as John would say, just strengthens the determination of the population. The more people volunteer at these recruitment stations, the more committed to the idea that this war is just and effectively all the accusations, which have been tossed against the West over the years, will seem to be legitimized or proven. But I think if there will be a strike against a nuclear power plant or a big city like Moscow or St. Petersburg, I think also the political pressure can increase dramatically. I remember I wrote an article back in, I think it was 2015 or 16th, from an Australian think tank. The title was why Putin is the last pro-Western alternative or something along those lines. But anyways, the whole point was exactly where the opposition is coming from, because back then as well you heard more louder voices from the military saying that, listen, your decision to try to make peace with NATO is just emboldening them. They're starting now to build up more and more military force. They're getting more engaged in Ukraine. What are we doing? We should do the opposite. We should clean up now and get us over with. Otherwise, we're going to have big problems in the future. There's obviously a lot of people who will blame Putin for weakness. I know in the West this seems absurd, because we think he's, of course, the reincarnation of Hitler and he's the worst one. There is, but I think people forget that this is a man who since he took power really tried to find a new platform for pursuing a, after the Yeltsin's platform of joining Europe collapsed, he was really looking for a new way of creating this greater Europe. I would define him as being pro-Western to this extent, trying to find a way to work in with Europe. Again, this policy went down for so long. This idea that he's really the anti-Western alternative in Russia, I think it's a huge miscalculation. If we continue to, we'll try to humiliate him or strike a Russian city, it's the main opposition who will come from someone who is fiercely more anti-Western than circling than Putin is, which is often criticized in Russia or exactly not being too hawkish, but for it to be pro-Western, too lenient, too predictable and not hard enough. I think we should be careful what political forces were driving forward in Russia with this kind of provocations. I have a question for you, too. We agree that these missile strikes, even if we increase the scope of them, will have hardly any military consequences, and we agree that the Russians are the dominant force on the battlefield, and they're like a steamroller moving forward, and we agree that there is some reasonable chance that the Ukrainian military will shatter at some point in the not too distant future. We're not saying that will happen, but we think that's a real possibility. My question to you, too, is what does the West do then? What happens when Ukrainians begin to fall apart? What are we going to do? My own view is that they will huddle even closer around the United States. What else can they do? I mean, that is what they will do. They will call and beg and plead for the United States to send more troops, more supplies, more weapons to become even more deeply involved in European affairs than it already is. There was an article a couple of about a week ago in the Financial Times by Eldridge Colby, but you made him, but anyway, he's apparently fairly well-important, well-connected person in the United States. He said in the Financial Times that the United States has to reduce its commitments to Europe, because it's got this major challenge in Asia, in China, it can't continue to be committing to the same extent in Europe because resources are finite, perfectly sensible thing, and that the Europeans need to look after their own defence. It was actually very, very interesting to see the response on the thread from various Europeans to this. They were in absolute panic. The idea that the Americans might leave had them all in, you know, that they were almost beside themselves with worry that that might actually happen. So I think that is what they will do. There will be all sorts of hurried conferences that will be brave to talk about increasing production of weapons in Europe. They'll be talking about reintroducing conscription, which has been proposed in Germany and then has been dropped in Germany. They'll be talking along the same lines in Britain, which nobody takes seriously, but ultimately the only thing they can do is ask the United States to come and become even more deeply involved in Europe than it already is. And if that doesn't happen, they will keep their ficus crossed and hope that the Russians don't come after them. And the one thing that they're not able to do at the moment is to do the one thing that they ought to do, and which an earlier generation of European leaders, De Gaulle and France and Schmidt and others once did, which is to establish a dialogue with the Russians. I think we are decades away from that point. But what do you think, Alexander, we will do? We mean in the West, in Ukraine. I think you're, I hadn't thought of the line of argument, you just laid out, which I think is very insightful. But the question is, what do we do in Ukraine? Well, I mean, there's a lot of talk about supporting an insurgency against the Russians there. It's a disastrous idea. I think it will very quickly be revealed as being a disastrous idea as well. I doubt that that is what in the end we are going to do. I think very grudgingly and very unwillingly we're going to have to accept that. Yeah, I agree with that. I think the narratives and the fake narratives we have created will come to an end as well, that eventually reality will catch up. And if we've done everything to escalate, nothing works. And in the process, we drained our weapon storages. I think there's not much we can do except sending our own troops, but we don't have that many, that big armies or we just accept defeat. And usually at the end of a defeat, we did the same with the end of the Iraq war, sorry, the Afghani is done more. You know, it's a horrific how we'll ever recover, but then we always have this one great solution. We just stopped talking about it and to find something new. And sadly, another day will come and this is the process we're going to go. But overall, I very much agree with what was said though. I think that this shock, which will come to Europe when we're discovering that we're not that interesting anymore, that the world is not Eurocentric anymore. The Americans will set their eyes on Asia. There's a great interesting picture of a rule of shots down at the United Nations, essentially speaking to an empty room. And it kind of shows, for me, it's a good symbol of what Europe will become. I think it will lose its significance dramatically. I think the Americans will be fine. They have their continent, they have their resources, they have their population, they have their own technological sovereignty. The Americans will be fine, I think. But I think for the Europeans, our market value will drop significantly or influence. This is what I always been very concerned about, again, for at least 20 years of warning, that redividing the European continent, remilitarizing it. Perhaps this is going to end in horror for us. We're going to become a chessboard, but I was told this is a pro-Russian argument, which should be dismissed. So I'm quite pessimistic about our future, unfortunately. So am I, I'm afraid. I'm talking about Europe again. I also believe that the United States will come through. It always does. It has this capacity to do that, and it's secure behind the oceans. I think it will come through. But Europe is going into a decline, that it's going to be very, very difficult to reverse, and which would require great statesmanship to reverse, and would require a degree of humility in order to reverse. We simply isn't there. We become very accustomed in Europe to being for 500 years at the centre of humanity, believing that everything revolves around us, and it's going to be a profound shock to Europeans to understand that this isn't the case anymore, and that we are just one part of a much wider world, and not the most interesting or dynamic part, either. And the final words, John, before we wrap this up, I think we went a bit over time today, so we'll give you the final word. No, I don't have anything further to say. It was a thoroughly depressing conversation. Nothing is new there, and I would imagine when we talk in a month or so that the conversation will be just as depressing. It's really quite remarkable how much trouble we're in. I often reflect on what the world looked like in the early 1990s, when so many people believed it was the end of history, and the United States was in the driver's seat, and the Europeans really were feeling good about themselves. If you just sort of contrast that world with the world today, and what the world is likely to look like in the future, it's really depressing. Yeah, probably it's come with me for the fall. So, anyways, thank you very much, John and Alexander, and yes, I take you up on that offer, and we'll do this again in a month. It's time. Absolutely. Thank you very much, John. My pleasure. I look forward to it. [Music]