Coffee House Shots
Has Nato been a success for Starmer?
Get three months of the spectator for just three pounds. Go to spectator.co.uk/trial. Hello and welcome to Coffee House shots, the spectators daily politics podcast. I'm Oscar Edmondson and I'm joined today by James Hill and Sophia Gaston, who is the head of foreign policy at politics change. So it's been a pretty good 48 hours for the new prime minister, not only a fantastic result in the football, but he's also had some wins at the NATO summit. In particular, NATO members have pledged their support for an irreversible path to future membership for Ukraine, which is something that he called for as leader of the opposition. And he's also had some positive first opportunities with President Biden. Sophia, is it fair to say that this has been a pretty successful NATO summit for the new PM? It has. And I think this is partly why the decision to hold the election at the time that it was was so perplexing for us in the foreign policy community, because of course, if the polls were right and they were and Labour was on course for victory, it meant that, you know, in week one, stammer goes to Washington and then you've also got the European political community summit coming up a week later. So two kind of moments to show yourself as a statesman right off the bat. And, you know, also dealing with our most important relationships there in the US and Europe, the kind of key ones that stammering his team have put at the heart of their agenda. So I think that's always been a strange aspect of this election timing. And I think some has really made the most of it. It is true, though, that there is a big question about defence spending, which is also hanging over this summit. And while, of course, for him, these bilaterals with Biden and with some other world leaders that he's having later today are really, really important. I think there's also been a broader British agenda, which was not just to try and kind of secure long term support for Ukraine, but also to really drive up that defence spending commitment across the continent. And if you talk to people in Washington, that is something they really want to see out of our bilateral relationship is Britain leading on those conversations. So I think it's certainly something that feels that maybe it's been pushed a little bit less down the order than perhaps it would have been otherwise. And I think they're sort of trying to downplay that aspect of a little bit in part because at the moment, the Stomas government doesn't actually have that clear coherent plan towards 2.5% because they've said they want to do a defence review first. So I think they've tried to sort of quieten the horses on that. But the cost is that they're not leaning into that defence spending leadership role. I mean, we were all guessing before the Labour government came in. They didn't give away too much when they were in the campaign. But are we seeing a sort of key a star, a foreign policy emerge? I think it's absolutely clear that the Euro Atlantic is being reaffirmed as our home region. And that was a shift that took place actually really in the integrated review refresh and that was kind of unlocked under the previous government through the Windsor framework. They're trying to sort of build on that and accelerate. And the part of that that is really their priority focus is on restoring relationships with Europe. It's interesting actually in the election campaign and the manifestos, both parties actually were putting forward that they would pursue new defence agreements with Germany, which has of course been through this big ziten vendor defence sort of security moment since the last British election. But I think we're sort of seeing that plus a whole host of other initiatives and relationships under Labour. And we've also seen those sort of early conversations and starting to sketch out what that question of a wider EU pact would look like. So I think that's really clear. There are other parts of the foreign policy agenda that are still quite ambiguous. I mean, we've only just had some of the appointments of the junior ministers. And actually that process has been quite interesting because, for example, Catherine West, who had been shadowing Anne-Marie Truvellian, who's the minister for the Indo-Pacific, she's actually been given a parliamentary under secretary role. So it's sort of a re-downgrading of that role from the heart of the foreign portfolio, how they end up kind of carving everything up is still to be decided. But I think there's certainly a few kind of allies in the Indo-Pacific region that are wondering whether that's a sign of things to come. James, how has all this gone down in Westminster? Well, look, I mean, Kia Stama has had a good start from the kind of PR optics of it all. You've got the Prime Minister sitting there in the White House Oval Office within his first week of being elected, the kind of thing that we all dream about, almost love actually, where the president of the United States is suggesting that it's because of Kia Stama's election, the Englander and the European Championships final. It doesn't get any better than that, does it? The stars align and Kia Stama's genie is worth over time. And he's a union rep, probably. Look, I think it's been good from that point of view, but I do think there is some criticism here. I think that Rishi Sunak's government didn't have too many achievements, but I think foreign policy was a contender for the most of it. I think when he looks back on his time as Prime Minister in the past 24 months, the Windsor framework will be the first of his achievements, not a particularly long list, I might say. But foreign policy was something where the Sunak government did some good stuff, the Tokyo Accords, obviously rebuilding some of the relations with the EU after the Johnson Trust era. And I think, conversely, Labour on foreign policy is one of its more underexplored areas. For instance, they've had much of the talks about the economy and what Rishi Ries will do there. By contrast, there's lots of big questions being asked, not only because of the first thing that they did in government was to change the Europe brief from the foreign office to the Cabinet office, which is now Nick Lutman Simmons' brief. So I think there's an interesting question there of white orthodoxy and white hole jungle about who really is. And Kissinger says about who do I speak to the phone and speak to Europe. The same thing is who do Europe speak to in this government? Does it Nick Thomas Simmons or David Lamy representing the government best on this? I think that's an interesting tension and wanted to keep an eye on. I think also that the jarring thing as sort of sphere says there is that they've just been elected on a pledge which didn't commit to the UK increasing defence spending by 2030. And yet they've just got to go to a conference where they're telling everyone else to increase defence spending quicker. So I think that's a kind of slightly jarring thing to have to kind of message across. And, you know, look, I was very critical to the Conservatives' pledge on this because I don't think it would probably cost it. They said they were going to slash 70,000 civil servants in order to increase defence spending to 2.5% or 2030. But equally, you know, I think it's a difficult thing. And I think that's going to be the interesting tension to work out. Traditionally, the most fraught institutional relationship in white hole is between the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury. I think that's only going to continue particularly because I think that there is a stronger impulse from the Labour Party to spend money on health and education and those public services, rather than defence. I think that's one to watch out given the kind of UK elsewhere is telling everyone else to spend more money. I think that's going to be something that comes home. And then finally, I think it's interesting that Stama took such a big delegation with him to Washington. He took his defence secretary, John Healy. He took the Foreign Secretary, David Lamme. He took Thomas Simmons with him. And I think that's interesting because next week, of course, we're at the European political community in Berlin and Paris. Now, that's the leader only level. So I think having such a big delegation, perhaps, was a kind of interesting given we're going to be telling you in our asset next week to shrink down your teams when you come to Ben and Paris. So I think that that's going to be an interesting one from the kind of Manucia at a tool and a lot still to work out. So I think that, yes, they've had a good start in the PR stuff, but I would question what comes next. Not least, of course, as we're going to come on to. There's some big appointments to fill. And this is going to be John Bue's, I think, last big summit. He was the kind of Tory guru for many, for three successive prime ministers and foreign policy. And Labour needs to find its John Bue and sharpish. Well, who do you think those people could be severe? Well, it's hard because it's hard to think of anyone who would be better suited to be Labour's John Bue than John Bue himself, especially given he had obviously, famously wrote on that wonderful biography badly. You know, I think it's obviously going to be the case that a new prime minister wants a new feel and sort of reset for government. And that's going to sort of mean a bit of clearing out of the sort of infrastructure, the intellectual infrastructure of the previous administration. But I think one thing that's interesting about this is, you know, they're actually-- it's hard to think of another time in modern history where you're coming into a more challenging geopolitical intray. And so, in that respect to actually, there is a need for a lot of continuity. Something I'm really interested to see is whether the government can sort of kind of reaffirm the structural foundations of the analysis that's been done over the last few years, particularly this kind of integrated review process. Because I think that there is a tendency in some parts of the Labour machine to look at that and sort of think that, well, this was all a post-Brexit project and therefore kind of the foundations of all of that were corrupt. And I think that certainly speaks to some of the things like the Indo-Pacific tilt now, the Indo-Pacific posture. But my feeling, and a lot of the other people who were sort of involved in that process feel, is that Britain would have had to reach that analysis regardless. I mean, look at what the conversation is at the NATO summit. The story today is really about this decision to very explicitly call out China's role in supporting Russia here. And that they are supporting Russia in material terms across so many different domains, and of course, around North Korea and so on. But that cooperation between the adversaries in these two security theatres mean that you can't just prioritise wrong region. You have to kind of think more systematically about these sorts of things. And it also, to go back to James' point-of-part machinery of government and to humans as one that speak, I think that in part the decision to kind of repatriate some of the kind of thornier aspects of the EU relationship to the government office does reflect the fact that this is just going to be so key to unlocking so many aspects of some of the agenda. But it also reflects that foreign policy is sort of done in a very different way these days. And one of the biggest trends has been this coming together of economic and national security objectives. So in many ways, the China relationship, for example, is also best served and kind of practically administered through the Cabinet Office as well. And that's why things like the National Security Investment Act, that actually moved from being owned by the Department of Business and traded into the Cabinet Office just because of that intersection. The China relationship is the most obvious of those, but in many ways the future EU relationship, but that this government is seeking, will also kind of fall into those domains. So I think foreign policy is a very different beast now. And actually in many ways it does raise questions about these appointments because what you end up with a lot of cooks in the kitchen. And the question about the specific role that the Foreign Office should play vis-a-vis the Cabinet Office and this kind of Sven Garley figure in number 10 is really, really interesting. So one thing I'll be sort of watching very closely is how everyone gets along and carves up their different portfolios, because they're all going to have to be able to work together really effectively. And James, what about David Lamy? I mean, were you surprised to see him carry over his brief? Because there were a lot of rumours before the Cabinet was announced that he might not get the chance to do that. I mean, I always thought he would, for a couple of reasons, I think one of which is, you know, Stalin's whole thing is stability and so therefore changing your foreign affairs spokesman. Arguably your third, fourth biggest job in government at the last minute seemed a bit out there. I know, of course, in '97, you know, George Robertson suddenly got given the defence brief after they won in '97 rather than the Scotland office. So these changes have happened but not at that level. I also thought the political sensitivity of removing David Lamy and giving him a more minor post might be such. I mean, I was also kind of wary about the people who were some of the sources, perhaps, who were putting this around. Maybe I've had a vested interest in who would have replaced David Lamy. So the kind of thing where sometimes with these things are Westminster people brief out their own, talk about their own chances, hence lots of reports about Norbandle some potentially. And one of these jobs for, say, DC as a potential ambassador, etc. One one wonders where those are coming from. But I think that I would probably, I think we would become foreign secretary. I'm not sure if we'll still be at the end of the next five years. At least because you've got ambitious types on the green benches, including, of course, Douglas Alexander come back into government straightaway. One of the 13 retreads former MPs just got elected. And I think that's an interesting sign. And Stama clearly is going to have to take a real view on what parliamentary management is like given in some ways with a super majority of kind of how you best manage that and those egos. But I was interested to decide to bring people straight into government, including Esther Kern, who is the former military veteran who's been straight into the Ministry of Defence and Georgia Gold as well. You know, Philip Gold's daughter and former Leader of the County Council. Some interesting appointments. But I think David Lamy, I am sure, is going to be one worth watching. Although one wonders what, of course, it means the institutional status of the foreign office. If the cabinet office is, as Saphir says, they're just being taken so into the heart of government. And how severe do you think my A, just finally, how do you think a Donald Trump presidency might compromise that? Because, I mean, David Lamy, not Trump's biggest fan. Previous comments might make it difficult for him to keep that role as foreign sector. Well, Lamy's team have been doing an extraordinary job over the last sort of four or five months to build strong relationships with a lot of the kind of Outriders in the Trump ecosystem. I think it's interesting because there are some ways in which the intellectual ecosystem will be really important in influencing Trump. But ultimately, as we all know, Donald Trump makes his own decisions. And sometimes you just, actually, it's the personal relationship with him or being able to get through to him on a particular issue that really, really matters. And we actually saw that with David Cameron with that Ukraine aid package, where he was able to do that, even though a bunch of Trump Outriders are actually quite against the U.S. continuing to give aid in that way. The Trump ecosystem is way more intellectually diverse and dispersed as well than a kind of traditional political ecosystem. So you have to really work in a quite unusual way and a much harder way, I think, to build those inroads and try and work out who is actually going to have the power and influence here and who is just being sort of the loudest voice. But I think David Lamy's shown a huge degree of pragmatism. And we've seen him kind of develop a narrative structure that will make it feasible for him to continue to work in that role in that way. And, of course, it really would be stammer in many ways, dealing directly with Donald Trump. So in many ways, that's sort of really the most pertinent question. But I think, look, that everyone in this government has shown that they can be absolutely ruthless and absolutely pragmatic to get into power. And I think they will understand and recognize their ongoing importance of that relationship and just make it work. Will it have that same kind of camaraderie and companionship feel that you would, with the central F government, absolutely not? But I'm not really sort of terrified about what happens only because I think that the institutional relationship will do its absolutely best to hold up regardless of the circumstances. I'm just reminded of the words of one diplomat I spoke to in London who said that the difference between Trump White House, previous White House, is normally in Washington, you have not much access, but a lot of influence. So access is very tightly controlled, and if people get through, Trump's White House access wasn't controlled. Eddie will get through. But that meant it very difficult to influence because there were so many kind of different unorthodox voices, different camps. The sphere says they're sort of swirling around in Trump's head and he could do unpredictable things. So I think that would be an interesting thing to watch. And I expect Lamy in the front office will be just one group of British experts, not least perhaps because Nigel Farage is very keen to talk up his own hotline to the president and we wait to see how that unfolds with interest. Yeah. Yeah, with interest. Thank you very much, Sophia. Thank you, James. And thank you very much for listening. [MUSIC] [MUSIC]